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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg February 11, 2016

Does the Level of Work Effort Influence Tax Evasion? Experimental Evidence

Christoph Bühren and Thorben C. Kundt
From the journal Review of Economics

Abstract

Using a real effort experiment, we analyze the dependence of tax evasion on the amount of effort invested to generate income. In three treatments, subjects were either endowed with income or had to work moderately or arduously to earn it. In line with prospect theory, subjects evaded more taxes when they worked hard for their income. We find little evidence for the prediction that tax evasion in the endowed treatment is higher than that in the moderate-effort treatment.

Online erschienen: 2016-2-11
Erschienen im Druck: 2014-8-1

© 2014 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart

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