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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter October 21, 2014

Relations and Order-Sensitivity

David Liebesman EMAIL logo
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

I ate my broccoli, though my broccoli did not eat me. The eating relation, like many other relations, differentiates between its arguments. The fact that eating holds between a and b does not entail that it holds between b and a. How are we to make sense of this? The standard view is that relations are sensitive to the order of their arguments. As natural as this view is, it has been the target of a powerful objection from Kit Fine. I examine Fine’s objection and defend the standard view.

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Matti Eklund, Aaron Garrett, Carl Ginet, John Grey, Paul Katsafanas, Ofra Magidor, Russell Powell, Yoni Porat, Russell Powell, John Symons, Sanem Soyerslan, Susanne Sreedhar, Dan Star, an audience at University of Texas El Paso, and anonymous referees.

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Published Online: 2014-10-21
Published in Print: 2014-11-28

©2014 by De Gruyter

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