Abstract
Split into two parts, the Empirical Paper Series on Secession and Constitutionalism explores the relationship between constitutionalism and secession. While the second part of the article will examine the constitutional arrangement towards secession that prevailed in the states that had a region secede since 1900, this first part discusses the relationship between indivisibility and secession clauses in current constitutions and the prevalence of secessionist movements worldwide.
Virtually all consequentialist claims contained in existing scholarship concerning the relationship between constitutionalism and secession fall within either one of two doctrinal creeds. Whereas the Indivisibilist School asserts that indivisibility clauses best prevent secessionism and that secession clauses necessarily prompt this phenomenon, the Secessionist School maintains that prohibiting secession is counter-effective and that recognising it as a right can help defuse secessionism by avoiding confrontational tactics.
These claims are assessed on the basis on the Cohesion Dataset, the first-ever census of all constitutional arrangements regarding secession currently operative throughout the world. Contrarily to what existing doctrinal claims would suggest, the relationship between these various constitutional arrangements and secessionism is not linear, but rather U-shaped: both indivisibility and secession clauses are significantly associated with more secessionist activity than average. It is in fact constitutions where secession is neither permitted nor prohibited that are correlated with the least secessionist activity.
Acknowledgements
I am deeply indebted to Professor Peter Cane of the University of Cambridge for his insightful guidance. I am also grateful to professors Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens and Karim Benyekhlef as well as to the Faculty of Law of the Université de Montréal and the Centre de recherche en droit public for their unwavering trust and generous financial support.
A Appendix to Section 3.2 – Cohesion Index
Part 1 – Distribution of points for indivisibility clauses
Types of indivisibility clauses | Points | |||
---|---|---|---|---|
Explicit | Declaratory | 15 | ||
Prohibitive | Subnational units | 15 | ||
Central state | 15 | |||
Eternity clause | 15 | |||
Implicit | Strong | Prohibition against referendums | 10 | |
Requirement for a national referendum | 10 | |||
Restrictions on rights and freedoms | General | 5 | ||
Freedom of association | 2 | |||
Political rights | 2 | |||
Freedom of speech, opinion and press | 2 | |||
Cultural and minority rights | 2 | |||
Legal rights | 2 | |||
General criminal offences | 5 | |||
Weak | Requirement for a qualified legislative majority | 5 | ||
State of emergency | 3 | |||
Roles and obligations | General | 3 | ||
State | 1 | |||
Head of state | 1 | |||
Executive | 1 | |||
Legislature | 1 | |||
Judiciary | 1 | |||
Military | 1 | |||
Subnational units | 1 | |||
Removal from office | State | 2 | ||
Head of state | 1 | |||
Executive | 1 | |||
Legislature | 1 | |||
Judiciary | 1 | |||
Military | 1 | |||
Subnational units | 1 | |||
Specific criminal offences | State | 2 | ||
Head of state | 1 | |||
Executive | 1 | |||
Legislature | 1 | |||
Judiciary | 1 | |||
Military | 1 |
B Part 2 – Distribution of points for secession clauses
Secession procedure | Competent authority to call the referendum and required majority to do so | Required referendum majority | Approval of secession | |||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Subnational unit | Central executive | 1/2 majority | 2/3 or absolute majority | No central approval required | Central approval required | |||||
Executive | Legislature | |||||||||
1/2 majority | 2/3 majority | |||||||||
Points | 20 (or) | 15 (or) | 10 (or) | 5 | + | 20 (or) | 10 | + | 20 (or) | 10 |
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