The central remarks of the Tractatus are without substantial content or consequence, remarks at the boundaries of sense that dissolve into truth. While they say nothing, they encapsulate logical features of language and the world. Unasserted, they express thoughts, the truth of which Wittgenstein takes to be unassailable and definitive, while asserted, they are out-and-out nonsense. What is manifest in linguistic practice is no more sayable - and no less significant - than what is manifest in logical truths, mathematical equations and the principles of mechanics.
About the author
After studying electrical engineering in London, Andrew Lugg uprooted to the USA, where he obtained a PhD in philosophy, after which he moved to Canada, where he taught for some 30 years with brief stints in Europe and the USA. Before turning his attention to the history of analytic philosophy he wrote for a decade or so on science. He is the author of a fair number of articles and two books, Pseudociencia, Racionalismo y Cientismo and Wittgenstein’s Investigations 1- 133. At present he is writing on Wittgenstein and colour and has in mind a book on Quine’s philosophy.
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