Abstract
The economics literature on Net Neutrality (NN) has been largely critical of NN regulation on the basis of theoretical findings that NN violations can be both welfare improving and welfare deteriorating, depending on the circumstances of the case in question. Thus, an ex post competition policy approach would be preferable to a strict ex ante prohibition of NN violations. In contrast, the current paper argues that NN regulation is largely ineffective, in particular, when it comes to the prohibition of fast lanes and other quality of service (QoS) differentiations, and to a lesser extent, when it comes to the zero price rule. NN regulation is only effective in preventing the blocking of specific content and in preventing the favoring of ISP owned content and in preventing some price discriminations. These are also areas where NN regulations are more likely to be welfare-enhancing. Where they are ineffective, NN regulations are likely to create inefficiencies through the cost and allocative inefficiencies caused by NN bypass. The paper ends with a call for theoretical and empirical economic analyses of NN circumvention techniques.
Acknowledgment
The author would like to thank Wolfgang Briglauer as the editor and two anonymous referees for constructive comments.
References
Areeda, P. (1989) “Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles,” Antitrust Law Review, 58:841–869.Search in Google Scholar
Brodkin, J. (2014) ‘It’s not a ‘Fast Lane’ but Comcast Built a CDN to Charge for Video Delivery,” Ars Technica, May 19; https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2014/05/Its-not-a-fast-lane-but-comcast-built-a-cdn-to-charge-for-video-delivery/.Search in Google Scholar
Broos, S. and A. Gautier (2017) “The Exclusion of Competing One-Way Essential Complements: Implications for Net Neutrality,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 52:358–392.10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.03.003Search in Google Scholar
Chiang, I. R. and J.-H. Jhang-Li (2014) “Delivery Consolidation and Service Competition Among Internet Service Providers,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 31:254–286.10.1080/07421222.2014.995561Search in Google Scholar
CISCO (2017) “The Zettabyte Era: Trends and Analysis,” White paper, June.Search in Google Scholar
Coucheney, P., P. Maillé and B. Tuffin (2014) “Network Neutrality Debate and ISP Inter-Relations: Traffic Exchange, Revenue Sharing, and Disconnection Threat. Netnomics, 15:155–182.10.1007/s11066-014-9090-3Search in Google Scholar
Dewenter, R. and J. Rösch (2016) “Network Neutrality and the Incentives (not) to Exclude Competitors,” Review of Economics, 67:209–229.10.1515/roe-2015-1010Search in Google Scholar
Easley, R., H. Guo and J. Krämer (2018) “From Network Neutrality to Data Neutrality: A Techno-Economic Framework and Research Agenda,” Information Systems Research, 29(2):253–272.10.2139/ssrn.2666217Search in Google Scholar
Faulhaber, G. R. (2011) “Economics of Net Neutrality: A Survey.” Communications & Convergence Review, 3(1):53–64.Search in Google Scholar
Frias, Z. and J. P. Martinez (2018) “5G Networks: Will Technology and Policy Collide?” Telecommunications Policy, 42(8):612–621.10.1016/j.telpol.2017.06.003Search in Google Scholar
Gans, J. (2015) “Weak versus Strong Net Neutrality,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 47:183–200.10.3386/w20160Search in Google Scholar
Gans, J. and M. Katz (2016) “Weak versus Strong Net Neutrality: Corrections and Extensions,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 50:99–110.10.1007/s11149-016-9305-7Search in Google Scholar
Genakos, C. and T. Valletti (2011) “Testing the ‘Waterbed’ Effect in Mobile Telephony,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9:1111–1142.10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01040.xSearch in Google Scholar
Greenstein, S., M. Peitz and T. Valletti (2016) “Net Neutrality: A Fast Lane to Understand the Trade-Offs,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30:127–150.10.3386/w21950Search in Google Scholar
Guo, H., S. Bandyopadhyay, H. K. Cheng and J. Yang (2010) “Net Neutrality and Vertical Integration of Content and Broadband Services,” Journal of Management Information Systems, 27:243–275.10.2753/MIS0742-1222270208Search in Google Scholar
Hoernig, S. and F. Monteiro (2018) “Zero-Rating, Network Effects, and Capacity Investments,” August 22. Available at http://libraries.fe.unl.pt/index.php/e-resources/nsbe-wp/item/zero-rating-network-effects-and-capacity-investments-steffen-hoernig-francisco-monteiro.10.2139/ssrn.3178051Search in Google Scholar
Jamison, M. (2017) “Technology-is-Outsmarting-Net-Neutrality,” American Enterprise Institute, AEIdeas, September 6, available at http://www.aei.org/publication/technology-is-outsmarting-net-neutrality/.Search in Google Scholar
Jamison, M. (2019) “Net Neutrality Policies and Regulation in the United States,” Review of Network Economics, 17(3):151–173.10.1515/rne-2018-0041Search in Google Scholar
Katz, M. L. (2017) “Wither U.S. Net Neutrality Regulation?” Review of Industrial Organization, 50:441–468.10.1007/s11151-017-9573-0Search in Google Scholar
Knieps, G. (2016) “The Internet of Things (IoT), Future Networks (FN), and the Economics of virtual Networks,” Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2756476.Search in Google Scholar
Krämer, J. and M. Peitz (2018) “A Fresh Look at Zero-Rating,” Telecommunications Policy, 42(7):501–513.10.1016/j.telpol.2018.06.005Search in Google Scholar
Krämer, J., L. Wiewiorra and C. Weinhardt (2013) “Net Neutrality: A Progress Report,” Telecommunications Policy, 37:794–813.10.1016/j.telpol.2012.08.005Search in Google Scholar
Lehr, W. (2018) Future of Broadband Competition in a 5G World. White paper, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3240191.Search in Google Scholar
Lehr, W., D. Clark, S. Bauer, A. Berger and P. Richter (2018) Whither the Public Internet? Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3141969.Search in Google Scholar
Maillé, P. and B. Tuffin (2014) Telecommunication Network Economics – From Theory to Applications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9781139507103Search in Google Scholar
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems (2008) Glasnost: Results from tests for BitTorrent traffic shaping. Available at http://broadband.mpi-sws.org/transparency/results/.Search in Google Scholar
Renda, A. (2015) Antitrust, Regulation and the Neutrality Trap: A Plea for a Smart, Evidence-Based Internet Policy. CEPS Special Report No. 104, Brussels, April.Search in Google Scholar
Stocker, V., G. Smaragdakis, W. Lehr and S. Bauer (2017) “The Growing Complexity of Content Delivery Networks: Challenges and Implications for the Internet Ecosystem,” Telecommunications Policy, 41:1003–1016.10.1016/j.telpol.2017.02.004Search in Google Scholar
Vogelsang, I. (2017) “Regulatory Inertia versus ICT Dynamics: The Case of Product Innovations,” Telecommunications Policy, 41:978–990.10.1016/j.telpol.2017.09.006Search in Google Scholar
Vogelsang, I. (2019) “Has Europe Missed the Endgame of Telecommunications Policy?” Telecommunications Policy, 43(1):1–10.10.1016/j.telpol.2018.12.006Search in Google Scholar
©2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston