Accessible Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter November 3, 2017

Legitimate Expectations in the Realm of Law – Mutual Recognition, Justice as a Virtue and the Legitimacy of Expectations

Stefan Arnold

Abstract

This essay argues that one structural feature of the law is its working as an expectations machinery that generates and protects legitimate expectations at the same time. The vindication of expectations becomes apparent when we focus on the ex post-dimension of legal norms. In their ex post-dimension, legal norms vindicate legitimate expectations, in their ex ante-dimension, they generate them. This paper identifies three categories of expectations: Mere hopes, legitimate expectations and vindicated (legitimate) expectations. In the practice of legal discourse, this categorisation is of crucial importance and decisive for our legal rights. This will be illustrated with examples concerning contract and property. The essay further shows that the classification of expectations faces an uncertainty problem. Building on Brandom, the essay argues that the rationality of the law’s classification of expectations can be ensured through the practice of legal discourse. Brandom’s theory of mutual recognition as a normative social structure must be supplemented by justice as a virtue (JAV), however. It will be argued that JAV strengthens the mutual recognition of the players of the law in their permanent reconstruction of legal content. JAV must be included in legal discourse to ensure the rationality of the law’s quest for the classification of expectations.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Christian Hiebaum, Marcus Schnetter and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

References

Aristotle. (1980/320 BC). The Nicomachean Ethics (translated with an introduction by D. Ross, revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson) (Oxford: Oxford University Press).Search in Google Scholar

Arnold, S. (2008). Die Bürgschaft auf erstes Anfordern im deutschen und englischen Recht [First Demand Guarantees in German and English law] (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck).Search in Google Scholar

Arnold, S. (2014). Vertrag und Verteilung – Die Bedeutung der iustitia distributiva im Vertragsrecht [Contract and Distribution – The Significance of iustitia distributiva in Contract Law] (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck).Search in Google Scholar

Arnold, S. (2016a). ‘Bürgerliches Recht und Rechtsphilosophie – Gegenseitige Anerkennung und Gerechtigkeit als Schlüssel zur Rationalität des Rechts‘ [‘Private Law and Philosophy of Law – Mutual Recognition and Justice as the Key to the Rationality of Law’], in D. Klippel, M. Loehnig and U. Walter (eds.). Grundlagen und Grundfragen des Bürgerlichen Rechts [Foundations and Fundamental Questions of Private Law] (Bielefeld: Gieseking Verlag), pp. 5–22.Search in Google Scholar

Arnold, S. (2016b). ‘Verhaltenssteuerung als rechtsethische Aufgabe auch des Privatrechts?’ [‘Behaviour Control as a Legal-ethical Task also of Private Law?’], in P. Bydlinski (ed.). Prävention und Strafsanktion im Privatrecht – Verhaltenssteuerung durch Rechtsnormen [Prevention and Punitive Sanctions in Private Law – Behaviour Control through Legal Norms] (Vienna: Verlag Österreich), pp. 39–62.Search in Google Scholar

Bollenberger, R. (2014/2005). ‘§ 861 ABGB’ [‘Section 861 Austrian Common Civil Code’], in H. Koziol, P. Bydlinski and R. Bollenberger (eds.). ABGB Kurzkommentar [Austrian Common Civil Code Short Commentary] (Vienna: Verlag Österreich).Search in Google Scholar

Brandom, R.B. (1988). ‘Inference, Expression, and Induction’, Philosophical Studies 54 (2): 257–285.10.1007/BF00354516Search in Google Scholar

Brandom, R.B. (1994). Making It Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).Search in Google Scholar

Brandom, R.B. (1999). ‘Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms’, European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2): 164–189.10.1111/1468-0378.00079Search in Google Scholar

Brandom, R.B. (2009). Reason in Philosophy. Animating Ideas (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).Search in Google Scholar

Brandom, R.B. (2014). ‘A Hegelian Model of Legal Concept Determination. The Normative Fine Structure of the Judge’s Chain Novel’, in G. Hubbs and D. Lind (eds.). Pragmatism, Law, and Language (London: Routledge), pp. 19–39.Search in Google Scholar

Brandom, R.B. (2015). ‘Towards Reconciling Two Heroes: Habermas and Hegel’, Argumenta 1 (1): 29–42.Search in Google Scholar

Busche, J. (2015/1978). ‘§ 145 BGB’ [‘Section 145 German Civil Code’], in F.J. Säcker et al. (eds.). Münchener Kommentar zum BGB I [Munich Commentary for the German Civil Code I] (Munich: C.H. Beck).Search in Google Scholar

Cartwright, J. (December 2006). ‘Protecting Legitimate Expectations and Estoppel in English Law’, Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 10 (3), (accessed on September 27, 2017).Search in Google Scholar

Christensen, R. and Sokolowski, M. (2008/2006). ‘Neopragmatismus: Brandom’ [‘Neopragmatism: Brandom’], in S. Buckel, R. Christensen and A. Fischer-Lescano (eds.). Neue Theorien des Rechts [New Theories of Law] (Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius), pp. 239–263.Search in Google Scholar

Cohen, M.R. (1927). ‘Property and Sovereignty’, Cornell Law Quarterly 13 (1): 8–30.Search in Google Scholar

Dworkin, R. (1977). Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).Search in Google Scholar

Dworkin, R. (1985). A Matter of Principle (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press).Search in Google Scholar

Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press).Search in Google Scholar

Habermas, J. (1994/1992). Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaates [Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).Search in Google Scholar

Hale, R. (1923). ‘Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State’, Political Science Quarterly 38 (3): 470–494.10.2307/2142367Search in Google Scholar

Hegel, G.W.F. (1995/1820). ‘Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse’ [‘Elements of the Philosophy of Right or the Fundamentals of Natural Law and Political Sciences’], in E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (eds.). Werke, Band 7 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).Search in Google Scholar

Hegel, G.W.F. (1996/1806). ‘Phänomenologie des Geistes’ [‘The Phenomenology of Spirit’], in E. Moldenhauer and K.M. Michel (eds.). Werke, Band 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).Search in Google Scholar

Höffe, O. (2011). Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft – Die Grundlegung der modernen Philosophie [‘Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason – The Foundation of Modern Philosophy] (Munich: C.H. Beck).Search in Google Scholar

Hohfeld, W.N. (1919). Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (edited by Walter Wheeler Cook) (New Haven: Yale University Press).Search in Google Scholar

Honneth, A. (2008). ‘Schwerpunkt: Anerkennung: Facetten eines Begriffs’ [‘Focus: Recognition: Facets of a Term’], Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (6): 875–876.Search in Google Scholar

Iser, M. (2013). ‘Recognition’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (accessed on August 27, 2017).Search in Google Scholar

Klatt, M. (2004). Theorie der Wortlautgrenze. Semantische Normativität in der juristischen Argumentation [Theory of the Limits of Meaning. Semantic Normativity in Legal Argumentation] (Baden-Baden: Nomos).Search in Google Scholar

Knappik, F. (2014). Im Reich der Freiheit. Hegels Theorie autonomer Vernunft [In the Empire of Freedom: Hegel’s Theory of independent reasoning] (Berlin: De Gruyter).Search in Google Scholar

Luhmann, N. (1972). Rechtssoziologie [Sociological Theory of Law] (Hamburg: Rowohlt).Search in Google Scholar

Luhmann, N. (1995). Das Recht der Gesellschaft [Law as a Social System] (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp).Search in Google Scholar

Meyer, L.H. and Sanklecha, P. (2014). ‘How legitimate expectations matter in climate justice’, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 13 (4): 369–393.10.1177/1470594X14541522Search in Google Scholar

Mittelstraß, J. (2013). ‘Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie. Bemerkungen zum Rationalitätsbegriff der Wissenschaftstheorie und des Rechts’ [‘Philosophy of Law and Theory of Law. Remarks on the Rationality of Law in the Theory of Science and in Law’], in P. Häberle (ed.), Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, Neue Folge 61: 513–524.Search in Google Scholar

Radbruch, G. (1973/1932). Rechtsphilosophie [Philosophy of Law] (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler).Search in Google Scholar

Westermann, H.P. (2016/1978). ‘§ 434 BGB’ [‘Section 434 German Civil Code’], in F.J. Säcker et al. (eds.). Münchener Kommentar zum BGB III [Munich Commentary for the German Civil Code III] (Munich: C.H. Beck).Search in Google Scholar

Wildhaber, L. (2007). ‘The Protection of Legitimate Expectations in European Human Rights Law’, in M. Monti et al (eds.). Economic Law and Justice in Times of Globalisation – Festschrift Baudenbacher (Baden-Baden/Vienna: Nomos/Verlag Österreich), pp. 253–266.Search in Google Scholar

Zweigert, K. and Kötz, H. (1998/1969). Introduction to Comparative Law (translated by Tony Weir) (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck).Search in Google Scholar

Published Online: 2017-11-3
Published in Print: 2017-11-27

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston