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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter March 21, 2014

Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences

  • Ahmed Doghmi EMAIL logo


In this paper we study the rationing problems in using the issue of Nash implementation in an environment of single-crossing preferences. We show that strict monotonicity (i) implies strict weak no-veto power and unanimity and (ii) is equivalent to Maskin monotonicity, which is vacuously checked in this domain. We show that any social choice correspondence that has full range can be implemented in Nash equilibria.

JEL: C72; D71
Published Online: 2014-3-21
Published in Print: 2014-7-28

©2014 Walter de Gruyter Berlin/Boston

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