Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the effects of non-exclusive agreements between networks of mobile money agents on mobile network operator choices, using survey data from Tanzania conducted in 2017. By combining survey responses with geo-location data and information on agent proximity, we employ discrete choice models to analyze consumers’ decisions in subscribing to mobile network operators and their corresponding mobile money providers. Our findings highlight the significant influence of the distance to mobile money agents on consumers’ subscription choices. To explore the impact of interoperability (non-exclusivity) at the mobile money agent level, where consumers can use the nearest agent from any mobile money provider, we assess its effects on market shares of mobile network operators. Our results indicate that interoperability at the agent level has only a minor impact on market shares. Smaller operators experience marginal gains as their consumers can now utilize agents of larger providers, which are often closer in proximity. In conclusion, we find that interoperability at the agent level does not considerably alter the market structure in the context Tanzania during the period under consideration.
Funding source: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
Acknowledgment
We acknowledge financial support from FIT IN Initiative at the Toulouse School of Economics. We would like to thank participants at the “FIT IN Initiative: Workshop on Mobile Money Interoperability” in 2022 in Toulouse for helpful comments. Lukasz Grzybowski acknowledges grant No. 2021/43/P/HS4/03115 co-funded by the National Science Centre and the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 945339. All errors are ours.
Multinomial logit/probit/Heckman selection model.
Multinomial logit | Probit | Heckman | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
(1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | |
Phone | Airtel | Halotel | Tigo | Vodacom | Phone | Mobile money | ||
dist_agent | −0.012** | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.003 | ||||
(0.005) | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.005) | |||||
Network dummies | −2.808*** | −4.631*** | −4.631*** | −1.922*** | ||||
(0.654) | (1.191) | (1.191) | (0.606) | |||||
LTE <5 km | −0.137 | −0.009 | −1.297*** | 0.141 | −0.332 | −0.181 | ||
(0.446) | (1.045) | (0.384) | (0.384) | (0.349) | (0.208) | |||
Dark | −0.458 | −0.262 | −0.827** | −1.004*** | −0.915*** | −0.519*** | −0.532** | |
(0.429) | (1.078) | (0.350) | (0.369) | (0.319) | (0.192) | (0.209) | ||
Bank account | 1.279** | 2.528*** | 2.040*** | 1.494*** | 1.694*** | 0.900*** | 0.264 | |
(0.613) | (0.799) | (0.554) | (0.554) | (0.533) | (0.268) | (0.290) | ||
Credit card | 2.022* | 0.978 | 1.652 | 1.629 | 1.721 | 0.813 | 0.360 | |
(1.145) | (1.334) | (1.116) | (1.115) | (1.102) | (0.522) | (0.383) | ||
Electricity | 0.511** | 0.284 | 0.861*** | 0.576*** | 0.638*** | 0.376*** | −0.052 | |
(0.243) | (0.575) | (0.211) | (0.209) | (0.175) | (0.103) | (0.179) | ||
Age <25 | 0.072 | 0.043 | 0.033 | 0.644* | ||||
(0.356) | (0.356) | (0.211) | (0.340) | |||||
Age <35 | 0.703** | 0.700** | 0.418** | 0.553 | ||||
(0.354) | (0.354) | (0.212) | (0.364) | |||||
Age <45 | 0.805** | 0.826** | 0.503** | 0.612 | ||||
(0.370) | (0.370) | (0.221) | (0.381) | |||||
Age <55 | 0.290 | 0.292 | 0.187 | 0.660* | ||||
(0.391) | (0.391) | (0.236) | (0.375) | |||||
Age <65 | 0.646* | 0.659* | 0.416* | 0.630 | ||||
(0.390) | (0.391) | (0.235) | (0.405) | |||||
Income <25k | 0.682* | 0.700* | 0.372 | −0.476 | ||||
(0.406) | (0.408) | (0.246) | (0.429) | |||||
Income <100k | 1.558*** | 1.574*** | 0.865*** | −0.236 | ||||
(0.435) | (0.437) | (0.259) | (0.463) | |||||
Female | 0.699 | 0.705 | 0.443 | 0.433 | ||||
(0.696) | (0.698) | (0.387) | (0.434) | |||||
Married | 0.535*** | 0.567*** | 0.338*** | −0.069 | ||||
(0.188) | (0.189) | (0.110) | (0.182) | |||||
HH size = 2 | −0.345 | −0.337 | −0.217 | −0.199 | ||||
(0.341) | (0.340) | (0.198) | (0.280) | |||||
HH size
|
−0.511* | −0.496* | −0.301* | −0.214 | ||||
(0.286) | (0.285) | (0.164) | (0.244) | |||||
Primary | 0.487* | 0.515* | 0.322** | 0.416 | ||||
(0.267) | (0.266) | (0.159) | (0.291) | |||||
Secondary | 1.044*** | 1.091*** | 0.669*** | 0.730* | ||||
(0.308) | (0.307) | (0.183) | (0.377) | |||||
Tertiary | 1.196*** | 1.266*** | 0.795*** | 0.819* | ||||
(0.414) | (0.413) | (0.240) | (0.430) | |||||
Employed | 0.619* | 0.613* | 0.372* | 0.323 | ||||
(0.333) | (0.333) | (0.193) | (0.261) | |||||
Self_employed | 0.482* | 0.407 | 0.247 | 0.316 | ||||
(0.275) | (0.275) | (0.163) | (0.235) | |||||
Housework | −0.506* | −0.555* | −0.323* | 0.328 | ||||
(0.287) | (0.288) | (0.172) | (0.264) | |||||
Student | −1.001*** | −1.000*** | −0.580*** | −0.622* | ||||
(0.357) | (0.358) | (0.210) | (0.356) | |||||
Retired | −0.854* | −0.888* | −0.494* | 0.397 | ||||
(0.454) | (0.455) | (0.268) | (0.442) | |||||
ATM <2 km | 0.392 | 0.403 | 0.220 | −0.094 | ||||
(0.274) | (0.275) | (0.157) | (0.187) | |||||
Constant | −1.116* | −0.660* | 0.583 | |||||
(0.587) | (0.351) | (0.922) | ||||||
Athrho | −0.173 | |||||||
Observations | 5950 | 1190 | 1190 | 779 |
-
*denotes significance at a 10 percent level; **denotes significance at 5 percent level; and ***denotes significance at 1 percent level.
Simulated market shares.
Whole market | |||
---|---|---|---|
Current | Simulated | Change | |
Airtel Cash | 12.7 % | 12.7 % | −0.2 % |
Ezy Pesa | 1.7 % | 2.4 % | 44.4 % |
M-Pesa | 23.9 % | 23.5 % | −1.5 % |
Tigo-Pesa | 27.2 % | 27.3 % | 0.2 % |
None | 34.5 % | 34.1 % | −1.2 % |
Urban | Rural | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Current | Simulated | Change | Current | Simulated | Change | |
Airtel Cash | 13.8 % | 13.9 % | 0.2 % | 11.1 % | 11.0 % | −0.8 % |
Ezy Pesa | 2.3 % | 2.7 % | 15.3 % | 0.8 % | 2.1 % | 156.8 % |
M-Pesa | 23.9 % | 23.7 % | −0.7 % | 23.8 % | 23.2 % | −2.5 % |
Tigo-Pesa | 36.7 % | 36.6 % | −0.2 % | 14.2 % | 14.4 % | 1.5 % |
None | 23.3 % | 23.1 % | −0.5 % | 50.1 % | 49.2 % | −1.7 % |
Light | Dark | |||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Current | Simulated | Change | Current | Simulated | Change | |
Airtel Cash | 14.1 % | 14.0 % | −0.3 % | 11.4 % | 11.4 % | −0.1 % |
Ezy Pesa | 2.4 % | 2.7 % | 12.5 % | 1.0 % | 2.2 % | 118.9 % |
M-Pesa | 23.3 % | 23.2 % | −0.6 % | 24.4 % | 23.8 % | −2.3 % |
Tigo-Pesa | 40.5 % | 40.4 % | −0.2 % | 14.5 % | 14.7 % | 1.1 % |
None | 19.7 % | 19.7 % | −0.3 % | 48.8 % | 48.0 % | −1.6 % |
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