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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter October 22, 2018

The Ideal of the Highest Good and the Objectivity of Moral Judgment

  • Nataliya Palatnik
From the journal Kant Yearbook

Abstract

Many Kantians dismiss Kant’s claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good - an ideal world that combines complete virtue with complete happiness - as incompatible with the core of his moral philosophy. This dismissal, I argue, raises doubts about Kant’s ability to justify the moral law, yet it is a mistake. A duty to promote the highest good plays an important role in the justificatory strategy of the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, its analysis leads to a new perspective on Kant’s conception of moral objectivity

Published Online: 2018-10-22
Published in Print: 2018-10-22

© 2018 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

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