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What do we Know About Lobbying in Germany?

Andreas Polk EMAIL logo
From the journal Review of Economics


Contribution payments and information are two important channels of lobbying influence. This survey analyzes what is known about these channels in Germany from a political economy perspective. Based on a discussion of the empirical literature and the available data, I argue that the state of empirical knowledge about lobbying in Germany is rather limited. To improve our understanding of the lobbying process, I identify research gaps and discuss potential methodological approaches which can be suitable to address these questions. Also, I discuss the role of party donations and temporary employment of bureaucratic staff, based on two novel data sets. The analysis indicates that party donations might play a role as a means to achieve access; in contrast, the temporary exchange of employees in the public administration seems to be of rather less importance in informational lobbying.

JEL Classification: D72; D73; K20


I would like to thank Michael Berlemann, Dieter Cassel, Jan Voßwinkel, seminar participants of the Jahrestagung des Ausschusses für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik des Vereins für Socialpolitik and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.


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Published Online: 2020-06-10
Published in Print: 2020-05-26

© 2020 Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag GmbH, Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg, Berlin/Boston

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