This paper addresses the ontological status of the ontological categories as defended within E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology (kinds, objects, properties/relations, and modes). I consider the arguments in Griffith (2015. “Do Ontological Categories Exist?” Metaphysica 16 (1):25–35) against Lowe’s claim that ontological categories do not exist, and argue that Griffith’s objections to Lowe do not work once we fully take advantage of ontological resources available within Lowe’s four-category ontology. I then argue that the claim that ontological categories do not exist has no undesirable consequences for Lowe’s brand of realism.
Funding statement: This research was carried out during my time as a Research Fellow on the Durham Emergence Project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation(Grant ID: 40485).
Acknowledgements and thanks
I am grateful to my colleagues at Trinity College Dublin, and to Anna Bortolan for discussions that helped to clarify the points made here.
Lowe, E. J. 2006. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. New York: Oxford University Press.Search in Google Scholar
©2016 by De Gruyter