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Wittgenstein, Wissen und die Gnade der Natur

Stefan Tolksdorf
From the journal Conceptus

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to explain Wittgenstein’s remark that „It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something.“ In this regard, two positions are distinguished. The first one is the standard interpretation within analytic epistemology. Alternatively, I will suggest another possibility to interpret Wittgenstein’s remark, which is inspired by John McDowell’s epistemological disjunctivism. As I am going to show, the alternative is the better choice.

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Online erschienen: 2017-1-3
Erschienen im Druck: 2017-1-1

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