“Personal Opinion” in Qurʾānic Exegesis: Medieval Debates and Interpretations of al-Tafsīr bi-l-Raʾy

: This article explores the long-contested question about the role of individual judgement vis-à-vis the authority of tradition in the interpretation of the Qurʾān. It focuses on the notion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy – interpretation of the Qurʾān by “personal opinion” – and offers an insight into medieval Muslim debates over the legitimacy of this type of exegesis, its alleged prophetic disapproval, and the scope and conditions of its use. Based on the Sunnī tafsīr works from the 3rd/9th to the 6th/12th centuries, the article examines how in the course of these debates Muslim authors negotiated the meaning of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy . Against the view that it encompassed any interpretation beyond tradition-based tafsīr , their reinterpre-tations of the term implied that philological, juridical, and Ṣūfī tafsīr could not be categorized as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy , thereby narrowing the meaning of this concept and broadening the scope of legitimate exegesis and interpretative authorities in Sunnī tafsīr tradition.


Is a Muslim thinker, however enlightened, justified in saying that the Qurʾān does not mean what devout Muslims have always thought it to mean? Once he has abandoned the traditional understanding of what is meant by faith, prophecy and Shariʿa, preserved and transmitted by responsible Muslims in each generation, on what grounds does he put forward his new interpretation, except that of unaided human reason, and ultimately of his own reason?
Albert Hourani1 The tension between personal judgment and the authority of tradition in the interpretation of the Qurʾān, highlighted in this citation from Albert Hourani, is not a new concern.For Hourani, writing in the mid-20th century, this tension was setting the limits to the possibility of a new interpretation of Islam, but it has long been at the heart of a wider discussion about interpretative authority with regard to the Qurʾān.What constitutes "traditional understanding" of the Qurʾān?How is "personal judgment" defined in the field of Qurʾānic exegesis?Is its use permitted?What is the scope of its application?Is it possible to interpret the Qurʾān with no recourse to individual judgment at all?These and other questions regarding the place of personal judgment in the interpretation of the Qurʾān have been and remain a matter of controversy among Muslim thinkers.This article sets out to explore one major focus of this controversy, namely the notion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy (interpretation of the Qurʾān by "personal opinion") by undertaking an enquiry into medieval Muslim debates surrounding this notion and its interpretations.
The term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy has been used in the Islamic tradition to designate a distinct type of exegesis.As its name suggests, it refers to interpretation based on individual judgment, in contrast to al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr (interpretation of the Qurʾān by transmitted material or tradition), conceived as being based on the interpretations from the Prophet Muḥammad, transmitted by the first generations of Muslims.However, al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy has been more than just a neutral term for a particular method of interpretation.Allegedly, the method of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy was condemned by the Prophet Muḥammad.2With the term overshadowed by this prophetic condemnation, to label an interpretation as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy also implied casting doubt on its legitimacy.3Against this background, the application of the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy did not go unchallenged and the question of what exactly constituted al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy remained a debated issue.
This article offers an insight into medieval Muslim debates about the legitimacy of the bi-l-raʾy exegesis, its alleged prophetic disapproval, and the scope and conditions of its use.It also examines how in the course of these debates Muslim scholars interpreted this notion.The scope of this article is limited to the Sunnī tradition, and its major sources comprise tafsīr works written in the period from the 3rd/9th to the 6th/12th centuries.Based on the examination of these sources, the article traces the debates between those who prohibited any tafsīr beyond the tradition-based exegesis, considering it al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, and the practitioners of tafsīr who defended their craft in the face of this opposition.It discusses the lines of reasoning and the arguments of both parties and highlights the practitioners' attempts at reinterpretation of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, which seem to have followed two directions.On one side, they aimed to prove that philological, juridical, and even Ṣūfī interpretations were not part of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, thus providing a negative definition for the term.On the other, while the term itself with its negative connotation has been preserved in the Sunnī tradition, it was redefined as tafsīr based on mere opinion, or tafsīr governed by whim, fancy, and personal agendas.In this sense the term has been primarily applied to sectarian traditions of tafsīr.Although the article provides only a sketch of the debates and interpretations of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, inevitably colored by the sources available for examination, this could potentially serve as a point of departure for further research on the history of the notion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.
The article is divided into four main sections, followed by a conclusion.It begins with an overview of modern scholarship on the al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr typology that sets a background for the enquiry into al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.The next part addresses the origins of the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.The third section discusses the debates over al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy as presented in the three medieval works of tafsīr -the tafsīr of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d.early 5th/11th century),4 the tafsīr of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d.450/1058), and the anonymous Kitāb al-Mabānī,5 and highlights their major themes and arguments.In the last part, the focus is on the various interpretations of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy resulting from the efforts of medieval Muslim scholars to determine exactly what this term referred to in the aḥādīth that portray the Prophet Muḥammad as condemning its practice.The discussion of these interpretations is based on the account from Sharḥ Taʾwīlāt ahl al-sunna, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī's (d.539/1144) commentary on the tafsīr of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (333/944).

The typology of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr in modern scholarship
Like many other terms in tafsīr studies, the terms al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr have been adopted into modern scholarship drawing from Islamic sources.This offers the undisputed benefits of approaching the tafsīr tradition on its own terms rather than through Western-coined concepts.However, it also entails the risk of taking a particular perspective of one's sources to stand for "the Islamic perspective," thus privileging it over others.This could be especially problematic when one is dealing with sensitive concepts, such as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.One example of how a particular perspective might inform the treatment of this concept is the account of al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr and al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy typology provided in the influential modern study on tafsīr by the al-Azhar scholar Muḥammad Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī -a three-volume al-  In this work, described by Walid Saleh as a Salafī history of tafsīr,7 al-Dhahabī clearly privileges al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr, which he defines as interpretation based on the transmitted material from the Prophet Muḥammad, his Companions (al-ṣaḥāba) and their Successors (al-tābiʿūn), as well as on the explanations given in the Qurʾānic text itself.8Its opposite, al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, is defined as interpretation by means of independent judgment (ijtihād).9This judgment, al-Dhahabī explains, is conditioned by the interpreter's prior knowledge of the Arabic language and the Arabs' manner of speaking, Arabic expressions and their different meanings, the interpreter's reliance on pre-Islamic poetry, his knowledge of the circumstances in which the Qurʾānic verses were revealed (asbāb al-nuzūl), the abrogating and abrogated verses (al-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh), and by the use of other "devices" (adawāt).10The reference to "other devices" extends the list of the disciplines that anyone wishing to go beyond al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr ought to master; they are compared to safety valves, preserving the commentator from the danger of speaking ignorantly about God.Al-Dhahabī enumerates 15 such devices: lexicography (ʿilm al-lugha); syntax (ʿilm al-naḥw); morphology (ʿilm al-ṣarf); etymology (al-ishtiqāq); three branches of rhetoric dealing respectively with the verbal expressions of concepts (ʿilm al-maʿānī), metaphorical language (ʿilm al-bayān), and figures of speech (ʿilm al-badīʿ); knowledge of the variant readings of the Qurʾān (ʿilm al-qirāʾāt); the principles of theology (ʿilm uṣūl al-dīn or ʿilm al-kalām); the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh); occasions of revelation (asbāb al-nuzūl); the stories of the prophets (al-qiṣaṣ); the abrogating and the abrogated verses (al-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh); the aḥādīth that elucidate the general (al-mujmal) and the obscure (al-mubham); and a special knowledge (ʿilm al-mawhaba) that God grants to those who live a pious life.11He remarks, however, that his list is not exhaustive, and that other scholars have offered different lists of knowledge prerequisites for the bi-l-raʾy commentator.In this way, al-Dhahabī seems to acknowledge a degree of subjectivity and flexibility in defining al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, to the extent that his open-ended list of the disciplines that a bi-l-raʾy commentator ought to acquire might indeed suggest an open-ended definition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy itself.But this attitude changes when he further explains that al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy is subdivided into two types: al-jāʾiz (the permitted) and al-madhmūm (the objectionable).12The value judgment already implicit in these terms becomes manifest when al-Dhahabī applies them to classify retrospectively the actual works of tafsīr.He identifies the al-jāʾiz type with the Sunnī tradition of interpretation (tafsīr ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamāʿa) and the al-madhmūm type with the tafsīr of the "unorthodox" groups (al-firaq al-mubta-diʿa).13 The open-ended definition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, the evaluation implicit in the terms "permitted" and "objectionable," and the clear stance on sectarian traditions that one perceives in al-Dhahabī's account, typify the challenges one might encounter when relying on traditional Islamic sources.In some works on tafsīr these challenges are outweighed by the aim of introducing the reader to the "traditional Muslim approach" to tafsīr, and the perspective of the sources naturally tends to be reproduced.14In others, however, the terms al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr 12 The word madhmūm is translated here as "objectionable" since it is contrasted to "the permitted" (al-jāʾiz); however, elsewhere in this article it is translated as "blameworthy" when contrasted to the "praiseworthy" (maḥmūd) tafsīr.The commentaries classified as of al-madhmūm type are not given in a list but rather discussed in the sections dealing with the "unorthodox" groups, covering the Muʿtazila, the Twelver Shīʿites, the Ismāʿīlis, the Bābis and Bahāʾis, the Zaydis, and the Khawārij.14 For example, Abdul-Raof 2012.
and al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy are used primarily to describe the format of the commentary, making no distinctions along sectarian lines15 and setting aside the claim to authenticity of the advocates of al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr.16Increasingly, however, the effectiveness of the terms al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr for the analysis of the tafsīr tradition is being called into question.Andrew Rippin has noted that this typology "[does not] provide a sufficient analytical tool by which one may characterize the wide variety of books and approaches which are contained within the broadly-defined genre of tafsīr, since it concentrates on a superficial understanding of the form of the work with little attention to their underlying substance."17Its subjective character has been emphasized by Jane Dammen McAuliffe, who saw in the application of the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy an "evaluation that [was] made, with varying degrees of opprobrium, by those who privilege commentary that is based primarily on traditional reports."18Adding to these disadvantages is the implicit assumption among the champions of al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr that while al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy relies on human agency, rationality, and reasoning, al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr stands for "authentic" and authoritative interpretation faithfully transmitted from the Prophet Muḥammad by the first generations of Muslims.This assumption has been challenged by the argument that the processes of transmission, evaluation, selection, and arrangement of the transmitted materials in the commentary are similarly affected by human agency.19On this ground, for example, the classification of the famous tafsīr of al-Ṭabarī, regarded as the highest achievement of the al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr tradition, has been questioned.20 In the light of this critical reevaluation of the traditional tafsīr typology, Abdullah Saeed offers a compromise.21Dealing with the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and acknowledging its "uncomfortable place" in the discipline of tafsīr, Saeed aims to show its importance by providing arguments in favor of its legitimacy.22He draws attention to the need both for linguistic interpretation of the Qurʾān, as even native speakers of Arabic may find it difficult to understand the text, and for juristic interpretations.In addition, personal reflection itself is encouraged in 15 See Bar-Asher 1999 andLawson 1993, both dealing with the Twelver Shīʿite al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr tradition.16 For discussion of the authenticity of exegetical aḥādīth, see Berg 2000.17 Rippin 2012. 18 McAuliffe 2003, 314.19 See, however, the section on the influence of the commentator's personality in the case of al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr in Al-Dhahabī 1976, I, 155-156. 20 For example, Speight 1988, 43. 21 Saeed 2006, 64-66. 22 Ibid., 57.several Qurʾānic verses, and there is also a need to address the fact that several commentaries accepted by the Sunnī tradition can in fact be classified as "tafsīr by opinion."These arguments of Saeed resonate with those advanced by medieval Sunnī scholars, and similarly the "legitimation" that is advocated has its limits.It is not extended to the "unacceptable" kind of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, which, according to Saeed, refers to any of the four following cases: when the interpreter rejects the most obvious meaning of the text and imposes a less obvious meaning; when the aim of the interpreter is to find justification for his view in the Qurʾān; when the interpreter chooses one meaning among the several possible, disregarding the context and other verses of the Qurʾān; and when the interpreter has a preconceived idea that he supports by choosing particular verses, thus "imposing a particular meaning on the text rather than searching for the most legitimate meaning."23At a further extreme on the spectrum, Farid Esack shares a critical perspective on the traditional typology of tafsīr.He deals with its three-fold variant, comprising al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr, al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, and al-tafsīr bi-l-ishāra (interpretation based on allusion).24Esack argues that this typology represents an inbuilt mechanism for rejecting the "heretical" other, developed by the proponents of Muslim "orthodoxy" in their efforts to secure their own legitimacy.25In his critique of this typology he points to several inherent problems.Beginning with the aforementioned argument that al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr is not innocent of personal interests and biases, he further problematizes the very set of disciplines that a commentator is required to master in order to prove his or her "scholarly credibility."For Esack, these requirements are subject to particular historical conditions.26Furthermore, he notes that the boundaries between the three types of tafsīr in question are blurred,27 and also that the attempts by the proponents of "orthodoxy" to delegitimize other traditions did not prevent them from acknowledging the contributions those traditions had to offer.28His conclusion emphasizes that the complexity of the act of interpretation does not allow for clearcut categorizations and typologies.29 23 Ibid., 67.24 On the meaning of this term, see Nwyia andEd. 2012. 25 Esack 2002, 136. 26 Ibid., 136.27 Esack's example here is that when the works of the deeply pious interpreters are classified as al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr (not al-tafsīr bi-l-ʿishāra), this implies that neither their piety nor spirituality affected their interpretations.28 For example, the popular commentary of the Muʿtazilite al-Zamakhsharī.Ibid.,137. 29 Ibid.,137.Perhaps the strongest critique of the traditional typology of tafsīr is offered by Walid Saleh.Saleh maintains, echoing the abovementioned scholars, that this typology represents an "ideological division of the genre [of tafsīr] that was aimed at consolidating the mainstream Sunnī interpretative tradition and undermining the non-Sunnī approaches as well as deviant Sunnī interpretations," and that it "has no basis in the genre itself."30He goes a step further, however, and argues that the use of this typology in theorizing on the history of tafsīr is of recent origin.This he traces to the 20th-century internal Sunni struggles over Qurʾānic hermeneutics, which manifested in writings on the history of tafsīr and publication of editions of tafsīr texts.31In these struggles, he argues, the Salafi movement, a "radical fringe," has won over the "mainstream" Sunni tradition by establishing "a sort of complete hegemony on hermeneutical theorisation,"32 that is to say by making the al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr and al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy typology the cornerstone of the hermeneutical theorizing, with al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr at the top of the hierarchy of various types of exegesis.This is corroborated by Saleh's historical investigation of the term al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr with the conclusion that there is "no evidence of the use of the term as an analytical term in the indigenous scholarship on the nature of tafsīr before 1940.What we find is al-tafsīr bi-l-ʿilm, but never al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr."33Saleh maintains that when the term al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr was first introduced in the textbook on the Qurʾānic disciplines authored by the al-Azhar scholar ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Zurqānī, it was used "to argue for the proto-Salafī position."34Ever since, it has been widely used in Arabic literature on tafsīr, and scholars in the West were obliged to use the term, being "under illusion that it is an old and native analytical term."35At the same time, Saleh's perspective on al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr does not deny the evident, namely that there had been advocates for al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr, in fact if not in name or under a different name,36 long before 1940.The roots of their tradition go back to the middle of the 2nd/8th to 3rd/9th centuries, the period that witnessed the opposition to the nascent discipline of tafsīr.This tradition had its moments of flourishing beyond this early time though, particularly in the 4th/10th century and the late 13th/19th to early 14th/20th centuries.It counted among its supporters a range of distinguished scholars, including Ibn Taymiyya (d.728/1328), Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373), Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), Muḥammad al-Shawkanī (d. 1250/1834), and Muḥammad Siddīq Ḥasan Khan (d. 1307/1890).37Nevertheless, Saleh emphasizes, it has always been on the margins of the tafsīr tradition, lacked "the theoretical foundation to withstand the constant attacks from its foes," and even "grand figures of the Sunnī establishment were ruthless in their ridicule of this trend."38If the proponents of what in the 20th century would be called al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr constituted only a marginal trend historically, the "mainstream" Sunni tradition, according to Saleh, devised the term to designate its own approach to tafsīr -al-tafsīr bi-l-ʿilm (interpretation based on knowledge).What was the meaning of this term, so crucial for the "mainstream" Sunni exegesis?"The problem, -Saleh writes, -has always been that one was not sure what exactly this term means.Yet, it was never perceived as being restricted to the early three generations as such."39Alongside the term al-tafsīr bi-l-ʿilm, he adds, the mainstream Sunni tradition used the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy as a means to disapprove exegesis of their opponents, while in reality "the distinction between the two modes turned out to be a mirage."40Saleh's investigation of the term al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr reinforces the conclusion that the term al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr should not be considered an effective analytical term.It also distinguishes between the two hermeneutical approaches within the Sunnī tradition and argues that the "radical Sunni hermeneutical approach" represented by the champions of al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr "has nothing to do" with the mainstream Sunnī exegesis.41Third, and most relevant for our topic, it draws attention to the significance of terminology that medieval and modern Muslim scholars used in their discussions of tafsīr.It demonstrates how the study of the key terms, their origins, interpretations, and functions can illuminate broader intellectual trends, debates, and struggles in the history of Qurʾānic exegesis.
Drawing on the above studies, this article focuses on the second category in the al-tafsīr bi-l-maʾthūr and al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy typology -the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.It shares the approach that undermines uncritical reliance on this traditional typology of tafsīr.It also corroborates the assessment that the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy functioned as a means to question the legitimacy of disapproved interpretations, as part of the processes of constructing and maintaining "orthodoxy" in the field of tafsīr.However, this article also attempts to broaden the discussion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy beyond the functional aspects of this term (without diminishing their importance).It aims to explore the making of the notion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy by addressing the question of its origins, documenting the ways in which medieval Sunnī authors defined this term, and shedding light on the debates about the legitimacy of the bi-l-raʾy exegesis.While dealing with the medieval Sunnī tafsīr tradition, this article builds on Saleh's assumption that this tradition is not homogenous and incorporates distinct hermeneutical trends: tradition-oriented (the "radical hermeneutical approach" in Saleh's terminology) and philology-jurisprudence-oriented (Saleh's "mainstream approach").The debate over the prohibition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and various attempts to reinterpret this notion, this article suggests, is a reflection of the initial tension between these approaches, giving way to their gradual accommodation and harmonizationthe trend described in Saleh's study by an elusive and as yet insufficiently documented term al-tafsīr bi-l-ʿilm.

Al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy: in search of origins
It is difficult to determine when exactly the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy originated.Those who have opposed al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy traced its prohibition all the way back to the Prophet Muḥammad.Several sayings, understood as condemning al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, have been attributed to him.The following three, listed in al-Tirmidhī's (d.279/892) collection of aḥādīth under the rubric What has been related about the one who interprets the Qurʾān by his personal opinion, have often been mentioned in discussions of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy:42 1. Maḥmūd ibn Ghaylān related from Bishr ibn al-Sarrī -from Sufyān -from ʿAbd al-Aʿlā -from Saʿīd ibn Jubayr -from Ibn ʿAbbās, that the Messenger of God said, "Whoever speaks (qāla) about the Qurʾan without knowledge (bi-ghayr ʿilm) let him take his seat in the fire."43 2. Sufyān ibn Wakīʿ related from Suwayd ibn ʿAmr al-Kalbī -from Abū ʿAwānafrom ʿAbd al-Aʿlā -from Saʿīd ibn Jubayr -from Ibn ʿAbbās, that the Prophet said, "Be wary of transmitting a tradition from me except for that about which you have knowledge (ittaqū l-ḥadīth ʿannī illā mā ʿalimtum); and whoever intentionally ascribes a lie to me (man kadhaba ʿalayya mutaʿammidan) let him take his seat in the fire; and whoever speaks (qāla) about the Qurʾan according to his personal opinion (bi-raʾyihi) let him take his seat in the fire."44 3. ʿAbd ibn Ḥumayd related from Ḥabbān ibn Hilāl -from Suhayl ibn ʿAbdallāh -from Abū ʿImrān al-Jawnī -from Jundub ibn ʿAbdallāh, that the Messenger of God said, "Anyone who speaks about the Qurʾan on the basis of his personal opinion (raʾy), even if he reaches the correct interpretation, he has erred (fa-aṣāba fa-qad akhṭaʾa)."45The task of investigating the authenticity of these aḥādīth and their variants would require an independent study, but it should be noted here that concerns about their authenticity have been raised on several accounts.There was no agreement, for example, on the reliability of ʿAbd al-Aʿlā ibn ʿĀmir who figures in the asānīd of the first and the second aḥādīth.46Also, the second ḥadīth can be considered as belonging to a cluster of aḥādīth that talk about the punishment for intentionally lying about the Prophet.This cluster was analyzed by Gautier Juynboll, who concluded that its "breeding ground" was the Sunnī traditionalist circles in Iraq at the end of the 2nd/8th to the beginning of the 3rd/9th centuries.47As for the third ḥadīth, it was described by al-Tirmidhī himself as unusual (gharīb), while several medieval ḥadīth scholars regarded Suhayl ibn ʿAbdallāh (Suhayl ibn Abī Ḥazm) as an untrustworthy transmitter.48What also points to the later provenance or limited circulation of these aḥādīth is that the texts from this period dealing with the question of the prohibition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy do not seem to treat these aḥādīth as the primary proof for it.For example, in the tafsīr of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī (d.211/827) the section on the interpretation of the Qurʾān according to one's personal opinion includes 10 traditions, of which only 1 is traced back to the Prophet.49Similarly, Kitāb Faḍāʾīl al-Qurʾān of al-Qāsim ibn Sallām al-Harawī (d.224/839) includes a chapter on the same subject, yet none of the 11 traditions it contains goes back to the Prophet; they are traced only to the generations of the Companions and Successors.50 The search for the notion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy at the time of the first generations of Muslims inevitably brings us to the long-standing and still unresolved scholarly debate about the opposition to exegesis in early Islam.51The nature and the time of this opposition have been debated; what is of interest to our discussion is that there is also a disagreement between Ignaz Goldziher and Harris Birkeland regarding the meaning of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy during this early period.Goldziher maintained that from the earliest times in Islamic history until the end of the 2nd/8th -the beginning of the 3rd/9th centuries tafsīr was discouraged and there was opposition to the two types of interpretations of the Qurʾān: narrative exegesis, that is to say stories about the Prophets (qiṣaṣ), and interpretations based on opinion (al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy) and personal inclination (bi-l-hawā), which referred to dogmatic exegesis.52Birkeland, on the other hand, suggested that there were two movements of opposition to Qurʾānic exegesis.He maintained that for the first Muslims interpretation of the Qurʾān was a natural activity, but toward the beginning of the 2nd/8th century an opposition to exegesis developed among some pious Muslims, including such figures as Shaqīq ibn Salama Abū Wāʾil and al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn Abī Bakr."To the representatives of this opposition," Birkeland says, "originally every tafsīr signified tafsīr bi-r-raʾy.To them the ḥadīṯ was represented by the Koran itself."53The reason for their opposition to exegesis was their austere piety.They, however, seem to have constituted only a small minority during a time when, according to Birkeland, the disciples of Ibn ʿAbbās "really exercised tafsīr," even though the authors of the later biographical literature tried to downplay their involvement in exegesis.54Aversion to tafsīr out of piety continued in later generations, the main example being the grammarian al-Aṣmaʿī (d.213/828) who reportedly refused to interpret the Qurʾān.But with the rise of different "heretical" opinions and factions, especially Muʿtazilites who used a dialectical method of interpretation of the Qurʾān, the orthodox scholars began to employ the same methods as their opponents.Thus, the initial opposition to any tafsīr was replaced by the opposition to al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and bi-l-hawā in contrast to al-tafsīr bi-l-ʿilm.This new opposition movement was associated with the famous traditionist Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d.241/855), whose motives "emanated from critical theories of sound tradition" and who "only opposed tafsīr as a recognised science."55Birkeland's argument therefore suggests that the meaning of the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy changed from 51 For the overview of this debate, see in Leemhuis 1988and Berg 2000, 65-105. 52 Goldziher 2006, 36-42. 53 According to Birkeland, it should be expected that they permitted interpretations by the sound traditions, but they themselves "would not have anything to do with them." Birkeland 1955, 9-10. 54 Ibid., 25. 55 Ibid., 19.any interpretation to interpretations that were not based on ʿilm, ʿilm here understood as knowledge of the tradition.On this last point, that the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy was used in the traditionist circles at the end of the 2nd/8th and beginning of the 3rd/9th centuries to refer to interpretations that were not based on sound traditions, there is a general agreement among the participants in the debate.
From the 3rd/9th century onwards, works of the faḍāʾil al-Qurʾān genre and introductions to commentaries on the Qurʾān often contain chapters on ra'y in exegesis.These are usually juxtaposed with chapters that praise the task of interpretation, thus reflecting their authors' positions of compromise.The concern about raʾy in exegesis, reflected in these works, has been considered as part of a broader debate on raʾy.56Norman Calder, for instance, regarded it as part of the debate between the traditionists (aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth) and rationalists (aṣḥāb al-raʾy) in jurisprudence, and in the aḥādīth condemning al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy he saw a manifestation of Sunnī orthodoxy in the field of tafsīr.57The close connection between the debates on raʾy in jurisprudence and raʾy in exegesis has been mentioned in passing by several other scholars as well,58 but it is yet to be investigated systematically.This important connection notwithstanding, there developed a fully-fledged debate that centered on raʾy in Qurʾānic exegesis and that is the subject of the two remaining sections of this article.

Al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy debated Three medieval accounts of the debates over al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy
Medieval works of tafsīr often contain statements cautioning against the practice of al-tafsīr bi-raʾy.Karen Bauer's analysis of the introductions to the 12 selected Qurʾān commentaries from the 4th/10th to the 6th/12th centuries, identified this as one of the major tropes therein.59Explicitly confirming the disapproval of al-tafsīr bi-raʾy, often with reference to one of the aforementioned prophetic aḥādīth, probably helped the commentators to preempt potential accusations that they were engaging in al-tafsīr bi-raʾy.However, while warning against this particular type of tafsīr, the commentators also provided justification for the craft of tafsīr as such by praising the knowledge of the Qurʾān and its exegesis.The introduction to al-Ṭabarī's (d.310/923) tafsīr, as one example, contains a section on the traditions that prohibit interpretation of the Qurʾān by personal opinion (bi-l-raʾy), a section that enumerates traditions encouraging knowledge of tafsīr, and the third section about the traditions that have been misinterpreted by those who disapprove of interpretation of the Qurʾān.In these three sections, al-Ṭabarī not only lists respective traditions but also alludes to the arguments of the opponents of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and offers some of his own comments on this issue.The recurrence of these arguments and supporting proofs, including specific verses of the Qurʾān and aḥādīth, in al-Ṭabarī's and other commentaries point to the ongoing controversy over the prohibition of al-tafsīr bi-raʾy.However, few tafsīr works explicitly mention this controversy or provide coherent accounts of the reasoning and arguments of those who prohibited al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and their opponents.60This section examines the three works that do so -namely, the tafsīr of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī (d.early 5th/11th century),61 the tafsīr of Abū l-Ḥasan al-Māwardī (d.450/1058),62 and the anonymous Kitāb al-Mabānī.63 Although, as we will see, the contexts of their references to the debates over al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and the amount of the offered details differ, these works reaffirm that such debates did take place, give some indication as to their participants (identified as certain groups, not individuals), and, most importantly, provide insights into the arguments, objections, counterarguments, and proofs employed by the opposing parties in the course of these debates.Taken together, these arguments, in turn, provide a broader framework that would enable us to read the isolated references to al-tafsīr bi-raʾy in various medieval commentaries on the Qurʾān, such as al-Ṭabarī's, in dialogue with each other, to trace elaborations of the recurrent themes, and identify the contributions of individual commentators to these debates.

a) Tafsīr of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī
The first of the three works under discussion is the tafsīr of al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī.64Unlike al-Māwardī and the author of Kitāb al-Mabānī who, as will be shown below, were taking a side in the debate, al-Iṣfahānī is speaking from the position of a neutral observer.Indeed, his brief account of the debate serves as a framing theme for the main subject of the chapter -the discussion of the devices that a commentator of the Qurʾān requires.Presenting the debate, al-Iṣfahānī says that scholars have disagreed on whether any knowledgeable person (dhū ʿilm) is allowed to interpret the Qurʾān.Some of them were very strict and did not allow anyone, even a deeply knowledgeable and educated scholar who possessed knowledge of inference from indications (dalīl), jurisprudence (fiqh), grammar (naḥw), historical reports (akhbār), and traditions (āthār), to interpret anything from the Qurʾān.They maintained that he should limit himself to the interpretations related from the Prophet, the Companions who witnessed the revelation, and the Successors who studied with them.To support their view, they referred to the prophetic aḥādīth disapproving of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy65 and to the report about Abū Bakr's refusal to interpret the Qurʾān according to his personal opinion, discussed in section c).Their opponents, arguing for the opposite view, in turn adduced verse 29 from sūra 38, "A book We have revealed to you, full of blessings, so that they might reflect upon its verses, and that those of understanding may receive admonition."66 Al-Iṣfahānī then explains that some authorities considered these two positions as being insufficient (al-taqṣīr) and exceeding the proper bounds (al-ghuluww), respectively.According to them, those who restricted tafsīr to the transmitted material (al-manqūl) were neglecting much of what was necessary.67At the same time, those who allowed anybody to indulge in tafsīr were laying it open to disorder (al-takhlīṭ), and not considering the last part of the Q 29:38, "so that those of understanding may receive admonition" that the champions of this view cited as their proof.
Concluding that the debate makes it necessary to explain what the Qurʾān contains and what a commentator requires in order to interpret it, al-Iṣfahānī proceeds to the main subject of his chapter.He says that the Qurʾān contains 64 Al-Iṣfahānī 1984, 93-97.65 These are the first and the third aforementioned prophetic aḥadīth, as well as the variant "Whoever speaks about the Qurʾān according to his personal opinion has disbelieved (fa-qad kafara)."66 Translations from the Qurʾān in this article are based on the translation of Abdullah Yusuf Ali with slight modifications.The Holy Qurʾān 1946.67 Cf.Rashīd al-Dīn Maybudī's tafsīr.Keeler 2006, 41. knowledge pertaining to belief (al-iʿtiqād) and knowledge pertaining to practice (al-ʿamal), which complement each other.To attain these two types of knowledge from the Qurʾān it is necessary that a commentator should rely on the 10 disciplines: philology (ʿilm al-lugha); etymology (al-ishtiqāq); syntax (al-naḥw); variant readings of the Qurʾān (al-qirāʾāt); traditions and reports (al-āthār wa-l-akhbār); knowledge of traditions (sunan) transmitted from the Prophet and those who witnessed the revelation, what they agree on and disagree about; the principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh); the discipline of achieving profound understanding and renunciation (ʿilm al-fiqh wa-l-zuhd); theology (ʿilm al-kalām); and knowledge granted by God (ʿilm al-mawhiba).One who has mastered these disciplines and bases his interpretation on them ceases to be a bi-l-raʾy commentator.One who is lacking in knowledge of some disciplines that are not obligatory for the interpretation of the Qurʾān and, being aware of this, turns to knowledgeable people in order to learn from them and be guided by what they say, is not counted among the bi-l-raʾy commentators either, God willing.As for him who interprets the Qurʾān according to his personal opinion, this is a person who does not have this knowledge but interprets the Qurʾān by guesses and assumptions.
It is about such a person the Prophet said that he is "mistaken, even if he has achieved the correct interpretation," because he is saying things that he does not know.In the conclusion to this chapter, reasserting the special status of the Companions and Successors, al-Iṣfahānī says that it is essential for anyone who embarks on the task of interpretation to be God-fearing and seek protection from all the vices of the self and from pride, and that he should be doubting his understanding of the Qurʾān even more than did the Salaf who were closely associated with the Prophet and witnessed the process of the revelation.

b) Tafsīr of al-Māwardī
The second reference to the debate over al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy comes from the al-Nukat wa-l-ʿuyūn of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Māwardī.In the introduction, the author mentions the controversy about al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy in the context of his argument that reflection and contemplation are indispensable to understanding the meaning of the Qurʾān, intuitive understanding of its wording being insufficient for this.Citing the ḥadīth "Anyone who speaks about the Qurʾān on the basis of his personal opinion (raʾy), even if he reaches the correct interpretation he has erred," al-Māwardī says that some cautious people who had little knowledge or experience took this ḥadīth literally (ʿalā ẓāhirihi) and refrained from interpreting the Qurʾān by ijtihād based on the clarity of its evidence, except where there was a sound tradition (naql ṣaḥīḥ) and an unambiguous text pointing to it.For al-Māwardī, who is clearly in favor of interpreting the Qurʾān by ijtihād, their position is problematic because it leads to a deviation from the command of God who has called His creation to worship Him, addressing them in a clear Arabic language (lisān ʿarabī mubīn), and has furnished ways for His creation to infer His commands (istinbāṭ aḥkāmihi), as stated in sūra 4, verse 83 of the Qurʾān, "But if they had referred it to the Messenger, or to those charged with authority among them, then those among them who can derive from it (yastanbiṭūnahu) would have known about it."Had the position of those cautious people been right, al-Māwardī argues, this would imply that the word of God could not be understood, and the message that God intended to convey by it would remain unknown.The Qurʾān would become like an obscure riddle (al-lughz al-muʿammā) and cease to be a proof (baṭala al-iḥtijāj bi-hi)."And I seek refuge in God," concludes al-Māwardī, "from saying things about the Qurʾān that could lead [people] to refrain from it and desist from using it as a proof."68He then adds that the meaning of the abovementioned ḥadīth that the opponents of interpretation by ijtihad followed, provided this ḥadīth is sound, is that those who interpret the Qurʾān according to their personal opinion and not according to the literal meaning of its wording have achieved the right interpretation (alḥaqq), but made a mistake regarding the evidence (al-dalīl) that they followed.69

c) Kitāb al-Mabānī
In contrast to al-Māwardī's brief reference and al-al-Iṣfahānī's concise account, the debate is discussed in greater length and detail in the anonymous Kitāb al-Mabānī li-naẓm al-maʿānī.This work is known from the unique manuscript that contains an introduction, which has been published and is a basis for the following discussion, and a commentary on the Qurʾān up to sūra 15. 70  The author of Kitāb al-Mabānī presents the debate as taking place between the practitioners of tafsīr (ahl al-tafsīr) and their opponents.He cites five reports implying that the Companions and Successors were reluctant to interpret the Qurʾān and even the Prophet himself interpreted only a few verses taught to him by Jibrīl,74 and states that these and similar reports have been used as a pretext (dharīʿa) to defame those who engaged in the interpretation of the Qurʾān.75This, he says, was what the Zanādiqa attempted to do76 in order to prevent the umma having a clear grasp of the religion it followed.They were followed by two other parties.The first party is described by the author as the "ignorant people" (juhhāl) who, lacking in knowledge, confined themselves to preoccupation with the meaning of the Qurʾānic words alone (maʿānī al-Qurʾān).Those people, he comments, were too proud to learn from the masters of tafsīr and remained content with their own ignorance.The second party comprised two groups: the Rāfiḍa77 who thought that the only way to learn about religion was to follow the infallible Imām, and the Ḥashwiyya78 who based their position on the aforementioned sayings of the Pious Forefathers (Salaf) and their warnings against speaking about the Qurʾān unless this was necessary.Siding with the practitioners of tafsīr, the author of Kitāb al-Mabānī sets out to refute their opponents.First, he says, he will explain that it is wrong to restrict tafsīr to the literal meaning of the Qurʾān and stories from it, as people do; then he will discuss the aforementioned reports, respond to them, and clarify their underlying reasons.79 Accordingly, the author first addresses the party who insisted that knowing the literal meaning of the Qurʾānic words was sufficient and there was no need for tafsīr.Citing sūra 38, verse 29, "A Book We have revealed to you, full of blessings, so that they might reflect upon its verses, and that those of understanding may receive admonition," and sūra 16, verse 89, "And We have revealed to you the Book explaining all things," he argues that the former verse encourages reflection -and that this reflection (tadabbur) is in fact interpretation (al-taʾawwul) and understanding of the Qurʾān, not just its memorization or listening to it being recited.While the latter verse suggests that since not everything has been explained in the literal wording of the text, the Qurʾān must contain aspects that need to be inferred through reflection.Therefore, both verses point to the necessity of tafsīr.80In turn, the author's opponents cite sūra 29, verse 51, "Is it not sufficient for them that We have revealed to you the Book that is recited to them?" and declare, "If one is not satisfied with the Book revealed by God, then nothing would satisfy him."81The author responds by arguing that this verse only implies that the Qurʾān suffices as a miracle proving the prophetic mission of Muḥammad but has no implications for tafsīr.He adds that it has been well known that relying on the literal meaning of the Qurʾānic text alone is not sufficient, because in order to understand the details of such matters as prayer, fasting, or almsgiving, it is not enough to rely on the literal meaning of the Qurʾānic passages mentioning them, and is necessary to refer to the prophetic sunna.
The next question raised by the author's opponents concerns the exclusive role of the Prophet Muḥammad in interpreting the Qurʾān, supported, according to them, by God's command in sūra 16, verse 44, "We sent down to you the message so that you may explain clearly (li-tubayyina) to people what was sent down to them."The opponents ask why the author is not content with the interpretations coming from the Prophet and needs to extend the practice of tafsīr to others after him.He replies that while he agrees that the Prophet was commanded to interpret the Qurʾān, the Prophet's interpretation corresponded to the needs of his time and his people, and later generations were in need of further interpretation.It is also possible, he adds, that the Prophet's explanations were given in a general manner, and it became necessary to elaborate them further.82 Having addressed the arguments of the first group, the author moves to the refutation of the Ḥashwiyya by discussing the abovementioned traditions about the Companions and Successors who refrained from interpreting the Qurʾān.He begins with the tradition about Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq who, when asked to interpret the phrase "God has power over all things (ʿalā kull shayʾ muqīn)" in sūra 4, verse 85, replied, "What earth shall bear me if I speak about the Qurʾān what I know not?"The author offers several explanations for this tradition, all implying that Abū Bakr did not disapprove of tafsīr as such.
One explanation suggests that Abū Bakr refrained from interpreting this phrase out of caution, because he did not want to encourage people to speak about the Qurʾān, except for those whom "God distinguished in pursuing this task."83His other explanation is that Abū Bakr's refusal to interpret the Qurʾān came instantaneously, but upon further reflection and realization that tafsīr was indispensable to the life of the umma, Abū Bakr began to interpret the Qurʾānas demonstrated by the tradition about him offering an interpretation for the word "kalāla" in Q 4:176.84According to yet another explanation, attributed to the Karrāmī theologian Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad ibn al-Hayṣam (d.409/1019), Abū Bakr, with all the vast and deep knowledge he possessed, knew the meaning of the word "muqīn" about which he was asked.Nevertheless, being in awe of the Qurʾān, he did not want to speak about it unless it was necessary.Neither did he believe that if, as a way of interpreting a Qurʾānic word, one were to offer its synonym, this synonym could convey the same meaning, as is the case with many synonyms that can offer only approximate meanings.85Therefore, according to Ibn al-Hayṣam, Abū Bakr refrained from interpreting the word "muqīn" because he knew that the person who was asking for it could dispense with it, as this word did not pertain to the commands or prohibitions.Moreover, since this word was conveying praise for God it would be more appropriate to leave it as it was revealed in the Qurʾān.86 The next tradition that the author addresses is related from ʿĀʾisha who said, "The Prophet would never comment on anything from the Qurʾān except a few verses [interpretation] of which Jibrīl had taught him."87Not only does this ḥadīth imply that the Prophet himself was reluctant to comment on the Qurʾān, but it also suggests an even higher source for tafsīr and the revealed nature of tafsīr.For the author of Kitāb al-Mabānī, however, this tradition indicates that the Prophet, in addition to the revelation, was in need of tafsīr of the Qurʾānic verses that Jibrīl would teach him, because Jibrīl bore witness to the matters that the Prophet himself did not.Similarly, his Companions witnessed the matters that generations after them did not, such as the circumstances of the revelation (aḥwāl al-nuzūl) or the abrogating and abrogated verses.Therefore, according to the author, this tradition does not undermine the argument that the generations after the Companions were in need of tafsīr.
As for the remaining three traditions about the Companions and Successors who refrained from the interpretation of the Qurʾān, they are compared to the traditions concerning those who refrained from talking about the Prophet except when this was necessary.It is for this reason, the author explains, that only a few traditions were transmitted from the greatest of the Prophet's Companions and those who had never parted from him.In both cases, however, he argues, the Companions' reluctance was caused by their reverence for the Prophet and for the Qurʾān, not by their disapproval of these practices as such or of others who engaged in them.88Furthermore, to counterbalance these traditions, the author cites several reports to demonstrate that the Companions and Successors did practice tafsīr and encouraged it.Among them is the tradition related from ʿAbdallāh ibn Masʿūd who said, "When one among us had learnt ten verses he would not go further until he had learnt their meaning," and the tradition from Saʿīd ibn Jubayr who said, "Whoever recites the Qurʾān but does not interpret it is like a blind man or a Bedouin."89This does not end the debate, however, and the author of Kitāb al-Mabānī goes on to deal with two additional matters raised by his interlocutors.First, he is asked whether it is permissible for those who have knowledge of the Arabic language (ahl ʿilm al-lugha al-ʿarabiyya) to interpret the Qurʾān according to the rules of the language (ʿalā sharāʾiṭ al-lugha) and the meanings of its rare words.He considers this permissible and further explains when and how such interpretation also ought to take into account the arguments of reason (ḥujaj al-ʿuqūl), the sunna and the ijmāʿ.He also supports his answer by stating that there is a consensus (ijmāʿ) among the Companions that such interpretation is permissible and by citing the traditions that imply that Ibn ʿAbbās and ʿĀʾisha engaged in this kind of interpretation.These traditions demonstrate, according to the author, the error of those who relate from the Prophet, ʿĀʾisha, ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, and ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-Azīz that they said, paraphrasing Q 3:7,90 "No one knows the interpretation (taʾwīl) of the Qurʾān except God.Those who are firm in knowledge (al-rāsikhūna fī-l-ʿilm) do not know its interpretation.Their firmness in knowledge (rusūkhuhum fi-l-ʿilm) only [meant] that they believed in its clear and ambiguous [verses], not that they knew its interpretation."91He further comments that if those firm in knowledge did not know the interpretation of the Qurʾān then others would be even less knowledgeable about it.Reinforcing his defense of tafsīr, he goes on to argue that since in several verses God urges His creation to reflect upon the Qurʾān, for example, in the Q 47:24, "Do they not reflect upon the Qurʾān, or are there locks on their hearts?",88 Kitāb al-Mabānī 1954, 191-192. 89 Ibid., 193. 90 On the Qurʾān 3:7, see Kinberg 1988. 91 Kitāb al-Mabānī 1954, 202.such verses would not make sense if interpretation of the Qurʾān were prohibited or impossible.This, moreover, would imply that God has commanded His creation to do something that cannot be done, and that is impossible.92 Finally, the author has to answer how could it be possible that God should allow for a situation where interpretation (taʾwīl) of the legal rulings that He explained in the Qurʾān has led to disagreement regarding those rulings (al-ikhtilāf fī l-aḥkām).While it is well known, his opponents say, that the Companions and generations after them disagreed on these matters, "how could this be possible according to Divine wisdom?"The author accepts that there is disagreement regarding these matters and goes on to discuss the reasons for this.93 These three accounts of the debates over the permissibility of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy not only differ in length and detail but also in their authors' position toward the subject.As have been mentioned, both al-Māwardī and the author of the Kitāb al-Mabānī act as participants in the debates, advocating the necessity of tafsīr that goes beyond the literal meaning of the Qurʾānic words and interpretations related from the Prophet, and allows for reflection and contemplation.The presentation of the debate in the Kitāb al-Mabānī, wherein the author refutes various groups of opponents, suggests several counterarguments, and refers to the past authorities, additionally indicates a wide-ranging and long-lasting intellectual impact of the debate.In contrast, al-Iṣfahānī in his commentary takes a more distant and neutral stand.He is not interested in giving support to either party but is following the middle path between them, shifting attention away from issue of permissibility of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy to the qualifications and knowledge requirements for a commentator.

Trajectories of argumentation
What do these accounts tell about the major lines of argumentation followed by the opponents and proponents of al-tafsīr bi-raʾy in the course of these debates?Many of these arguments and the associated proof texts are recurrent and have been alluded to in other tafsīr works, on which this section also draws for occasional examples.
One major theme in the debate was a set of arguments advanced by the opponents of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy that focus on the authority of the Prophet Muḥammad.This is reflected on three levels: in the argument that the Prophet alone was to 92 Ibid., [200][201][202][203][203][204][205][206] interpret the Qurʾān, in the tradition about the Prophet's alleged reluctance to interpret the Qurʾān, and in the traditions implying the Prophet's explicit condemnation of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.It is not surprising that in their response to the first argument the Sunnī exponents of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy did not openly question the Prophet's foremost authority in exegesis, which is furthermore supported by various Qurʾānic verses wherein God assigns the task of explaining (bayān) the Qurʾān to the Prophet, such as Qurʾān 16:44.Rather, they only argued that the task of interpretation was not limited to the Prophet alone.
Regarding the even more restrictive argument about the Prophet's reluctance to comment on the Qurʾān so that he only commented on a few verses, as reported in the abovementioned ḥadīth from ʿĀʾisha, it was reinterpreted as meaning that there were some aspects of the Qurʾān that were known to the Prophet alone, through God's help, and also that some aspects were known only to God.The nature and scope of such aspects, however, varied according to different commentators.Al-Ṭabarī, for instance, maintained that the aspects which were known to the Prophet exclusively and only through him could be known to others, included God's commands and prohibitions, the forbidden and the permitted, the ḥudūd punishments, and other legal regulations.94While according to Ibn ʿAṭiyya (d. 541/1147) this ḥadīth referred to the hidden aspects of the Qurʾān (mughayyabāt) and the explanation of their details that could only be known through God's help.Among the matters that God does not disclose, reserving their knowledge for Himself, Ibn ʿAṭiyya mentions the time of the resurrection, the number of trumpet blasts on that day, or the order in the creation of heaven and earth.95As for the prophetic ahādith seemingly condemning al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, they were skillfully deflected by the defenders of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, and their strategies in this process will be discussed in the next section of this article.
Another cluster of arguments in the debate over al-tafsīr bi-l-raʿy centered on the authority of the Companions and Successors, whose reported reluctance to engage in tafsīr was taken as an authoritative precedent for the prohibition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʿy.To counter this argument, the exponents of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʿy suggested various reasons for the Companions' and Successors' hesitancy to interpret the Qurʾān, other than their prohibition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʿy.Furthermore, as proof to the contrary, they drew attention to those Companions and Successors who did interpret the Qurʾān or praised the task of its interpretation and understanding.96In addition, some commentators pointed out disagreements among 94 Al-Ṭabarī 2001, I, 57-58.95 Ibn ʿAṭiyya 1954, 263. 96 See al-Ṭabarī 2001, I, 53-55.the Companions' and Successors' interpretations of the Qurʾān, taking this as evidence that they went beyond a mere transmission of the prophetic exegesis since their different interpretations could not have all come from the Prophet.97In al-Tirmidhī's collection, one finds what was probably a response to this assumption about the nature of interpretations offered by the Companions and Successors.Al-Tirmidhī explains that it was not thought about such figures as Mujāhid or Qatāda who, unlike the Companions who abstained from interpreting the Qurʾān, did interpret it, that they had been doing so without knowledge (bi-ghayr ʿilm) or that they had been advancing their own interpretations (min qibali anfusihim).98This is supported by the traditions emphasizing that the Companions' and Successors' knowledge of exegesis was a received one, such as the tradition from Qatāda who said, "There is not a single verse of the Qurʾān about which I have not heard something."99It seems that Ibn Taymiyya was responding to the same argument when in his Muqaddima he addressed the issue of differences (ikhtilāf) between the interpretations of the Companions and Successors.Defending their authority, Ibn Taymiyya argued that these differences were few in number and that their essence was that of natural variation (ikhtilāf al-tanawwuʿ) rather than of profound contradiction (ikhtilāf al-taḍādd).100 Another, less prominent, theme employed by those who opposed al-tafsīr bi-l-raʿy concerns certainty of religious knowledge, resonating with the discussions on certainty and conjecture in jurisprudence.101Those who rejected al-tafsīr bi-l-raʿy argued that it was based on conjecture, not certainty, and was therefore equivalent to speaking about God without knowledge, which was prohibited in sūra 7, verse 33, "My Lord has forbidden shameful deeds, whether open or secret, sins, and unjust insolence, assigning partners to God, for which He has not given authority, and saying things about God of which you have no knowledge." To counter the argument that human reason is unable to know for certain the meaning of the Qurʾān as intended by God, the defenders of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʿy put forward the argument for the necessity of tafsīr.This argument of necessity can be illustrated by the following tradition from the Kitāb al-Mabānī, related by ʿAlī ibn Zayd ibn Jadʿān on the authority Abū Naḍra.Abū Naḍra said, "We were at ʿImrān ibn Ḥuṣayn's talking about knowledge, when someone said, 'Let us not talk about anything that is not [found] in the Qurʾān."ʿImrān ibn Ḥuṣayn replied to that person, "You are really foolish.Do you find in the Qurʾān that the midday prayer should consist of four rakʿāt and in none of them the Qurʾān should be recited aloud?Or that the prayer at sunset should consist of three rakʿāt, in two of which it should be recited aloud, but not in the third one?Or that the dawn prayer should consist of two rakʿāt and in both of them the Qurʾān should be recited aloud?"Here ʿAlī ibn Zayd remarks, "That person was not one of those who speak nonsense, it was just a slip of his tongue."Abū Naḍra continued his narration, "Then ʿImrān ibn Ḥuṣayn said to me, "We are not deviating from the Qurʾān in this or anything of this sort."And I replied, "'Imrān has spoken the truth and gave an excellent reminder of the necessity to interpret the general commandments (mujmalāt) in the Qurʾān." The necessity of tafsīr was justified not only by the practical need to derive legal rulings from the Qurʾān.Those arguing for the need to go beyond the tradition-based exegesis appealed to the authority of the Qurʾān as a source of guidance and knowledge in general.They emphasized that tafsīr was indispensable to this role of the Qurʾān and that God Himself urged His creation to reflect upon the Qurʾān in various verses that convey the need for its interpretation or explicitly encourage its contemplation and understanding.Moreover, the line of reasoning that centered on the authority of the Qurʾān also touched upon the question of Divine wisdom.As we have seen, both al-Māwardī and the author of Kitāb al-Mabānī have pointed out the absurdity of the situation wherein God would have commanded mankind to follow his commandments in the Qurʾān without providing them with the means to derive and understand these commandments; hence the necessity of tafsīr.102 Besides these recurrent themes of the Prophet's and the Qurʾān's authorities, of historical precedents in the prohibition as well as engagement in tafsīr, and of the certainty and necessity of tafsīr, one of the most important issues in the debates was the meaning of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy itself.As has been noted, those who prohibited al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy understood it as referring to any interpretation beyond tradition-based exegesis or even, on a stricter level, beyond the prophetic interpretation alone.Its defenders, in order to justify the practice of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, had to reinterpret the term.Their attempts at reinterpretation, given in response to the aforementioned prophetic aḥādīth that allegedly condemned al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, are the focus of the next section.

What did the Prophet really mean (and what he did not mean) by al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy?
The collective effort of the defenders of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy to redefine the meaning of this term manifested in their attempts to explain what exactly the Prophet meant in the ḥadīth wherein, according to their opponents, he clearly condemned al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.These explanations have been summarized by ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Samarqandī (d.539/1144), the Ḥanafī jurist and theologian of the Māturīdī tradition,103 in the still unpublished Sharḥ Taʾwīlat ahl al-sunna, a commentary on the tafsīr of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (333/944).104 Al-Samarqandī's account of the various solutions proposed for the alleged prophetic prohibition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy is introduced as a response to the following problem (ishkāl) faced by al-Māturīdī and other Qurʾān commentators of his time: "[Al-Māturīdī], may God have mercy upon him," says al-Samarqandī, "began [his commentary] with addressing the problem which anyone talking about the meaning of the Qurʾān by means of inference and personal opinion had to solve (badaʿ raḥimahu ʿllāh bi-ishkāl yaḥtāju ilā ḥallihi kull man takallama fī maʿānī l-qurʾān bi-l-istinbāṭ wa-l-raʾy).105This [problem] is that the Prophet, peace be upon him, said, 'Whoever interprets (fassara) the Qurʾān according to one's personal opinion let him take his seat in the fire.'While we find that the Pious Forefathers (Salaf) from among the Companions and Successors, may God be pleased with them, talked about deriving the meaning of the Qurʾān by means of personal opinion, since not all their sayings referred to the prophetic ḥadīth (lam yūjad fī jamīʿ mā dhakarū min al-aqāwīl ḥadīth marfūʿ)."106Thus, on the one hand, "the wording of the ḥadīth prohibits interpretation of the Qurʾān by means of personal opinion," but, on the other, "the practice (ʿamal) of the umma and their unanimous agreement (ijmāʿ) to discover the meaning of the Qurʾān by means of personal opinion is an indication that this is permissible (dalīl al-jawāz)';107 hence, there is a contradiction (al-tanāquḍ) between the ḥadīth and the ijmāʿ that requires reconciliation (al-tawfīq).
Al-Samarqandī says that al-Māturīdī responded to this challenge (fa-ajāba wa-qāla) and begins the discussion of the suggested solutions for the Prophet's reported condemnation of tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.He lists the following five solutions, not naming their champions: 1. Some, he says, doubted the soundness of this ḥadīth (ankarū ṣiḥḥat hādhā l-ḥadīth) because they found that the consensus (ijmāʿ) of the umma goes against it.And while ijmāʿ constitutes a conclusive proof, khabar al-wāḥid108 makes an action obligatory only on the basis of probability and should not be followed since it contradicts the ijmāʿ (al-ijmāʿ dalīl min ḥaythu l-qaṭʿ wa-khabar al-wāḥid mūjib lil-ʿamal maʿa l-iḥtimāl fa-yutraku bi-muʿāradat al-ijmāʿ).109Others, however, accepted this ḥadīth as sound because it has an uninterrupted isnād and is traced to the Prophet through the trustworthy transmitters, but disagreed among themselves on how to reconcile the aforementioned contradiction.2. One group sought the solution in differentiating between tafsīr and taʾwīl.
They maintained that the Prophet disapproved of tafsīr "by opinion," but argued that when the Salaf and the jurists (fuqahāʾ) were interpreting the Qurʾān by means of personal opinion they were undertaking taʾwīl, not tafsīr.And since taʾwīl is different from tafsīr the contradiction has been resolved, taʾwīl "by opinion" was being rendered acceptable.110 This group, however, disagreed on the difference between tafsīr and taʾwīl.Some of them defined tafsīr as relating (ikhbār) the circumstances of those about whom the Qurʾān was revealed and the reasons for the revelation.This, they maintained, was permitted only to the Companions who witnessed the revelation, based on what they had witnessed.Anyone else who would try to explain these matters without tracing their explanation back to the Companions would be practicing al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.As for taʾwīl, it refers to the explanation of the possible meanings that the word admits.Ta'wīl is permitted because people have a need for it.Since God has made the Qurʾān the source of all the beliefs and practices that people were commanded to follow, and since not all of them are explicitly stated in the wording of the Qurʾān, it becomes necessary to discover them by means of personal opinion.For this reason, it is sometimes said that tafsīr is the prerogative of the Companions while taʾwīl is that of the jurists.111Others from among this group understood tafsīr as explaining the word that only allows for one meaning, and taʾwīl as an explanation of several meanings that a polysemous word admits.Yet others, including al-Māturīdī,112 maintained that tafsīr refers to a conclusive statement that God has intended a particular meaning of the word (al-qaṭʿ ʿalā anna l-murād lil-lafẓ hādhā).If this statement is based on a conclusive proof, such as a ḥadīth with an uninterrupted chain of transmission (mutawātir) or the consensus of the community (ijmāʿ), then it is a sound and commendable tafsīr (fa-in qāma dalīl maqṭūʿ bi-hi naḥwa mutawātir wa-ijmā al-aʾimma ʿalayhi yakūnu tafsīran ṣaḥīḥan mustaḥsanan).Without a conclusive proof, however, it becomes al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, which is prohibited (ḥaram).113Regarding taʾwīl, al-Māturīdī is cited as saying that it is an explanation of the meanings that the word admits and of the most likely meaning according to the predominant opinion but without being conclusive (fa-ammā al-taʾwīl fa-huwa bayān bi-mā fī-hi al-iḥtimāl wa-muntahā l-amr bi-ghālib al-raʾy dūna l-qaṭʿ).For this reason, remarks al-Samarqandī, al-Māturīdī named his work Taʾwilāt and not Tafsīr, taking care lest the prophetic ḥadith prohibiting al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy would apply to it (iḥtirāzan ʿan al-dukhūl taḥta hādhā l-ḥadīth).114Yet, other scholars maintained that there was no difference between tafsīr and taʾwīl, but they too disagreed on how to reconcile the contradiction between the aforementioned ḥadīth and ijmāʿ.3. Some of those for whom tafsīr and taʾwīl were synonymous, insisted that in this ḥadīth the Prophet only meant al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy that resulted from using reason alone, while neglecting the foundational sources (uṣūl), such as the unambiguous verses of the Qurʾān, traditions with uninterrupted chains of transmission, and the consensus of the community (al-murād min al-ḥadīth huwa al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy al-ṣādir ʿan mujarrad al-ʿaql dūna l-ʿarḍ ʿalā l-uṣūl min āya muḥkama wa-ḥadīth mutawātir wa-ijmāʿ al-umma).For these scholars, as long as the uṣūl were taken into consideration, tafsīr, even if based on reasoning, could not be classified as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.1154. The position of another party was that even tafsīr that takes uṣūl into consideration should nevertheless be categorized as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy (wa-qāla baʿḍuhum inna tafsīr al-qurʾān bi-l-ijtihād wa-l-ʿarḍ ʿalā l-uṣūl tafsīr bi-l-raʾy).
Yet they offered another solution.They distinguished between the two varieties of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy: the praiseworthy (maḥmūd) and the blameworthy (madhmūm), and argued that in the aforementioned ḥadīth the Prophet only meant the blameworthy type of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy (al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy naw'āni madhmūm wa-maḥmūd wa-qad urīda bi-l-ḥadīth al-madhmūm dūna l-maḥmūd).For this party, the Companions and Successors had practiced its praiseworthy type, which was not intended by the Prophet when he condemned al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.116As for its blameworthy type, according to them, it occurs in either of the following two cases: first, when someone interprets the Qurʾān on the basis of his individual judgment and claims that his interpretation represents the true meaning of the Qurʾān (ḥaqq) -al-Samarqandī here adds that this corresponds to the position of some Muʿtazilites who maintain that every mujtahid is correct; second, when personal opinion becomes a measure and a criterion for the interpretation of the Qurʾān, while the conventional meanings of the words and literal meaning of the text are disregarded -this, al-Samarqandī notes again, is what many Muʿtazilites who "interpret the Qurʾān according to their established wrong views" do.117 5. Finally, some scholars held that this ḥadīth referred only to the interpretation of the ambiguous passages in the Qurʾān (mutashābih) that were not necessary for people to know, because they did not deal with the obligatory matters of belief and law.Tafsīr of such passages, they argued, is not just a matter of excess and burdening but becomes a superfluous action allowing for errors and mistakes; practicing it goes against the laws of wisdom (wakāna tafsīruhu khārijan makhraj al-ghuluww wa-l-takalluf wa-jarā majrā amr mustaghnan ʿanhu ma'a iḥtimāl al-ghalaṭ wa-l-khaṭaʾ fī-hi wa-huwa khārij ʿan sunan al-ḥikma).As for al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy of the passages that pertain to the obligatory doctrinal and legal issues, they say that it is impossible that the Prophet would have intended to prohibit it.118 Al-Samarqandī's list of solutions for the alleged prohibition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy highlights the significance of this controversial issue and the intellectual effort expended by various groups of scholars trying to resolve it.In the process, they offered reinterpretations of the notion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy that did not compromise the exegetical authority of the Prophet and the Companions yet at the same time extended the boundaries of approved exegesis to accommodate the authority of human reason.Several of these solutions were followed by Sunnī commentators.Of the five, the fourth, implying that al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy qualified by the due consideration of the uṣūl was no longer al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, seems to have had a strong influence on the Sunnī tradition of tafsīr.It acknowledged tradition-based tafsīr as the starting point and the core of exegesis but broadened the scope of legitimate tafsīr to cover philological and juridical tafsīr as well.This position was shared, for instance, by Abū Layth al-Samarqandī (d.373/983), who considered the pursuit of tafsīr and taʾwīl of the Qurʾān as an obligation (wājib), but maintained that nobody should interpret the Qurʾān according to their personal opinion.119However, those who based their interpretations on the lexical meanings of the words (wujūh al-lugha) and knew the circumstances of the revelation (aḥwāl al-tanzīl) were not bi-l-raʾy commentators.120Asimilar view is expressed by Ibn 'Aṭiyya in his comment on the ḥadīth disapproving of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.Ibn ʿAṭiyya says: The meaning of this [ḥadīth] is that a person is asked about the meaning [of a passage] in the Book of God and rushes to give an answer on the basis of his own opinion without considering [the interpretations] of the ʿulamāʾ and the rules of the disciplines such as grammar and the fundamentals [of theology].This ḥadīth does not apply to philologists explaining its language, or grammarians explaining its grammar, or jurists explaining its [legal] concepts, while each one of them bases his explanation on ijtihād founded on the rules of the disciplines (ʿilm) and reasoning (naẓar).One who interprets the Qurʾān in this way is not giving an interpretation merely on the basis of his own opinion.121 The position of the fifth group, who subdivided al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy into the "praiseworthy" and "blameworthy" categories, also left a lasting legacy, even though the application of these terms has changed over time.In al-Samarqandī's summary, this solution was suggested by those who were replying to the argument that tafsīr should be restricted to the prophetic interpretation alone.The notion of a "praiseworthy" type of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy allowed them to accommodate the interpretations of the Companions and the Successors.Yet in al-Dhahabī's exposition on this topic, discussed at the beginning of this article, exegesis of the Companions and the Successors is already treated as an integral part of the tradition-based tafsīr, while the notion of "praiseworthy" al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy now allows for accommodation of Sunnī bi-l-raʾy exegesis.The label "blameworthy" al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy is reserved by al-Dhahabī for sectarian traditions of tafsīr.Probably under the influence of his work, a similar attitude to al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy is expressed in other modern studies on tafsīr.122It is possible to detect a certain resemblance to the third solution that distinguishes between tafsīr and taʾwīl, and which, as mentioned, was followed by al-Māturīdī, also in al-Ghazālī's (d.505/1111) account of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, although al-Ghazālī does not use exactly the same terms.123Al-Ghazālī attempts to justify Ṣūfī approaches to the Qurʾān, one characteristic of which is the belief that the Qurʾān has hidden meanings (asrār al-Qurʾān) that can only be grasped by the people of purified souls (arbāb al-qulūb al-zakiyya).He reserves the outer meaning of the Qurʾān (zāhir) for the tradition-based tafsīr but refutes the claim that the Qurʾān has no meaning other than zāhir.People claiming this, according to al-Ghazālī, show their own limitations and place all others on the same level as themselves.124In contrast, he argues for the existence of multiple levels of meaning in the Qurʾān, adducing a number of traditions to that effect.As part of his defense of the Ṣūfī tradition, he also has to deal with the prophetic ḥadīth condemning al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.Al-Ghazālī argues that the Prophet did not mean therein that interpretation of the Qurʾān should be restricted to the transmitted material (naql and masmūʿ): what was meant is the disapproval of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, which al-Ghazālī defined as tafsīr influenced by the desire to justify one's opinion and inclination (hawan), or tafsīr based on to the linguistic meaning of the text alone.Yet, al-Ghazālī's account has a compromising tone in that he emphasizes the significance of the outward exegesis as the necessary foundation for comprehending the deeper meaning of the text.He says that "Whoever claims understanding of the hidden meanings of the Qurʾān without having mastered its outward exegesis is similar to one who claims to have entered the house without having passed through its door."125Thus, in his attempt to defend Ṣūfī interpretations as a legitimate tafsīr, al-Ghazālī, similarly to other champions of what the traditionists called al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, is following the strategy of accommodation and compromise.

Conclusion
This enquiry into the history of the notion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy has explored the trajectory of the debates about the permissibility of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and its interpretations in medieval Sunnī tradition.While the origin of the term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy is not easily traceable, by the 3rd/9th century it was used by the traditionists to refer to any interpretation of the Qurʾān beyond tradition-based tafsīr.They used it in the context of their opposition to the developing discipline of tafsīr, arguing that al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy was prohibited on the authority of the Prophet and the first generations of Muslims.While the defenders of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy advanced their arguments and proofs against its prohibition, they did not seem to question the foundational role of interpretations from the Prophet and his Companions and Successors.Yet, they also asserted the role of philological and juridical interpretations in the enterprise of tafsīr, considered by their opponents as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, even if their scope was limited to the matters on which tradition-based explanations were not available, and their application conditioned by the rules of tafsīr and prior knowledge requirements for those undertaking it.In the course of these debates, the proponents of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy also negotiated the meaning of the term, insisting that philological, juridical, and even Ṣūfī interpretations could not be categorized (and therefore disapproved of) as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.They applied several strategies to reinterpret the meaning of the prophetic ḥadīth disapproving of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.Besides denying the authenticity of this ḥadīth, these included a suggestion that the disapproval applied only to certain parts of the Qurʾān; that it referred only to tafsīr by "mere opinion"; that its scope did not extend to al-taʾwīl bi-l-raʾy; and that there were two varieties of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy: the "praiseworthy" and the "blameworthy," of which only the "blameworthy" was disapproved.Thus, the position of the defenders of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy offers a compromise, where the authority of the tradition-based exegesis is not openly challenged, but the boundaries of legitimate tafsīr are extended beyond it so that philological, juridical, and Ṣūfī interpretations cease to be al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.
The debates about the legitimacy of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, its gradual accommodation and the efforts to redefine this term, reflected a profound intellectual challenge that the developing Sunnī tradition of tafsīr had to address -namely how to harmonize between different interpretative authorities with regard to the Qurʾān: that of God, the Prophet, the Prophet's Companions, their Successors, and other human beings -be they scholars, mystics, or ordinary people, whose authority stem from scholarly qualification, the power of reason, linguistic abilities, or purified hearts.A similar effort to harmonize between various interpretative authorities is reflected in the attempts to suggest alternative categorizations of tafsīr.For example, the well-known tradition ascribed to Ibn ʿAbbās, "Interpretation of the Qurʾān has four aspects: interpretation which the learned know, interpretation which the Arabs know, interpretation which no one may be excused from not knowing, meaning the ḥalāl and the ḥarām, and interpretation which no one knows except God, and which whoever claims the knowledge of it is a liar (man iddaʿā ʿilmahu fa-huwa kādhib),'126 affirms the validity of the three categories of tafsīr and the corresponding exegetical authorities -philological, juristic, and scholarly -but also acknowledges their limits to the exclusion of interpretations known to God alone.
A more elaborate categorization is offered by Ibn al-Hayṣam, whose categories of interpretation are linked to various contents of the Qurʾān.127Above them, Ibn al-Hayṣam places God's exclusive knowledge of certain aspects in the Qurʾān.128These do not pertain to the obligatory commands and prohibitions, and include such aspects as the time of the Day of Judgment, and that of the coming of ʿIsā, knowing how God created Adam with His own hands, or the benefits (maṣlaḥa) behind the commandments of the sharīʿa.Human beings have no ability to understand them and should not be asking about them.With this exception, God has made it possible for human beings to understand all other aspects of the Qurʾān.Among them are rational rules (aḥkām ʿaqliyya) that can be easily grasped by human reason, while the Qurʾān provides their confirmation (taʾkīd) and reminder (tanbīh) about them.Tafsīr of such aspects, according to Ibn al-Hayṣam, is possible (mumkin) and easy (sahl) for anyone using his reason (li-man aʿmala ʿaqlahu).
Among them are also legal commandments (aḥkām sharʿiyya) mentioned in the Qurʾān in a general manner (ajmalahā).These commandments can only be interpreted through the revelation from God as explained by the Prophet Muḥammad.They include regulations pertaining to the obligatory prayer, the payment of the alms, and the pilgrimage.With regard to them, Ibn al-Hayṣam says, the Prophet was only giving interpretations which God had revealed to him through inspiration (mā yūḥī llāh).Tafsīr of such matters is not admitted from anyone else.
Another category of tafsīr relates to the abrogating and abrogated legal rulings (al-nāsikh wa-l-mansūkh min aḥkām al-qurʾān) and the commands that God made a duty (mā ḥatama min al-awāmir), or to the explanation of the desirable (targhīb) and well-mannered (taʾdīb), and the general (ʿāmm) and specific (khāṣṣ).129Their tafsīr is only permitted to the Companions who witnessed the circumstances and knew the occasions for the revelation of the verses and the Successors who also knew these circumstances from the widespread reports in their time and from being closer to the time of the revelation.No one, says Ibn al-Hayṣam, can pursue this type of tafsīr after them without first becoming certain of these circumstances through the transmitted reports.They should follow their predecessors and fully accept that which they have agreed upon.They should also look into that about which they have disagreed and select from among their views the one that is more appropriate, more beneficial, and better conforms to the foundational sources of religion (awfaqu bi-l-uṣūl).
The last category of interpretation, according to Ibn al-Hayṣam, has "the wider scope than what has been mentioned and is easier."130It is a process of relating the word to the meanings it admits in accordance with the language of the Arabs and examining its possible interpretations.This is taʾwīl that is permissible to the scholars at any time.If in this process an interpreter finds a proof that would allow him to decide on interpretations that the word admits, such as the judgment of reason, consensus of the community or sunna, then he can say conclusively (qaṭaʿa) that one of them is the intended meaning of the verse, and not others.However, if he finds no proof, he should consider the various interpretations that the word admits as possible, without claiming any of them as definitive.
Ibn al-Hayṣam's categories of interpretation, therefore, present a harmonious picture wherein different contents of the Qurʾān each requires a particular exegetical authority and method of interpretation.These various categories of tafsīr are no longer seen as contradictory but as complimentary, each dealing with a specific aspect of the Qurʾān.Such a categorization ensures the plurality, although not equality, of interpretative authorities and methods.
This harmonizing tendency, reflected in the compromise between the tradition-based exegesis and what was initially labeled as al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, would remain characteristic of the Sunnī tafsīr tradition.However, the efforts of Sunnī commentators in accommodating al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy also had their limits.The boundaries of the approved tafsīr had to be delineated.It was necessary to regulate al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy and to distinguish between the interpretations now claimed as legitimate within the Sunnī tradition and those that remained al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.This required a different definition of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, which became increasingly associated with baseless opinion, whim, fancy, and theological agenda.Sectarian traditions of tafsīr remained for the Sunnī tradition al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.In his discussion of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, while defending the Ṣūfī tradition, al-Ghazālī mentions the practice of the Bāṭinīs,131 who, he says, use it to deceive people and to invite them to "their false doctrine" (ilā madhhabihim al-bāṭil).132Al-Samarqandī, as we have seen, twice points to the practice of the Muʿtazilites as examples of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy.And later, Ibn al-Naqīb (d. 698/1298) includes in his list of definitions of al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy one that explicitly identifies al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy with the tafsīr affirming the wrong position (al-tafsīr al-muqarrir li-l-madhhab al-fāsid), where a belief becomes a foundation for tafsīr and the Qurʾān is interpreted in accordance with that belief by all means possible, even if such an interpretation might be weak.133 The term al-tafsīr bi-l-raʾy, with its negative connotations, has been preserved in Sunnī exegetical tradition.Redefined as tafsīr by baseless opinion, influenced by fancy and theological agenda, it has been applied to various sectarian traditions of tafsīr and remains until the present day the tradition-sanctioned means of guarding the limits of the approved interpretations of the Qurʾān.
The work originated in the Karrāmī milieu71 and has been attributed to the Karrāmite of Nishapur Ibn Bisṭām (Abū Muḥammad Ḥāmid ibn Aḥmad ibn Jaʿfar ibn Bisṭām al-Ṭaḥīrī).72Its writing began in 425/1033.73Mabānī 1954.The second edition of this work published in 1972 in Cairo by ʿAbdallāh Ismāʿīl al-Ṣāwī and mentioned in Zysow 1988, 578, f. 6, was not available to me.71 On the Karrāmiyya, see Bosworth 2012.72 This text, attributed to Ḥāmid b.Aḥmad Ibn Bisṭām, is discussed in Gilliot 2000, 15-81; and idem 2006.73 Jeffry 1954, preface; see, however, Gilliot 2006, who takes 425/1034 as the year of the completion of this work.