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Counting the Particles: Entity and Identity in the Philosophy of Physics

Francesco Berto
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

I would like to attack a certain view: the view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View (French and Krause 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce the Received View in Section 1. In Section 2 I explain what I mean by “entity” (synonymously, by “object” and “thing”), and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by “identity”, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In Section 3 I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements, n being a positive integer. In Section 4 I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In Section 5 I address the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.

Acknowledgments

Various parts of the work were presented between 2015 and 2016 at the Philosophy of Mathematics seminar of the IHPST (University Paris 1-Pantheon Sorbonne), at the 7th Workshop of the MetaMetaPhysical Club, University of Rotterdam, and at the IMERA – Institute for Advanced Study in Marseille. Thanks to the audiences for their comments and remarks. Special thanks go to Andrew Arana, Guido Bacciagaluppi, Alfio Bonanno, Otàvio Bueno, Claudio Calosi, Vincenzo Fano, Federico Faroldi, Fausto Fraisopi, Cristian Mariani, Fred Muller, Fabrice Pataut, and Francesca Poggiolesi.

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Published Online: 2017-3-18
Published in Print: 2017-4-1

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