Transformation of Polish Military Administration in the First Half of Seventeenth Century – Ideas and its Realization

Background ‒ The article aims to present some proposal of transformation of Polish military administration in the first half of the seventeenth century and its realization in the form of successful attempt to establish the office of Master of Ordnance (starszy nad armatą) and failed rehearsal to regulate the question of food supply for Polish army stationing on the south-eastern border. Methodology ‒ The author has examined manuscript and printed narrative, normative and treasury sources. He compared the results with existing historiography concerning this topic. Principal findings/Results ‒ Affected by the negative results of war against Sweden between 1621 and 1629, Polish and Lithuanian noble elite agreed to establish new office of Master of Ordnance with new tax to finance artillery on condition that King’s domain would be burdened by it. At the same time, the diet rejected all proposals tended to transform the system of food supply for army defending the south-eastern border of Poland, especially establishing new taxes and officials. Conclusions/Significances ‒ It was widely expected from the King to prepare the defence of the country from his own sources. Many nobles, especially from western part of the Commonwealth shared the aversion for new taxes dedicated to the defence of the southern border against Tatars’ raids, while inhabitants of Ruthenia or Ukraine were not going to pay new taxes alone and suffer the presence of the troops at the same time. The creation of the office of master of ordnance shows clearly that change in military administration was possible, if the nobility was convinced that reforms were necessary and saw the option to pay for it from King’s coffer, in which case the complaints of the opponents were gladly dismissed. It seems that in the case of army supply too many parliamentarians and their electors did not see the sufficient need for a change and rejected the idea to burden the possessors of King’s estates by new tax.

proposals of changes in military administration and the attempts to realize them will be the subject of this article. I would like to focus on reorganization of ordnance department and reform of the system of quarter troops provisioning during winter, so-called hiberna.
Both topics were only marginally raised in earlier historiography. Bohdan Baranowski was concerned especially with the so-called wladislavian reforms in the thirties, paying less attention to earlier proposals.¹ Tadeusz Marian Nowak published very important works on artillery during the second half of the Wladislaw IV's reign, after establishing the office artillery general (starszy nad armatą).² I made some remarks on the topic in one of my earlier articles about proposals of transformation of Polish army, formulated in the twenties.³ In the time of Sigismund August (1548-1572), the lieutenant general of quarter army (hetman polny) commanded artillery collected in the castles of Ruthenia and Podolia, but today administration was in the hand of field clerk (pisarz polny).⁴ Many years later, in 1625 similar solution was applied by the diet (sejm), who decided to buy cannons for quarter army and entrusted the field clerk with care of them, under the supervision of hetman polny.⁵ The rest of the artillery was administered by local starosta up till 1572. The King or Crown Grand Hetman appointed special temporary officials to supervise them. Sigismund Augustus designated the official with the task of administering the whole ordnance only exceptionally, usually in the time of campaign, like in the case of Stanisław Lipnicki in 1564.⁶ Similar practice could be observed during Stefan Batory's reign: Wacław Wąsowicz was master of ordnance in 1576, 5 years later the same task was conferred on Bartłomiej Ostromęcki, who later took care of cannons in Livonian castles.⁷ Sigismund III followed similar practice during most of his reign,⁸ though sometimes he divided the responsibility for ordnance between two or more persons. During Khotin campaign in 1621 Arnulf Bartochowski vel Bartoszewski was entrusted with guarding the ordnance, but the King forbidden him to meddle in the matters of gunners. Bartochowski commanded only the infantry, who escorted ordnance. There were quarrels between infantrymen and gunners, especially when drunken soldiers were walking near cannons and gunpowder barrels. Soldiers were also an embarrassment to civilians, e.g. citizens of Lublin and Lviv. Bartochowski complained that city authorities did not only detained his subalterns, but also not prepared means of transportation, what he asked them for.⁹ Similar practice could be noticed during war against Sweden in Royal Prussia in 1626-1629. In the autumn of 1626, the ordnance was commanded by unknown master, but after his death command over field artillery was conferred on captain of dragoon company, Bazyli Judycki. At the same time, Jan Waxman took  1 B. Baranowski, Organizacja wojska polskiego w latach trzydziestych i czterdziestych XVII wieku, Warszawa 1957: especially pp. 15-50, 173-186. 2 T. M. Nowak, Polska technika wojenna XVI-XVIII w., Warszawa, 1970; idem, Studia z dziejów polskiej techniki wojskowej w latach 1500-1655, in: Studia z dziejów polskiej techniki wojskowej od XVI do XX wieku, ed. J. Wojtasik, Warszawa, 2001, pp. 136-197. 3 P. Gawron, Projekty reform armii Rzeczypospolitej w latach 20. XVII w. na tle wojskowości zachodnioeuropejskiej, in: Staropolski ogląd świata, t. I, Rzeczpospolita między okcydentalizmem a orientalizacją. Przestrzeń kontaktów, ed. F. Wolański, R. Kołodziej, Toruń, 2009, pp. 183-213. 4  care of Warsaw arsenal and supplied for a field army with guns, ammunition and the rest of ordnance.¹⁰ Judycki died as a victim of plague in the summer of 1629,¹¹ but it is possible, than Petrus de Corrige, titled in treasury accounts as petardigerus et artileriae praefectus took his place.¹² Crown Treasurer (podskarbi koronny) played important role in administering the ordnance. Treasury officials paid the ordnance bills and probably sometimes took care of guns. When Bratslavian voivode Aleksander Zasławski wanted to recover cannons taken from Ostrogski's entail for Khotin campaign, he wrote directly to Crown Treasurer Mikołaj Daniłowicz. In 1635 Władysław IV ordered deputies for assembling quart money, designated by the parliament, to give money from supplementary levy on the King's estates (so-called druga kwarta) to Crown Treasurer to cover the cost of the maintenance of the Ordnance.¹³ At that time, the condition of Polish artillery left a lot to be desired. Ottomans and Swedes got the upper hand. For example, at the second day of the battle of Dirschau (17)(18) August 1627) Swedish fire almost drove important part of Polish forces to panic.¹⁴ Year earlier Polish master of ordnance brought inappropriate projectiles to the camp, what caused a break in the bombardment for 3 days. Later he was occupied by drinking wine instead of cannon deployment.¹⁵ It seems that some conclusion from that sad situation was derived before Sigismund III's death in 1632. It is known that experienced soldier of Netherlands origin, Wilhelm Apelman, was charged the responsibility for the condition of the ordnance in Royal Prussia with the title armamentarii et apparatuum bellicorum in munitionibus palatinatuum Prussia supremo provisor et praefectus. There were scarce information about his duties and activities, probably he commanded a group of gunners and took care of artillery left in Prussian castles. Warsaw arsenal was supervised by Jan Waxman up till his death circa 1633, but it is difficult to say, who commanded artillery on the Ukraine, where most Polish troops were stationed.¹⁶ After Sigismund III's demise, there was interesting discussion concerning article about artillery in pacta conventa prepared for a new king during election diet in the autumn of 1632. Between 10 and 12 November senators and representatives of the nobility discussed the matter. All of them shared the common view that Commonwealth badly needed permanent investment for ordnance, financed by the king, and artillery administration should be entrusted to the permanent official.¹⁷ Some inspiration of older proposals, formulated by Jerzy and Krzysztof Zbaraski 12 years later can be seen here, because they proposed to establish such official with wide competences, encompassing not only administering ordnance, but also building and repairing of fortification and command over foreign infantry on Polish service. Such official was to be submitted to Crown hetmans. Zbarascy justified their proposals by reference to Spanish and Imperial army.¹⁸ In 1632 much contested matter were the way, which the king should finance the ordnance department. Some of the disputants (e.g. Krzysztof Ossoliński or Crown chancellor Jakub Zadzik) voted for new taxes for all the King's estates modelled on quart tax established in the second half of the sixteenth century for the maintenance of small permanent forces guarding south-eastern border. They were also prone to agree on designation of the income from selected estates for this purpose. Their opponents, with most prominent representative in the person of Sieradz castellan Maksymilian Przerembski, argued that King's domain was devoted to all people distinguished in Commonwealth service and charging it by additional tax may cause the unwillingness to such duties among nobility. They proposed instead to burden the King with obligation to pay yearly sum of 60-100,000 florins for the maintenance of ordnance.
The different proposed versions of pacta conventa article reflected the discussion. Firstly, on 11 November it comprehended entry about new quart for every possessor of the King's estates, 60,000 florins of caution and obligation to deliver gunpowder, bullets etc. Day later Jakub Sobieski, speaker of noble chamber, read the new much more vague text about the maintenance of ordnance from King's domain and establishment of the office of the Master of Ordnance (starszy nad armatą). After one more round of discussion, finally pacta conventa allowed for new quart in all King's estates in Poland and payment of the fixed sum by possessors in Grand Duchy of Lithuania, equivalent to single rate of donatywa, earlier form of temporary taxation on King's domain there. It also mentioned about the establishment of starszy nad armatą, one in Poland and the other one in Lithuania. They should take care of the whole artillery and arsenals. Both of them must take an oath and receive salary from Treasury. The King obligated himself to set up the school for gunners and military engineers.¹⁹ It is difficult to explain why this article became a dead letter for almost 5 years. It is known that during war against Muscovites in 1632-1633 Gothard Jan Plater and Mikołaj Abramowicz took responsibility for artillery, but it is most probable that both of them were designated to this task on ad hoc basis and finished their mission just after the war.²⁰ The Sejm dealt with the matter only in 1637, during the first diet in Warsaw. The members of Izba Poselska submitted to the King their grievances on 23 February, among them they demanded to put into effect the article of pacta conventa about new quart and Master of Ordnance called this time a general of the artillery in Poland and Lithuania. Both officers should have noble origin, take an oath and receive just salary.²¹ Władysław IV answered 4 days earlier, questioning the very idea of maintenance of the ordnance only by income from King's estates, noticing the high costs of such initiative. He expected the help from Commonwealth in the form of new taxes. Accepting the proposal to establish new officers, the monarch proposed for him the title of captain, arguing that the name of general is contrary to Polish custom. He remarked that without just salary it would be difficult to find suitable candidates, e.g. Mikołaj Abramowicz rejected such offer for this reason. Another matter was how to establish the office in the Crown without any prejudice to hetman's power and agreed on the nomination with hetman Stanislaw Koniecpolski. Finally, the diet finished his proceedings without taking any decision, not only on that matter.²² Office of the Master of Ordnance (starszy nad armatą) was finally set up on the other diet at the same year on the basis of statute Quarta na armatę naznaczona,²³ but its competences and financial basis were described in the statute Oeconomia bellica, enacted in 1638. At the same diet, Mikołaj Abramowicz was designated to the task of taking care of Lithuanian ordnance according to the statute Czekhauzy Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego.  Since 1646 statutes were complemented by the King's privilege, addressed to general of the Crown artillery, a new name for starszy nad armatą.²⁴ In the light of parliamentary legislation, the Master of Ordnance should be a nobleman with landed estate and take an oath, but the statutes did not precise its exact form. First master, Paweł Grodzicki, was to handle building and provisioning of the arsenals, cannon production and maintenance, and preparation of the reserve of ammunition and other artillery stuff. All these activities were to be financed thanks to the income of new quart. Grodzicki was obligated to make a financial report on the diet together with artillery inventory. Master of the Ordnance should consult his expenditures with Crown hetman, because his office was subordinated to Koniecpolski and his successors. Abramowicz' competences were rather similar, with the lack of subordination to hetman, though statute predicted that his power must not prejudice the power of hetman and Lithuanian Treasurer. It mentioned about salary for Abramowicz, 3,000 zloty, but without specification, if that sum could be paid once or on yearly basis. It is worth mentioning that in Poland Grodzicki's and his immediate successor Krzysztof Arciszewski's efforts much improved the state of ordnance in Poland, but in Lithuania situation did not alter significantly.²⁵ The question of quarter army's winter maintenance in the camp on south-eastern border of Poland, called by contemporaries hiberna, appeared in public discussion at the turn of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.²⁶ According to parliamentary legislation (statutes: Disciplina militaris in 1591, Obrona z kwarty 2 years later and Porządek około zachowania żołnierza in 1609) companies were to be gathered in the summer camp situated in the unsettled part of the Ukraine, but in the winter they should be spread in King's estates in the south-eastern voivodeships. Since 1609 hetman, who was responsible for army dislocation, could also designate church estates for his soldiers. Dislocation in noble estates was strictly prohibited and punished by fines besides the obligation to repair the damage made there. Hetman was to judge in such cases, but plaintiff had a right to appeal to Crown Supreme Tribunal (Trybunał Koronny).²⁷ According to Parliamentary wishes, winter quarters should be located near the border and close to each other, what allowed for army quick concentration and reaction against Tatars' raids. At the same time, companies could avoid long and tiresome marches from summer camp to winter quarters and back again, disturbing also to civilian population. But since the last decade of sixteenth century it became obvious that King's estates near the border were not able to maintain the quarter army and situation did not improve much after including church estates as a base for soldiers in 1609. Already in 1596 Jan Zamoyski, then crown hetman and chancellor broke the law and sent his companies to noble estates, what caused the huge dissatisfaction not only among their owners, though Zamoyski explained his move indicating to Tatars' danger for Cracow.²⁸ Twenty years later his successor at the office of hetman, Stanisław Żółkiewski, presented to the diet the memorial O chowaniu żołnierza kwarcianego. He proposed dislocation of 3,000 strong army all year round in the place near paths usually used by Tatars to invade Poland. To maintain such force, newly created magister annonae or prowent maister was to buy food and forage for soldiers on the market and sell it to the soldiers in Winnycia on the Ukraine at the same price, determined by the diet. The cost of such operation could be covered by income from quart. Żółkiewski argued that similar solution was used not only  Warszawa, 1939, p. 33. 27 Volumina Constitutionum, vol. II, issue 2, ed. S. Grodziski, Warszawa, 2008 28 Diariusze sejmowe z 1597 r., in: SSRP, t. XX, ed. E. Barwiński, Kraków, 1907: 498; J. Rzońca, Sejmy z lat 1597 i 1598, cz. I, Bezowocny sejm z 1597 roku, Warszawa, 1989, p. 51. in ancient Roman army, but indicated also the Ottomans war logistics as an example to follow.²⁹ Unfortunately, his ideas were rejected and similar fate met another proposal made by prince Jerzy Zbaraski and commissionwith Żółkiewski participationhaving worked on that subject during the diet in 1619.³⁰ It is interesting to note that institution of quartermaster appeared in Polish-Lithuanian army fighting against Sweden in Livonia between 1605 and 1609. Jan Mokrzycki, acting on behalf of Lithuanian hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz, supervised purchasing and transport of food to field army and castle garrisons. Similarly, during another conflict with Swedes in 1621-1622 Sigismund III delegated the task of quartermaster to Stanisław Brolnicki, son of Lithuanian Treasury official, skarbny, Mikołaj, but at that time Brolnicki's efforts were not very successful.³¹ Later, during the war for Royal Prussia in 1626-1629, the diet was trying to prepare food supply for army and set up the function of quartermaster (prowiantmistrz), which was delegated firstly to Krzysztof Ossoliński in 1626, next to Prokop Leśniowolski since the autumn of 1627 and in the end to Stanisław Gajowski and Paweł Wojankowski in the spring of 1629. Their function ceased to exist after the war, though Gajowski and Wojankowski had some problem with accounts a few years later.³² On the last diet during Sigismund III's reign, 23 March 1632 Crown field hetman (hetman polny koronny) Stanisław Koniecpolski proposed to establish 6,000 strong army on south-eastern border, supplying by quartermaster, who was to buy food and fodder on the market and next to sell it to the soldier at a lower price, according to the fixed price list. Koniecpolski suggested to set up fixed place for army camp. In case, when no King's estate would not be suitable to such purpose, hetman remarked about acquisition of noble property. The proposition failed because of resistance of some members of noble chamber, probably from Cracow, Poznan and Calissia voivodeship, though Koniecpolski was supported by the representatives from south-eastern voivodeship. His opponents argued that empty treasure and the lack of proper authorisation by their voters did not allow us to agree on hetman's proposal.³³ There were some interesting discussions about hiberna during the first diet in the Władisław IV's reign in 1633 in Cracow,³⁴ but the parliament decided to confer the difficult task to finding the lasting solution on special committee. Crown hetman, 4 senators and 23 nobles representing south-eastern voivodeships were to gather on 13 February 1634 in Lviv and prepare the draft of hiberna and afterwards present it to all dietines (sejmiki). Within the set time limit only six persons, with Stanisław Koniecpolski and Jakub Sobieski among them, came to Lviv and prepared the proposal Postanowienie hybernorum.³⁵ Committee members proposed to adapt the amount of the army to tax income and establish budget for military expenses in the form of special parliamentary script signed by primate and the speaker of chamber of noble representatives, which was to be published by all local starosta. Crown Treasurer would be formally bound by new budget and his accounts should be presented and controlled by the diet. It was expected that clarity and public control of the budget would persuade the nobility to pay taxes. Tax collectors and possessors of King's estates were to be punished more severely for their transgressions by Trybunał Koronny. The diet was to enact a statute determining the maximal prices of goods to reduce the cost of army maintenance and appoint special instigators in every voivodeship to control its observance. Instigators should take an oath and receive undefined salary. Quart income was to be transported to border city Bar, hetman's headquarter instead of Lviv. Thanks to this last change soldiers, sent as envoys from every company to receive and bring back salaries, had shorter way to travel and weakening of their troops would be much shorter.
The committee suggested establishing the new official to administer the food supply, the quartermaster (prowiantmagister), who was to be nominated by the King on the advice of hetman for 2 years between two ordinary diets, but it was possible to renew the cadence. He should take an oath and present his accounts on the diet, so it was predicted to add him a treasury clerk to help. Fund embezzlement was to be punished. He was to receive undefined salary. Prowiantmagister had a task to buy food on the market but at prices fixed by the state and sell it to the soldiers at half the price. The committee determined the amount of quarter rate for a horse and declared that salary would constitute the half of that, while the other half was to be spent on the food.
To cover all expenses, the committee proposed to establish new tax on all the King's domain and church estates. Its amount was to be set by special committee, established by the diet with Crown Treasurer, three senators and four members of the chamber of noble representatives. The base of the new tax was to be the number of the lans, verified every 2 years. The diet was to confirm committee evaluation and afterwards The King with the consent of two chambers would send out special call (uniwersał) to all local governors to order all possessors of King's domain to pay the tax within 12 weeks since the diet close up. In respect of church estates, bishops should determine the amount of money taken from the lan in the church estates. Possessors and church institutions were to cover the cost of transport money to Warsaw, Piotrków or Lublin, depending on the estate's geographical location.
The Lviv committee suggested the establishment of military camp in Bratslav or Ladižin, prince Janusz Wiśniowiecki's estates and remarked about the need to exchange some King's estate for it. Hetman was to have the right to change the place of the camp in the case of greater danger and army enlargement. To strengthen the discipline among the troops, project assumed the necessity to augment the salary for colonels and captains to persuade them to stay with their soldiers.
The King submitted Postanowienie hybernorum to the dietines in the autumn of 1634.³⁶ It was considered by the diets in 1635 (I), 1637 (II), 1638 and 1641, but without results.³⁷ In 1638 and 1642 Stanisław Koniecpolski produced new proposals: Praesidium ukrainne i hyberna wojsku tamecznemu³⁸ and Obmyślenie hibernorum wojsku Rzeczypospolitej kwarcianemu.³⁹ Neither of them included suggestion about establishing the quartermaster nor about supplying soldiers with foodstuffs. Koniecpolski also gave up the idea of tax church estates, but suggested adding special money for food (so-called karmowe pieniądze) to the soldiers' salaries and rising officers' wages to persuade them to reside in the camp permanently. In both of them there was an idea to establish permanent military camp near south-eastern border and routes used by raiding Tatars, there was no place for the quartermaster and new taxes for food supply, presented to the first diet in 1635. In the another proposal, formulated by Mikołaj Ligęza. From his point of view the best possible option was to build the Dutch-style permanent fortification between Kamianets Podolskyi and Khotin, where soldiers should be stationed all year round, getting foodstuffs from Treasury, but the number of soldiers had to depend on the quart tax income.⁴⁰ Nobility from Ruthenian voivodeship proposed to establish special committee dedicated to military supply. In 1643, the dietine in Wisznia proposed to set up such committee, acting between the diets with the task to number all the lans using tax receipts and determine the size of allowances for the army according to this criterion.⁴¹ In 1645-1647, the dietine consequently suggested to nominate between the diets special commissars beside hetman, who also would have been responsible for determining the size of allowances for the troops, monitoring of their numbers and removing needless servants and surplus soldiers.⁴² All the projects were rejected by members of parliament, especially the group from Great Poland (Wielkopolska).⁴³ There were various reasons for such failure. The part of the Polish noble elite was too conservative and too attached to the old institutions to allow for any change. It was widely expected from the King to prepare the defence of the country from his own sources. Many nobles, especially from western part of the Commonwealth, shared the aversion for new taxes dedicated to the defence of the southern border against Tatars' raids, while inhabitants of Ruthenia or Ukraine were not going to pay new taxes alone and suffer the presence of the troops at the same time. The creation of the office of master of ordnance shows clearly that change in military administration was possible, if the nobility was convinced that reforms were necessary and saw the option to pay for it from King's coffer, in which case the complaints of the opponents were gladly dismissed. It seems that in the case of army supply too many parliamentarians and their voters did not see the sufficient need for a change and rejected the idea to burden the possessors of King's estates by new tax. In spite of negative results of confrontation with Sweden between 1621 and 1629 nobility was not urged to establish Polish-Lithuanian version of Scandinavian fiscal-military state.⁴⁴