Abstract
This paper studies the effect of the commonly used phrase “thanks in advance” on compliance with a small request. In a controlled laboratory experiment we ask participants to give a detailed answer to an open question. The treatment variable is whether or not they see the phrase “thanks in advance.” Our participants react to the treatment by exerting less effort in answering the request even though they perceive the phrase as polite.
Funding statement: This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
A.1 Additional tables
Balancing of Covariates Across Treatments.
| Variable | ThanksInAdvance | Control | Difference |
| Politeness rating (1=low, 7=high) of | |||
| “Thanks in advance.” | 5.72 | 5.74 | −0.02 |
| (1.25) | (1.26) | ||
| “I expect your answer.” | 2.35 | 2.40 | −0.05 |
| (1.21) | (1.43) | ||
| “I would be delighted to receive a response.” | 6.32 | 6.31 | 0.01 |
| (1.22) | (1.11) | ||
| Time in Instructions (seconds) | 101.86 | 106.78 | −4.92 |
| (27.06) | (29.40) | ||
| Time in BRET (seconds) | 79.45 | 89.90 | −10.45 |
| (33.56) | (39.74) | ||
| No. of packages collected | 11.71 | 11.07 | 0.64 |
| (3.72) | (3.92) | ||
| Male | 0.38 | 0.32 | 0.06 |
| (0.49) | (0.47) |
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Note: Reporting means with standard deviations in parentheses. Difference column reports mean difference: ThanksInAdvance − Control and p-values of two-sided t-tests across treatments. The p-value for “Male” was calculated using a Pearson’s chi-squared test.
Robustness: Estimations of Treatment Effects Controlling for Behavior in the BRET.
| Time in seconds | Length in characters | |||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| ThanksInAdvance | −32.47** | −30.21** | −36.16 | −32.46 |
| (14.11) | (14.13) | (25.58) | (25.71) | |
| No. of packages collected | −0.89 | 1.23 | ||
| (1.85) | (3.36) | |||
| TimeBRET | 0.27 | 0.28 | ||
| (0.19) | (0.35) | |||
| Constant | 195.31*** | 161.12*** | 316.24*** | 304.79*** |
| (22.84) | (19.94) | (41.40) | (36.27) | |
| Observations | 179 | 179 | 179 | 179 |
| R-squared | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
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Note: OLS-estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Estimations of Treatment Effects without Unreliable Observations: Time.
| Time in seconds | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| ThanksInAdvance | −34.25** | −41.46** | −51.18** | −57.31* |
| (14.37) | (17.76) | (25.23) | (29.26) | |
| Male | 26.19 | 19.29 | ||
| (21.88) | (23.12) | |||
| ThanksInAdvance#Male | 13.30 | 20.10 | ||
| (29.90) | (30.87) | |||
| Polite | −28.26 | −22.13 | ||
| (22.33) | (23.36) | |||
| ThanksInAdvance#Polite | 24.13 | 19.57 | ||
| (30.73) | (31.40) | |||
| Constant | 185.22*** | 176.90*** | 204.84*** | 194.45*** |
| (10.28) | (12.33) | (18.60) | (22.28) | |
| Observations | 174 | 174 | 174 | 174 |
| R-squared | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.07 |
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Note: OLS-estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Estimations of Treatment Effects without Unreliable Observations: Length.
| Length in characters | ||||
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
| ThanksInAdvance | −37.77 | −61.76* | −42.80 | −75.93 |
| (26.01) | (32.39) | (45.64) | (53.22) | |
| Male | −2.61 | −16.64 | ||
| (39.90) | (42.06) | |||
| ThanksInAdvance#Male | 61.49 | 74.28 | ||
| (54.53) | (56.16) | |||
| Polite | −39.72 | −45.02 | ||
| (40.40) | (42.50) | |||
| ThanksInAdvance#Polite | 5.12 | 12.72 | ||
| (55.59) | (57.11) | |||
| Constant | 328.96*** | 329.79*** | 356.54*** | 365.50*** |
| (18.60) | (22.49) | (33.66) | (40.52) | |
| Observations | 174 | 174 | 174 | 174 |
| R-squared | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
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Note: OLS-estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
A.2 Instructions for participants of the experiment
The following section provides the English translation of the originally German instructions which the participants received in the experiment on-screen:
Screen 1
Welcome to PLEx
Please abide by the following rules:
1. Communication is forbidden as long as you are in the laboratory.
2. If you have any questions, please ask the experimenters.
3. You may only use those functions of your computer that are intended for the experiment.
Thank you for supporting our research. You will find the instructions for the experiment on the next pages.
Screen 2
General Instructions
You will receive 5 euro for your arrival on time and your participation in the experiment.
Furthermore, you can earn additional money in the main part of the experiment. The amount of money you earn depends on your decision in the experiment.
At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in cash.
The experiment consists of a main part, which we will explain to you in detail on the next page, and a subsequent questionnaire. Please read the instructions for the main part of the experiment carefully.
If there is anything you do not understand, please raise your hand. We will then come to your seat and answer your question personally.
Screen 3
Instructions for the main part of the experiment
In the main part of the experiment you will see a rectangle on the left side of the screen, which consists of 25 numbered packages.
Your task is to collect packages. This is done by a left-click on the desired package. You earn 0,50 euro for each collected package.
Once you have collected a package, it disappears from the rectangle. On the right side of the screen you will see current information about the number of packages you have collected so far and how your earnings may look like accordingly.
But beware: Your earnings are merely hypothetical at first, because behind one of the 25 packages there is a bomb! If you have collected the package behind which the bomb is hidden, all packages you have collected will be destroyed and you will receive 0 euro for this part of the experiment.
You do not know behind which one of the packages the bomb is. The bomb can be hidden anywhere in the rectangle with equal probability.
Only when leaving the laboratory, you are going to pick a number from a bag of 25 numbered notes. The number on your note determines behind which package the bomb is in your case. Therefore, you will learn only after the experiment whether or not you have collected the package behind which the bomb is located. If you have collected the package behind which the bomb is located, you will receive 0 euro. However, if you have not collected the package behind which the bomb is located, you will receive 0.50 euro for each package you have collected. In any case, you may keep the 5 euro for your punctual appearance.
If you have collected a package by accident, you can always return all packages by clicking “reset” and start collecting the packages again.
There is no time limit for this task. Once you are done, you will start with the questionnaire.
A.3 Screenshots
The following section provides screenshots of the bomb risk elicitation task (Figure 2), of the open question in the ThanksInAdvance treatment (Figure 3) as well as in the control treatment (Figure 4).
Screenshot of the 5×5-version of the bomb risk elicitation task. In the task, participants collect packages. Each package collected is worth 0.50 euro. There are 25 packages which are numbered consecutively from 1 to 25. In one of the packages, a bomb is hidden. If a participant collects this package, all packages collected will be destroyed and the participant will earn 0 euro for this task. On their screen, participants see a rectangle with 25 buttons labeled “package 1” to “package 25.” They can decide which packages to collect. Participants are allowed to collect between 1 and 24 packages.
Screenshot of the request in the ThanksInAdvance treatment.
Screenshot of the request in the control treatment.
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Conflict of interest: None.
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