Accessible Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter August 29, 2013

The Dilemma of Public–Private Partnerships as a Vehicle for the Provision of Regional Transport Infrastructure Development in Africa

Olabisi Delebayo Akinkugbe

Abstract

With regional economic integration (REI) as a major strategy for development, the African continent hosts a plethora of regional economic communities of varying ambition longevity and success. While in the 1970s, political-economic ideas built mainly on the “developmental state” informed the design of most of these agreements, the change in economic thought in the 1980s which ushered in the “neoliberal turn” has since influenced the design of most REI schemes in Africa, including the New Partnership for African Development. However, among other factors, inadequate transport infrastructure linking regions poses a major impediment to regional trade and development in Africa. The more so as most African governments are not able to meet up with the financial burden, pace and managerial capability for the efficient provision and management of regional transport infrastructure. The article explores the dilemma associated with the adoption of Public–Private Partnerships (“PPP”) as a mechanism for the provision of regional transport infrastructure in Africa. While sourcing infrastructure provision through the PPP mechanism has significant advantages, it is however also embedded with a complex financial, contractual and legal process. First, it explores the theoretical assumptions which inform PPP based on ideologies within law and development debates. It argues that theoretically, PPPs are reflective of the neoliberal policy set. Against the trajectory of governance in Africa, it critically foregrounds insights that are derivable from an application of Path Dependency theory to the institutional change which comes with the planned adoption of PPP at the regional level. These insights are essential considerations for policy experts to bear in mind both while designing the regional institutional framework for PPP and during the implementation stage. Secondly, although most of the past initiatives for the provision of regional infrastructure have fallen short of their flamboyant development policy goals, the article argues that the recently initiated Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (“PIDA”) provides a new hope for the future of infrastructure development in the continent. The article contends that PIDA offers a legitimate platform which with the requisite support of the regional economic initiatives can generate the enabling environment for the implementation of successful regional PPP infrastructure projects.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks the Mandela Institute and the African International Economic Law Network Group for generously funding his attendance at this conference. I also acknowledge the financial support of the Graduate Studies Office of the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa and the Human Rights Research and Education Centre, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa.

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  1. Earlier versions of this article was presented as Public-Private Partnerships as the Nexus Between Regional Transport Infrastructure and Regional Economic Integration in Africa at the Graduate Students’ in Law Annual Conference, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa on November 16, 2011; and at the Second African International Economic Law Network Conference, Johannesburg, South-Africa, March 7–8, 2013.

  2. 1

    In this regard, a study found that “Africa’s infrastructure networks increasingly lag behind those of other developing countries and are characterized by missing regional links and stagnant household access.” See, V. Foster and C. Briceno-Garmendia (eds.), Africa’s Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation – Overview (The World Bank, Infrastructure Consortium for Africa, 2010), p. 1, available at: <http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/system/files/AIATT_Consolidated_smaller.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013. This study examines the state of Africa’s infrastructure, the costs required for transforming it and the efficiency gains that will arise from bridging the continent’s infrastructure gap.

  3. 2

    S. Simuyemba, Linking Africa through Regional Infrastructure (African Development Bank Economic Research Paper No. 64, 2000), p. 5, available at: <http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/00157662-EN-ERP-64.PDF>; R. Ranganathan and V. Foster, ECOWAS’s Infrastructure: A Regional Perspective (The World Bank, June 2011), available at: <http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/system/files/library/2012/02/REC%20ECOWAS.pdf>. On the nexus between trade and development, see, J. Stiglitz and A. Charlton, Fair Trade for All: How Trade Can Promote Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

  4. 3

    Wherever used in this article, Regional Economic Initiatives refer principally to the eight (8) regional economic communities recognized by the African Union, to wit; East African Community (“EAC”), Economic Community of West African States (“ECOWAS”), South African Development Community (“SADC”); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”), Economic Community of Central African States (“ECCAS”), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (“IAD”), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (“CEN-SAD”), and Arab Maghreb Union (“AMU”).

  5. 4

    For example, see, Chapter VII of ECOWAS Treaty of 1993–Co-operation in Transport, Communications and Tourism; and Chapter Fifteen of the EAC Treaty of 1999–Co-operation in Infrastructure and Services.

  6. 5

    According to the ICA, “[t]o create a transport network that provides adequate regional, national, rural, and urban road connectivity complemented by adequate rail, port, and airport infrastructure will require significant spending [in the region of] $18 billion a year, half of which is related to maintenance.” Foster and Briceno-Garmendia (2010), supra note 1, p. 56.

  7. 6

    To the author’s knowledge, there is no generally acceptable definition of PPP. See generally, the following articles with different takes on PPP in the transport sector: A. Estache, E. Juan and L. Trujillo, Public-Private Partnerships in Transport (World Bank, 2007), available at: <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/12/12/000158349_20071212 085739/Rendered/PDF/wps4436.pdf>, accessed 10 Jun 2013; C. Willoughby, How Much Can Public Private Partnership Really Do for Urban Transport in Developing Countries? 40 Research in Transportation Economics (2013), 34–55; B.G. Perez and J.W. March, Public-Private Partnerships and the Development of Transport Infrastructure: Trends on Both Sides of the Atlantic (United States Department of Transportation, 2006), available at: <http://financecommission.dot.gov/Documents/Background%20Documents/perez_banff_ppp_final.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013; R. Fischer, The Promise and Peril of Public-Private Partnerships: Lessons from the Chilean Experience (International Growth Centre Working Paper 11/0483, June 2011); World Bank, Toolkit for Public-Private Partnerships in Roads and Highways (March 2009), available at: <http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/highwaystoolkit/index.html>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  8. 7

    For example, see, NEPAD, Revision of the African Union/NEPAD African Action Plan 2010-2015: Advancing Regional and Continental Integration Together through Shared Values – Abridged Report 2010–2012 (2011), available at: <http://www.nepad.org/system/files/AAP%20final%20web%20130111.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013. This report identifies PPP as a principal financing strategy to accelerate programme and project implementation in Chapter 6: “Implementation of the Revised AAP [African Action Plan].”

  9. 8

    It should be noted that other theories such as dependency theory, structuralism, and similar heterodox development ideas co-existed at the same time as the dominant ones discussed in this article. See generally, D.M. Trubek and A. Santos (eds.), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) for compelling discussions from various perspectives which maps the debates and ideas in law and development from the post-war period.

  10. 9

    See, D.M. Trubek, H.A. Garcia, D.R. Coutinho and A. Santos (eds.), Law and the New Developmental State, The Brazilian Experience in Latin American Context (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). The “Law and the New Developmental State (LANDS)” research project which was launched by Professor David M. Trubek in 2007.

    “LANDS explore the changing role of the state in development today and the implications of such changes for the use of law and regulation as tools of economic and social policy. It rests on the premise that developing nations are exploring new ways that the state can and should promote both growth and equity and that these efforts may go beyond the policies recommended by the “augmented Washington Consensus.” See: LANDS website, available at: <http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/lands.html>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  11. 10

    See generally the following text on the latest thinking of scholars within the law development field: D. Kennedy and J. Stiglitz (eds.), Law and Economics with Chinese Characteristics: Institutions for Promoting Development in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),

  12. 11

    D. Andrew, C. Smith and M.J. Trebilcock, State-Owned Enterprises in Less Developed Countries: Privatization and Alternative Reform Strategies, 12 European Journal of Law and Economics, no. 3 (2001), 217–252, at 219.

  13. 12

    D. Kennedy, “The ‘Rule of Law’, Political Choices, and Developmental Common Sense”, in D.M. Trubek and A. Santos (eds.), supra note 8, pp. 95-173.

  14. 13

    K. Olayode, Reinventing the African State: Issues and Challenges for Building a Developmental State, 8 African Journal of International Affairs, nos. 1&2 (2005), 23-43, at 25.

  15. 14

    Kennedy (2006), supra note 12, p. 129.

  16. 15

    H. De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

  17. 16

    A. Santos, “The World Bank’s Use of the ‘Rule of Law’ Promise in Economic Development”, in D.M. Trubek and A. Santos (eds.), supra note 8, pp. 253-300.

  18. 17

    D.M. Trubek, “The “Rule of Law” in Development Assistance: Past, Present, and Future”, in D.M. Trubek and A. Santos (eds.), supra note 8, pp. 74-94, at 87.

  19. 18

    Olayode (2005), supra note 13, pp. 27-28.

  20. 19

    M.O. Chibundu, “NEPAD and the Rebirth of Development Theory and Praxis”, in Jeremy I. Levitt (ed.), Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008), pp. 257-295. Chibundu argues that the factor which united the African leaders towards the formation of the NEPAD “was their embrace of the neo-liberal order (embodied in what had become symbolically referred to as the ‘Washington Consensus’) …”. In relation to the substance of the NEPAD agenda, he argues that “the ‘framework’ document follows in the line of the neo-liberal development theory …” pp. 259-260. See also, I. Taylor, Globalization and Regionalization in Africa: Reactions to Attempts at Neo-Liberal Regionalism, 10 Review of African Political Economy, no. 2 (2003), 310-330. For a critique of the NEPAD policy agenda, see, J.T. Gathii, A Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade Regime in an Era of Market Centred Development, 13 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, no. 1 (2003), 179-210; J.T. Gathii, The Neoliberal Turn in Regional Trade Agreements, 86 Washington Law Review, no. 3 (2011), 421-474.

  21. 20

    In terms of evolution of PPPs, prior to year 2000, the United Kingdom distinguished between Private Finance Initiative (“PFI”) and PPP. PFI was announced in 1992 by the then Chancellor with the aim of increasing the involvement of the private sector in the provision of public services. It was not until “2000, [that] the government published ‘Public Private Partnerships – the Government’s Approach’ which defined PPP in three categories, to wit:

    1. the introduction of private sector ownership into state-owned businesses, using the full range of possible structures …, with sales of either a majority or a minority stake;

    2. the … (PFI) and other arrangements where the public sector contracts to purchase quality services on a long-term basis so as to take advantage of private sector management skills incentivised by having private finance at risk. This includes concessions and franchises, where a private sector partner takes on the responsibility for providing a public service, including maintaining, enhancing or constructing the necessary infrastructure; and

    3. selling government into wider markets and other partnership arrangements where private sector expertise and finance are used to exploit the commercial potential of government assets.”

    See, HM Treasury, PFI: Meeting the Investment Challenge (The Stationery Office, July, 2003b), p. 3, available at: <http://www.ppp.mg.gov.br/biblioteca/downloads/Meeting%20the%20Investment%20Challenge%20-%20Estudo%2002.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013.

    In the context on developing countries, it has been argued that they “became interested in toll financing during the 1980s, when economic and population growth led to increasing demand in infrastructure. In Mexico, President Salinas established a national highway building program that relied heavily on private toll financing [and] [i]n Indonesia, expected traffic growth and projections of high construction costs led the government to launch a joint venture private toll financing program to fund and manage toll projects.” See, G. Fishbein and S. Babbar, Private Financing of Toll Roads (RMC Discussion Paper Series No. 117, December 1996), p. 3, available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGUARANTEES/Resources/Private_Financing_of_Toll_Roads.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  22. 21

    For various approaches to categorizing PPPs, see, J. Delmon, Understanding Options for Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure, (The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5173, January 2010), accessed 10 June 2013, available at: <http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/5173.pdf>?expires=1370910235&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=4B9B69B0 C28A2171F73C6E400EDB005E>.

  23. 22

    D.M. Trubek, Developmental State and the Legal Order: Towards a New Political Economy of Development and Law (October 2010), p. 15, available at: <http://www.law.wisc.edu/gls/documents/developmental_states_legal_order_2010_trubek.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013. It is important to caution that the “New Developmental State phenomenon”, as Trubek calls it, is not a theory that has been completely developed. Trubek provides an indicative list of policy benchmarks that will help determine if a state is turning towards such a paradigm: “… we should look to see to what extent there is: [1] primary reliance on the private sector as investor rather than direct state ownership; [2] acceptance of a major role for the state in steering investment, coordinating projects and providing information especially with multiple inputs and long term payoff; [3] extensive collaboration and communication between public and private sectors; [4] strong interest in exports and relative openness to imports; [5] direct attention to entrepreneurship, innovation, and new development rather than reliance on imported technology and know-how; promotion of productive' (rather than speculative) foreign direct investments; [6] emphasis on making private firms competitive rather than on shielding them from competition; [7] privatization or public/private partnerships in provision of public services; [8] promotion of domestic capital markets and the financial sector both to generate and to allocate resources; [9] attention to social protection including efforts to reduce inequality, maintain solidarity and protect against some of the costs of restructuring; and [10] welfare programs conditioned to recipients work or investment in their human capital.” [Emphasis mine] Ibid, pp. 10-11.

  24. 23

    Ibid, p. 12

  25. 24

    See generally, P. Meyns and C. Musamba (eds.), The Developmental State in Africa: Problems and Prospects (Institut für Entwicklung und Frieden, INEW-Report 101/2010), available at: <inef.uni-due.de/cms/files/report101.pdf>; P. Mbabazi and I. Taylor, The Potentiality of “Developmental States” in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (Dakar: CODESRIA, 2005).

  26. 25

    Simuyemba (2000), supra note 2, p. 5. The author notes that “[h]istorically, Africa’s trade patterns have been outward looking – with the rest of the world, rather than inward looking – into the rest of Africa.” He explains that the reasons include “the pattern of colonial exploitation, homogeneity of production with most African countries producing and trading in primary commodities … as well as high export concentration”, p. 6.

    This idea resonates with the concept of Gate-keeper developed by Frederick Cooper in postcolonial studies. Gate-keeping alludes to the tenacity of Africa leaders to hold on to techniques of governance that mirrors the development strategy of the colonial encounter. It connotes the development of institutional and infrastructural structures by the different colonial powers in Africa essentially in border towns where natural resources were exploited in the colony for export. Its application as a form of colonial legacy traverses the economic, political and social architecture of the African strata. This resulted in uneven infrastructural development of the colony as the focus remained in areas where natural resources were exploited. Although the concept does not have to be negative, its negative impact as a colonial legacy in Africa is that whereas the economy of most African states could have diversified and looked at other possibilities for growth and development, the focus was thwarted and had been narrowed down to a monolithic one in most cases, often times with richness in natural resources such as oil. With the independence of African states, successive nationalist government have maintained the “gate” which provided the finance for governance. See, F. Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 156-190. For an incisive legal account of the colonial impact on the demographics and geographical boundaries of Africa, see M. Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa, 16 Michigan Journal of International Law, no. 4 (1994–1995), 1113-1176.

  27. 26

    My discussion of this concept draws on the analysis of M.M. Prado and M.J. Trebilcock, Path Dependence, Development and the Dynamics of Institutional Reforms, 9 University of Toronto Law Journal, no. 3 (2009), 341-379. For them, “institutions” refer to “those bodes (formal and informal) charged by a society with making, administering, enforcing or adjudicating its laws or policies”; p. 349. Also see, A. Kay, Path Dependency and the CAP, 10 Journal of European Public Policy, no. 3 (2003), 405-420; P. Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 The American Political Science Review, no. 2 (2000), 252-267. Also see, O.k. Kofi, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States, (England: Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire, 2006) pp. 35-36. Kufuor synthesizes the essence of path dependency in the following words:

    the concept of path dependence explains gradual institutional transformation: well-established and powerful lobbies refuse to accept change and seek to keep the organisation of a particular trajectory although this resistance does not necessarily lead the organisation towards efficiency or even social legitimacy. What makes resistance possible is the multifaceted set of restraints or institutions: the formal rules embedded in the organisation’s hierarchy that are so costly to change. In addition measures aimed at institutional and organisational change must confront and try to overcome informal constraints that also have the ability probably greater than that of formal rules, to persist. Formal and informal constraints interact to shape organisation paths. Once in a given institutional path, an organisation’s decision-makers and interests obtain advantage from the increasing returns to the institutional matrix, and, as a consequence institutions will endure notwithstanding whether they are efficient or inefficient and even if there is an alternative path for the organisation which is demonstrably more efficient.

  28. 27

    Douglass North notes in this regard that, “[p]ath dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today’s choices … without tracing the incremental evolution of institutions.” See, D.C. North, “The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development”, in J. Harris, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds.), The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 100. It has however been argued that path dependence can also be forward-looking, Prado and Trebilcock (2009), supra note 26, p. 353. For the purpose of this paper, I rely on the historical value which path dependence offers.

  29. 28

    Prado and Trebilcock (2009), supra note 26, p. 350.

  30. 29

    Ibid, p. 354.

  31. 30

    Some examples of “abnormal times” given by the authors which may privilege radical reforms include “times of economic collapse, major political crises or scandals, civil war [and] military invasion”; while “normal times” are instances of post-conflict societies. Whether in normal or abnormal times, the authors articulate four (4) mechanisms for dealing with switching costs. First, in terms of political economy considerations based on parties who benefit from the status quo, costs may be mitigated by reforms that enhances an opposing political constituency or that vested interests be bought-off in order to mute opposition; secondly, as to switching costs which arise from individual learning costs associated with adjusting to the new regime, programmed transition and state-sponsored public education system are proposed; thirdly, where it arises based on scarcity of financial and human resources required to implement the new institutional regime, they suggest seeking external financial and technical assistance; and lastly, where switching costs are a reflection of the deeply embedded cultural benefits or practices that resist change; the reforms may reflect traditional institutions where possible or implemented in a gradual manner which may lead to changes in cultural belief. Ibid, pp. 370-371.

  32. 31

    Ibid, p. 368.

  33. 32

    P. Farlam, Working Together: Assessing Public-Private Partnerships in Africa (The South African Institute of International Affairs, NEPAD Policy Focus Series, February 2005), p. 38, available at: <http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelopment/34867724.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  34. 33

    Delmon (2010), supra note 21.

  35. 34

    In the Nigerian context, in 2005, the national government established the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) pursuant to the provision of Section 20 of the Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Act (“ICRC Act”). The Commission is amongst others mandated to perform four major functions, which revolve around contract compliance and monitoring, efficient execution of contracts, compliance with the provisions of the ICRC Act, and such other functions as may be directed by the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or as are expedient for the performance of its aforementioned functions. Its strategic objective is to ensure the acceleration of investment in national infrastructure through private sector funding. The Commission is expected to leverage on PPPs as the key vehicle for facilitating the participation of the private sector. The Commission has developed a series of operational policy guidelines which will guide its operation in respect of the PPP projects in the pipeline. More information on the Commission and its activities is available at: <http://www.icrc.gov.ng>. For an online copy of the ICRC Act, see, the website of the National Assembly of Nigeria: <http://www.nassnig.org/nass/actssearch.php?search=2005&Submit=Search>.

    However, prior to the establishment of the Commission, the Federal Government of Nigeria had awarded some concession contracts which were to be delivered under a PPP arrangement. Ironically, the projects which were in respect of road and airport projects were awarded to the same private party: Bi-Courtney Limited. The contract in respect of the 125 km road project which was awarded in May 2009 was terminated in 2012 for alleged serial breach of contract by the private party. See “Lagos-Ibadan Expressway: Nigeria Sacks Bi-Courtney”, 19 November 2012, available at: <http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2012/11/19/lagos-ibadan-expressway-nigeria-sacks-bi-courtney/>, accessed 8 June 2013. Bi-Courtney however completed the local wing of the Murtala Mohammed Airport in Lagos, Nigeria. The plan completely transferred all development and operating risks to the private party specifically on a Design-Build-Operate-Transfer (DBOT) arrangement. The project comprises an Airport Terminal Building, a multi-storey car park and an apron over a land area of 20,000 m2. The operational aspect of the project has been the subject of various litigation between the parties which makes question whether the government is ready for such arrangements. Or are they simply to be treated as teething issues from which lessons can be learnt for the future?

  36. 35

    The Lagos State Government of Nigeria has set an example of a successful pioneering PPP project in the road sector which Phase 1 is currently in the operational phase. The Lekki Toll Road Project is mandated under a 30-year Concession Agreement for the upgrade, expansion and maintenance of approximately 50 km of the Lekki-Epe Expressway (Phase I), and construction of approximately 20 km of the Coastal Road (Phase II) on the Lekki Peninsular. The project is designed to deliver essential road infrastructure and services along the Lekki Peninsular of Lagos. It is a PPP scheme, and uses the Design-Build-Operate-Transfer (DBOT) model of Infrastructure delivery. The Concession is for a period of 30 years, following which the assets will be transferred to Lagos State Government. The Project won three international awards in 2008 as the Africa Investor Transport Deal of the year; Euro-money International Africa PPP of the Year; and Reuters African Infrastructure Deal of the Year. See, Lekki Concession Company Ltd, available at: <http://www.lcc.com.ng/tolls.asp?pid=20>. Also see, The Lagos State Public Private Partnership Law, No. 11, 2011 which replaced the Lagos State Roads (Private Sector Participation) Authority Law, No 7, 2007.

  37. 36

    For studies on the N4 Toll Road project, see, Public–Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility Toolkit for Public–Private Partnerships in Roads & Highways, N4 Toll Road from South Africa to Mozambique (March 2009), available at: <http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/highwaystoolkit/6/pdf-version/safricamozambique.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013. Also see, Trans African Concessions, About the N4 Toll Route, available at: <http://www.tracn4.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=86&Itemid=54>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  38. 37

    D. Grimsey and M.K. Lewis, Evaluating the Risks of Public Private Partnerships for Infrastructure Projects, 20 International Journal of Project Management, no. 2 (2002), 107-118.

  39. 38

    At the regional level, there are various provisions in the establishing treaties of the organizations which recognize a role for the private sector in the provision of regional transport infrastructure amongst others. For example, see the following provision of the ECOWAS Community Treaty of 1993. Furthermore, Article 32(1) (Transport and Communication) provides that: “For the purpose of ensuring the harmonious integration of the physical infrastructures of Member States, … Member States shall: (a) evolve common transport and communications policies, laws and regulations; (b) develop an extensive network of all-weather highways within the Community, priority being given to the inter-State highways; (c) formulate plans for the improvement and integration of railway and road networks in the region; (d) …….” Article 32(2) however states that: “Member States also undertake to encourage the establishment and promotion of joint ventures and Community enterprises and the participation of the private sector in the areas of transport and communications.” [Emphasis mine]

    For the current state of policy strategy in relation to regional infrastructure in the East African Community, See Africon Ltd., The East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project: East African Transport Strategy and Regional Road Sector Development Program (2011); Ioannis N. Kessides, Regionalizing Infrastructure for Deepening Market Integration: The Case of East Africa (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2012).

    See also, the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite regional harmonisation and cooperation initiative which among other things has infrastructure development as one of its focal points. See, <http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&id=581&Itemid=201&limitstart=2>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  40. 39

    See, World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Program, available at: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/EXTAFRREGTOPTRA/EXTAFRSUBSAHTRA/0,menuPK:1513942~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:1513930,00.html>, accessed 10 June 2013. The SSATP was launched in 1987 by a joint-initiative of the World Bank and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa as an outcome of the first United Nations Transport and Communications Decade for Africa. It is described as “a unique partnership of 36 African countries, 8 regional economic communities, 3 African institutions, and many national and international development partners – all dedicated to ensuring that the transport sector fosters Africa’s poverty reduction, pro-poor growth, and regional integration.”

  41. 40

    The World Bank co-sponsored the “Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostics” (“AICD”) programme in 2005. It is a knowledge based programme on Africa’s Infrastructure which grew out of the commitment by the G8 Summit at Gleneagles to substantially increase development assistance to Africa. AICD served as a vehicle for building consensus about the appropriate response to Africa’s infrastructure problems. It precedes the formation of the ICA also in 2005.

    The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (“ICA”) which was launched “to help improve the lives and economic well-being of Africa’s people through encouraging, supporting and promoting increased investment in infrastructure in Africa, from both public and private sources.” The ICA acts as a catalyst for private sector financing of infrastructure projects and programmes in Africa. For more information on ICA, see, <http://www.icafrica.org/en/about-ica/>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  42. 41

    See generally, the PIDA website at <http://www.pidafrica.org/>. For the purpose of the discussion on PIDA, I have reviewed the following publications: (i) PIDA General Terms of Reference; (ii) PIDA Concept Note; (iii) Inception Report; (iv) Africa Transport Outlook 2040; and (iv) Africa Infrastructure Outlook 2040, all available at: <http://www.pidafrica.org/publication.html>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  43. 42

    PIDA Concept Note, Ibid, p. 3.

  44. 43

    “Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa to be Key feature of AU Summit”, PIDA News (January 2012), available at: <http://www.pidafrica.org/news-events.html>.

  45. 44

    PIDA, Inception Report, p. 15 available at: <http://www.pidafrica.org/Inception%20report%20Final%20Version%20GB.pdf>, accessed 10 June 2013.

  46. 45

    Simuyemba (2000), supra note 2, pp. 34-41 for an extremely useful roadmap which can be adopted by the regional economic initiatives.

Published Online: 2013-08-29

©2013 by Walter de Gruyter Berlin / Boston