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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter May 2, 2015

Do Ontological Categories Exist?

  • Aaron M. Griffith EMAIL logo
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

This paper concerns the ontological status of ontological categories (e.g., universal, particular, substance, property, relation, kind, object, etc.). I consider E. J. Lowe’s argument for the view that ontological categories do not exist and point out that it has some undesirable consequences for his realist ontology. I go on to argue that the main premise in Lowe’s argument – that ontological categories cannot be categorized – is false and then develop a conception of ontological categories as formal ontological kinds.

References

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Published Online: 2015-5-2
Published in Print: 2015-5-25

©2015 by De Gruyter

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