Research Article

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Lithuanian aspirations for an equality with the Crown in the 17th century. An attempt to systematize¹

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Abstract: The activity of representatives of the elites of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which sought equality with the Crowners, but also the defense of their prerogatives was present from the first days after the signing of the Lublin Union. Analyzing this issue, it should be remembered that the Crown and Lithuania were separated state bodies, which union did not merge into one country, but formed a federal state. They were characterized by a separate treasury, army, offices, judiciary, law, local government institutions, i.e. basically everything that determines the administrative independence of the country. Lithuanians wanted to guarantee the same rights as the Crown nobility had, however, remaining separate. Thus, offices were established having the same prerogatives in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, such as the Grand and Field Hetman, Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors, Treasurer and Grand and Court Marshal, as well as a number of land and town dignities and dignitaries. The first of these were allocated appropriate seats in the senate, behind their crown counterparts, which caused quarrels between Poles and Lithuanians. However, manifestations of activity guaranteeing and “reminding” Poles of Lithuania’s separateness from the Crown were evident throughout the entire existence of the federal Commonwealth.

Keywords: Grand Duchy of Lithuania Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth XVII century

The activity of representatives of the elites of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who sought equality with the Crowners but also the defense of their prerogatives, was present from the first days after the signing of the Lublin Union. Analyzing this issue, it should be remembered that the Crown and Lithuania were separated state bodies, which their union did not merge into one country, but formed a federal state. They were characterized by a separate treasury, army, offices, judiciary, law, local government institutions, i.e. basically everything that determines the administrative independence of the country. Nevertheless, as early as 1569, Lithuanians wanted a guarantee to the same rights as the Crown nobility had, however, remaining separate. Thus, offices were established having the same prerogatives in the Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, such as the Grand and Field Hetman, Chancellor and Vice-Chancellors, Treasurer and Grand and Court Marshal, as well as a number of land and town dignities and dignitaries. The first of these were allocated appropriate seats in the senate, behind their crown counterparts, which caused quarrels between Poles and Lithuanians. However, manifestations of activity guaranteeing and “reminding” Poles of Lithuania’s separateness from the Crown were evident throughout the entire existence of the federal Commonwealth. It is worth paying attention here to the 17th century, when Lithuanian activity in this field was extremely intense².

The aspirations for equal rights for Lithuanians were mostly visible in the parliamentary system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Every third marshal of the deputy’s chamber during the session of the Parliament had to

¹ The article was made as a result of research conducted as part of PRELUDIUM 12 project titled ‘Attitudes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania elites towards the election of Władysław IV Vasa and Michał Korybut Wisniowiecki’ (project no. UMO-2016/23/N/HS3/00679) financed by the National Science Centre in Kraków.

² H. Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita. Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej XVI-XVII wieku*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1978, 11-15 (in Polish); E. Opaliński, *Sejm srebrnego wieku 1587-1652. Między głosowaniem większościowym a liberum veto*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2001, 17-19, 25-29 (in Polish).

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come from the Grand Duchy. However, this did not quite suit Lithuanians, who believed that they were compared to provinces such as Greater Poland (in Polish: Wielkopolska) or Lesser Poland (in Polish: Małopolska), and not treated as a federal state equivalent to the Polish Crown³. Even before the union the remainders of the Lithuanian parliamentary system were recognised as so-called “Lithuanian convocations”. Opinions about them are divided among historians, but it seems that all doubts about these conventions were dispelled by Andrzej Rachuba⁴. Lithuanian convocations were convened by the king, and during the times of interregnum they were appointed by representatives of the Grand Duchy. It was similar in the case of councils of the Senate, in which only Lithuanians appeared, and which during the interregnum the right to convene had the Vilnius bishop. Outside the interregnum, the king had done it⁵.

An extremely interesting case of convocation was the one called after the death of Zygmunt III Waza by the Lithuanian Field Hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł. He did not appear in Warsaw, where the primate Jan Wężyk convened a Senate Council at the beginning of May 1632. During the meeting, the assembled senators had to decide on securing the Commonwealth until the new king was elected. They also had to choose the date of Pre-convocation Local Councils and Convocation Parliament. Despite the insistence of the Lithuanian Grand Hetman Lew Sapieha, Radziwiłł did not appear at the meeting and instead he organized his own gathering. In the opinion of the Crowners and even some Lithuanians, it was in opposition to Senate Council in Warsaw. The convocation organized by Radziwiłł in Vilnius was attended by deputies and senators of the Grand Duchy, previously gathered at the Lithuanian Tribunal. During the tribunal, decisions about secure the borders of Lithuania were taken, and the separateness of the two states of the Republic was highlighted⁶.

Similarly, after the death of Władysław IV Waza (May 20th, 1648), Janusz Radziwiłł (son of the above-mentioned Krzysztof), acting as the marshal of the Lithuanian Tribunal, decided to take over the function of national defender and, bypassing the interrex person, mobilized the nobility gathered around him. On May 23, 1648, he met in Vilnius with the Vilnius Bishop Abraham Woyna, the Bishop of Samogitia Jerzy Tyszkiewicz, the Voivode of Troki, Mikołaj Abramowicz and the castellan of Połock Krzysztof Rudomina Dusiacki. Due to problems with obtaining money to enlist troops against the Cossacks, they decided to convene the Lithuanian convocation. Certainly, Janusz Radziwiłł was the inspiration behind these activities⁷. The deliberations probably lasted from 3 to 10 of June 1648 and a fairly large group of senators gathered there, like the above mentioned Abraham Woyna and among others, a lot of voivods: Krzysztof Chodkiewicz (Vilnius), Mikołaj Abramowicz (Trakai), Jerzy Karol Hlebowicz (Smoleńsk) and castellans: Jan Kazimierz Chodkiewicz (Vilnius) and Józef Klonowski (Vitebsk). Other influential people who attended the meeting included Alexander Chodkiewicz, Hieronim Sanguszka and Jerzy Billewicz⁸.

However, it is impossible to describe here all the convocations of 17th-century Lithuania because of their number, which, also testifies to the “separatism” of the Grand Duchy, whose citizens intended to make the most important decisions

3 E. Opaliński, *Sejm srebrnego wieku 1587-1652. Między głosowaniem większościowym a liberum veto*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2001, 124-125 (in Polish).

4 A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 243 (in Polish); H. Wisner, *Rozróżnieni w wierze. Szkice z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej schyłku XVI i połowy XVII wieku*, KIW, Warszawa, 1982, 59-62 (in Polish); H. Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita. Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej XVI-XVII wieku*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1978, 21-22 (in Polish).

5 A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 243-284 (in Polish).

6 Sapieha L., (1632, May 2). Letter. [Lew Sapieha to Krzysztof Radziwiłł in Wojeń]. Archival Material. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, sec. V, ms. 13855/XXII, 11-13; copy of the letter: Lietuvos mokslių akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka, BF 432, 117; Sapieha L., (1632, May 5). Letter. [Lew Sapieha to Krzysztof Radziwiłł in Warsaw]. Lietuvos mokslių akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka, BF 432, 118; A. Czwolek, *Piórem i buławą. Działalność polityczna Lwa Sapiehy kanclerza litewskiego, wojewody wileńskiego*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń, 2012, 639-640 (in Polish); H. Wisner, *Rozróżnieni w wierze. Szkice z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej schyłku XVI i połowy XVII wieku*, KIW, Warszawa, 1982, 111-113 (in Polish); A. Ziober, „...żebyśmy zgodni ze sobą na tej przyszłej elekcji wszystko mówili, rozumieli, czynili.” Radziwiłłowie linii nieświeskiej i birżańskiej na sejmach konwokacyjnych i elekcyjnych 1632 r., in: A. Ziober (ed.), *Wolna elekcja w dawnej Rzeczypospolitej. Procedura-przebieg-publicystyka*, Wydawnictwo Piotr Kalinowski, Wrocław, 2014, 122-123 (in Polish).

7 A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 235-236 (in Polish); M. Sawicki, *Stronnictwo dworskie w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w latach 1648-1655*, Mi Graff, Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, 2010, 78 (in Polish); A. Ziober, *The political attitudes of Krzysztof and Janusz Radziwiłł towards the election of Władysław IV and Jan Kazimierz. Outline of the problem*, *Open Political Science*, Vol. 1, 2018, 195-196.

8 A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 236-237 (in Polish).

for themselves⁹. The conventions themselves were not entirely lawful either, because only the king could convene parliamentary sessions - "one joint parliamentary session will be held by this two nation as a single body in Poland" (in Polish: "jedno zawsze spolne sejmy temu obojemu narodowi jako ciału jednemu w Polsce składać będzie")¹⁰.

Numerous disputes between Lithuanians and Crowners occurred during interregnum and the question of choosing a new ruler. The most representative example here is the late 16th century, when the offended representatives of the Grand Duchy did not agree to the acceptance of any of the two elects chosen by the Coroners - Zygmunt Waza and Ernest Habsburg. Lithuanians believed that the Polish nobility, who chose the Swedish prince as king, violated the laws enshrined in the Lublin Union¹¹. Lithuanians often threatened during the Sejms the possibility of breaking their union with the Crown, which also took place during the elections. An example would be the election Parliament in 1648, which took place after the death of Władysław IV Waza. When the election of Jan Kazimierz as king was almost close to success, the followers of Karol Ferdynand continued their efforts to bring supporters to their candidate. Hearing about these efforts, Lithuanians used blackmail and threatened that if the Coroners did not agree on the election of Jan Kazimierz, they would consider him to be the ruler of the Grand Duchy, and thus break union with Poland. Despite the rather dangerous situation, the Coroners downplayed the situation. Finally, events on the front of Ukraine led to the election of Jan Kazimierz¹².

During the interregnum after the death of Sigismund III in 1632, the Lithuanian Field Hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł tried not only by calling the Vilnius convocation to emphasize the equality of Lithuanians towards the Crowners. He decided to mobilize a large number of his supporters, with whom he wanted to go to the election or count on their support on the fields near Warsaw. This is evidenced by his frequent correspondence¹³.

Other representatives of the Lithuanian elite who supported the plans of Radziwiłł tried to gather the nobility for the prince of Birże. In a letter from August 1632, Krzysztof Zawisza informed the Field Hetman that he was trying to drag citizens of the Minsk province to his side and he thought that many of them would appear at the election¹⁴. Radziwiłł's abovementioned efforts related to the mobilization and attracting as many Lithuanian nobility as possible to Warsaw concerned his plan to gather near Livno and go to the capital of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth together. The Field Hetman intended to create a Lithuanian camp separate from the Coroners¹⁵.

It seems that by making such moves Radziwiłł wanted to demonstrate the political strength and determination as well as the potential high influence of the citizens of the Grand Duchy on the choice of a new king. Perhaps his moves were inspired by the experience of previous interregnum (in which Radziwiłł did not participate, however, he could obtain information on this subject from various sources, whether such information provided orally or in writing fixed) and the Coroners' disregard for the attitude of representatives of the Grand Duchy to candidates for throne¹⁶. It cannot be ruled out that the Field Hetman was also afraid that a tumult could occur, and the candidate could be thrown into the throne or split by election, although on the other hand it was rather unlikely in 1632 and the Parliament deliberations promised to be calm. The Radziwiłł could also show his position in society through the gathered clientele, and thus have a greater impact on the election process.

However, all the action was unsuccessful; despite this, Radziwiłł did not stop at implementing his plan. He tried to persuade senators, including Lew Sapieha, to establish a Lithuanian camp on the other side of the Wisła River in Prague

9 All convocation sessions have been described in detail by Andrzej Rachuba: A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 243-284 (in Polish).

10 A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 243 (in Polish).

11 H. Lulewicz, *Gniewów o unię ciąg dalszy. Stosunki polsko-litewskie w latach 1569-1588*, Wydawnictwo Neriton, Warszawa, 2002, 385 (in Polish).

12 M. Sawicki, *Stronnictwo dworskie w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w latach 1648-1655*, Mi Graff, Ostrowiec Świętokrzyski, 2010, 116 (in Polish).

13 H. Wisner, *Kilka uwag o stronnictwie wojewody wileńskiego Krzysztofa Radziwiłła (1585-1640)*, *Zapiski Historyczne*, Vol. LXII, No. 4, 1997, 33 (in Polish).

14 Zawisza K. (1632, August 16). Letter. [Krzysztof Zawisza to Krzysztof Radziwiłł, unknown place]. Archival Material. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, Archiwum Radziwiłłów, dz. V, ms. 18580, 7.

15 H. Wisner, *Litwa wobec elekcji Władysława Wazy*, *Rocznik Białostocki*, Vol. 17, 1991, 13 (in Polish).

16 T. Kempa, *Problem kandydatów do tronu Rzeczypospolitej w kontekście podziałów w elicie politycznej Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego w trzech pierwszych bezkrólestwach po śmierci Zygmunta Augusta*, in: M. Markiewicz, D. Rolnik, F. Wolański (eds.) *Wokół wolnych elekcji w państwie polsko-litewskim XVI-XVIII wieku*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice, 2016, 131-142 (in Polish).

near Warsaw. The Voivode of Vilnius, however, refused to Radziwiłł, arguing that he was never put on that side of the river, and that the election never took place there, and it would be hard to persuade others to stop there. In addition, he claimed that the bridge that would have to be crossed was not ready. However, Lew Sapieha himself promised to wait for Radziwiłł one day in Prague, probably pointing out a bit maliciously that he must give up participation in the Catholic mass for this reason¹⁷.

Albrycht Stanisław Radziwiłł also mentioned the willingness of the Senators to gather senators on the other side of the Wisła: “The prince, Lithuanian Field Hetman, stood on the other side of the river. He wanted to stop the voivode of Vilnius here, and therefore he tried to attract others and even me, but this could not happen, because all major senators crossed over to this site, and many of the nobility moved to the city, although there was already a bridge built at a cost of 14,000 polish zloty” (in Polish: “Książę, hetman polny litewski, stanął po drugiej stronie rzeki. Chciał w tym miejscu zatrzymać wojewodę wileńskiego i dlatego usiłował ściągnąć tam i innych, a nawet mnie, ale to się stać nie mogło, gdyż wszyscy znaczniejsi senatorowie przeprawili się na tę stronę, a także wielu ze szlachty przeniosło się do miasta, chociaż był już most zbudowany kosztem 14 000 zł”)¹⁸.

Conflicts between Lithuanians and Crowners also occurred during the election in 1669. After the abdication of Jan Kazimierz, the nobility did not want to put on the throne a candidate who was considered a foreigner, and particular resentment was felt against the French pretender. In connection with the above, ideas related to the election of the descendant of the Jagiellonians, and later the king-countryman, the Pole, so-called “Piaśt” especially spread. They were candidates perceived in society as their own. Of course, the first of these ideas enjoyed much greater popularity among the elite of the Grand Duchy than the election of a Pole, which could have led to increased political influence by the Crowners at the court of the new king¹⁹.

From the beginning of the interregnum the leader of the dominant party in Lithuania, the Chancellor of the Great Lithuanian Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac, was not supportive of the idea of choosing a Pole. In his letter to the starost of Liw, he emphasized that the promoter of the idea of the election of the compatriot king (probably he mean here Andrzej Olszowski) wants to rule “this wooden king himself”²⁰, acting as a kind of favorite of the monarch, like Richelieu, and after him Mazarin in France. He further believed that “from the House of this Piaśt - maybe he was referring specifically to Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki - as many relatives as Principes would be sangvinis, so much tyrannos”²¹. He also complained about the originator of this concept, who was supposed to harass with nippy lists senators, hetmans and other Polish and Lithuanian officials, which certainly did not favour the increased popularity of the idea forced by Olszowski²². Even after announcing the election of Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, Chancellor Pac tried to prevent his election. According to envoy of Habsburgs Gaspard de Chavagnac, he was to get up and start listing Charles, Prince of the Lorraine as the best candidate for the throne. His behavior, however, was not met with applause from those gathered, and when he proposed the above mentioned as king, “the shot pierced his dress. Terrified senators confirmed this with silence”²³.

17 Sapieha L. (1632, September 25). Letter. [Lew Sapieha to Krzysztof Radziwiłł in Praga near Warsaw]. Lietuvos mokslų akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka, BF 432, 132-132v.

18 A. Przyboś i R. Żelewski (transl. and ed.), A. S. Radziwiłł, Pamiętnik o dziejach w Polsce, Vol. 1, 1632-1636, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1980, 141-142 (in Polish).

19 A. Ziober, Postawy elit Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego wobec elekcji Władysława IV Wazy i Michała Korybuta Wiśniowieckiego, PhD thesis, University of Wrocław, Wrocław, Poland, 2018, 199 and next (in Polish).

20 „[...] sam tylko tym drewnianym królem [...]”; Pac K. Z., (last months of 1668). Letter. Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac to staroste of Liw (probably Adam Oborski). Archive Material. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, Nabytki, oddział I, ms 199, 52v.

21 „[...] z Domu tego Piaśta – być może miał tu na myśli konkretnie Wiśniowieckiego – ile krewnych tyle Principes byłoby sangvinis, tyle tyrannos [...]”; Pac K. Z., (last months of 1668). Letter. Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac to staroste of Liw (probably Adam Oborski). Archive Material. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, Nabytki, oddział I, ms 199, 52v.

22 Pac K. Z., (last months of 1668). Letter. Krzysztof Zygmunt Pac to staroste of Liw (probably Adam Oborski). Archive Material. Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, Nabytki, oddział I, ms 199, 52v. Mieczysława Chmielewska probably misinterprets the starostę of Liw with the staroste of Lipsk: M. Chmielewska, *Sejm elekcyjny Michała Wiśniowieckiego*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2006, 113 (in Polish).

23 „wystrzał przeszył mu suknię. Potrwożeni tem senatorowie umilkli”; Wyjątek z pamiętnika hrabiego de Chavagnac legata do Polski, po abdykacji króla Jana Kazimierza i w czasie elekcji króla Michała r. 1668, in: J. U. Niemcewicz (developed) Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawnej Polsce z rękopismów, tudzież dzieł w różnych językach o Polsce wydanych oraz listami oryginalnymi królów i znakomitych ludzi w kraju naszym, Vol. 4, Lipsk 1839, 309-310 (in Polish). French edition of Chavagnac's memories: : *Mémoires du comte Gaspard de Chavagnac 1638-1695*, oprac. J. de Villeurs, Paryż 1900.

When the crowds of the royal nobility proclaimed as king Michał Korybut Wiśniowiecki, deputies of the Grand Duchy fell into a panic and proposed the candidacy of Lithuanian, which finally took the form of Bogusław Radziwiłł. It was an activity that could not be met with great popularity and success. Despite this, the prince of Birże won quite a large number of votes. The main argument in favor of his candidacy was an alliance with the Jagiellonians through his mother Elżbieta Zofia Hohenzollern (therefore the great-grandmother of Radziwiłł was Barbara Jagiellonka)²⁴.

One of the most frequently cited by historians signaling, even separatist aspirations of Lithuanians should be considered the agreement in Kiejdany signed by Janusz Radziwiłł with the Swedes in 1655. To this day, it causes a lot of controversy and raises extreme opinions. The Great Lithuanian Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł, by making a pact with Sweden, broke the union between the Grand Duchy and the Crown and gave Lithuania to the protection of the invader. Opinions on the motives of his conduct are divided, some believe that Radziwiłł was guided by religious considerations, because he was a Calvinist and he was closer to Lutheran Sweden. However, in my opinion, these claims were rightly disputed. It should be acknowledged that Janusz Radziwiłł was guided by the Lithuanian *raison d'état*, and he wanted above all to save the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the Moscow occupation in connection with the lost war and the lack of prospects for help from the Polish Crown²⁵.

Numerous disputes between Lithuanians and Coroners were also related to the priority issue of dealing with Eastern policy. Representatives of the Grand Duchy from signing the union in 1569 wanted to lead the primacy in deciding on contacts with the Moscow state. An example of the dispute over this background is the deputation to Moscow that took place in 1634. Kazimierz Leon Sapieha was delegated to them from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The purpose of the mission was to swear by the tsar Michał peace in Polanów. In legation Sapieha, played a secondary role because King Władysław IV Waza entrusted the mission of making peace to the castellan of Kamieniec Aleksander Piaseczyński. Kazimierz Leon in 1635 set off on a journey with a great retinue, which he finally had to reduce. During the deputation, he got into conflict with representatives of Moscow, who he accused of treating the envoys of the Commonwealth improperly. There was also a dispute with Piaseczyński, whom Sapieha accused of discriminating against Lithuanians, pride and incompetence and threatened, despite the Pole's gray hair, that next time he would "run his chin" (in Polish: "wytarga go za brodę"). In the end, the dispute took on so large that three keys were obtained for the chest containing the documents regarding the legation. Only the three deputies could open it: Sapieha, Piaseczyński and another Lithuanian accompanying them, Władysław Wołłowicz²⁶.

Lithuanian fears related to the loss of their prerogatives, as well as the desire to expand them, broke out quite unexpectedly and dynamically, especially if deputies and senators abused alcohol. At that moment, the emotions grew stronger and led to complicated, sometimes drastic situations. For example, when in 1635 during his stay in Vilnius, Władysław IV Waza received letters from envoys residing in Moscow, he decided to convene a council of the senate. Senators appeared at deliberations, had fun at a party organized by Lithuanian Referendary Marcin Tryzna. In addition to drunkenness, the audience was even more agitated by the fact that the messages from Polish envoys in Russia were read by a Crown official, not Lithuanian as was in the case with Eastern affairs. A great uproar began, during which the Lithuanian Grand Hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł began to insult the Crown Marshal Łukasz Opaliński, who was leading the meeting. At the end of the meeting, Vilnius bishop Abraham Woyna arrived, who also began to shout at the Coroners accusing them of insolence. Seeing what was happening, the king wanted to end the meeting immediately and ordered to leave the room on a litter. However, it did not succeed, because the Vilnius Bishop threw himself on the monarch

24 Genealogy table of Bogusław Radziwiłł. Archive Material. Bibliothèque nationale de France, NAF 9705, 67; T. Wasilewski, Radziwiłł Bogusław, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków-Gdańsk-Łódź, 1987, 171 (in Polish); T. Wasilewski, Rodowód i pierwsze lata życia, in: T. Wasilewski, *Zarys dziejów Bogusława Radziwiłła*, in: T. Wasilewski (ed.), B. Radziwiłł, *Autobiografia*, PIW, Warszawa, 1979, 8 (in Polish).

25 W. Konopczyński, K. Lepszy (eds.) *Akta ugody kiejdańskiej 1655 roku*, Wilno 1935 (in Polish); A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 299-300 (in Polish); A. Ziobier, Janusz Radziwiłł – dissident and traitor?, E. C. Gardner, A. (eds.) *Qamar in: Dissident Voices in Europe? Past, Present and Future*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Birmingham, 2016, 115-126.

26 A. Rachuba, Sapieha Kazimierz Leon, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, Vol. XXXV, No. 1, Warszawa-Kraków, 1994, 32 (in Polish). More information about the deputation: A. Filipczak-Kocur (ed.), *Poselstwo Aleksandra Piaseczyńskiego i Kazimierza Leona Sapiehy do Moskwy w 1635 roku*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Opole, 2017 (in Polish); A. Filipczak-Kocur, *Poselstwo Aleksandra Piaseczyńskiego i Kazimierza Leona Sapiehy do Moskwy w 1635 roku*, in: R. Skowron (ed.), *Polska wobec wielkich konfliktów w Europie nowożytnej. Z dziejów dyplomacji i stosunków międzynarodowych*, Societas Vistulana, Kraków, 2009 (in Polish).

with impetus and demanded a voice in drunken amok. Opaliński refused, however, claiming that the moment the King decided to leave the meeting room, the meeting should end. Krzysztof Radziwiłł reacted furiously, saying that he would bring the case to the next Parliament. At this point the Great Hetman joined his son Janusz, who probably waited in the hall and listened to the events. Also intoxicated, he began to shout that the Lithuanians would not let themselves be offended and “the time will come when Poles will be shown the exit not the doors, but the windows” (in Polish: “przyjdzie czas, kiedy jako wyjście wskaże się Polakom nie drzwi, ale okna”), thus referring to the events in Prague in 1618. The King seized the opportunity and went among the screams of Radziwiłł to a nearby church²⁷. The above situation perfectly illustrates the mood prevailing among Lithuanians. For representatives of the Grand Duchy, any situation that violated their prerogatives, laws, traditions and honor could have led to a great outbreak of aggression. This somewhat testifies to the attitude of Lithuanians, who believed that they were in a worse position, secondary to the Coroners.

Lithuanians' aspirations for equality with the Crown were also evident in the proposals and demands made by deputies at Local Councils and Parliament. In 1632, in the parliamentary instructions we find the postulate that the king, after two years spent in the Crown, one year should be a resident in the Grand Duchy²⁸. Similar demands were made regarding the holding of general sessions in Lithuania. The first parliament on its territory was held in Brześć-Litewski in 1653, but not because of the fulfillment of Lithuanian demands, but because of the spreading plague in the Crown and the proximity of Ukraine, where the war was fought. Conditions in Brześć caused, however, not only critics of Coronians. These claims increased even more in the second half of the 17th century, and finally, by means of blackmail, Lithuanians managed to obtain a decision to convene, with the exception of convocation, election and coronation, every third parliament in the Grand Duchy in Grodno, a city not completely prepared at that time²⁹.

A negative and to some extent distrustful attitude of Lithuanians towards Poles may also be confirmed by correspondence exchanged between Lithuanians. It is worth mentioning here, for example, the letter of the Great Lithuanian Hetman Jan Karol Chodkiewicz to Krzysztof Radziwiłł, in which he stated that “For a long time Poles have been there so that us, large families in Lithuania, having brought to destruction, would bring them so that they could lead Lithuania according to their thoughts” (In Polish: “Dawno Polacy na tym są, aby nas, wielkie familie w Litwie, powaźniejszy do zniszczenia przywiedli, aby tak snadnie mogli według myśli Litwą kierować”) ³⁰. This kind of mood prevailing among the Lithuanian elite is also confirmed by the correspondence of the Great Lithuanian Hetman Lew Sapieha with Field Hetman Krzysztof Radziwiłł from May 31, 1632. The letters between those mentioned a general concern over the problem of securing the borders of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania during interregnum against possible Moscow aggression. However, Sapieha was afraid that Poles would not keep their earlier promise to hand over 600,000 Polish zloty to defend the eastern borders. Lew was probably aware that the Coroners did not take seriously the threat from the Moscow state and were reluctant to allocate their own money to cover military hauls of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Next, the great hetman wrote that Lithuanians should devise their own points that should be presented to the future elect to fulfill: “And that our ancestors ordinary sub interregno exorbit in rights and freedoms, bring to their club and heal articles to give to the future Lord, so also whatever collapsum ordinary resituere, whatever was deforme reformare. It would also be great for us to think about this and what conditon to tell the future Lord about what God would give us sufficiently at convocatia” (A iż przodkowie nasi zwykli sub interregno to co w prawach i wolnościach exorbitowało, do swojej kluby przywodzić i artykuły do uleczenia tych rzeczy przyszłemu Panu podawać, tak też cokolwiek było collapsum zwykli resituere, cokolwiek było deforme reformare. Niewadziłoby też nam i o tem pomyśleć, iakieby condicie przyszłemu Panu podać, o czym dostateczniej da Pan Bóg na convocatii). Later in the letter

27 W. Czapliński, *Na dworze króla Władysława IV, Książka i Wiedza, Warszawa, 1959, 224-227* (in Polish).

28 H. Wisner, *Rozróżnieni w wierze. Szkice z dziejów Rzeczypospolitej schyłku XVI i połowy XVII wieku*, KIW, Warszawa, 1982, 57 (in Polish).

29 A. Rachuba, *Wielkie Księstwo Litewskie w systemie parlamentarnym Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1569-1763*, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2002, 176 (in Polish); W. Szwed, *Grodzieńskie sejmy Rzeczypospolitej, Białostoczyzna*, Vol. 1, 1998, 30-35 (in Polish); J. Gordziejew, *Socjotopografia Grodna*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń, 2002, 43-44 (in Polish); T. Ciesielski, *Grodno miastem obrad komisji i trybunałów skarbowych. Przyczynek do dziejów skarbowości litewskiej pierwszej ćwierci XVIII w.*, in: A. Ф. Смаленчука, Н. У. Сліж (eds.), *Гарадзенскі палімпсест. Дзяржаўныя ўстановы і палітычнае жыццё. XVI – XX ст.*, Grodno, 2009, 140 (in Polish); M. Sawicki, *Grodno w pamiętniku Karola Stanisława Radziwiłła z lat 1688-1713*, in: A. Ф. Смаленчука, Н. У. Сліж (eds.) *Гарадзенскі палімпсест. Асoba, грамадства, дзяржава. XV - XX стст.*, Mińsk, 2012, 81 (in Polish).

30 Quote from: H. Wisner, *Najjaśniejsza Rzeczpospolita. Szkice z dziejów Polski szlacheckiej XVI-XVII wieku*, Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, Warszawa, 1978, 17 (in Polish).

he returns to matters related to Moscow. He said that an office-boy should be sent there, but he points out that he should be from Lithuania. He regretted, however, that it was impossible, because in the act of the union it was decided that the legations could be celebrated only together “[...] and they, the Crown Lords, would not accept our letters, if we do not grant them the title of Hospodar the their present Lord, but we cannot do it so that we could be awarded the title without consensus, the Princess of His Majesty Władysław” (in Polish: “a oni choćby P.P. Koronni na to pozwolili, nieprzyimają listów naszych, jeśli im nieprzyznamy tytuły Hospodarskieho, Panu ich terażnieyszemu, my zaś tego uczynić nie możemy abyśmy mu tytuł przyznawać mieli bez konsensu królewica Jego Mci Władysława”) ³¹.

Interestingly, it seems that Sapieha and Radziwiłł, despite their general reluctance towards each other, preferred to consult together about the good and security of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. It seems that both of them expressed their reluctance and great fears about proceeding in this matter Coroners, who in principle were not concerned with Lithuania’s military problems. It was also not in their interest to finance the Lithuanian soldiers. It is probably for this reason that Radziwiłł and Sapieha wanted to decide for themselves on Eastern policy, because the often reckless, according to the Lithuanians, moves of Poles could lead to a sharpening of relations with Moscow, and the impetus of the Eastern neighbor’s impact always focused on the Grand Duchy, not the Crown. It is also interesting that the Lithuanians wanted to present their own demands to the elect, which they probably did not intend to consult with the Crowners. Of course, this does not mean that Lithuanians treated Poles as enemies, although they definitely treated their actions with a certain degree of distrust.

In 1569, the federal Republic of the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was created. A unique state in Europe was created, consisting of two nations, to which an attempt was also made to join in 1658 a third - Ruthenians (Ukrainians), although these efforts proved to be ineffective for various reasons. The resulting creation survived until 1791, when it was only the Constitution of May 3 that finally eliminated the differences between the two countries. Throughout this period, Lithuanians, injured in the act of the Union of Lublin, approached their prerogatives with great sensitivity, stigmatizing the lack of compliance by Polish brothers at every step. Against this background, there have been high-profile conflicts and threats of breaking the union. Nevertheless, despite many misunderstandings, a federal state with a very specific political system has survived for over 200 years, while maintaining the separateness of each of the nations that make up the Commonwealth.

31 Sapieha L. (1632, May 31). Letter. [Lew Sapieha to Krzysztof Radziwiłł in Brześć Litewski]. Archive Material. Lietuvos mokslo akademijos Vrublevskių biblioteka, BF 432, 126-126v.