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Intentionality, Privilege and World Pluralism: Reply to Beillard

Timothy J. Nulty EMAIL logo
From the journal Metaphysica


I respond to Julian Beillard’s (2016) critique of my arguments (2009, 2015) for a plurality of worlds. My initial arguments deployed the notions of relevant similarity and primitive triangulation found in the later writings of Donald Davidson. More specifically, I address Beillard’s claims that my use of intentionality to develop further Davidson’s concept of primitive triangulation is incoherent and leads to empirically absurd results. I argue that Beillard’s two main arguments—the causal objection and the coherence objection – fail due to a limited and erroneous understanding of the forms of intentionality relevant to primitive triangulation. I argue Beillard unjustifiably privileges one form of intentionality as the standard for what counts as real in a given world. Some of Beillard’s claims might in fact commit him to the world pluralism I advocate.


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Published Online: 2017-3-25
Published in Print: 2017-9-26

© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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