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BY-NC-ND 3.0 license Open Access Published by De Gruyter September 25, 2013

Another look at HMAC

Neal Koblitz EMAIL logo and Alfred Menezes

Abstract.

HMAC is the most widely-deployed cryptographic-hash-function-based message authentication code. First, we describe a security issue that arises because of inconsistencies in the standards and the published literature regarding keylength. We prove a separation result between two versions of HMAC, which we denote and , the former being the real-world version standardized by Bellare et al. in 1997 and the latter being the version described in Bellare's proof of security in his Crypto 2006 paper. Second, we describe how (the FIPS version standardized by NIST), while provably secure (in the single-user setting), succumbs to a practical attack in the multi-user setting. Third, we describe a fundamental defect from a practice-oriented standpoint in Bellare's 2006 security result for HMAC, and show that because of this defect his proof gives a security guarantee that is of little value in practice. We give a new proof of NMAC security that gives a stronger result for NMAC and HMAC and we discuss why even this stronger result by itself fails to give convincing assurance of HMAC security.

Received: 2013-01-06
Revised: 2013-04-11
Accepted: 2013-04-13
Published Online: 2013-09-25
Published in Print: 2013-10-01

© 2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston

This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License, which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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