Accessible Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter (A) September 19, 2019

Kollektives Verstehen

Rico Hauswald

Abstract

Many epistemic attitudes including belief and knowledge have already been examined to determine the extent to which they can be attributed to collectives. The epistemological literature on explanatory understanding and objectual understanding, on the other hand, has focused almost exclusively on individual subjects. However, there are many situations that can be described by sentences of the form “We understand P”, “We understand why p”, “Group G understands P”, or “G understands why p”. As I shall show, these situations can be classified into five categories: distributive, common, joint, deferential, and cooperative understanding. Based on a definitional scheme, according to which the general concept of understanding has a cognitive component, a factivity component, and an epistemic-pro-attitude component, this paper aims to analyse these five types.

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Published Online: 2019-09-19
Published in Print: 2019-09-10

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