“How can we free ourselves from this despotic Moscow oppression?” The attitude of Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships noblemen towards the Russian army actions in the years 1758-1759. Contribution to the history of the Seven Years’ War


 The aim of the text is to show the attitude of the nobility from the Poznan and Kalisz provinces in the years 1758-1759 during the Seven Years’ War. This area, despite the neutrality of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, became a place of Prussian-Russian fighting. The article is a contribution to reflection on the functioning of the political elites and state structures of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

The issue of the presence of foreign, though mainly neighbouring-country military forces in the area of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the 18th century is a partially explored topic, mostly because of its background as well as the political and military consequences, yet has beenanalyzed to a lesser extent from the economic, social and demographic perspective or in terms of mutual perception and attitude of the local nobility towards the situation. The purpose of this text is to present the latter issue on the example of events which took place in the voivodeships of Poznan and Kalisz. The following text will concentrate on events which took place during the initial period of Russian military troops presence in the time period between 1758 and 1759 and should be treated as a supplement to the findings of Wladyslaw Konopczynski, whose scientific work, despite the passage of over 109 years, is still the very last monograph on the history of this conflict seen from the Polish perspective 1 . It is a colorful and vivid description of purely political history and, for obvious reasons, 1 it depicts the situation of the Greater Poland nobility in a synthetic way. Extraordinarily abundant preserved source materials allow to tackle these issues from a slightly different, bottom-up perspective, embodied by the provincial nobility, their Sejmik, and senators representing the local elites.
It should be emphasized here that the Polish-Lithuanian Republic did not participate in this military conflict as it was back then officially a neutral state and only its ruler Augustus III, being a Saxon elector, was an ally of Austria, France and Russia. As Konopczynski pointed out many years ago, neutrality did not matter in that case. The Republic was unable to secure its borders and King Augustus III, being dependent on the support of his allies, was simply forced to tolerate the presence of foreign military forces within the borders of his state 2 . It was one of the natural and permanent consequences of the growing dependence of the Republic of Poland on the Russian Empire in the 18th century in which the process had already started in the times of King Augusust II and which was a phenomenon unseen before by the population living in the western and central areas in the earlier time (16th-17th century). The causes of this situation have already been numerously described by a general historiography 3 , therefore I have no intention of discussing them here. I will only indicate the time periods in which the inhabitants of the Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships had to deal with the presence of Russian military troops. Such a new situation was experienced for the first time and on such a mass scale during the Great Northern War in which Tsar Peter I was an ally of King Augustus II as a Saxon elector. Between 1706 and 1719, at its peak number, about 30,000 soldiers were stationed in the area of Greater Poland, Kujawy and Pomerania, although these estimations are not certain. Abuse, robberies, killings, rape together with other crimes committed by the Russians constituted a problem which the nobility of Greater Poland and their subjects were unable to cope with, despite a number of bottom-up attempts to do so. It must be stated here that the Swedish army acted in a similar way, and probably the Crown army itself was not the most disciplined one either. At that time, supporters of Stanislaw Leszczynski, who had fairly strong support from the Greater Poland nobility, fought with the Russian army. After the end of the war and the mediation between the Confederation of Tarnow and August II, which was finalized by the Silent Sejm on February 1, 1717, the situation in the entire Republic of Poland gradually started to normalize. Tsar Peter I, however, did not decide to withdraw his troops immediately, thus wojny siedmioletniej, in Wielkie wojny w Prusach, N. Kasparek, W. Gierszewski (ed.), Dąbrówno, 2010, pp. 97-168 (in Polish); T. Ciesielski, Rzeczpospolita wobec wybuchu wojny siedmioletniej (jesień 1756 -zima 1757), in Między obowiązkami, przywilejami a prawem Rzeczypospolitej XVI -XVIII wieku: Społeczeństwo w obronie państwa polsko-litewskiego, A. Kalinowska, A. Perłakowski, F. Wolański, D. Rolnik (ed.), Warszawa, 2018, pp. 119-139 (in Polish); T. Ciesielski, Pogranicze polsko-pruskie w dobie wojny siedmioletniej, Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie, Vol 259, No 1, 2008, pp. 3-17 (in Polish) sending a clear message to King Augustus II that he had an advantage over him, which also resulted in further damage and a heavy burden 4 .
The traumatic situations of the past years did not reoccur in the case of Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships during the war for the Polish succession in the period between 1733 and 1736 when the Russian army intervened in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to enable the son of King Augustus II, Frederick Augustus II (Augustus III) to take the throne. Military troops marched through the eastern provinces of the Republic of Poland from the northern and southern directions and at the peak of this conflict, which lasted more than 18 months, these forces numbered over 70,000 soldiers 5 . The voivodeships of Poznan and Kalisz mainly struggled with the presence of the Saxon army, which entered their territory in November 1733. Back then, the nobility of both voivodeships was also politically divided. However, in terms of the presence of Russian troops in the country, as well as their entry into both voivodeships, the noblemen were united and openly against them, including a group of Augustus III supporters. 6 After the end of military operations and pacification in 1736 when the last Russian troops marched out from the Commonwealth in August, the problem of their presence within the state borders appeared several more times in the following years in the eastern borderlands as a result of the then ongoing Russian-Turkish War 7 . However, it did not affect the noblemen of Greater Poland, as for many years they enjoyed relative peace within the borders of their provinces, interrupted only at times by cases of kidnapping of inhabitants and their forceful recruitment into the Prussian army. This was undoubtedly an issue of concern for the local nobility, nevertheless, it was not a mass phenomenon 8 .
The situation changed after the outbreak of the Seven Years' War. Russian troops crossed the borders of Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships no sooner than in the summer of 1758 in order to secure this area against further massive robbery of horses and grain by the Prussian army. It should be emphasized here, that the then Great Hetman of the Crown, Jan Klemens Branicki, despite the Republic's declared neutrality, probably supported by silent consent of King Augustus III, assured the Russian commanders of his favor towards them and promised to ensure constant supplies of food and forage for them. On the one hand, it was an expression of rationalism. Obviously, a stable supply protected the local people from exploitation and losses, on the other hand, such proposals were not made to the Prussian side. The presence of Russian military troops in the summer of 1758 in the area of Poznan and Kalisz voivodships was relatively short. At that time, they occupied Poznan, where they built food storage locations which were also created in Leszno, Naklo and several other towns 9 .
Nevertheless, their march did not proceed according to the results of the talks between Augustyn Dzialynski, Kalisz Voivode and Wojciech Miaskowski, Kalisz Castellan with Russian commanders. Despite repeated protests against harmful actions and the plundering of property, the Russian side maintained that the Parliament itself should decide on these issues. Miaskowski himself was already complaining about the destruction of his properties in Naramowice and Golecin also mentioning others who incurred losses. In the city of Poznan, the Russians demolished some of the city buildings in order to strengthen their fortifications and forced the townspeople to provide them service and support. According to official statements from the years between 1758 and 1761, the damage inflicted in villages belonging to the city at that time amounted to 344,034 thousand tynfs 10 . Miaskowski urged Dzialynski to report the fatal situation of the voivodships to the ministers of the Crown, who would further provide the data to King Augustus III 11 . Kalisz Voivode was skeptical about this idea, as the Russian troops did not cause damage in all the areas, and in some places they even paid for their provisions. Those living near Poznan camp were undoubtedly mostly affected. Dzialynski recommended Miaskowski to try to communicate with Jerzy August Mniszch who was Greater Poland General Staroste as well as with Royal Court Marshal who was the most influential minister at the court at the time 12 . However, he mentioned to him that it would probably make a difference whether he would choose to write a public letter or a private one.
He also proposed to discuss this issue at the nearest pre-parliamentary Sejmik of both voivodships on August 21, 1758 being an institution representing the nobility. He suggested introducing an appropriate paragraph in the instructions for the parliament deputies on this issue 13 . Ultimately, the assembly was broken up as a result of other disputes. At that time, Russian troops were already marching to Brandenburg 14 and after a bloody battle of Zandorf on August 25, 1758, they returned to their winter quarters across the Vistula River, mainly in the Pomerania region. Before they eventually reached that point, however, they passed through the area of Greater Poland, causing further losses 15 . Eventually, small Cossack units guarding the warehouses remained in this area for the winter period 16 .
The situation changed in the early spring of 1759 when Frederick II, in his manifesto presented on of March 2, announced that his troops would initiate combating Russian troops which were stationed within the borders of the Commonwealth and assured that his military troops would not harm the Poles. As a matter of fact, even before the announcement, Prussian troops entered the territory of Greater Poland destroying Russian warehouses and ending their raid around March 12 17 . In May and June 1759 warfare was resumed and this time both armies, the Russian and the Prussian, carried out maneuvering operations in Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships. The passivity of Russian troops contributed to destruction of further warehouses by the Prussian 18 . Augustyn Dzialynski, Kalisz Voivod, who enjoyed great authority among the noblemen died on May 13, 1759 19 .
The obligation to save voivodeships was at that time taken over by Wojciech Miaskowski 20 , who had already cooperated with him at the time of his Poznan Castellan term in office due to the fact that all the remaining senators "tanquam in latebris delitescerunt" 21 . At the turn of May and June, he carried out further talks with Colonel Krasnoszczok as well as the Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Wilhelm Fermor, he also contacted the Prussian Commander, General Christophal II von Dohna-Schlodien 22 which, unfortunately did not bring positive results as both armies conducted military maneuvering actions and numerous skirmishes 23 took place. For this reason, noble institutions also did not function at that time. To take an example, St. John's courts did not take place and proceedings of Poznan municipal court had to be relocated due to the fact that the city castle was inhabited by Prussians and sick Russians who were taken captive 24 .
Private correspondence addressed to Jerzy August Mniszch, the Greater Poland General Governor and to Royal Court Marshal enumerated dozens of examples of successive loss, destruction and rape caused by the ongoing battles and by the Russian soldiers themselves who were stationed in the citizens' properties 25 . Such letters must have been reaching other ministers as well 26 . At the same time, they criticized the lack of proper supply organization and economical over-exploitation 27 , furthermore, they asked to appoint commissioners as provisions specialists and claimed that a new Kalisz Voivode should become someone with significant influence in the voivodeship due to the passive attitude of other senators 28 .
This role was then taken over mainly by Wojciech Miaskowski, Poznan Castellan. On July 15, 1759, once again, he asked Hetman Branicki to put an influence on Russian commanders to restrain themselves from recruitment in the provinces due to the fact that the nobility perceives them in the same way as the Prussians. In a situation when such activities were to be limited, as a result, the reception of their presence would be better 29 , which clearly indicated that he understood the back-then political situation and the necessity of cooperation with the Russians.
On the other hand, it did not mean that he was blind to the dangers stemming from the presence of Russian military troops, therefore, he continued to enumerate his complaints in subsequent letters, highlighting the need of "freeing us from such a despotic Moscow oppression". According to him, if the situation in question continued, there would be no hands to sow grain left and, as a result, famine would break out. Miaskowski pointed to the fact, that till then he managed to stop the nobility from performing any decisive bottom-up actions by the power of his argumentation concerning the soon-to-be established damage-repair committee 30 . However, the Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships' noblemen were slowly losing patience and already during Sejmiks in September 1759 they were planning to send an envoy to King Augustus III and to Russia. Miaskowski managed to change their intentions, which he himself would only later regret 31 . As a result of other disputes, both Sejmiks were broken. The nobility protested for a long time, refusing to agree to break the deliberations, however, in the end no legislation was passed 32 and the aforementioned damage-repair committee creation was not even mentioned in the following months 33 . The subject of the Greater Poland voivodeship occupation was repeatedly discussed among the crown ministers, still, little from the content of the letters exchanged between them was actually put in practice 34 .  In such a situation, Miaskowski, in the absence of any specific guidelines and struggling under the noblemen's pressure, together with Piotr Sapieha, Smolensk Voivoide, who possessed property in Greater Poland, prepared a list of damages caused by the Russian army 35 . On October 27, 1759, his document was approved by Primate Wladyslaw Lubienski and treated as a document presenting the official position of the Polish authorities. It was the first official response to the voices of the noblemen inhabiting the Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships. Jan Lochocki, Osieka Staroste, went on a parliamentary mission to present the damage and suggestions to remedy the problematic issue. He himself had doubts concerning some of the instructions he received as, at times, the victims did not mention the specific properties names which were negatively affected. Continuously, on his own initiative, as well as in cooperation with Miaskowski, Poznan Castellan, he supplemented the list of damages with the proposed changes 36 . Nevertheless, some representatives of the Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships nobility still expressed dissatisfaction with his actions. Due to the fact that his mission proclamations were not issued, not all the sufferers were able to prepare their lists of losses. Lochocki explained that such a request could not be officially announced, because at the time of his instructions receipt in Warsaw, it was unknown where the negotiations would be conducted. Being also in contact with J.A. Mniszch, he declared to intervene on his behalf as he was instructed to do so 37 .
Gaining a quick audience was impossible and Lochocki kept sending unsuccessful letters asking about the possibility of a meeting while the Russians intentionally deceived him knowing what his mission was. Eventually, he was forced to ask for help of the Saxon General Riedesel, as he himself was not able to reach the Russian commanders 38 . After a long wait, he was finally granted an audience and was able to present his document to Field Marshal Piotr Siemianowicz Saltykow in Kornik on November 15, 1759. His twenty-item-long paper contained descriptions of crimes committed by the Russian army. The first paragraph mentioned the most severe ones, such as theft of the goods of Ignacy Niezychowski, who was robbed and stabbed in the chest with a spear 39 , he or his brother was arrested and put in stocks until he eventually redeemed himself.
Also, the following real-estate owners were badly affected by robberies: Franciszka Zakrzewska née Mielzynska in Pakosc, Zofia Gorzenska from Sarbinowo and Franciszka Szoldrska née Radomicka, Inowroclaw Voivod's wife (property in Lysiny -valued at 10,106 thalers). The instruction also included an annotation stating that Jerzy August Mniszech himself demanded clarification in the latter case. Szołdrska sent him yet another letter in November, in which she enumerated the losses in the subsequent realestates: Pniewski: 42,917 thalers, Trzciel:4,026 thalers) 40 , followed by Ludwika Godlewska née Korytowska, Inowrocław Huntress, who, together with her son, was beaten and robbed in her property near Znin in Cerekwica village. A similar fate shared Cielecki in Chartow near the city of Poznan as well as Mąkowski, while Teofila Nieswiatowska née Dzierzanowska was beaten to death during the robberies (item 1, 5-7).
Lochocki was also supposed to demand giving second orders to the entire army, forbidding robbery, battery and verbal abuse of the local population under severe penalty (item 2), demanding even the smallest squads of soldiers to perform their duties in the presence of their officers, so that, in the event of any disputes, it would be easier to establish the soldiers' identities and, additionally, all the actions were to be taken only on command (item 3). Otherwise, the victims should have the right to capture the soldiers while committing crimes and to deliver them to a military court in Poznan or to the nearest Russian military headquarters (item 4). Lochocki also listed examples of crimes committed by Lieutenant Dubinski, who during a fair in Jarocin arrested the Hussarian Flag Crown army soldiers and later tied them to cartwheels as well as participated in thefts of large money sums from various noble courts and the town of Koscian.
Relations between the Russian army and the citizens of the Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships were to be governed by the following rules: all purchases of provisions and food products were to be made in cash and at binding market prices, only the Field Marshal was supposed to indicate specific locations where they should be deposited in accordance with the measurements and the Polish zloty currency exchange rate was to be applicable in the Republic of Poland, according to which 1 red zloty was 18 zlotys (items 8 and 12). If the payment was to be made in rubles, then only gold or silver ones were acceptable, additionally, giving receipts proving payment was prohibited (items 9 and 21). What is more, all transactions should be settled financially on the spot and if the military forces wished to use horses or carts for transportation, they should inform how long the routes would be and plan them so as not to exhaust the animals. If the citizens intended to transport something, the soldiers were forbidden to collect tolls on the Bridge of Torun (item 18).
The locations where the Russian military units had already camped should be released from any burdens, especially around the city of Poznan, similarly to all the properties belonging to public officials residing in Warsaw with King Augustus III who, thus, could not personally secure their estates. This rule was supposed to be also applicable to those estates where the Crown army troops were stationed. In a separate item, such a privilege was also requested for Wojciech Miaskowski, Poznan Castellan, who due to his commitment to ensure citizen protection, incurred permanent economic losses. For this reason, his tenement house in Poznan was supposed to be free from army presence. Essentially, all manor houses and noblemen's quarters were to be exempt from Russian soldiers' accommodation (items 13, 14, 17, 19, 20) 41 In addition to the instructions, Lochcocki presented other documents, most probably itemized lists, which he managed to collect from the remaining part of the Greater Poland nobility representatives.
The result of the talks was by no means satisfactory for him as, according to the Russian commander, the Prussians and the Austrians took all the responsibility; however, he saw the proposal of appointing a permanent army commissioner as an idea worth considering. This matter was additionally discussed by the Field Marshal Wilhelm Fermor with Augustyn Dzialynski, Kalisz Voivode, before his death. What is interesting is that this issue remained open, even despite the insistence of Russia in June 1759 42 . Saltykov was also given a list of complaints and crimes descriptions and gave his assurance that he would issue adequate resolutions concerning this matter 43 . Lachocki was rather skeptical as far as the effects of his mission were concerned when he reported its course to Jan Malachowski, Great Crown Chancellor. He was aware that if nothing changed, the nobility would initiate bottom-up actions, the consequences of which no one could predict 44 . He was also unable to receive the final reply of the Russian side, despite his numerous letters and his insistence and he was aware that he was being deceived by the other side. Eventually, he waited for a message for some time in Poznan, where he planned to meet the Field Marshal, who failed to arrive. After December 2, he left for Torun, as the Russian army marched to Pomerania and waited for some information there 45 . During that time, he asked the Primate and other ministers for further instructions on how to proceed 46 .
As he knew, the reply of the Russian commanders together with the broadest possible list of damages should be received by Kasper Rogalinski, a deputy and Oborniki Staroste, who, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth, was to go to St. Petersburg on November 18, 1759, to present the problems related to the stationing of Russian military troops 47 . Field Marshal Saltykow's reply was sent as late as on December 8 from his quarters in Kwidzyn 48 and its content was later published in the Polish Courier at the beginning of 1760 49 .
The Russian side stated that it wished the Polish nation to remain in a close alliance and not to suffer any losses. Saltykow noticed that in the case of the first item on Lochocki's list, he had no power to decide as all the compensation cases had to be referred to higher instances. He assured that he would give strict orders once again so as to prevent the army from harming the citizens and underlined that Russian officers always accompanied their subordinates to maintain the discipline. He gave his consent to arrest the perpetrators of the crimes and to deliver them to the designated locations for appropriate punishment, as it took place in the case of Lieutenant Dubinski, whose legal case was pending. In the case of other offenses, the Field Marshal asked for reports from his commanders, but at the same time noted that in many cases it could have been the actions of other armies or robbers disguised as Cossacks or Polish citizens. He also assured that the Russian army always paid in cash or with the use of coupons, which were always fully acceptable, furthermore, the value of the ruble was raised that year and both the King and the Polish ministers knew well about it. Furthermore, payment for the grain on the spot was declared impossible by him as no officer carried a scale with him, which according to the Polish measure was supposed to be used with the use of a Poznan stone which constituted exactly 24 pounds. Russian troops would not be stationed in noble estates, estates of people holding public offices, or in Miaskowski's property, Poznan Castellan as well as anywhere where the Crown military troops stationed. However, he asked to be delivered a list of such locations so that it would be easier to plan further actions in this matter. Generally speaking, one can get an impression that Field Marshal Soltykow's response, in reference to Lochocki's instructions, negates most of his postulates and presents the Russian army as perfectly disciplined and always efficiently meeting its obligations towards the local people.
As late as in December 1759, when the Russian army retreated to its winter quarters across the Vistula River, it left behind a far greater number of military units in Poznan and Kalisz voivodships to protect the warehouses. The main garrisons were located in Kalisz, Rawicz, Leszno and Wschowa 50 . The local nobility enjoyed the winter march of Soltykow troops, as they believed that the burdens would become less heavy at least for a short period of time 51 . However, this state of affairs did not last long, as Austrian military squads 52 were to march through a part of Greater Poland (Wschowa, Kalisz, and later towards Lesser Poland) which belonged to their activities carried out at that time. In addition, it was the time when Field Marshal Soltykow issued a universal order prohibiting the sale of grain abroad 53 . In the face of such a tragic situation, part of the nobility deluded themselves and were fooled into believing that at least some positive effects would be achieved by the mission of Kasper Rogalinski, Oborniki Staroste intending to gain an audience with Tsarina Elisabeth 54 . In fact, it can be said that he was more fortunate than Lochocki, nevertheless, his actions and the attitude of the nobility of Poznan and Kalisz voivodeships towards the Russian and Prussian troops in the following years (1760-1763) require further source research 55 .
The above considerations and the findings of historiography depict a paradoxical situation, namely that one of the largest European countries at the time, such as the Polish-Lithuanian Republic was, being a neutral state was unable to protect its citizens from harm and losses caused by two foreign nations remaining at war with each other on its territory. In the early modern era, we could often observe situations where foreign armies have marched through neutral lands, however, such ventures were usually agreed in advance and on terms which were to limit any potential losses. In this case, the Russians, together with the Prussians, turned Greater Poland into an area of military operations and an easy prey to feed their armies with. From the perspective of the local nobility and the elites, such a situation was quite a stalemate. The powerlessness of the central state institutions (the Sejm, the Senate, ministers), breaking the Sejmiks and, in the year 1717, depriving them of most of their fiscal and military power made any bottom-up attempts to save the voivodeships impossible.