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Semantic Realism, Actually

Simon Hewitt ORCID logo EMAIL logo
From the journal Metaphysica

Abstract

Michael Dummett offered a semantic characterisation of a variety of realism-antirealism debates. This approach has fallen out of fashion. This has been to the detriment of metaphysics. This paper offers an accurate characterisation of Dummett’s view, often lacking in the literature, and then defends it against a range of attacks (from Devitt, Miller and Williamson). This understanding of realism debates is resilient, and if we take it seriously the philosophical terrain looks importantly different. In particular, the philosophy of language has a foundational role with respect to metaphysics.


Corresponding author: Simon Hewitt, School of Philosophy, Religion, and the History of Science, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT, UK, E-mail:

Funding source: Leverhulme Trust

Acknowledgments

Thanks to John Divers, Alex Douglas, Jade Fletcher, Jonathan Nassim, Tasia Scrutton, Naomi Thompson and Robbie Williams for discussion. The work presented here was supported by a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship, and was presented to audiences at the Centre for Metaphysics and Mind, Leeds, and the University of Southampton.

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Published Online: 2020-08-18
Published in Print: 2020-10-25

© 2020 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston

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