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Publicly Available Published by De Gruyter May 5, 2021

Philosophy of the Symbolic

Edited by Arno Schubbach*

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The historical beginnings of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of culture remain unclear. For it is not apparent how his major philosophy of culture and the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, published in the 1920s, emerged from his earlier epistemological work and Substance and Function from 1910. However, this gap can be filled to a certain extent by the “Disposition” of a “Philosophy of the Symbolic” from 1917 that could be reconstructed from Cassirer’s literary estate and is documented in this contribution. In the preceding “Introduction” an overview of Cassirer’s text is given and some consequences for our general understanding of Cassirer’s project of a philosophy of culture are put up for discussion.

Editor’s Introduction

The historical development of Ernst Cassirer’s philosophy of culture arising from his earlier theory of scientific knowledge remains somewhat obscure. Not that there were too few texts available unfolding the one as well as the other: Cassirer’s epistemology is developed in his major work Substance and Function from 1910, his philosophy of culture is extensively documented in the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms that appeared in three volumes from 1923 to 1929. In addition, further texts, especially from the 1930s, were edited from his literary estate and offer valuable insights into the continued development of Cassirer’s philosophy of culture and his reflections on its foundations.[1] Yet, there is only a small number of texts providing insight into the historical transition from Cassirer’s epistemology to his philosophy of culture and their systematic relation: Between 1910 and 1923, Cassirer mainly presented two studies in the history of ideas, namely Freedom and Form (1916) and Kant’s Life and Thought (1918). But their systematic significance for the development of Cassirer’s own thought and the beginnings of his philosophy of culture is not obvious.

However, this gap can be filled to a certain extent. In Cassirer’s literary estate, we find extensive records cataloged as “research notes” concerning the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, which have been largely ignored by Cassirer scholars.[2] Among them, one is able to reconstruct a text of 32 pages that was titled by Cassirer himself as “Philosophy of the Symbolic” and dated June 13, 1917.[3] Clearly, this text should not be read as a major treatise. It is rather a first outline, a “General Disposition”, as Cassirer calls it in the title. However, this “Disposition” allows valuable insights into the historical beginnings of Cassirer’s later philosophy of culture as well as its systematic framework. Therefore, this text will be documented below and made available to the research community for the first time in English translation.[4]

In the present introduction, I will take a fresh look at the disposition of the “Philosophy of the Symbolic,” aiming at Cassirer’s framework and basic understanding of ‘the symbolic’. For this purpose, I shall, in the main section, give an overview over Cassirer’s disposition. In the conclusion, I highlight three main aspects of Cassirer’s outline of a philosophy of culture and of his concept of ‘the symbolic’ that is surprisingly, but not without reason, rarely addressed directly in his outline of a “Philosophy of the Symbolic”.


A brief survey of the disposition of a “Philosophy of the Symbolic” shall begin with an overview over its basic structure. Cassirer sketches his approach in five steps: “I) The Psychology of the Symbolic”, “II) The Logic of the Symbolic”, “III) The Number-Function (N)”, “IV) General Doctrine of Knowledge”, “V) The Fundamental Problems of Aesthetics”, and “VI) The Metaphysics of the Symbolic”.[5] At first glance, this order may seem puzzling. Already the starting point of a “Psychology of the Symbolic” may surprise some. Cassirer follows a Kantian and neo-Kantian tradition that, since Hermann Cohen’s interpretation of Kant, had always opposed any psychologism that would fail to recognize the normative dimension of the validity of knowledge (cf. Anderson 2005, esp. 298–307). Against this backdrop, it does not seem very likely that Cassirer approaches a “Philosophy of the Symbolic” starting from a ‘psychology’. Yet, readers more familiar with Cassirer will recall that his major epistemological work from 1910, Substance and Function, ended precisely with a chapter on the “Psychology of Relations” (cf. Cassirer 1923, pp. 326–346). Consequently, Cassirer presumably takes up his older approach and now develops it further under the concept of the symbolic instead of that of relations.

How then, is such a neo-Kantian psychology to be understood? First of all, it is worth remembering that already Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is by no means free of all psychology (cf. Hatfield 1992, esp. 209–217). Admittedly, he critically opposes a psychological or “physiological derivation” (Kant 1998, p. 221) of cognition in the style of Locke: Instead of retracing the psychological or physiological origin of cognition from the most basic ‘sensible impressions’ provided by empirical perception, he aims at working out the forms and laws of knowledge and refers, for this purpose, to the faculties of consciousness, i.e., to “that which our own cognitive faculty (merely prompted by sensible impressions) provides out of itself” (Kant 1998, p. 136). Accordingly, Kant’s ‘psychology’ would therefore have little to do with the modern empirical and often naturalistic research that we associate with psychology, but rather invokes the “original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul),” because they are supposed to “contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience” (Kant 1998, p. 225). The key point of Kant’s approach is, however, that these conditions, the forms and laws that characterize the faculties in this way, also determine the possible objects of experience. This correlation of the condition of cognition and its objects is the starting point and the fundamental premise of the neo-Kantian epistemology since Cohen’s seminal reading of Kant. Thus, Cassirer simply assumes, without speculating on the faculties of human beings, that it is the relational or symbolic structure of experience that ensures the determination of its objects.

Consequently, a “Psychology of Relations” or a “Psychology of the Symbolic” aim at the relational or the symbolic structures that condition both the conscious experience and the objects of experience. In the “Psychology of the Symbolic” this question primarily comes down to the temporal relatedness of each experience. This involves the aspect of recollection, which Cassirer relates to Kant’s consideration of “reproduction and recognition” (p. 3; cf. Kant 1998, pp. 228–234), and the aspect of “anticipation,” (p. 6) in which Cassirer sees present “(practical) tendencies towards movement” (p. 7). Cassirer’s argument opposes any reduction of experience to isolatable, purely momentary elements (cf. p. 3 and 5f.) and ultimately concludes that any presentation already presupposes the temporal structure of representation: “Depiction of the not-now in the now[.] This the secret of representational consciousness [Vorstellungsbewusstsein] as such, such that without this putative representation there is simply no presentation possible” (p. 4). In many respects, these lines anticipate the ‘psychology’ immanent in the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (cf. Cassirer 1955, pp. 98–105) and especially the conception of “symbolic pregnance” in the third volume (cf. Cassirer 1957, pp. 191–204, esp. pp. 201–204).[6]

At first glance, Cassirer’s “[a]nalysis of time-consciousness” (p. 4) shows astonishing parallels to Husserl’s “Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness,” which was not published until 1928, and especially his elaboration of “retention” and “protention” as constitutive aspects of the present moment (cf. Husserl 1991, pp. 88f.). However, the brunt of Cassirer’s analysis is quite different: His primary interest is not an analysis of ‘internal time-consciousness’ establishing its intentional relation to the world in itself. Instead, he aims at describing the interrelatedness of “the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’” (p. 1) constitutive for psychic life as such. Therefore, he frames his discussion of time-consciousness with the question of expression, i.e., of the “function of expression […] as constitutive of the ‘existence’ of the mental itself” (p. 1). But he not only conceives of such an expression as enabled by ‘the symbolic’. After the analysis of time-consciousness, he explicates “the symbolic function” more radically “as a ‘transition’ from ‘inner’ to ‘outer’” (p. 8). This is also the reason why he illustrates this “‘symbolic’ relationship” in turn by its – presumably – most elementary example: the “relation of mind [Seele] and lived body [Leib]” (p. 2). Noticeably, “the relation between body and soul” provides Cassirer’s philosophy of culture from its very beginning with “the prototype and model for a purely symbolic relation,” as Cassirer also states in the third volume of the Philosophy of the Symbolic Forms (Cassirer 1957, p. 100). But body and soul here do not form a dualistic ontology; instead, they are the elements of a “double relational unity” (p. 2), which in turn presupposes the ‘symbolic function’.

Thus, the “Psychology of the Symbolic” takes a different approach than Kant’s ‘psychology’. Both explore the structures that condition subjective experience, as well as its possible objects. Different from Kant, however, Cassirer does not justify these structures by recurring to cognitive faculties and their forms or laws. Instead, he links the conceptual relations or symbolic structures of experience to a constitutive interrelatedness between ‘the inner’ and ’the outer,’ the mind and the body, and thus, ultimately, situates experience in cultural and social contexts.[7] That is why the “Psychology of the Symbolic” abandons any speculation about the allegedly cryptic depths of consciousness. Instead, it considers consciousness in the context of different forms of symbolization and their historical development.[8]

This approach has far-reaching consequences which become clear right away in the ensuing second section of the disposition. “The Logic of the Symbolic” jumps right into the discussion of logic in the mathematical sense and deals with the logical treatment of concepts. This is somewhat surprising, because, against the Kantian background of Cassirer’s philosophy, one could expect a rather different kind of ‘logic’ that follows a ‘psychology’ in the Neo-Kantian sense discussed. Indeed, Kant’s ‘transcendental psychology’ culminates in the “Transcendental Logic” of the Critique of Pure Reason, which is supposed to ensure the relationship of cognition to objects. According to Kant, it is the faculty of understanding that constitutes this relationship, which is why the “Transcendental Logic” consists in an inquiry into this faculty and its a priori concepts. The key challenge in this part of the Critique is to explain how the understanding, even though it cannot refer to objects directly, can nevertheless do so by means of referring to intuitions. For Cassirer, however, this discussion is no longer obligatory and in fact quite unnecessary. Neither does he start from the Kantian distinction between understanding and its concepts on the one hand and sensibility and its intuitions on the other, nor does he attempt to clarify the general relationship between cognition and its objects by virtue of a reference to cognitive faculties. Instead, he simply assumes that it is the relational or symbolic structure of experience that determines the objects of experience. Said in other words: By addressing the symbolic structures of experience, the “Psychology of the Symbolic” simultaneously ensures the most basic relation of experience to its possible objects and thus already does the work of Kant’s “Transcendental Logic”.

At first glance, then, Cassirer’s “Logic of the Symbolic” has no connection to Kant’s “Transcendental Logic”; it assumes that the task of the latter is already settled and goes on to discuss the nature of mathematical logic. At second glance, however, Cassirer’s treatment of logic implies a critique of the “Transcendental Logic”, which appears only on its surface as not concerned with mathematical logic. At closer examination, however, it does maintain a subtle connection to it. For Kant determines the elementary structure of the understanding, which enables it to relate to objects, as the act of judgement. That is why he unfolds the forms of judgment in reference to Aristotelian logic, in order to determine the a priori concepts of understanding and their relation to possible objects of experience (cf. Kant 1998, p. 210–214; Longuenesse 2001, pp. 73–166). Put more simply, Kant grounds experience in general on structures which he derives from the logic of his time. However, around 1900 this logic was replaced by quantificational logic, which Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead adopted as the basis for reconstructing all mathematics by virtue of elementary relations. It is this theory of relations that Cassirer embraces in Substance and Function. He understands it as the ground of all cognition and its objects. In doing so, he remains within the Kantian framework and modernizes it at the same time, namely insofar as he – like Kant and Cohen – still conceives of the structure of judgment as constituting the fundamental structures of experience, but also grounds these structures in the new mathematical theory of relations (cf. Cassirer 1923, pp. 326). By contrast, the “Philosophy of the Symbolic" goes beyond this framework by detaching the structures of experience from mathematical logic. Thus, the “Psychology of the Symbolic” mentions neither judgment nor concept, since they are now the topic of the “Logic of the Symbolic.” And the latter discusses the theory of relations and concepts without merging them with the general structures of experience. One of the central points of this presentation is then that Aristotelian logic, from which Kant extracted the fundamental structures of all experience, is to be derived from a specific treatment of concepts in mathematical logic.[9] In other words, the seemingly universal logical foundations of all experience which Kant assumed, turn out to be too narrow. These ‘foundations’ are, according to Cassirer, not universal at all – they are based on mathematical logic and its specific understanding of concepts.

This twist makes clear that the “Philosophy of the Symbolic,” while grounding experience and its objects on the symbolic, considers at the same time the latter with reference to the specific forms of symbolization (cf. also Cassirer 1955, pp. 93–98). Correspondingly, in the sections on both logic and aesthetics, just as in the section on psychology, Cassirer stresses that the symbol is to be understood as a condition for the particular field under consideration.[10] At the same time, he puts his effort not so much into clarifying his concept of ‘the symbolic’, as rather into safeguarding its various forms and exploring their respective characteristics. Thus, in respect to logic he highlights its “particular application of the symbolic” (p. 17), and in respect to aesthetics he stresses its “specific ‘point of view’” (p. 21). It seems clear that both the generality of the symbolic – encompassing all forms of experience – and the specificity of its different forms – like logic or aesthetics – moves to the center of Cassirer’s considerations.[11]

The new focus on both the generality and the specificity of the symbolic brings into light not only the particular forms, but also the differentiations within those forms. A good example of this is Cassirer’s new approach to the specific form of logic. First, Cassirer rejects the plausible attempt to approach the “Logic of the Symbolic” with a look at the role of symbols or signs in mathematical logic, because he argues with reference to Leibniz’ or Lambert’s understanding of “sign language” that they presuppose that “the concepts are already given, are known by other means” (p. 9). In contrast, he insists on “the objectifying function and significance of the ‘sign’” (p. 11), but hardly explains this function or the role of the sign in greater detail. Instead, he turns to the “Logic of Subsumption” (p. 12), beginning with the observation that concepts can be, and indeed often are, “disparate, ‘heterogenous’” (p. 13), depending on the underlying relations generating them. For example, the concept of natural numbers and the concept of triangles are heterogenous. But it seems possible to relate them to one another, when one, for example, counts triangles. Following Cassirer, the task of formal logic is thus “to overcome this heterogeneity” of concepts by considering only their extents and their mereological relations to each other: the “‘form’ [of logic, A.S.] consists simply in the fact that it abstracts from the specific form of concepts” (p. 15).

Thus, logic from the outset considers only the extent of concepts, such that it is not able to grasp scientific knowledge in its entirety, which is built on the unfolding of specific concepts and develops into a diversity of fields and disciplines. Therefore, in the following section, Cassirer supplements the logical perspective on the concept by considering its development into “the whole system of exact sciences” (p. 18) starting from the “number function.” Yet this attempt to order first the various fields of mathematics and then also different exact sciences – meaning, in effect, that Cassirer seems to reduce them to their mathematical basis – runs into considerable problems, as I tried to show in detail elsewhere (see Schubbach 2016, pp. 86–103; Schubbach in print). However, it can nonetheless be stated that with the new concept of ‘the symbolic’ a shift of focus to the specificity of scientific disciplines and fields can be observed. This shift is also recognizable in the following, very short section “IV) General Doctrine of Knowledge”: Although this “‘epistemology of the symbolic’,” following a marginal note, is intended to draw on Substance and Function, it is meant to connect the epistemological discussion of “empirical science” with that of “science of history” (p. 20). In this way it not only goes beyond the scope of Cassirer’s older epistemological study, but also realigns the focus on the differences between the sciences and envisions their possible systematic order that is to be understood ultimately as a part of a larger and encompassing order of symbolic forms.

In respect to aesthetics and the arts, Cassirer again highlights both the “constitutive role of the ‘symbolic’” (p. 20) and the importance of “the symbolic peculiar to it” (p. 23). However, this systematic intention hardly goes beyond a statement of intent. Admittedly, Cassirer makes very clear that he regards classical concepts of aesthetics, such as semblance and play, imitation or illusion, as unhelpful, indeed as obstacles, for bringing into focus the specific aesthetic point of view and its form of symbolization, because they measure aesthetics by the alien “standard of absolute reality” (p. 21). But he hardly characterizes the aesthetic point of view in a positive way. The presumably later added note on Lessing’s Laocoon at the end of the section can thus be seen as a kind of prelude to the pending exploration of this new field (cf. p. 24).

Overall, we have seen how Cassirer simultaneously focuses on the generality of the symbolic and the specificity of symbolic forms. With this, he outlines a philosophy of culture that emphasizes its plurality from the outset and understands thus plurality as an intrinsic value of culture. It is this aspect that Cassirer renders the subject of the concluding section of his disposition “The Metaphysics of the Symbolic” (p. 25). As is typical for Cassirer, he seemingly takes a new approach in this section by raising the question of what the relationship between truth and reality is. After a few references to the history of this philosophical problem, the first key point of this discussion is the well-known Kantian motto of the “Copernican turn”: “What is essential lies in the transition to the positively specific characteristic of the knowledge-function: this function does not reproduce the object, but rather it constitutes this object – indeed, it ‘is’ the object itself.” (p. 28f.) In consequence, truth can “be defined immanently”, i.e., independently of an “external ‘original’” (p. 29). Therefore, its inherent symbolic structure can move into focus, because it is not directly referenced and obliterated in a presupposed reality. This leads to the second and more original key point in this section: Truth conceived in such a way allows and enables its own inherent plurality. It is the plurality of “various symbolic levels”, of “Knowledge, Art, Philosophy, Religion” (p. 30) that takes center stage in the final pages of the disposition.

There are at least two reasons for this. A first reason lies in the fact that Cassirer wants to place all emphasis on the value of this plurality. Thus, the plurality of symbolic forms is related to “the process of self-renewing and increasing life itself” (p. 30) and Cassirer stresses its inherent value by conceiving it as “the concrete fullness of the diverse itself” (p. 31). A second reason for Cassirer’s focus on the plurality of culture is related to the systematic task of clarifying how this plurality is to be understood. Cassirer’s own formulations are by no means always clear and invite misunderstanding. The reference to ‘symbolic levels’ seems to suggest that they can be ordered hierarchically. The formulation of a “path through these symbolic levels” (p. 30) seems to suggest that they form a certain sequential order and are secondary to a specific progression and goal. Against this background, Cassirer himself presumably sees the danger of evoking the impression of a simplistic Hegelian model of dialectical development which could in turn cast doubt on his emphasis on the plurality of culture. That is why, arguably, he refers to Hegel and distinguishes his own approach in two main respects from him. First, Cassirer highlights that the intrinsic value of the development of the ‘symbolic levels’ lies not in its supposed goal, but exclusively in its process: “the path through these symbolic levels is synonymous for us with the goal” (p. 30); “in this path and on this path we have life” (p. 31). Second, the relations between these different symbolic levels or forms cannot be grasped from the point of view of one specific form, as can be seen when Cassirer objects to Hegel’s dialectic und its arguably imputed prioritization of logic (cf. p. 31 and also Cassirer 1955, pp. 83f.). Cassirer thus rejects not only the Kantian assumption that logic provides the universal foundation of experience, but also the Hegelian claim that the relationship of the various forms of experience to one another could finally be summarized within the terms of a logic from the absolute standpoint.

However, these distinctions from Hegel teach us little about how Cassirer himself conceives the relationship between the different ‘symbolic levels’ or specific forms of symbolization, how he envisions the ‘path’ and ‘process’ through them. At the beginning of Cassirer’s new project, many questions arise and will have to be dealt with in the course of the work on it.[12] But Cassirer’s “Philosophy of the Symbolic” is unambiguously committed to the plurality or diversity of forms: “in fullness and in context, in the particularity of specifically diverse symbolic expressions, lies for us the unity and the fullness of the world, of reality” (p. 31).


Cassirer’s disposition of a “Philosophy of the Symbolic” from 1917 raises many questions that remain unasked by Cassirer and even less answered. However, it must be kept in mind that this is but a first outline of a project that could only be realized through years of intensive work and finally would not come to a completion even in the three extensive volumes of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms that were published until 1929. Nevertheless, as this introduction hopes to have made clear, this outline is of great interest to Cassirer scholars. It provides new insights into the beginnings of his philosophy of culture and its development from his earlier epistemological work. In particular, it reveals the continuity between Cassirer’s theory of the concept and its constitutive role for scientific knowledge and his approach to the symbolic as a condition of all forms of cultural expression.

It is true that here – as in his later writings – Cassirer spends little effort in explicating the concept of the symbolic. However, the recurring terminology, especially the notion of the “series” or “series-function” (pp. 4f. and 32; see also Cassirer 1923, pp. 16–26), reveals that both the symbolic and the concept shall address the problem of “representation” in a very specific form. Both ask for the way in which a certain element is supposed to ‘represent’ something – and both answer this question by construing this element as a member of a relational or symbolic structure that it itself presupposes and thereby can also ‘represent’. This topic is crucial in the “Psychology of the Symbolic” (cf. p. 5f.), but also in the “Logic of the Symbolic” (cf. p. 11) and is summed up finally in the “‘epistemology of the symbolic’” as follows: “[t]he particular as ‘representation’ of the general case” (p. 20). This approach to the problem of ‘representation’ is known from Cassirer’s epistemological work (cf. Cassirer 1923, pp. 282–285), but within the context of this disposition it seems to become the basis for Cassirer’s understanding of the symbolic. In contrast, “the symbolic” and “representation” are only marginally addressed on the basis of a theory of signs, which would be expected from the point of view of a semiotic reading of Cassirer.[13] The sign is rarely mentioned: in the note on Lessing’s Laocoon and its analysis of the various arts and of their “specific ‘signs’” (p. 24); in the context of logic with reference to Leibniz’ or Lambert’s understanding of “sign language” which Cassirer seems to regard as peripheral at best and misleading at worst. Finally, Cassirer’s insistence that “the objectifying function and significance of the ‘sign’ must be recognized” seems to take a semiotic perspective, but ultimately leads back to the “‘relational’ nexus’” that constitutes our “experiential reality” (pp. 11f.). Thus, the problem of ‘representation’ is not formulated on the basis of sign theory, but framed by the question of how an element can signify another element or represent something general, because it is a member of a series or part of a structure (cf. p. 5 and Cassirer 1923, p. 300). It is this basic approach that we find also in the programmatic “Introduction” to the first volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (cf. Cassirer 1955, pp. 100–102 and 105–107).[14]

The disposition also highlights a second important aspect of Cassirer’s philosophy of culture. The assumption of the generality of the symbolic is conjoined with a new methodological focus on the specificity of its forms, like language and myth, art and science, and the further differentiations within these forms, like certain languages and particular myths, various arts and different sciences (cf. Cassirer 1955, pp. 76–78). Cassirer understands the symbolic as general condition of culture, but he does not limit the question to the most general and a priori conditions. Even less does he attempt to derive the different cultural fields from a presupposed concept of ‘the symbolic’. Quite the opposite, Cassirer starts with the specific and historically unfolded various regions of culture in order to reflect on their both general and specific symbolic conditions. In doing so, he bases his philosophy of culture on the cultural facts as established in empirical research about languages, myths and religions, arts and sciences (cf. also Luft 2015, pp. 12–16). Thereby, he connects his philosophy of culture and its basic concept of the symbolic with the empirical research carried out in cultural studies of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century and decisively locates his philosophy in an interdisciplinary context – an approach with which philosophy often struggles to this day.

Finally, the relevance of Cassirer’s “Philosophy of the Symbolic” can also be seen in its ethical-political stakes. For the disposition may reveal the emphasis that Cassirer places on the plurality of culture less cautiously than Cassirer’s published texts do. It seems obvious that Cassirer understands the plurality inherent in the symbolic and the diversity of forms in which it unfolds as an ethical or political value of its own. To emphasize this value, he makes recourse to a pathos-laden language committed to life and its fullness. This language, however, was particularly typical of philosophers and intellectuals at the time who emphasized the unity of life and thus considered the plurality of culture rather as a symptom of its decline and dissolution (see exemplary Joël 1914, esp. pp. 50f.). Cassirer, in contrast, takes a different angle. It is the plurality of culture that constitutes its life, its fullness and its value. Occasionally, these pages even create the impression that Cassirer sticks only to the singular of ‘the symbolic’ in order to intensify the irreducible diversity and richness of cultural regions and points of view: “The symbol in this sense – this unity, which always remains the same in the next case and the next, again and again – this is perhaps the final form of metaphysics that is possible for us!” (p. 32) For this unity and sameness of the symbol refers from the outset to its unfolding into a diversity of symbolic forms, each of which is specific, but at the same time related to and reflecting others: “Language, Art, Concept, Myth fused into one – each reciprocally lighting up – reflecting – this is the highest point to which even our ‘reflection’ can advance” (p. 31). In the midst of World War I, when Cassirer outlined his philosophy of culture, he saw furious cultural criticisms prevailing. But in the plurality and diversity, the fullness and richness of culture, he found a rationale for a different approach – and a reason to oppose the critics of culture that endangered the future of culture.

Corresponding author: Arno Schubbach, Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Basel, Basel, Switzerland, E-mail:


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Published Online: 2021-05-05
Published in Print: 2021-04-27

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