Our minzu studies should not delegate the minzu people in question to decide whether a minzu should be recognized as minority minzu, a separate minzu. Ethonyms cannot be imposed from or altered by others. Our work is to study the formation of communities with facts and analysis, so as to help those who already proposed for an ethnonym to consider through consultation whether they should be part of a minority minzu or a separate minzu. These questions should be answered by the people themselves. It is their right.” (Fei and Lin 2009[1957]: 157)

The two predecessors clearly placed the study of minzu recognition on a subordinating role to the policy of ethnic recognition. They argued that the ethnonym should be decided by the people themselves, and is regarded as “ethnonym by owner” (名从主人). However, the way to realize “ethnonym by owner” seems unknown. This is a question worthy of pursuit if we look further at what Lin Yaohua (1984: 1) put in a quarter century later:

In 1954, there were more than 260 minzu groups reporting their ethnonyms. Our preliminary survey found these ethnonyms to be very confusing. Some groups proposed self-appellation [as ethnonyms], some proposed appellation-by-others, and some proposed subgroup names. Surprisingly, some proposed their place of origin as ethnonyms, and some even proposed certain special occupational titles. Many local communities still had a strong common psychological feelings, though they spoke Chinese and underwent a long process of sinicization.”

Now that the proposed ethnonyms were so diverse, why has the 260 proposed ethnonyms in Yunnan been reduced to 26 (including the Han)? What is the role played by the principle of “ethnonym by owner”? Who is the so-called “owner”? How did the owner “consider through consultation” in order to decide its ethnonym? Why were other ethnonyms abandoned?, and what were the implications? I believe a social historical study of ethnonym-making, helps us to better understand the current focus on the construction of minzu, and it deepens our understanding on how this process ends up with our present knowledge on minzu and nationalism.

This paper examines the negotiation process of “Bai” as an ethnonym by analyzing an “ethnic symposium”

**Research Article**

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**Creating a Common Fate: The Negotiation Meeting of the Bai’s Ethnonym**

**Abstract:** Based on archival studies, this paper analyses an “ethnic symposium” organized by the party committee of the Dali Prefecture in 1956. The author argues that determining the Bai as the ethnonym is a process of “name standardization”. It was neither the decision of the state power, nor was it led by the scholar’s opinion, but by the local elites’ deliberate complicity with the state project. It could be thus called a process of “creating a common fate” under the combined principles of the discourse of “liberation-cum-backwardness”, historical evidence, anti-discrimination, legibility to the ordinary member, conformity to the communist value, etc. It defamiliarizes the everyday knowledge of the people and creates a liminal stage in which a shared fate could be felt. Therefore, this paper is not intended to deconstruct the ethnic identity, but attempts to provide the empirical analysis on a sociological issue of knowledge through contextualizing the usage and implication of the word “minzu” (ethnicity, nation).

**Keywords:** ethnonym, ethnic classification (minzu recognition), local elites, common fate

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**1 Introduction**

In “The Several Tasks of Ethnology for the Current National Work”, the forefathers of Chinese anthropology, Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yaohua argued about the ethnic classification (民族识别, literally “minzu recognition”) during the 1950s. They stated that academic study on the minzu recognition only plays a supporting role in the political decision of ethnic classification:
organized by the party committee of the Dali Prefecture in 1956. The author argues that determining the Bai as the ethnonym is a process of “name standardization”. It was neither the decision of the state power, nor was it led by the scholar’s opinion, but by the local elites’ deliberate complicity with the state project. It could be called a process of “creating a common fate” under the combined principles of the discourse of “liberation-cum-backwardness”, historical evidence, anti-discrimination, legibility to the ordinary member, consistency with the communist value, etc. It defamiliarizes the everyday knowledge of the people and creates a “liminal” stage by which a shared fate could be felt. The study was based on the released archives kept in the Archive Bureau of the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture. The fieldwork was conducted in September 2010.

2 Ethnonym and “Seeing like a State”

As far as “name standardization” is concerned, James Scott puts forward a classic view of “seeing like a state”. Basically, the state transformed the local worlds into a legible structure by naming, through which the central government can administrate the local community. However, it usually leads to a loss of local knowledge (what Scott called “métis”), and results in the failure of the entire program. For example, in Tuscany and England, the use of surnames was not a common phenomenon in the 15th century, and the state forced people to simplify their long and complicated names into combinations of given name and surname. This was done in order to have a proper and clear record of people’s personal property and their tax situation. As a result, those new names lost its local information, which deprived individuals of their crucial connections with their family genealogies. Finally, it generated social unrest, such as Watts Taylor uprising which was caused by an unprecedented registration and tax assessments. Thus, there was a great tension between the state and local community in the process of “name standardization”. Therefore, this was because “for English as well as for Tuscan peasants, a census of all adult males could not but appear ominous, if not ruinous” (Scott 1998: 68).

Scott’s view was provocative to our study, but it also has limitations. Of course, ethnic classification was conducted by the state, with the purpose of making local communities legible to the state. There was indeed a loss of local knowledge, as 260 ethnonyms dropped to 26. However, name standardization does not only serve the purpose of state ruling or levying tax, as Scott suggests. The purpose of the name standardization project in China during 1950s was to establish the unprecedented political status for the minorities. As Nicholas Tapp (2002: 68) argues about the ethnic classification, “its avowed aim was the liberation of ‘nationalities’, however, these should be located, from feudal and semi-colonial forms of oppression.”

Many who participated in the ethnic classification project tend to support the standpoint of “liberation” based on a narrative of “science”. Lin Yaohua (1984) and Du Yuting (1997) held the view that ethnic classification marks the new development of Marxist ethnology. Li Shaoming (1998) suggests that a new development of ethnic classification has to depend on more in-depth ethnological fieldwork and the role of scholars. Among English-speaking world, the general view tends to question the “scientific” and “liberate” stance, highlight the internal discontinuity within the officially classified ethnic groups, and support the validity of unofficial ethnonyms (Brown, 2001; Gladney, 1991; Gros, 2004; Litzinger, 2000; Kaup, 2000). For instance, Louisa Schein (2000) argues that “minzu” is a creation without authenticity, and it creates the subject of the state. However, Pan Jiao (2010) pointed out that the nature of such comments was re-orientalising rather than de-orientalising. In addition, there seems to be a dichotomy between China and the West, which confuses indigenous peoples with migrant groups. The logical consequence is to reify an authoritarian China. Pan did not only rightly points out the prevalent tendency of blindfold deconstruction, but he also has no intention to save the scientism of the older Chinese scholars. In this light, I suggest that we revisit the specific context in which ethnonyms were generated, instead of abandoning classified ethnonyms for the sake of diversity on one hand, or giving up reflections in the name of science on the other.

Based on massive archival studies, Thomas Mullaney did revisit the context of ethnic classification in Yunnan. He argued for the pivotal role of the scholars, who carried on the ethnonyms that had been around in the Republican era. In particular, it was Yun-nan: the Link Between India and the Yangtze by Captain Davis(1909), which was

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1 However, there is one notable exception: Nicholas Tapp argues for the necessity of ethnic classification, and suggests that ethnic classification cannot be simply reduced into colonization of the state, labeled as “Orientalism”. Compared with other projects in the world then, China’s ethnic classification was not more essentializing, and it effectively prevented the chronic tendency of assimilation (Tapp, 2002).
“championed and only partly modified by Republican era Chinese social scientists, that became the foundation of Chinese ethno- logical studies of the southwest, the 1954 Ethnic Classification Project and, indeed, the present-day classification of ethnic groups in Yunnan” (Mullaney, 2011: 45). Mullaney neglected the role of local elites and gave too much agency to the British Captain. The ethnic classification was not likely to be made by Captain Davis himself, who must have had no choice but relied on the local elites with such a classificatory knowledge. As some researchers argued that local elite plays an important role in ethnic classification, Harrell (2001: 42) put forward that “the project [of ethnic classification] is not a one-way thing, imposed top-down on passive local peoples. From the beginning, consultation with local leaders was an important part of the process, and from the beginning also, many if not most of the agents of the state who implemented ethnic identification and other aspects of the literizing project were themselves members of the minority communities. In other words, the language of ethnic identification is the one that can be spoken by people of all ethnic identities and claimed identities”. Tapp (2002: 70) also rightly points out that during the ethnic classification, “it must, in most cases, have been the members of local elites who were questioned and listened to by the linguists, anthropologists and sociologists who carried out the project”. Due to the ethnic classification in Yunnan region, Yang Bin also suggests that we should study case by case. Some group cannot become a separated ethnic group because it does not have powerful elites. Elite becomes an important factor in determining classification. As a result, the outcome of classification almost replicates the imperial knowledge of borderland governance (Yang, 2009).

As Fei Xiaotong and Lin Yaohua mentioned, the study of ethnic classification is subordinate to the political recognition of a minzu. The agent of such a political recognition is the minzu members themselves. In a review paper on ethnic classification, Fei Xiaotong also argued that “according to the equality policy of minzu, the decision on classification issues finally depends on the wishes of the minzu people. It cannot be arranged by a proxy, not to mention any form of external force or imposition” (Fei Xiaotong, 1980: 161). Lin Yaohua who directly supervised the study of ethnic classification in Yunnan, further stated the importance of “ethnonym by owner”. Therefore, “ethnonym cannot be imposed on its people or changed by others. Researchers’ duty is to offer scientific evidence for ethnic classification, seek for advice from ethnic people and patriotic personages, and help ethnic group to confirm its ethnonym by negotiation. ‘Ethnonym by owner’ means that an ethnonym should be decided by its own people, as it is their right” (Lin Yaohua, 1984: 3). Accordingly, we can assume that, as the local elites of one of the largest ethnic minority groups in Yunnan, the Bai elites are likely to play a key role in determining their ethnonym. Combined with Scott’s view on name standardization, this paper will focus on analyzing how local elites negotiates along the crack between “seeing-like-a-state” and local knowledge, what strategies and principles they adopted, and how these principles were relevant.

3 The Background of the Negotiation Meeting and the Selection of the Participants

In the official documents before 1956, Bai Zu (白族) used to be called Minjia (民家) or Minjia Zu (民家族). However, Minjia was mainly used in the Dali basin. Many remote Bai-speaking people had many other ethnonyms, recorded as Baimin, A Bai, Bai Erzi, Minjia Zi, Nama, Lemo, Lebi, Baizi, and Bairen. Some of these ethnonyms were also self-appellations, which also included Baini, Baihuo, Baizi Bainü. Fang Guoyu argued that Minjia was the product of the household registration system in the Ming Dynasty. At that time, the people under the jurisdiction of Tusi (imperial recognised local chieftains) were Tuhu (local household) and were called Tujia (local family). The immigrants managed by the Dali Wei (Dali Army Garrison) were Junhu (army household) called Junjia (army family). The civilian households administered by the Dali Fu (Dali prefectural government) who had originally lived in the locality pertained to Minhu (civilian household), were called Minjia (civilian family). In 1656, the army household decided to withdraw, and Minjia gradually lost its connotation of the “descendant(s) of the barbarians”. Fang Guoyu (1957: 14) further maintains that “linguistically speaking, expressions such as Nijia (you) and Tajia (he) were used to denote mutual courtesy and respect. That was probably the origin of Junjia and Minjia. Therefore, Minjia was a form of address used by the Han, but without malicious intent” Similarly, Australian scholar Fitzgerald (1941: 13-14) who lived in Dali for years also thought that Minjia was a neutral appellation.

At the very beginning of the People’s Republic, the Chinese Communist Party promised a constitutional ground of “a unified multi-ethnic state” through The Common Program. The minzu recognition project which started from 1953 aimed not just to deliver the promise,
but also to determine the representative quota for the coming first National People’s Congress. At that time, Bai Zu (the Bai minzu) was used as an unofficial ethnonym, and so was Minjia. The government took no action to simplify other similar ethnonyms. However, there were already 27 ethnic autonomous governments or ethnic united governments and 784 ethnic village authorities established in the Dali Prefecture (大理地区). From the perspective of the state, name standardization had to be done to administer these governments. With the gradual implementation of the policy of Ethnic Regional Autonomy, the issue of establishing an ethnic autonomous prefecture (自治州) in Dali was eventually placed on the agenda by the end of 1954. General Zhou Baozhong (1902–1964), former Vice Governor of Yunnan Province now working in the State Commission on Ethnic Affairs, highlighted several points on this issue, in his Suggestions on the Establishment of a Bai (Minjia) Autonomous Prefecture of Dali (Bianxiezu, 1986: 64). As a local Minjia himself, Zhou Baozhong grew up in the agricultural areas in northern Dali basin. His wording of “Bai (Minjia)” demonstrated his own precaution. At this critical moment, as a local elite and senior party member, his suggestion illustrated the importance of ethnic elites in the process of establishing the political status of minorities.

The central and the provincial Party authorities also showed precautions. According to a document, with the establishment of the “Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture”, these authorities clearly instructed that “there were different views on which [Chinese] character for Bai should be used as the ethnonym. It could be decided after the creation of the Preparatory Committee [for the establishment of the autonomous prefecture]” (the United Front Work Department of Dali Party Committee, 1956). Exactly, Minjia Zu was inclined to be excluded and the bone of contention was to choose between Bai (白) and Bai (僰, pronounced as Bo in present Mandarin). As a matter of fact, both the central and provincial party authorities held their view that it was necessary “to unify the understanding”, or to formulate a unified interpretation. This is because there were different views on whether it was necessary to retain the identity of the Bai ethnic minority or create an autonomous prefecture. According to Yang Yongxin (1986), the first deputy governor of Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture, many regarded the Bai as a branch of the Han, and there was no need for the Bai to become a separate minzu. Baizu Jianshi Jianzhi Hebian (The Combined Edition of a Brief Histories and Ethnography of the Bai) published in 1963 recorded some of such concerns: “the Bai and the Han are almost the same, and the implementation of regional autonomy is just an option”; “under the situation of the regional autonomy of Bai, can the rights of other ethnic groups be fully guaranteed?” (The Investigation Team, 1963: 247).

The United Front Work Department of Dali Party Committee decided to hold an ethnic symposium before the establishment of prefectural Preparatory Committee. However, they put forward specific guidelines for the qualification of the representative. According to these guidelines (the United Front Work Department of Dali Party Committee, 1956), the representatives “would be chosen by the prefectoral Party committee of Dali after the submission of the name list of proposed representatives and their biographical notes by the county’s (city) Party committees.” In other words, the representatives were chosen by the prefectoral Party Committee. The principles for choosing representatives prioritized the representativeness, namely, “the representatives should be selected in line with the distribution and the proportion of the ethnic population. While preference is given to the “ethnic upper strata” (民族上层) of all minzus, the Bai should constitute the major pool. Majority minzus should let the minority minzus enjoy more preference, and [representative quota] should be allocated to the minzu branches too. Any minzu in the prefecture should have at least one representative.” The use of “branch” (支系) here indicated not just the existence of different ethnonyms, but also a conviction that these ethnonyms can be simplified by one. In fact, “Bai Zu” was commonly used in this and in other previous documents. Compared to Zhou Baozhong’s cautious use of “Bai Zu (Minjia Zu)”, it shows clearer official proneness.

The seats were capped at 78, among which the prefectoral Party Committee decided it to be 45. “Sixteen Bai people (out of 25 nominations), occupying 35.6%”, were selected according to the quota, which was likely to be based on the Census data in 1954. It is worth noting that the counties of Heqing, Jianchuan, and Lamping which were Bai settlements, but had been under the jurisdiction of Lijiang Prefecture for centuries, were recently decided by the higher authority to be allocated to the new Bai prefecture. Therefore, the Dali authority had to delegate the Party Committee of Lijiang Prefecture to select six representatives on its behalf. In other words, the determination of the seats was quite complex, even to the point of overcoming the administrative barriers. Therefore, it happened to be closer to one of the Stalin’s four criteria on ethnicity – a common area.

Representativeness should be in line with the revolutionary idea at that time, apart from other principles of “the ethnic distribution”, “the proportion of the population”, and “the ethnic upper strata”. The
seats determined on the principles of ethnic distribution should be “politically and historically clear, about those who are activists, role models in the socialist revolution, and prominent representatives of their ethnic groups”. This is to say, that the representatives is highly involved in revolution. The representatives from the “ethnic upper strata” should be those “who support or least do not oppose the socialist revolution; and are closely related to people of the minzu in question, and act as great representative figures in their groups.” Compared to the former, the latter is not measured so much by their being revolutionary, however “they should be very representing”.

Accordingly, the ethnic symposium that aimed at determining the ethnonym was called upon under the instruction of higher authorities (central and Yunnan provincial party Committees). Before the meeting, “Bai” was already preferred, and its “branches” were also beyond questioning. The administrative arrangement of the new ethnic autonomous prefecture about to be created followed this preferred ethnic identity. However, the seats still should be carefully nominated and examined in light of the ethnic distribution, population proportion, the ethnic upper strata, and political qualification in order to maximize their representativeness. Why then, were there still tremendous efforts to call upon a symposium intended to deliberate over an ethnonym that had largely been determined with a political consequence? In my opinion, the purpose of this meeting was not to find an answer to an unknown question, but to attain a shared understanding over a relatively clear answer. Hence, this understanding is an understanding about a common fate.

4 From Controversy to Compromise: The Process of the Meeting

After preparation, the ethnic symposium was held on the 25th and 26th of April 1956, in the Dali. Attendants reduced from the planned 78 to 28, by which there were “18 Bai, 5 Han and 5 from the Dali prefectural authority. From a perspective of ethnic distribution, the attendants were in accordance with the principle of representativeness. In addition, a number of representatives had collected opinions in their local ethnic symposiums, while some sent their opinions in writing. The symposium were recorded in a document (1956) of Dali commissioner’s office in details.

The representatives consciously regarded 1949 as a watershed and emphasized that ethnic policy aimed to make the unacknowledged ethnic group, Minjia Zu, became an equal minority. Commissioner Y who presided the meeting, stated that “in the old society, the reactionary ruling class carried out the policy of ethnic oppression in order to maintain its dominance, making Minjia Zu afraid to admit its identity as a separated minority.” Representative M from Eryuan County held the view that: “During the early period, under the oppression of the landlord class, we claimed ourselves as Han, having no courage to claim our Minjia Zu identity. It is until under the leadership of the Communist Party we dared to admit [our Minjia identity].” It is worth noting that the condition of the equal status is associated with the acknowledgement of the backwardness, and a consequent willingness to catch up with the pace under the help of the Han, “ as Commissioner Y said:

Some people think that it is wrong to establish an autonomous prefecture to build an independent kingdom. Some are afraid that it is hard to implement autonomy on their own, and what can we do if the Party and the Han stop helping us. Indeed, the socialist construction of autonomous prefectures needs the support of the Party and the central government, and the help of Han people and Han cadres. Some think we should not seek the help of Han people and Han cadres because the Han once oppressed us in the past. However, the view is extremely wrong. For the Han people, they should be active and enthusiastic to help the development of the ethnic minorities, and it is very important for advanced minzu to help the development of the backward minzu. Some Han people and Han cadres think they will lose their status after the establishment of an autonomous prefecture, which was also wrong. Consequently, both the Han and the Minjia Zu have the responsibility to help the development of ethnic minorities and guarantee their equal rights.

What Commissioner Y emphasized was the obligation of the mutual assistance between the Han, the Minjia Zu, and other minorities in order to dispel the “worry” of a number of people. This view is certainly in line with the state’s ethnic policy, but its premise is apparently the simultaneous existence of “liberation”, “equality” and “backwardness”.

Different from ethnic identity we are familiar with today, the representatives generally hold the view that the determination of the ethnonym and the establishment of an autonomous prefecture are special measures in catching up with the Han. The autonomous prefecture is a temporary arrangement. Its aim is to better complete the production tasks and achieve the same socialist system
already in place in the Han area. Representative Zh from Dali County said: “the only way for our minorities to completely ‘turn around’ (翻身) is to unite and achieve socialism. The establishment of an autonomous prefecture is to accelerate the realization of socialism.” Representative M said, “the importance of the establishment of an autonomous prefecture is about the realization of socialism. Only by establishing an autonomous prefecture and uniting all minzus to develop production, can we realize socialism”. Some representative indicated that “establishing an autonomous prefecture is not an isolated plan, but part of the fulfillment of the five-year plan and the program of forty lines”; “The autonomous prefecture should be established; and likewise, production tasks should be accomplished.” “Our region will become like Kunming after the establishment of the prefecture.” The establishment of Dali autonomous prefecture was generally seen as a means for ethnic minorities to enter socialism with the Han after the founding of new China.

Why do they change the “name of Minjia that they have been so accustomed to”? Commissioner Y expressed the official opinion: To start with, Minjia is an appellation by others, while “the Bai Zu call themselves ‘Bai Zi’”. Minjia is used in contrast with the use of “Guanjia” (family of officials) and “Junjia” (army family), and contains the meaning of insult and oppression. Thus, Bai (白) and ancient Bo (僰) should be considered. Most people thought that Minjia in their regions has a derogatory meaning, and agreed to abolish it. However, a representative from Dali argued Minjia was commonly acknowledged, while Bai Zi is a derogatory term, which is in line with Fitzgerald’s observation (Fitzgerald, 1941: 13–14). Such debate also implied that from a perspective of pragmatics, the meanings of an ethnonym vary from place to place at least before 1956.

The next question was to choose between Bai and Bo. One of the representatives who intended to use Bo put forward the reason that “Bo had the meaning of cutting firewood, which implied working people, and that labor creates the world. The radical on the top of the character suggested two shoulders. The character of Bo indicated the image of ethnic people lively and meaningfully”. “Bo is the symbol of working people. Therefore, it is proper to use Bo and is in response to the advocacy that labor promotes the development of production nowadays.” The best value of Bo lay in the fact that “it has historical basis”, and was “created by the ancestors”. Many historical evidences suggested that the Bai Zu was used to be called the “Bo people” (Bo Ren). Those who advocated the use of Bai argued that Bai literally means innocent, pure, simple, honest, and bright, the Bai adored the color of white, and there were legends of the White King and the White Kingdom. Meantime, several representatives thought that Bo was “hard to recognize”, “unable to know when seen”, while Bai was easy for the peasants to accept. In addition, Bai was beneficial to inter-ethnic unity, because the favorable color of the muslim Hui people in Dali region was also white. Zh, a representative from Dali County and a local master of Confucianism, held the view that “Bo indicates the life of ancient people under bushes and thorns. Absolutely, we should not use Bo because it is an insult to the ancestors.” Also, he suggested the use of Kunmi (昆弥) found on many literatures, or Bai, because “the White Kingdom had existed since the period of Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty; and with the spread of Buddhism across Dali, people love to be simple and pure, and do not like to dye”.

However, the character of Bai was also questioned. A representative from Binchuan County said that there was a White King, but he called himself Bo. Some pointed out that using Bai would be against Red. “Five or six senior people said that Bai offends red, the color of Chinese Communist Party.” Some representative indicated that Bai in Minjia language was not a derogatory term. A representative also pointed out that “Bai” was “after all, a Chinese word”. Those who were against Bai (白) were relatively fewer. Those who supported to use Bo also changed their mind the next day for different reasons. Some realized the character of Bo was hard to write. Some found that Bo had derogatory meanings only after others said so. The most important reason was that Bo may make people confuse the Bai with the Dai, because Bo was arguably considered as the ancestors of the Dai too. Representative H held the view that the advocating Bo lacks the awareness of enemy: “This question should be considered from the viewpoint of ethnicity and the masses. Using Bo may confuse us with the the Dai, which leaves a loophole for enemies. We should avoid such situation. Thus, I quitted my former choice and choose Bai, which means open, straightforward, pure, and honest.”

The reason for confusion “with the Dai” would be seen as a lack of “awareness of the enemy” involvement with a famous academic dispute on the relations between China and Thailand during the early period of the Cold War. At that time, it was widely believed among the Thai and European academia that the Thai was the master of China who established the Nanzhao Kingdom, and then moved southward to found Thailand. Hence, this was as a result of the pressure from the Chinese polity established by the Chinese ancestors. Such a conviction was the cornerstone of modern nationalism in Thailand (Hsieh, 1993). Chinese academia repeatedly wrote to emphasize that Nanzhao...
was not founded by the Thai in many articles from 1950s, especially after the Bandung Conference (see Liang, 2010). Thus, the use of Bo indicated the confusion of the Thai and the Dai who took Bo as their ancestors, which may leave a pretext for “imperialists to split China”. Accordingly, it was obvious to choose Bai over Bo.

The meeting did not vote at the end, but concluded with Commissioner Y’s announcement, that all the representatives had agreed to use Bai instead of Minjia, and that he would report the agreement to “the provincial and central authority”. Therefore, in April 26, 1956, “Bai” became Minjia’s consensus and their new ethnonym. On the 12th day after the ethnic symposium, the prefectoral Party committee reported the meeting in written form to the provincial and central authorities, which soon sent official approval in return. On 17th November, the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture was established and a grand celebration was held on that day. Authorities from Beijing, Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou sent delegations to attend the ceremony and sent congratulatory letters.

5 Creating a Common Fate

There are two topics worthy of examination in the minutes of the ethnic symposium: the negotiation progress and the value that the representative views follow.

During the period from the preparation to the agreement, there was no divergence on the ethnonym standardization. Despite of the question on whether to establish Minjia Zu as an independent ethnic group or not, around this meeting, the issue were beyond questions. In other words, for Minjia, the ethnic recognition has been completed, and the issue remaining is to decide the ethnonym.

On the decision of the ethnonym, the negotiation focus was not to reach a conclusion to an unknown problem – the official documents clearly implied the preference to Bai, and the negotiation focused on the formation of an acceptable consensus. It can be seen easily that even in the form of fierce controversy, the negotiation was not a progress about majority rule, but a progress that all the members of the meeting accepted the same opinion. The meeting records showed that many delegates eventually changed their stance and agreed on Bai. With regard to the representativeness which was strongly emphasized by the Party’s committee, the consensus made the agreement to maximize its impact on the ordinary folk. This was probably the most important mission of the meeting.

In expressing opinions, these ethnic elites consciously applied the discourse of liberation-cum-backwardness, but never questioned the internal contradictions between liberation and backwardness – the co-existence of the logic of equality and inequality within the ethnic identity. Nevertheless, on one hand, the ethnic minorities who had been under the feudal reactionary forces of oppression should be liberated, and the purpose of the liberation is to let them obtain equality with the Han. On the other hand, the ethnic minorities were less developed as the Han in the social stage of development and the level of productivity, etc. It indicated that the ethnic minorities were in a backward position at the same time on an equal footing, which was expressed as political equality, economic, and cultural backwardness. The difference also could be seen in the realm of politics, which was the root of the query on the establishment of the autonomous prefecture of the Bai: “Is it a sign of founding an independent kingdom?”

“Will we get the help from the Han after establishment?” “Will it affect the rights of other minorities?” However, only a small number held such view and they “just lack a better understanding of the policy of ethnic autonomous prefecture and come up with unnecessary concerns and incorrect ideas”(Diaochazu, 1963: 247). The majority supported the establishment. This should be more or less the reality.

However, why did majority of representatives, support the activity of the establishment of an autonomous prefecture, including ethnonym standardization? Why can no one point out the internal contradiction between liberation and backwardness? I believe the key is that the representatives and CCP officials shared a common sense of history which is a sense of time of socialist construction to realize Communism. This is a common fate, which was the reason why majority of the representatives and the commissioner of Dali Prefecture held the view that it’s establishment, and the ethnonym was closely related to the accomplishment of the five-year plan, production tasks, and the construction of socialism. This relatedness implied a relatively short period of construction. However, both the representatives and the officials tend to believe that they were on a transitional stage, i.e. a “liminal” stage. The backwardness and difference between ethnic groups were temporary and would be quickly eliminated by the system of regional ethnic autonomy. Even ethnic difference would soon be out of use. That is to say the idea that ethnic differences will persist, which is generally accepted by the public today, was not the mainstream at that time. At that time, local elites and officials were unambiguously in complicity.

Apart from the two conceptual values of liberation and backwardness in the negotiation progress of the ethnonym, the representatives put emphasis especially on
When it came to the specific operation of the local society, completely ignored in the knowledge system of local elites, one could see that Stalin's definition on ethnicity was almost negligible at the national level (Fei, 1980; Lin, 1984). In this case, it can be argued that Stalin's definition was modified at the national level and was questioned at the academic level. It was usually not held in academic circle that Stalin's definition was questioned at the national level and was not considered by the local elites. It is an alternative sense of time, and a past about the future. This was what Mullaney (2011) called "a history of future". The two values were prevalent to prevent discrimination and to accord the red symbol of the Communist Party. This was the case for the debate on Minjia, when discrimination issue was raised. So was the case with Bo, which suggested pejorative meanings. Bai was also questioned for its "offence" on the red colour of the Communist Party. Bo was excluded for its confusion with the Dai, which may leave "loopholes" to the enemies. Besides, a common-emphasized value was interesting in that the character of Bai is easy for the common members of the ethnic group to accept, and to write. The majority of the representatives accepted this value, thus making Bai outstanding from other choices. It indicated that name standardization is not just to create a concept "legible" to the state, but also to the common members of the ethnic group, which was highly emphasized by the representatives.

It is worth noting that, among the many values working in the negotiation, no one ever mentioned the four criteria of the ethnic groups defined by Stalin - common areas, common language, common economic life, and common psychological complex. Even the minority who questioned the independent status of the Bai based their arguments on a unique understanding of history, or the issue of whether the ethnic minorities would receive assistance from the state. This led to the conclusion that the name standardization was 91.

6 Conclusion

The ethnic symposium witnessed a hot debate on the determination of ethnonym. Many documents and reminiscent articles have the same record (Yang Yongxin, 1986; Shi Lizhuo, 2004), and some researchers of the Bai identity have noticed it (Ma Xuefeng, 2011; Liang Yongjia, 2008; Shen Haimei, 2010). However, researchers only emphasized the decision of Bai as the ethnonym, and neglected the progress due to inaccessibility to the primary sources.

The local elites who actively supported the state
program played an important role in the progress of negotiating the ethnonym, in the sense that the ethnonym of Bai is the product of the complicity between the state and the local elites, which differs from the deconstructionist studies of ethnic classification by many scholars (like Schein, Gladney, etc.), and Mullaney’s view that the knowledge of the ethnologists “became the foundation of Chinese ethnological studies of the southwest.” Moreover, many scholars have underestimated the agency of local elites to appropriate state symbols.

The negotiation progress also questioned Scott’s view on name standardization. Firstly, name standardization, with the purpose to create a legible structure, is not only to meet the need of the state, but also the demand of the masses, of which elites have an outstanding role in communication and suture. Secondly, deep distrust to state leads Scott to the emphasis on the selfish interest of the state – tax levy, conscription, and apportion. However, in the case of Bai, the state is not always a seizing monster, but an entity that has a strong ideal to change the society. If one only understands the name standardization from a perspective of the state violating the society, it is hard to explain the active cooperation of the ethnic elites and the general acceptance of the mass. Nor did one see how the knowledge about “minzu” were closely related to the state’s program to change the society. The knowledge about minzu operated at the grassroots level in 1950s was not relevant to Stalin’s four criteria at all. The key to understanding ethnic classification, the system of regional ethnic autonomy and name standardization, is the plan of socialist construction to a communist future. Like Tapp argues, “we may also need to remind ourselves that this was not merely a national, and nationalist project, but also a socialist one” (Tapp, 2002: 68).

Any discussion of ethnonym in contemporary China plagued with rife and rampant context of ethnic essentials is easy to be labeled as “deconstruction”. This causes possible dissatisfaction of the ethnic minority members. Among a number of issues that may induce such dissatisfaction, the active appropriation of the identities by classified minzu has become important during the last three decades. In my opinion, the appropriation by the local elites considered two facts: on one hand, the identity of classified minzu has become a “forbidden zone” and any attempt to historicize the minzu identity may cause repulsion among ethnic elites; while on the other hand, ethnic identity has become a fertile ground of invented tradition, and materials for a variety of projects such as cultural heritage. I am inclined to adopt Scott’s position that this identity deserves respect, but not sacrosanct, because “All identities, without exception, have been socially constructed… Quite often, such identities, particularly minority identities, are at first imagined by powerful states, as the Han imagined the Miao, the British colonists imagined the Karen and the Shan, the French the Jarai” (Scott. 2009: xii, italics original). Scott continues to state that the identity will be seen as “a badge of honor” and leads to “self-making of a heroic kind”. Thus, for those who devoted themselves to acknowledgment of some ethnic group, “I have only admiration and respect” (Scott, 2009: xiii). Similarly, this paper does not intend to deconstruct the ethnic identity of Bai people, because deconstruction becomes meaningless when all the identities, including ethnic identity is deconstructed. The meaningful question is to ask the reason for anti-deconstruction, understand the use and meaning of “minzu” in specific social context, and carry out empirical analysis in the sense of sociology of knowledge.

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**Bionotes**

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制造共同命运：以“白族”族称的协商座谈会为例

梁永佳

[内容提要]本文依据公开档案，分析了1956年大理地区的一次协商白族族称的“民族座谈会”。作者提出，“白族”族称是一个“名称标准化”过程，它的确定既不是国家权力的决策，也不是学者意见的主导，而是一个由地方精英主动靠拢国家计划的过程。族称的确定可以称之为各种原则作用下的一种“制造共同命运”的过程。通过确定族称，民族成员的社会知识被陌生化，融入家的共同命运之中，形成了一个短暂的“阈限”阶段。本文无意解构“民族”身份，旨在理解“民族”知识在具体社会场景中的使用及其意涵，进行知识社会学性质的经验研究。

[关键词]族称 民族识别 地方精英 共同命运

制造共同命运：以“白族”族称的协商座谈会为例

有关20世纪50年代的民族识别，老一辈学者费孝通先生、林耀华先生在1957年共同撰写的《当前民族工作提给民盟学的几个任务》一文中就早已指出，族别问题的研究在民族识别的政治决策中只能起到辅助作用，“民族名称”是不能强加于人或由别人来改变的，我们的工作只是在从共同体的形成上来加以研究，提供材料和分析，以便帮助已经提出民族名称的单位，经过协商，自己来考虑是否要认为是少数民族或是否要单独成为一个民族。这些问题的答案是各族人民自己来做的，这是他们的权利”。(费孝通、林耀华，2009 [1957]:157)

两位前辈明确地将民族识别研究放在民族识别决策的从属地位，认为“民族名称”是由各族人民自己确定的，这就是著名的“名从主人”原则。但是，如何实现“名从主人”，他们却未作评论。这是一个值得追问的问题，因为正如林耀华(1984:3)所说：“一九五四到一九五四年，仅云南省就有二百六十多个族体上报族称。当时我们仅从表面分析，就发现‘族称’很混乱。有的用自称，有的用他称，有的用民族内部分支名称。一些自报地方籍贯名称，一些人竟自报特殊职业的名称。还有地方共同体受汉族影响深，讲汉话，民族特点虽不显著，但还保留强烈的共同心理感情等等”。既然族称问题如此复杂，那么，云南的260个族称是如何缩减到今天的包括汉族在内的26个民族呢？“名从主人”的原则发挥了什么作用？谁是名从主人的“主”？这些主人又是如何“协商”和“考虑”，从而确定一个民族的族称的？其他族称为何被放弃？这个过程可以给我们什么启示？这些有关族称的问题，有助于我们从民族史的角度理解当下急需追问的“民族”建构过程，并深入理解这一过程与当下民族与民族主义知识之间的关系。

本文试图以1956年云南省大理地区统战部组织的一次“民族座谈会”为例，探讨“白族”这一族称在民族代表中的协商过程。作者提出，“白族”族称是一个“名称标准化”过程，它的确定既不是国家权力的决策，也不是学者意见所主导的，而是一个由地方精英主动靠拢国家计划的过程。族称的确定可以称之为各种原则作用下的一个“制造共同命运”的过程。这些原则包括“解放”和“落后”的话语，历史根据，避免歧视，易为民族成员接受，符合共产主义价值等。通过确定族称，民族成员的日常知识被陌生化，融入与国家的共同命运之中，形成了一个短暂的“阈限”阶段。本文无意解构“民族”身份，旨在理解“民族”知识在具体社会场景中的使用及其意涵，进行知识社会学性质的经验研究。

有关“名称标准化”的研究，詹姆斯·斯科特提出了“国家的视角”(seeing like a state)这一经典看法。即中央政府通过命名，将地方社会转化为可以被国家“读懂”(legible)的结构，并据此管理和操控地方社会。但这经常导致地方知识(斯科特称之为“米特斯”[mētis])的流失，造成整个计划失败。例如，在15世纪的托斯卡纳和英格兰，姓氏并非普遍现象，但国家为了清晰而简单地记录个人财产和纳税情况，强制人们将“复杂冗长”的名字简化为“名”与“姓”的组合。结果导致这些新名字失去了地方信息，使日常生活中十分重要的家庭谱系不再与个人关联，引发地方社会动荡。著名的瓦特·泰勒起义，就是由一次前所未有的登记和人头税评估所引起的。可见，名称的标准化过程中，国家与地方社会之间存在很大的张力，因为“对于英国的农民如同对于托斯卡纳的农民一样，关于成年男性的人口普查如果不是毁灭性的，也是不详的”(斯科特，2004:89)。

斯科特的看法对于族称研究有一定启发，但存在重要不足。民族识别的确是一个由国家推行的“清晰化”过程，其目的同样在于让国家“读懂”地方社会。云南族称从260个骤降到26个，的确也涉及地方知识的流失。但是，名称标准化并非像斯科特所说，一定纯粹服务于国家的统治愿望和征税目的。50年代的族称标准化计划，目的无疑是为了赋予少数民族前所未有的政治地
位。正如王富文（Nicholas Tapp）指出的，“不论如何识别民族，(民族识别)本身的目的，都是将民族从封建的和半殖民地的压迫中解放出来”（Tapp, 2002:68）。


正如费孝通和林耀华两位先生业已指出的，民族识别的研究仅处于民族识别决策的从属地位。民族识别的主体是民族成员本身。费孝通在一篇回顾民族识别的文章中指出，“根据民族平等政策，族别问题的解决不能由其他人包办代替，更不能有任何强迫或是勉强，必须最后取决于本民族的人民的意愿”（费孝通，1980:161）。林耀华更进一步阐明了“名从主人”原则的重要性：“民族名称是不能强加于人或由别人来改变的。我们科学工作者的工作只是提供民族识别的科学依据，还要征求本民族人民群众和爱国上层人士的意见，通过协商，帮助已提出族称的族体最后确定族称或归属。’名从主人’就是说，族称要由各族人民自己来定，这是他们的权利。”（林耀华，1984:3）林耀华直接指导了云南的民族识别研究，我们可以设想，白族作为云南人口最多的少数民族之一，其地方精英的协商在确定族称上很可能起到了关键作用。结合斯科特有关名称标准化的论述，本文将着力分析地方精英如何在“国家的视角”和“地方知识”之间协商，采用了哪些策略和原则，以及这些原则之间的关系。

二 族称会议背景和成员选择


中国共产党在新中国成立之际就通过《共同纲领》承诺了“统一的多民族国家”的宪法基础。1953年开始的民族识别，不仅意在贯彻这一承诺，而且要为即将召开
开的第一届全国人民代表大会确定代表比例。此时，“白族”一词虽然在使用，但尚未成正式族称，仍沿用“民家族”的名称，政府也并未对流行于大理的其他类似族称进行禁用。但是，大理地区已经成立了27个民族自治政府或民族联合民主政府，民族乡已经多达784个。从国家角度来说，面对如此众多的民族自治政权，名称的标准化势所必然。随着民族区域自治政策逐步推行，成立大理民族自治州的问题于1954年底摆到议事日程上来。已经调到国家民委的云南省人民委员会前副主席周保中将军（1902—1964），于1955年在致云南省委关于《建立大理白族（民家族）自治州的意见》中，指出了解决州要注意的问题（编写组，1986：64）。周保中生于大理盆地北部的农业地区，是土生土长的民家人。他使用“白族（民家族）”的格式提出建议，说明在族称问题上颇为谨慎。他在一个关键时刻提出建议，说明了拥有民族成员和党内高层双重身份的精英人物，在少数民族政治地位的确立过程中所发挥的作用。

中央和云南省委对于族称问题同样很谨慎。根据当时的一份档案，中央和省委在批准建立“大理白族自治州”的同时，明确指示：“对民族名称究竟用哪个‘白’字，意见尚未统一，考虑可在筹备会成立后最后决定。”（大理地委统战部，1956）此处的“哪个‘白’字”，指的是后来成为争议焦点的“白”或“僰”，“民家族”的说法已经倾向于废止。实际上，从周保中到省委和中央，都认为有必要的“统一认识”，因为不仅族称问题悬而未决，就连是否有必要继续保留白族的少数民族身份和成立民族自治地方，都存在不同意见。根据大理白族自治州首任副州长杨永新（1986）的回忆，当时有许多人认为白族只是汉族的一个支系，没有必要成为一个单一民族。1963年完稿的《白族简史简志合编》也记录了当时某些人的“顾虑”：“白族与汉族差不多，实行不实行区域自治都可以”，“建立了白族自治州其他民族的权利能否得到充分的保证”（调查组，1963：247）。

大理地委统战部通过大理地委，决定在筹备会成立前召开“民族座谈会”，并提出代表资格的具体意见。根据这份建议（大理地委统战部，1956），代表人选由“有关各县（市）委提出初步名单和代表的主要情况报地委审查决定”，即决定权在地级党委。代表的分配原则，特别强调了“代表性”，要“根据民族分布和人口比例，兼顾各族的上层人物，以白族为主，同时也包括境内的各个民族。大民族照顾小民族，并适当照顾民族支系，境内主要单一民族都有代表出席”。此处使用的“支系”这一概念，不仅说明在多个需要处理的民族名称，而且说明这些名称被认为是可以归并为一个民族了。实际上，在这份文件和先前的一些文件中，已经多次使用“白族”，与周保中1955年使用“白族（民家族）”相比，官方已经有了更明确的倾向性。

会议的规模定在78人，其中地委审定45人。根据名额分配，“白族16人（提名25人），占35.6%”。这个比例如何确定不得而知，可能与1954年的人口普查数据有关。值得注意的是，历史上属于丽江管辖的“白族聚居区”——鹤庆、剑川和兰坪——已经由上级决定划入新的自治州，所以又通过丽江地委分配了6个名额。换言之，名额的确定颇为复杂，甚至要克服行政障碍，却碰巧巧合了斯大林的四个民族原则之一——共同地域。

除了符合“民族分布”、“人口比例”和“民族上层”这三个原则外，代表的“代表性”还要符合当时的革命观念。对于按人口和民族分配确定的代表“要政治历史清楚，在社会主义革命中的积极分子和模范人物，在本民族中有突出的代表性”，就是说，这些代表要有较高的革命性。对于“民族上层”，则要是“拥护或不反对社会主义革命，与本族人民有密切联系，在本民族中有代表性的人物”，相比前者，对他们的革命性要求不高，但要求他们“代表性较大”。

从这些文件我们可以看出，协商族称的“民族座谈会”，是根据上级（中央和云南省委）的指示而召开的。在召开之前，已经倾向于使用“白族”这个称呼，族称之间的“支系”关系也不是问题。新自治州的行政区划，更是根据这个确定的民族主体加以确定。但是，这此会议仍然要在民族分布，人口比例，民族上层，政治资格四个方面，经过认真的提名和审查，尽最大可能实现代表性。在已有明确倾向并据此做出决策的情况下，为何仍倾注如此大的人力物力召开这个会议？我的解释是，会议目的并非在于就一个未知的问题寻找答案，而是为一个大致明确的答案寻找共识，一个有关共同体命运的共识。

三 从争论到妥协：会议过程

“民族座谈会”经过筹备，于1956年4月25日，26日在大理召开。参加会议的人数由原定的78人减为仅28人，其中包括“白族18人，汉族5人，地专机关5人”。但从代表分布看，仍符合了原来对于代表性的要求，而且，多数代表在赴会之前在本地召开了座谈会，收集了意见，没有到会的代表也有人发来了书面意见。代表们的发言详细地记录在大理专员公署（1956）的一份文件里。

代表们自觉地以1949年为分水岭，强调民族政策使过去不敢承认和不被承认的“民家族”成为一个平等的少数民族。主持会议的大理地区专员L发言说：“在旧社会里反动统治阶级实行民族压迫的政策，民家族连自己是少数民族都不敢承认。”洱源县M代表说：“解放初期登记填表都报汉族，不敢认民家，这是地主阶级压迫造成的。今天在共产党的领导下才敢承认。”值得注意的是，这种平等地位的连带条件却是承认落后并愿意在汉族的帮助下赶上汉族。如Y专员说：
有人认为建立自治州的目的是改变现状，也有的将自治州建立在了，“白族”不承认，“白族”认为“白”字“晓不得”，“看见也认不得”，白字容易让农民接受。大理地区的回族同样崇尚白色，所以“用白字有利于民族团结”。大理县代表认为，“僰字是说古人住在荆棘树下生活，现在用是侮辱祖先……万万不能用”。他建议使用文献上的“昆弥”，即使不用“昆弥”，也要使用“白字”，因为“汉武帝以后，大理有白子国，而且大理是佛教之地，爱素净洁白，不喜欢染上颜色，所以用白字是好”。

但是，“白”字同样遭到质疑。一位宾川县代表说，虽然过去有白王，但他自称为“僰”。有几个代表同时指出，“白”与“红”格格不入，“有五个老先生说，共产党红旗当政，用白字与红字有冲犯”。但很快就有代表提出，“白”字在民家话里并没有汉语中的贬义。一个代表还指出，即使用“白”字“还是汉字”。相比之下，反对“白”字的意见较少。几个起初主张“僰”字的代表到了第二天，纷纷改变了立场，支持使用“白”字，但改变的原因则五花八门。有人认为自己已经意识到“僰”字难写，有人说听别人发言才发现“僰”字有贬义。最关键的意见在于“僰”字会与傣族混淆，因为当时也有意见认为傣族祖先与“僰”有关。M代表说，“自己认识到用‘僰’字缺乏‘敌情’意识，应该从民族化，大众化考虑。用‘僰’字与傣族混淆，给敌人有空可钻。所以我放弃原来的意见，非常同意用白色的‘白’字，白子就是光明磊落，纯洁，诚恳（的）意义。”

之所以“与傣族混淆”会是“缺乏敌情意识”，在于“冷战初期涉及中国和泰国关系的一个著名的学术公案。泰国和欧美学术界在当时普遍认为泰族曾是中国的主人，并建立了南诏，后来在当代中国人祖先成立的中原政权压力下，一路南下，建立泰国。这一看法成为泰国现代民族主义的基石（谢世忠，1993）。从20世纪50年代开始，尤其是万隆会议之后，中国学界反复撰文，强调南诏不是泰族建立的（见Liang，2010）。因此，如果使用“僰”字，将会跟认同僰人为自己祖先的，与泰族同源的傣族混淆，给帝国主义分子留下分裂中国的口实。当这个问题摆明后，弃“僰”用“白”就变得非常明显了。

会议并没有进行投票，而是由Y专员进行了总结发言。他宣布大家已经取得一致意见，即不用“民家”而用“白”字，并通知将把结论“报省和中央”。"白族"这个名称就这样在1956年4月26日这天，成为民家族的共识和新的名称。
四 制造共同命运

“民族座谈会”的会议记录中可以看到两个值得关注的问题：协商过程和代表意见所遵循的价值。

从会议筹备到最终形成一致意见，对于是否需要归并族称，以及是否需要将族称标准化，并没有产生疑问。尽管此前存在“民家族”是否成为独立民族的问题争议，但在这次会议前后，这个问题不再成立。换句话说，对于民家来说，民族识别已经完成，剩下的问题只是族称问题。

就族称问题来说，协商的重点并不是就一个未知的问题做出结论——政府文件中显然对“白族”有倾向性，协商重点在于形成大家都接受的共识。我们看到，虽然争论激烈，但协商并非是一个多数意见压倒少数意见的过程，而是一个全部成员接受同一意见的过程。会议记录显示，很多代表最终改变了自己的立场，同意“白族”这一族称。考虑要择选代表时地委反复强调的代表性，这种共识将确保该决定最大限度地影响民众。这恐怕是召开这个会议的重要使命。

这些民族精英在表达自己意见的时候，自觉地使用有关“解放”和“落后”的话语，从未质疑两者之间在今天比较明显的内在矛盾，即平等和不平等的逻辑共同存在于民族身份中：一方面，得到解放的是长期受到封建反动势力压迫的少数民族，解放的目的是取得与汉族平等的地位。另一方面，少数民族在社会发展阶段，生产力水平等方面低于汉族。在处于平等地位的同时，又处于落后地位。这被表述为政治平等，经济文化落后。但这差异，也同样体现在政治上，这也是有人质疑建立白族自治州的原因：是否在眼巴巴地寻求独立王国？是否再得不到汉族帮助？是否会影响其他少数民族的权利？但是，质疑的声音是微弱的，他们只是“少数人”，只是“对当时的民族区域自治政策认识不足，了解不够，产生了某些不必要的顾虑和不正确的想法”（调查组，1963:247），多数人是拥护建立自治州的。这应该是实情。

那么，为什么多数人拥护包括归并族称在内的建州活动？为什么在会上没有人提出“平等”与“落后”并行不悖这一内在矛盾？我认为关键在于，与会代表和政府官员有着共同的历史观，即，一个为实现共产主义而进行社会主义建设的时间感，一个共同命运。这就是为何多数代表和大理地区专员将协商称建立自治州的活动，与完成五年计划，完成生产任务和建设社会主义社会联系在一起。这种联系的潜台词，是认可一种相对短暂的建设时期。即，少数民族和官员都倾向于认为大家正处于一个“过渡”阶段，一个“阈限”(liminal)阶段。少数民族的“落后”与“差异”只是暂时的，民族区域自治制度将很快消除这种落后，民族差别甚至可以很快消失。可以说，今天公众普遍接受的“民族差异长期存在”的说法，在当时并非主流。在时间观上，地方精英与政府官员明确无误地处于共谋（complicity）关系中。

除了“解放”和“落后”这两个价值概念外，在协商族称的过程中，代表们特别强调历史根据。可以说，“民家”、“白族”、“僰族”（以及Zh代表提出的“昆弥”），都在形形色色的历史叙述中存在的。这些历史叙述并非学术意义上的历史，而是包括了历史文献，碑刻，传说，甚至老人的回忆，即一种对过去的大众知识。大家有一种共识，“现在”不仅与社会达尔文主义式的“未来”有关，同样也跟地方精英相对熟悉的“过去”有关。这是另一种时间感，一种关于未来的过去，被墨磊宁(Mullaney，2011)称为“未来史”(a history of future)。另外两个价值取向是避免歧视，以及要符合共产党的红色符号。支持和反对“民家”意见就是围绕该词是否有歧视展开的。“僰”字出局的理由之一也是它具有贬义。对“白”字的主要质疑，则在于它“冲犯”了共产党的红色。放弃“僰”字的另一个原因，则是它会跟傣族混淆，给敌人“钻空子”的机会。此外，一种普遍重视的价值观很有趣，即“白”字易为普通民族成员接受，容易写。多数代表都接受了这种价值观，也成为“白”字最终脱颖而出的原因之一。这说明，族称的标准不仅是创造一个可以被国家“读懂”的概念，代表们还很重视这个概念能否被普通民族成员“读懂”。

值得注意的是，在众多起作用的价值观中，没有人提及斯大林民族定义的四个标准——共同地域，共同语言，共同经济生活，共同心理素质。即使是少数质疑白族为独立民族地位的人，也是出于对历史的独特理解或对少数民族是否会得到汉族帮助的担忧而提出的，没有从斯大林的定义出发。白族受教育程度在西南地区可谓最高，精英中有不少知识分子，如大理的Zh代表，就是一位留学日本的地方文人，曾任云南陆军讲武堂教官。很难想象他们都对斯大林的民族概念毫不知情，但他们却并没有考虑这一概念的愿望，也没有面临考虑这一概念的压力。学界通常强调，斯大林的民族定义在国家层面得到改动，在学者层面受到质疑。（费孝通，1980；林耀华，1984）这个案例则告诉我们，斯大林民族概念虽然在国家政治和学术领域中发挥重要作用，但在地方社会的具体操作中，在地方精英的知识体系中，它几乎被完全忽略。

所有在座谈会上发挥作用的价值概念可以归结到这样一个原则：即获得正式名称的人群应该与党和国家共享一个共同的命运。首先，确认“解放”和“落后”，就强化了共产党和中央政府的合法性和无可争议的领导地位，所以新的族名应“冲犯”红色符号。其次，不能具有歧视义涵，也是为了配合民族的解放地位，拥抱平等的政治权利和憧憬社会主义制度。再次，具有历史依据，除了与地方社会特别的历史感有关（有关论述见王斯福，2008），更体现了对一个内部均衡，外部差异的共同体的想象。通过认同共同的起源和祖先，建立起一个通向未来的，被识别人口的谱系，使其一体性清晰化。最后，新的名称不仅要被国家“读懂”，更要被民族成员“读懂”。这个价值更是在于让尽可能多的普通民众——该民族成员和其他民族成员——认可这
一通向美好明天的身份，最大限度地“坐实”民族主体。“白族”族称的确定，使其原本名称交织、地域不同、歧义众多的“族称丛”转变成单一的(singular),可辨识的(identifiable),可触摸的(tangible),可通约的(denominational),可动员的(mobilisable)群体，成为整个国家政治架构中的行政单位，整个社会计划中的一个组成部分，一个与国家有着共同命运的人群。这个案例说明，族称的确定过程，是一个制造共同命运的过程，“民族”知识是关于国家未来的知识，关于共同命运的知识。与国家共享时间感的地方精英，起到了关键作用。

五结论

这次协商族称的“民族座谈会”，争论相当热烈。当时的文件档案与多年后的回忆文章都有同样的记录（杨永新，1986; 施立卓，2004），研究白族身份的学者也注意到了这一点（马雪峰，2011; 梁永佳，2008; 沈海梅，2010）。但是，显然，研究者只强调确定“白族”族称这一最后结论，忽略了得出结论的过程。在协商白族族称的过程中，主动靠拢国家计划的地方精英扮演了重要角色，可以说，“白族”族称是国家和地方精英共识的产物。这与墨磊宁所说的“民族学者扮演了重要角色”看法十分不同，更与上述解构民族识别的学者（路易莎，2009）的研究有差异。事实证明，地方精英的能动性，尤其是挪用(appropriate)国家符号的能动性，被很多学者低估了。白族族称的协商过程同样质疑了斯科特对于名称标化的论述。首先，族称的标准化并非仅仅照顾了国家的“读懂”需要，它还充分考虑了普通民众的“读懂”需要。这一点，正是斯科特所强调的沟通和缝合作用值得再次突出。其次，斯科特对国家的深度不信任，导致他关于名称标准化的论述过于强调国家的“一己私利”——收税、征兵、摊派。白族族称的案例说明，国家并不总是推取民众的怪物，它也会对一个社会抱着强烈改造思想的实体。如果仅仅从国家侵犯社会的视角来考察国家的“读懂”问题，就不容易解释地方精英的主动配合与民众的普遍接受；也无法看到，“民族”知识在具体场景中，与国家对社会的规划之间的密切关系。20世纪50年代在基层社会实际使用的“民族”知识，跟斯大林的四个标准不存在任何意义上的关系。通往共产主义未来的社会主义建设计划，才理解民族识别、民族区域制度、族称标准化的关键。用王富文的话来说，“我们要提醒自己，（民族识别）不仅是一个民族的或者民族主义的工程，更是一个社会主义工程”（Tapp，2002:68）。

在当下民族本质化甚嚣尘上的语境中讨论“族称”问题，很容易被贴上“解构”的标签，更可能招致少数民族成员的不满。这种标签和不满，本身涉及了众多问题。其中，被识别民族在近三十年来对国家所赋予身份的积极挪用十分重要。在我看来，地方精英的挪用产生了两个问题：一方面，已被识别民族的身份成为不可讨论的“禁区”，考古民族身份历史过程的研究常遭到民族精英的排斥；另一方面，民族身份又成为发明传统的“沃土”，成为文化遗产等各种工程的素材。我更愿意采纳马特·斯科特的立场，认为这种身份既值得尊重，又不是神圣不可侵犯的，因为“所有身份都是社会建构的，绝无例外……这些身份，尤其是少数民族身份，经常先是被强大的国家想象出来，如汉人想象苗人，英国殖民者想象克伦人和掸人，法国人想象嘉莱人”（Scott，2009:28; 粗体为斯科特加）。斯科特继续说，这种身份会最终被少数民族成员当成“荣誉勋章”，进行“英雄式的自我营造”。因此，对于那些全力为某些民族争取承认的人来说，“我只报以崇敬和尊重”（同上，2009:13）。同样，本文无意“解构”白族的民族身份，因为既然包括民族身份在内的所有身份都可以被解构，解构本身也就失去意义。有意义的问题在于追问反对解构的理由，理解“民族”在具体社会过程中的使用及其意涵，进行知识社会学性质的经验分析。

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