Abstract
Expressions are synonymous if they have the same semantic content. Complex expressions are synonymously isomorphic in Alonzo Church’s sense if one is obtainable from the other by a sequence of alphabetic changes of bound variables or replacements of component expressions by syntactically simple synonyms. Synonymous isomorphism provides a very strict criterion for synonymy of sentences. Several eminent philosophers of language hold that synonymous isomorphism is not strict enough. These philosophers hold that ‘Greeks prefer Greeks’ and ‘Greeks prefer Hellenes’ express different propositions even if they are synonymously isomorphic. They hold that the very recurrence (multiple occurrence) of ‘Greeks’ contributes to the proposition expressed something that indicates the very recurrence in question. Kit Fine argues that this thesis, which he labels semantic relationism calls for a radically new conception of semantics. I have argued that the relevant phenomenon is wholly pragmatic, entirely non-semantic. Here I supplement the case with a new argument. No cognition without recognition—or almost none. With this observation, standard Millianism has sufficient resources to confront Frege’s puzzle and related problems without injecting pragmatic phenomena where they do not belong.
About the author
Nathan Salmon is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he has taught since 1984. He graduated from UCLA (B. A. 1973; Ph.D. 1979). Salmon specializes in analytic metaphysics and philosophy of language. In 1984, the Council of Graduate Schools awarded him the Gustave Arlt Award in the Humanities for his book, Reference and Essence (1981). His second book, Frege’s Puzzle (1986), was selected by Five Books as one of the best five books on the philosophy of language.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to my audience at Pragmosophia, an international conference on pragmatics and philosophy, in Palermo, Sicily, and to Teresa Robertson for discussion.
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