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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter May 21, 2014

Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-representationalism

Ingvar Johansson
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

Contemporary defenders of non-disjunctivism take a representationalist philosophy of mind for granted; all kinds of conscious intentional states/acts/events are automatically regarded as being representations. The paper presents an alternative anti-representationalist view of the mind. It differs from other present-day anti-representationalisms in arguing that all conscious phenomena contains a this-worldly something called “from-pole”, and it denies that an intentional content and the corresponding intentional object always are distinct entities. The view is set in contrast to both a transcendental ego tradition and a no from-pole tradition. Hereby, the paper defends the common sense-like view that we are persons who directly perceive, act in, and talk about things in a common world.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jan Almäng, Kevin Mulligan, Oscar Ralsmark, and Kristoffer Sundberg both for comments on earlier versions and for earlier discussions.

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Published Online: 2014-5-21
Published in Print: 2014-11-28

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