Abstract
Merricks (2007; Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) argues for and defends a novel version of primitivism about truth: being true is a primitive monadic but non-intrinsic property. This examination consists of the following triad: a critical discussion of Merricks’ argument for his view, a rejection of his objection against Horwich’s (1998; Truth, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press) minimalist theory of truth, and a direct objection against his view on the grounds that it entails being true is a mysterious and suspicious property. The conclusion is that Merricks’ primitivism should be rejected.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Peter Forrest, André Gallois, Matt Leonard, Hugh Mellor and Joshua Spencer for comments and discussion on earlier versions of this paper. I also thank the audiences at the Pacific APA, 7 April 2012, Seattle, WA, and the University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia, 24 June 2010.
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