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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter September 1, 2013

The Court of Reason in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason

Sofie C. Møller
From the journal Kant-Studien

Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to discuss how the legal metaphors in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason can help us understand the work’s transcendental argumentation. I discuss Dieter Henrich’s claim that legal deductions form a methodological paradigm for all three Critiques that exempts the deductions from following a stringent logical structure. I also consider Rüdiger Bubner’s proposal that the legal metaphors show that the transcendental deduction is a rhetorical argument. On the basis of my own reading of the many different uses of legal analogies in the first Critique, I argue that they cannot form a consistent methodological paradigm as Henrich and Bubner claim.

Published Online: 2013-09-01
Published in Print: 2013-09

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