Das optimale Design von Auktionen als Teil einer modernen Ordnungspolitik: Zum Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom

Literatur

Ausubel, Lawrence M. und Paul Milgrom (2002a), Ascending Auctions with Packag Bidding, in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 1, S. 1–44.10.2202/1534-5955.1019Search in Google Scholar

Ausubel, Lawrence M. und Paul Milgrom (2002b), Package Bidding: Vickrey vs Ascending Auctions, in: Revue Economique, 3, S. 391–402.10.3406/reco.2002.410411Search in Google Scholar

Berninghaus, Siegfried, Karl-Martin Ehrhart und Werner Güth (2006), Strategische Spiele: Eine Einführung in die Spieltheorie, Berlin: Springer Verlag.Search in Google Scholar

Bichler, Martin und Jacob K. Goeree (Hg.) (2017), Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781316471609Search in Google Scholar

Böckers, Veit, Lilian Hardorp, Justus Haucap, Ulrich Heimeshoff, Niklas Gösser und Susanne Thorwarth (2016), Wettbewerb in der Restmüllerfassung: Eine empirische Analyse der Anbieterstruktur, in: List-Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, 42, S. 423–440.Search in Google Scholar

Bolle, Friedel (1992), Supply Function Equilibria and the Danger of Tacit Collusion. The Case of Spot Markets for Electricity, in: Energy Economics, 14(2), S. 94-102.10.1016/0140-9883(92)90002-USearch in Google Scholar

Bundesnetzagentur (2020), Ausschreibungen für EE- und KWK-Anlagen, verfügbar unter: https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/Unternehmen_Institutionen/Ausschreibungen/Ausschreibungen_node.html.Search in Google Scholar

Caspari, Volker (1989), Walras, Marshall, Keynes. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.10.3790/978-3-428-46639-9Search in Google Scholar

Coase, Ronald (1959), The Federal Communications Commission, in: Journal of Law and Economics, 2, S. 1–40.Search in Google Scholar

Coase, Ronald (1988), The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Search in Google Scholar

Cramton, Peter (1997), The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, in: Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6, S. 431–495.Search in Google Scholar

Cramton, Peter (2013), Spectrum Auction Design, in: Review of Industrial Organization, 42, S. 161–190.Search in Google Scholar

Goetzendorff, Andor, Martin Bichler und Jacob K. Goeree (2018), Synergistic Valuations and Efficiency in Spectrum Auctions, in: Telecommunications Policy, 42, S. 91-105.Search in Google Scholar

Haucap, Justus (2017), The Rule of Law and the Emergence of Market Exchange: A New Institutional Economic Perspective, in: von Alemann, Ulrich, Detlef Briesen und Lai Quoc Khanh (Hg.), The State of Law: Comparative Perspectives on the Rule of Law, Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press, S. 143–172.Search in Google Scholar

Haucap, Justus (2020a), Auktionen in Theorie und Praxis: Zum Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom, in: Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium (WiSt) 49 (12), S. 35–41.10.15358/0340-1650-2020-12-36Search in Google Scholar

Haucap, Justus (2020b), Ökonomie-Nobelpreis 2020 für Robert Wilson und Paul Milgrom: Zwei Ökonomen, die echte Märkte schufen, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 100, S. 969–975. 10.1007/s10273-020-2806-0Search in Google Scholar

Haucap, Justus und Hans-Theo Normann (2014), Jean Tirole: Ökonomie-Nobelpreisträger 2014, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 94, S. 906–911.Search in Google Scholar

Herzel, Leo (1951), ‘Public Interest’ and the Market in Color Television Regulation, in: University of Chicago Law Review, 18, S. 802–816.Search in Google Scholar

Herzel, Leo (1998), My 1951 Color Television Article, in: Journal of Law and Economics, 41, S. 523–528.Search in Google Scholar

Joskow, Paul L. und Jean Tirole (2000), Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks, in: RAND Journal of Economics, 31, S. 450–487.Search in Google Scholar

Kagel, John H. (1995). Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research, in: Kagel, J. H. und Alvin E. Roth (Hg.)., Handbook of Experimental Economics, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Search in Google Scholar

Kagel, John H. und Dan Levin (2014), Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research.Search in Google Scholar

Klemperer, Paul (2002), How (not) to Run Auctions: The European 3G Telecom Auctions, in: European Economic Review, 46(4–5), S. 829–845.Search in Google Scholar

Klemperer, Paul D. und Margaret A. Meyer (1989), Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty, in: Econometrica, 57, S. 1243–1277.Search in Google Scholar

Königlich Schwedische Akademie der Wissenschaften (2020), Scientific Background Paper in the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2020, Stockholm.Search in Google Scholar

Kremer, Ilan und Kjell G. Nyborg (2004). Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules, in: RAND Journal of Economics, 35, S. 147–159.Search in Google Scholar

Kübler, Dorothea (2012), Stabile Allokationen und Matching-Märkte: Zum Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften an Lloyd S. Shapley und Alvin E. Roth, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 92(12), S. 843–847.Search in Google Scholar

Kwerel, Evan und Gregory Rosston (2000), An Insiders' View of FCC Spectrum Auctions, in: Journal of Regulatory Economics, 17(3), S. 253–289.Search in Google Scholar

McMillan, John (1994), Selling Spectrum Rights, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(3), S. 145–162.Search in Google Scholar

McNeal, R.A. (1988). The Brides of Babylon: Herodotus 1.196, in: Historia, 37, S. 54–71.Search in Google Scholar

Milgrom, Paul (1981a), Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications, in: Bell Journal of Economics, 12, S. 380–391.10.2307/3003562Search in Google Scholar

Milgrom, Paul (1981b), Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding, in: Econometrica, 49, S. 921–944.10.2307/1912511Search in Google Scholar

Milgrom, Paul (2004), Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511813825Search in Google Scholar

Milgrom, Paul und Robert J. Weber (1982), A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding, in: Econometrica, 50(5), S. 1089–1122.Search in Google Scholar

Moldovanu, Benny (1996), William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie: Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996, in: Wirtschaftsdienst, 76(12), S. 651–656.Search in Google Scholar

Moldovanu, Benny und Manfred Tietzel (1998), Goethe’s Second Price Auction, in: Journal of Political Economy, 106(4), S. 854–859.Search in Google Scholar

Rossner, Christiane (2008), Drei, zwei, eins: meins! Eine kleine Kulturgeschichte der Auktionen, in: monumente – Magazin für Denkmalkultur in Deutschland, 18(1), S. 48–52.Search in Google Scholar

Vickrey, William (1961), Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed-Tenders, in: Journal of Finance, 16, S. 8–37.Search in Google Scholar

Vickrey, William (1962), Auctions and Bidding Games, in: Recent Advances in Game Theory. Proceedings of a Conference, Princeton: Princeton University Press, S. 15–27.Search in Google Scholar

Wilson, Robert B. (1967), Competitive Bidding with Asymmetrical Information, in: Management Science, 13, S. 816–820.Search in Google Scholar

Wilson, Robert B. (1969), Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information, in: Management Science, 15, S. 446–448.Search in Google Scholar

Wilson, Robert B. (1977), A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition, in: Review of Economic Studies, 44, S. 511–518.Search in Google Scholar

Wilson, Robert B. (1979), Auctions of Shares, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, S. 675–689.Search in Google Scholar

Wilson, Robert B. (1985), Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions, in: Econometrica, 53, S. 1101–1115.Search in Google Scholar

Wilson, Robert B. (2002), Architecture of Power Markets, in: Econometrica, 70, S. 1299–1340.Search in Google Scholar

Wilson, Robert B. (2008), Supply Function Equilibrium in a Constrained Transmission System, in: Operations Research, 56, S. 369–382.Search in Google Scholar