How is the role of context in moral philosophy to be understood? Why is the consideration of context important here? This paper is a small contribution to answering these questions. The kind of context that is in focus does not help us answer moral questions but is essential for understanding what kind of moral question arises – indeed, if any question arises at all. For whom does the question arise? What form does the question have for him or her? What relation does the person for whom it arises have to the events in the example as described by the philosopher? In considering such issues, the importance of thinking from an existentially and morally engaged perspective becomes evident.
Many thanks to Christopher Cordner, with whom I discussed a previous version of the paper and whose questions helped me improve it. I have presented previous versions of the paper at the research seminar in philosophy at Åbo Akademi University and at the research seminar at the Centre for Ethics, University of Pardubice. Thanks to those who participated in the discussions, especially to Salla Aldrin Salskov and Lars Hertzberg. This publication was supported within the project of Operational Programme Research, Development and Education (OP VVV/OP RDE), ‘Centre for Ethics as Study in Human Value’, registration no. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/15_003/0000425, co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund and the state budget of the Czech Republic.
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