Abstract
It is often claimed that realists about universals must be either “platonists”, holding that universals lack spatio-temporal location, or “aristotelians”, asserting that universals are located where their instances are. What’s more, both camps agree that locatedness or unlocatedness is part of the essential nature of universals; consequently, aristotelians say that universals cannot exist un located, and platonists allege that universals cannot be located. Here I argue that the dispute may be resolved by synthesizing the most attractive features of each position. I claim that universals are located at their instances when instantiated by particulars which themselves possess a spatio-temporal location; however, uninstantiated universals exist without location. This has the consequence that it will often be a contingent matter whether a given universal has a location, if the universal is only contingently instantiated. Nevertheless, I claim, objections to this position may be overcome.
References
Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism. Volume II: A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. 1985. What Is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. 1989. Universals: an Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Search in Google Scholar
Beebee, H., and J. Dodd, eds. 2005. Truthmakers: the Contemporary Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.001.0001Search in Google Scholar
Bradley, F. H. 1897. Appearance and Reality, 2nd ed. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. Ltd.Search in Google Scholar
Dodd, J. 2002. “Is Truth Supervenient on Being?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102:69–85.10.1111/j.0066-7372.2003.00043.xSearch in Google Scholar
Ehring, D. 2002. “Spatial Relations between Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80:17–23.10.1080/713659347Search in Google Scholar
Fine, K. 1994. “Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture”. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1–16.10.2307/2214160Search in Google Scholar
Franklin, J. 2015. “Uninstantiated Properties and Semi-Platonist Aristotelianism”. The Review of Metaphysics 69:25–45.Search in Google Scholar
Gilmore, C. S. 2003. “In Defence of Spatially Related Universals”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81:420–8.10.1080/713659709Search in Google Scholar
Grupp, J. 2003. “The Impossibility of an Exemplification Tie between Particulars and Universals”. Metaphysica: The International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 4:27–38.Search in Google Scholar
Hornsby, J. 2005. “Truth without Truthmaking Entities”. In Beebee and Dodd.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199283569.003.0003Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Search in Google Scholar
Lewis, D. K. 1990. “Noneism and Allism”. Mind 99:23–31.10.1017/CBO9780511625343.009Search in Google Scholar
Liggins, D. 2008. “Truthmakers and the Groundedness of Truth”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108:177–96.10.1111/j.1467-9264.2008.00242.xSearch in Google Scholar
Loux, M. J. 2002. Metaphysics a Contemporary Introduction, 2nd ed, revised. London: Routledge.10.4324/9780203438244Search in Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 1995. “The Metaphysics of Abstract Objects”. The Journal of Philosophy 92:509–24.10.2307/2940785Search in Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. 2006. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Search in Google Scholar
MacBride, F. 1998. “Where are Particulars and Universals?” Dialectica 52:203–27.10.1111/j.1746-8361.1998.tb00050.xSearch in Google Scholar
MacBride, F. 2005. “The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?” Mind 114:565–614.10.1093/mind/fzi565Search in Google Scholar
MacBride, F. 2011. “Relations and Truthmaking”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society S.V 84:213–41.10.1111/j.1467-9264.2011.00304.xSearch in Google Scholar
MacBride, F. 2014. “How Truth Depends Upon Being”. Analysis 74:370–8.10.1093/analys/anu057Search in Google Scholar
Most, G. W. 1996. “Reading Raphael: ‘the School of Athens’ and Its Pre-Text”. Critical Inquiry 23:145–82.10.1086/448824Search in Google Scholar
Peacock, H. 2013. “Bradley’s Regress, Truthmaking, and Constitution”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 86:1–21.10.1163/9789401209182_002Search in Google Scholar
Peacock, H. 2014. “Existence as the Possibility of Reference”. Acta Analytica 29:389–411.10.1007/s12136-014-0216-xSearch in Google Scholar
Quinton, A. 1957. “Properties and Classes”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 58:33–58.10.1093/aristotelian/58.1.33Search in Google Scholar
Read, S. 2005. “The Unity of the Fact”. Philosophy 80:317–42.10.1017/S003181910500032XSearch in Google Scholar
Rosen, G. 1990. “Modal Fictionalism”. Mind 99:327–54.10.1093/mind/XCIX.395.327Search in Google Scholar
©2016 by De Gruyter
