J. Robert G. Williams argues that referential indeterminacy may arise as a result of ontic indeterminacy, and that lambda-abstraction is not applicable to indeterminate identity statements, i.e., statements of the form, ‘it is indeterminate whether is identical with ,’ if they involve such ontically induced referential indeterminacy; so Evans’s argument against vague objects does not work. This paper finds fault with Williams’s defense of vague objects and shows that there is much reason to doubt that the idea of ontically induced referential indeterminacy plays any significant role in a proper defense of vague objects against Evans’s argument.
Barnes, E., and J. R. G.Williams. 2011. “A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy.” In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 6, edited by K.Bennett and D. W.Zimmerman, 103–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Curtis, B., and H.Noonan. 2014. “Castles Built on Clouds: Vague Identity and Vague Objects.” In Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness, edited by K.Akiba and A.Abasnezhad, 305–26. Dordrecht: Springer.10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5_15Search in Google Scholar
Darby, G. 2014. “Vague Objects in Quantum Mechanics?” In Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness, edited by K.Akiba and A.Abasnezhad, 69–108. Dordrecht: Springer.10.1007/978-94-007-7978-5_4Search in Google Scholar
Salmon, N. 1981. Reference and Essence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Williams, J. R. G. 2008a. “Multiple Actualities and Ontically Vague Identity.” Philosophical Quarterly58:134–54.Search in Google Scholar
Williamson, T. 1994. Vagueness. London: Routledge.Search in Google Scholar
©2015 by De Gruyter