Truth is a value in that sense that a belief is correct just in case it is true, which is frequently expressed in the metaphor that beliefs aim at truth. But, what does it mean to say that beliefs aim at truth? There are three most prominent approaches to this issue: purposive (or causal), teleological (or intentional), and normative. A comprehensive discussion of these approaches is the goal of our article. We also offer the hierarchy of languages and meta-languages, which gives a fragmentary account of the concept of God’s omniscience.
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Of course, the theory m must be previously determined in a meta-language for the object-language .
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