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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter December 9, 2017

Can Universals be Wholly Located where Their Instances are Located?

John Robert Mahlan
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

Many philosophers believe that there are both particulars and universals. Many of these philosophers, in turn, believe that universals are immanent. On this view, universals are wholly located where their instances are located. Both Douglas Ehring and E.J. Lowe have argued that immanent universals do not exist on the grounds that nothing can be wholly located in multiple places simultaneously without contradiction. In this paper, I focus on Lowe’s argument, which has received far less attention in the literature. Using the theory of location found in Josh Parsons (2007), I show how Lowe’s argument against immanent universals can be resisted.

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Trenton Merricks for reading the first version of this paper. Thanks as well to Dean Da Vee for helpful comments on a slightly more recent version of the paper at the APA Central Division Meeting in 2016. Thanks to the audience that day as well, especially Peter Finocchiaro for serving as impromptu chair of that session. Finally, thanks to Jim Darcy and Derek Lam for helpful discussions about, and written feedback on, the most recent version of the paper.

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Published Online: 2017-12-9
Published in Print: 2018-3-26

© 2018 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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