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Are Advocates General Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Advocates General at the European Court of Justice

  • Jens Frankenreiter EMAIL logo
From the journal Review of Law & Economics

Abstract

The question whether political preferences of EU Member States play a role in the decision-making of the members of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has so far gone largely unanswered in the literature. This paper formally tests the hypothesis that the political preferences of Member State governments are reflected in the decisions of the Advocates General, who are judge-like members of the ECJ. The empirical analysis is motivated by a novel model of the interaction between the Advocate General and the judicial panel. Based on this model, the paper develops a formal test to answer whether there is a relationship between the policy preferences of EU Member State governments with regard to European integration and the decision behavior of Advocates General appointed by these governments. It then tests this hypothesis using a newly assembled dataset combining information on agreements and disagreements between the opinions issued by the Advocates General and the ensuing judgments of the ECJ in preliminary ruling proceedings with information on political preferences of Member State governments obtained from party manifesto data. The results of this test suggest that the votes of Advocates General reflect the political preferences of the appointing governments vis-à-vis European integration.

Appendix

List of cases

C-90/94C-160/96C-61/97C-328/97
C-18/95C-163/96C-67/97C-329/97
C-67/95C-171/96C-76/97C-337/97
C-97/95C-176/96C-77/97C-340/97
C-120/95C-200/96C-86/97C-350/97
C-189/95C-201/96C-87/97C-355/97
C-225/95C-203/96C-93/97C-366/97
C-284/95C-212/96C-124/97C-371/97
C-322/95C-213/96C-131/97C-373/97
C-334/95C-228/96C-147/97C-378/97
C-337/95C-237/96C-162/97C-379/97
C-338/95C-261/96C-193/97C-383/97
C-341/95C-266/96C-210/97C-391/97
C-347/95C-270/96C-212/97C-394/97
C-349/95C-274/96C-215/97C-405/97
C-382/95C-291/96C-222/97C-412/97
C-1/96C-292/96C-224/97C-424/97
C-15/96C-304/96C-230/97C-439/97
C-36/96C-315/96C-233/97C-6/98
C-44/96C-325/96C-234/97C-27/98
C-51/96C-336/96C-237/97C-31/98
C-54/96C-343/96C-241/97C-35/98
C-55/96C-348/96C-247/97C-37/98
C-57/96C-350/96C-254/97C-38/98
C-69/96C-360/96C-255/97C-44/98
C-80/96C-367/96C-258/97C-48/98
C-85/96C-369/96C-259/97C-49/98
C-90/96C-370/96C-262/97C-55/98
C-97/96C-389/96C-275/97C-58/98
C-98/96C-400/96C-280/97C-61/98
C-104/96C-402/96C-290/97C-65/98
C-108/96C-410/96C-294/97C-67/98
C-118/96C-1/97C-302/97C-94/98
C-142/96C-5/97C-307/97C-97/98
C-143/96C-41/97C-311/97C-102/98
C-108/98C-441/98C-253/99C-123/00
C-109/98C-448/98C-255/99C-136/00
C-160/98C-455/98C-257/99C-137/00
C-165/98C-456/98C-268/99C-143/00
C-176/98C-463/98C-277/99C-153/00
C-190/98C-464/98C-285/99C-159/00
C-195/98C-473/98C-288/99C-162/00
C-200/98C-1/99C-306/99C-172/00
C-209/98C-3/99C-309/99C-182/00
C-220/98C-15/99C-317/99C-188/00
C-224/98C-16/99C-324/99C-190/00
C-228/98C-33/99C-371/99C-208/00
C-233/98C-42/99C-385/99C-244/00
C-238/98C-43/99C-389/99C-245/00
C-246/98C-54/99C-390/99C-251/00
C-251/98C-63/99C-393/99C-255/00
C-254/98C-66/99C-413/99C-257/00
C-281/98C-85/99C-430/99C-259/00
C-293/98C-87/99C-443/99C-260/00
C-301/98C-94/99C-451/99C-276/00
C-309/98C-109/99C-459/99C-290/00
C-310/98C-119/99C-462/99C-294/00
C-314/98C-135/99C-470/99C-318/00
C-324/98C-141/99C-479/99C-324/00
C-339/98C-157/99C-510/99C-355/00
C-348/98C-164/99C-513/99C-356/00
C-356/98C-169/99C-515/99C-360/00
C-357/98C-178/99C-516/99C-379/00
C-366/98C-184/99C-17/00C-385/00
C-368/98C-187/99C-19/00C-386/00
C-379/98C-191/99C-31/00C-388/00
C-380/98C-192/99C-53/00C-411/00
C-381/98C-201/99C-55/00C-416/00
C-383/98C-205/99C-60/00C-421/00
C-397/98C-213/99C-92/00C-422/00
C-399/98C-223/99C-99/00C-435/00
C-405/98C-226/99C-112/00C-436/00
C-411/98C-234/99C-115/00C-438/00
C-423/98C-235/99C-121/00C-453/00
C-466/00C-313/01C-203/02C-195/03
C-469/00C-317/01C-222/02C-209/03
C-6/01C-322/01C-224/02C-210/03
C-15/01C-337/01C-239/02C-211/03
C-18/01C-364/01C-240/02C-215/03
C-34/01C-383/01C-247/02C-227/03
C-56/01C-387/01C-275/02C-230/03
C-57/01C-405/01C-289/02C-231/03
C-63/01C-411/01C-293/02C-242/03
C-78/01C-413/01C-309/02C-253/03
C-79/01C-421/01C-315/02C-265/03
C-92/01C-422/01C-319/02C-293/03
C-95/01C-452/01C-327/02C-306/03
C-99/01C-462/01C-338/02C-327/03
C-100/01C-482/01C-361/02C-329/03
C-108/01C-485/01C-386/02C-330/03
C-109/01C-8/02C-387/02C-374/03
C-110/01C-9/02C-396/02C-376/03
C-112/01C-10/02C-400/02C-403/03
C-113/01C-12/02C-414/02C-411/03
C-152/01C-14/02C-429/02C-446/03
C-167/01C-25/02C-434/02C-451/03
C-168/01C-36/02C-438/02C-458/03
C-171/01C-42/02C-442/02C-467/03
C-209/01C-46/02C-443/02C-468/03
C-215/01C-47/02C-444/02C-495/03
C-216/01C-56/02C-456/02C-512/03
C-222/01C-71/02C-467/02C-513/03
C-224/01C-91/02C-17/03C-515/03
C-232/01C-92/02C-20/03C-537/03
C-234/01C-102/02C-21/03C-544/03
C-241/01C-112/02C-26/03C-3/04
C-243/01C-115/02C-28/03C-23/04
C-245/01C-133/02C-72/03C-39/04
C-255/01C-138/02C-134/03C-40/04
C-285/01C-145/02C-136/03C-89/04
C-290/01C-148/02C-152/03C-96/04
C-292/01C-153/02C-169/03C-109/04
C-300/01C-200/02C-170/03C-140/04
C-147/04C-290/04C-406/04C-506/04
C-151/04C-293/04C-410/04C-514/04
C-154/04C-300/04C-419/04C-517/04
C-158/04C-311/04C-434/04C-10/05
C-192/04C-331/04C-438/04C-11/05
C-196/04C-339/04C-452/04C-50/05
C-201/04C-340/04C-456/04C-140/05
C-213/04C-346/04C-465/04C-149/05
C-222/04C-353/04C-466/04C-169/05
C-226/04C-366/04C-467/04C-290/05
C-247/04C-372/04C-470/04
C-258/04C-386/04C-479/04
C-265/04C-392/04C-493/04

Factorplot for pairwise comparisons of AG ideal points

Figure 4 Pairwise comparisons of ideal point estimates for AGs.
Figure 4

Pairwise comparisons of ideal point estimates for AGs.

Acknowledgements:

Dr. Jens Frankenreiter, LL.M. (Harvard) is a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in Bonn, Germany. Most of the work on this project was done during the author’s time as a Research Fellow at the Center for Law & Economics at ETH Zurich. The author is grateful to two anonymous reviewers, participants in the First Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe, participants in the Midwest Political Science Association 73rd Annual Conference, participants in the 2013 EALE Annual Meeting, participants in the 4th Workshop for Junior Researchers on the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, and participants in the internal seminar series at the Center for Law and Economics (ETH Zurich) for providing useful comments. In particular, he thanks Sofia Amaral Garcia, Dave Armstrong, Stefan Bechtold, Daniel Chen, Christoph Engel, Matthias Finger, Josh Fischman, Jérôme Hergeux, Bill Jacoby, Jim Johnson, Heiko Karle, Marloes Maathuis, Jean-Pierre Nadal, Kevin Quinn, Daniel Rubinfeld, Heike Schweitzer, Martin Schonger, Holger Spamann, and a number of unnamed judges, Advocates General, and référendaires at the European Court of Justice. This research has benefited greatly from a two-week research stay at the European Court of Justice. The author remains solely responsible for all opinions and errors.

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Published Online: 2018-3-3

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