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BY-NC-ND 3.0 license Open Access Published by De Gruyter April 6, 2016

Inertia processes and status quo bias in promoting green change

  • Svein Åge Kjøs Johnsen EMAIL logo
From the journal Human Affairs

Abstract

Change can be difficult to achieve, and system inertia may be considered relevant. There is a tendency for dynamic systems to enter into specific states characterized by stabilizing factors. The present work attempts to define inertia processes and explores these with regard to pro-environmental behaviour and decision-making. Inertia processes can be considered both within an organizational context and from the level of the individual, and may involve a number of psychological processes and aspects of the decision-making process. A few suggestions for research are also presented.

Introduction

Green change is on the agenda today. The Norwegian government has a formulated ambition that Norwegian businesses should be leaders in the green shift[1], and there is an increasing focus on curtailing CO2-emissions of individuals and organisations. However, we know that change can be difficult and slow for various reasons. Although there may be evolutionary advantages to resisting change—for example, preserving interpersonal stability and intrapersonal integrity, conserving energy, and perhaps even lower risk exposure—there are also disadvantages to such tendencies, and it is important to be aware of evolutionary adaptations in human beings that make it more difficult to achieve substantial reductions in environmental impact (Gifford, 2011).

In the present context, inertia processes are seen as dynamic components that slow down or hinder changes towards more pro-environmental behaviour, or hinder environmentally responsible decision-making. There are of course many obstacles to consider when promoting green change; however, the present article does not focus on barriers or obstacles to behaviour change in general. For an excellent discussion on this topic, see Gifford (2011), and for research on perceived constraints to pro-environmental behaviour, see Tanner (1999). The following discussion aims rather to draw attention to the dynamics of green change, and specifically processes that hinders rather than directly oppose change.

In the past two decades environmental psychology has grown tremendously as a field and in particular the area dealing with pro-environmental behaviour. Pro-environmental behaviour is often defined in terms of actual impact on the environment (Schultz & Kaiser, 2012; Steg & Vlek, 2009). Researchers have focused on the predictors of pro-environmental behaviour (e.g., Abrahamse & Steg, 2009, see Bamberg & Möser (2007) for a meta-analysis), and on interventions to promote pro-environmental behaviour (e.g., Schultz, Nolan, Cialdini, Goldstein, & Griskevicius, 2007, see Osbaldiston & Schott (2012) for a meta-analysis). However, one might argue that researchers have focused less on the processes, and more on the concrete factors. There are a few exceptions, for example, some researchers have developed a self-regulation theory of change processes (Bamberg, Fujii, Friman, & Gärling, 2011), and introducing habitual processes in social psychological models can provoke interesting discussions (e.g., Klöckner & Matthies, 2004), but the general picture is that researchers are testing theories or interventions and not theorizing on processes. The purpose of the present article is to begin an exploration with a stronger focus on the process perspective. The word “process” can have many connotations and meanings. In the present context, there is a larger focus on what Magnusson and Törestad (1993) call the loop of reciprocal interactions between different systems, and less focus on determinants and prediction. For example, supplying certain types of information can make people change their behaviour (Osbaldiston & Schott, 2012). However, supplying information is only a small part of the process that changes people’s behaviour (see for example Werner, 2013). A heightened awareness that somehow leads to cognitive change, and eventually behaviour change could be one rudimentary description of this process. Four areas are considered in the present article: social psychological models, habits and routines, decision-making and organisational climate.

Social psychological models

The bulk of descriptive research on pro-environmental behaviour has employed either the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) or norm activation theory (Schwartz, 1977) as starting points (e.g., Gardner & Abraham, 2008; Nordlund & Garvill, 2003; Stern, 2000; White, Smith, Terry, Greenslade, & McKimmie, 2009). These kinds of research projects are primarily about testing theories and searching for determinants of behaviour, and not specifically about processes, so we really cannot say a great deal about the dynamics of change through such research. Although there are of course outlines of change processes in the original theories, for example, how attitudes toward specific behaviours may develop (Ajzen, 1991). There is a challenge in moving from the group perspective to the individual perspective, because research utilizing these theories is often conducted using hundreds of respondents, and cannot necessarily describe what happens within one particular individual. However, when such research utilizes attitudes and other cognitive concepts as determinants, the cognitive dissonance perspective may be one appropriate process to consider when describing how the cognitive aspects and behaviour are connected (Festinger, 1957). In this perspective, inertia processes can be anything that helps reduce dissonance, for example emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) or defence mechanisms. It is important to point out that the arguments presented above do not exclude the possibility that these theories can describe processes on an individual level. Moreover, there might be intentional processes at work in the theory of planned behaviour, but whether changes in intentions actually lead to changes in behaviour is an empirical question. A meta-analysis shows that this may not be as clear-cut as the theory of planned behaviour indicates, and in addition, the authors identify three aspects that may hinder this process: habitual processes, lack of control, and social reactions (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). The self-regulation perspective is also important here (Webb & Sheeran, 2006). The self-regulation perspective is also important here (see Bamberg et al., 2011) and control theory (feedback loops) has been used to explain the process of following a standard, or a goal, and in turn controlling behaviour, or effecting behaviour change (Carver & Scheier, 1982). In this regard, inertia processes can have an impact on several levels.

Normative aspects are important determinants in social psychological models of pro-environmental behaviour (e.g., Bamberg & Möser, 2007; White et al., 2009), and intervention research gives further support for the importance of norms, and descriptive norms in particular have been successful in promoting pro-environmental behaviour (e.g., Demarque Charalambides, Hilton, & Waroquier, 2015; Cialdini, 2007; Schultz et al., 2007). Social and personal norms can be about the moral convictions occurring within each individual, but it is probably also a social comparison process. One study investigated the dynamics involved in this process by having several students report on their feelings and their pro-environmental behaviours four times per day. The researchers found that a combination of descriptive norms and pride was relevant for subsequent behaviour (Bissing-Olson, Fielding, & Iyer, 2016). This indicates that the social comparison process is a foundation for a positive emotional process, that is, what maintains the behaviour is feeling good about doing something that we perceive as valuable and common in our social group. Inertia processes here might be anything that hinders feeling pride, and anything that hinders us from knowing what our social group does or values.

The decision-making process

An often-used model for environmentally significant situations is the social dilemma, or the resource dilemma (Gardner & Stern, 1996; Hardin, 1968). The indicated dilemma is often between short-term self-interest and long-term collective interests, and the decision-maker must decide whether to cooperate or defect (Dawes, 1980; Van Lange, Joireman, Parks, & Van Dijk, 2013).

In some cases, human beings have difficulties in making decisions, and this may also apply to decisions with regards to environmental issues. It is well known within psychology that decisions can be based on heuristics, which can influence our assessment of environmental risks (Böhm & Hanss, 2012). The availability heuristic can make us decide, or solve problems, based on what is easiest to become aware of, that which is in the forefront of our minds at any given time (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For example, one might believe a little less in global warming if the weather has been cold for a longer period. In addition, affect heuristics are probably very relevant for environmental issues—decisions can be guided by the degree to which different alternatives have implicit positive negative connotations (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007). These types of heuristics are relevant for decisions concerning climate change and the environment, and being aware of them can be advantageous for decision-makers. However, there is also a human tendency to postpone making decisions, and this tendency may present itself particularly in areas or topics where there is uncertainty or a lack of clarity (Anderson, 2003). It seems possible that notdoing something could have had some benefits in prehistoric times, perhaps because uncertainty was high; however, postponing decision-making in the current era simply because we perceive uncertainty may not be as appropriate. There are several examples from research on resource dilemmas where uncertainty and/or noise can reduce the number of decisions to cooperate (Van Lange et al., 2013). In addition, media can contribute to this noisy situation by communicating mixed messages—which can be a barrier to environmental behaviour and lead to denial (Gifford, 2011). Anticipated regret also influences the decision-making process (Zeelenberg, 1999) Taken together this means that if options have uncertain outcomes and there is a great chance for regret either way, then we have a recipe for a situation where human beings would prefer to do nothing or to postpone the decision.

Anderson (2003) defines “status quo bias” as the human tendency to hold a heightened preference for things as they presently are, and for thing to continue as they are now. That is, decision-makers prefer choosing the options that do not change anything at all or that do not require any action. There is a general inertia in our decision-system, and it is important to be aware of this on several levels of society. We often prefer options that do not change anything, decisions that do not require us to do anything, and we may prefer to postpone making any decisions at all (Anderson, 2003).

As mentioned above, this has a lot to do with perceived uncertainty. For example, uncertainty concerning the resource (for example the atmosphere) is directly associated with cooperation on managing the resource, that is, if there are doubts concerning the size of the resource, whether it is in the process of being drained or not, people tend to cooperate less (Van Lange et al., 2013). Research shows that if we are aware of the size of a resource, we use the principle of equality when distributing the resource; however, when there is no such information available, we use our own values as the guiding principles (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006). There is something important and general about this finding; if people are not able to draw information from the surroundings, they tend to regulate themselves, and guide their behaviour by internal cues. For example, when activating a self-focus in people, they may cooperate both more and less: those that are pro-self may cooperate less, those that are pro-social may cooperate more (Utz, 2004a). On the other hand, activating the notion of interdependency may influence people to cooperate more (Utz, 2004b). These results indicate that situational circumstances play an important part in whether people make cooperative choices or not. Moreover, whether they make environmentally responsible decisions or not.

There are many relevant processes to consider on a group level as well. For example, higher levels of stress may degrade decision-making in groups because people rely more on simplified models and cognitive heuristics (Kerr & Tindale, 2004). However, a review of decision-making and problem solving in groups is beyond the scope of the present article.

Habits and routines

In many cases, habitual processes fit the description of inertia processes. Habits are governed more by cues in the surroundings than by conscious reflection, and are learned behaviours (Gärling, Fujii, & Boe, 2001; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). The process of habits is the automatic performance of a behaviour due to situational constancy, and habit formation is the development of habitual responses controlled by cues (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). Given these definitions, one may argue that habits are stable interactional loops that in certain circumstances hinder green change. Research aimed at promoting pro-environmental behaviour has focused on breaking habits by changing the situation, for example in natural circumstances when people move to a new place (e.g., Bamberg, 2006; Verplanken & Roy, 2016). People may have habits at home or at work that are more or less environmentally friendly: what type of transportation we use, shopping habits and so on. Although habits can be a challenge for green change efforts at first, new behaviour patterns may ultimately lead to the formation of new habits. However, one problematic aspect here is that people with strong habits do not really focus on new information that is supplied to them (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999). This is interesting in itself because it seems almost to indicate a defensive process, and perhaps a more pronounced inertia. In an organizational context, habits can be compared with routines, and there may be some relation between them (Felin, Foss, Heimeriks, & Madsen, 2012). Routines are not necessarily rigid if-then constructs—although they may sometimes be repetitive patterns (Felin, Foss, Heimeriks, & Madsen, 2012). Either way, routines can be conceived of as obstacles to change. Organizational climate may supply an important context for routines, and their development.

Organizational climate

Researchers often conceive of organizational climate as a concept that captures important aspects of an organization, for example norms and values, it refers to shared perceptions among employees (Flamholtz & Randle, 2014). A great deal of research has been conducted using the safety climate concept (Zohar, 2014), and a meta-analysis shows that it is associated with accidents and safe behaviour (Christian et al., 2009), see also Kongsvik, Johnsen, and Sklet (2011). It is not such a stretch to envision an environmental climate, and a pro-environmental climate has been conceptualized (Norton, Zacher, & Ashkanasy, 2015). The authors also indicate three focus points for research: outcomes (e.g., behaviour); antecedents of climate; and how pro-environmental climate and culture manifests itself within organizations. Perhaps an explicit focus on processes could be fruitful as well. Climate can be weak and strong; when climate is weak there is a higher degree of variance in the organization (Flamholtz & Randle, 2014). This means that some employees may perceive an agreement on the topic pertinent, while others may not. Accordingly, when conceptualising pro-environmental climate as a process, we may include both levels of agreement and levels of endorsement of environmental issues. In particular, the weak/strong distinction relates directly to inertia processes. There will be more inertia in a strong low-endorsement climate, than in a weak climate when initiating change efforts.

There are unresolved issues concerning pro-environmental climate, both theoretically and methodologically (Norton et al., 2015), as is the case with organizational climate in general (Flamholtz & Randle, 2014). The issues may range from how to measure a strong, or weak climate, and at what level of aggregation (e.g., Zohar, 2014), and the relation between climate and organizational culture (e.g., Flamholtz & Randle, 2014). However, if one accepts that such shared perceptions can develop within an organization—it seems reasonable to assume that these can influence social norms, attitudes, behaviour and decision-making, and vice versa (e.g., Norton, Zacher, et al., 2015; Zohar, 2014).

A dynamic systems model?

The process model indicated in the following takes inspiration from Markov models in order to represent different states of the change process. See for example Vilcassim and Jain (1991) for an application of Markov models to behaviour change. By viewing organizations and individuals as dynamic systems it becomes possible to indicate two main categories of inertia processes: namely those that counteract change itself when it is attempted or initiated (type 1), and those that stabilizes the system in its current state (type 2).

Bronfenbrenner and Evans (2000) have defined process in the context of developmental psychology as a transference of energy in the system, that is, between the person and the environment. Proximal processes are most important for development and change, and refer to interactions that occur regularly and over some period (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000). An evolutionary analysis employing the dynamic systems model shows how social norms emerge in networks (communities), and points out how this is constrained by the decision-making system of human-beings, and group dynamics (Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003). Taken together, these two theoretical developments demonstrate how an organizational climate or culture can develop (see also Norton, Zacher, & Ashkanasy, 2015), but also that this can be constrained by common human tendencies. The organizational context also supplies a foundation for decision-making. One author has suggested looking at situations, (e.g., social situations), in terms of affordances (Reis, 2008). Affordances refer to the properties of the environment, the possibilities for an activity that the environment provides (Greeno, 1994), and can be thought of as functionally meaningful (Heft, 2013). Affordances supply a reference for behaviour and decision-making, opportunities to follow social norms, or not, and act in accordance with an attitude, or not (Reis, 2008). When there are no affordances for a certain behaviour, promoting this behaviour may be difficult.

Discussion

In order to promote green change in organizations and individuals it may be necessary to focus not only on the factors that support and are directly conducive to change, but also on processes that hinder change. Through a focus on inertia processes, we may address important aspects of dynamic systems that keep them stable, and identify how change can be facilitated. It is important to identify obstacles and determinants (Gifford, 2011), but a focus on processes can complement this research, and perhaps a stronger focus should be placed on proximal processes (see Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000).

The present article has been an attempt to draw attention towards the processes that maintain the current situation (e.g., status quo bias), and the processes that counter change when it is attempted. For example, constraints may include affordances that stabilize a certain behavioural pattern, and a strong non-environmental climate in an organization. Social dilemmas are situations that have a certain inertia with regards to green change because there is a tendency for people to behave a certain way when encountering them. Perceived uncertainty can even make these situations more difficult for people to manage (de Kwaadsteniet et al., 2006), which is a challenge for environmental sustainability. Uncertainty can be identified as an aspect of the social dilemma that contributes to type 1inertia; for example, as uncertainty increases it may be that change becomes more difficult. There is probably both a cognitive and an affective component to uncertainty (e.g., Anderson, 2003). Similarly, emotional processes have an impact on decision-making in general; for example, anticipated regret is implicated in the status quo bias (Anderson, 2003). When promoting change on an individual level, we may characterize habitual processes as both type 1 and 2 inertia. Habits make change efforts harder and it is more difficult to initiate change as well. Attempting change on an organisational level can be difficult when there is already an established culture that is incompatible with environmental sustainability. In these situations, it is important to acknowledge this and support the initiatives that do exist (see DuBois, Astakhova, DuBois, 2013). In addition, it may be relevant to focus in group dynamics and organisational conditions that contribute to inertia.

This article presented a few very broad theoretical frameworks relating to affordances, proximal processes, self-regulation, and dynamical systems. The advantage is that these may be fundamental to inertia processes, and obstacles to change; however, further developments need to be more concrete and formulate testable research questions, for example, by focusing on the relationship between status quo bias and pro-environmental organizational climate. Dynamic aspects, such as the hypothetical strength of concepts such as habits (Verplanken & Aarts, 1999), may also be considered. Moreover, as stated above, habits are often activated by situational cues, and it might be interesting to consider what happens if affordances are made less compatible with the habit. An explicit focus on processes, as found within psychotherapy research, may help further develop research on the psychology of environmental issues, and perhaps researchers might focus on micro level processes as well (see Elliott, 2010).

The present article represents a modest beginning of an exploration of inertia and status quo bias in environmental sustainability; hopefully these small steps toward a theory of inertia processes in green change can lead to some fruitful research efforts.

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Published Online: 2016-04-06
Published in Print: 2016-10-01

© 2016 Institute for Research in Social Communication, Slovak Academy of Sciences

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

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