Proponents of supervaluationism claim super-truth, i. e., truth on every admissible precisification, is identical to truth or, at least, is a suitable truth proxy. I object that super-truth is neither identical to nor a suitable proxy for truth. I argue that to claim a statement is super-true is simply to maintain that a certain counterfactual holds, and that a claim is true, counterfactually, is no reason to treat it as true. I further argue that, with super-truth undermined, Roy Sorensen’s objection that supervaluationism cannot accommodate vague directly referential terms presents supervaluationism’s defenders with a significant challenge.
Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.Search in Google Scholar
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