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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter May 2, 2015

Do Ontological Categories Exist?

Aaron M. Griffith
From the journal Metaphysica


This paper concerns the ontological status of ontological categories (e.g., universal, particular, substance, property, relation, kind, object, etc.). I consider E. J. Lowe’s argument for the view that ontological categories do not exist and point out that it has some undesirable consequences for his realist ontology. I go on to argue that the main premise in Lowe’s argument – that ontological categories cannot be categorized – is false and then develop a conception of ontological categories as formal ontological kinds.


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Published Online: 2015-5-2
Published in Print: 2015-5-25

©2015 by De Gruyter

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