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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter September 27, 2016

Bundles, Selves, and Sceptical Realism in Udo Thiel’s The Early Modern Subject

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From the journal Kant-Studien


This paper deals with how to understand David Hume’s theory of personal identity. Udo Thiel endorses a view that resembles the Sceptical Realist interpretation to some extent while taking issue with its ontological implications. Thiel argues that Hume’s so-called bundle theory of the mind is not a theory about its real essence but rather only a theory about our idea of the self. Thiel thus argues for an epistemological reading of the bundle theory and rejects the mainstream reading as unjustifiably ontological. In this paper, I challenge Thiel’s view by discussing some textual and philosophical evidence against it.

Published Online: 2016-9-27
Published in Print: 2016-9-27

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