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Licensed Unlicensed Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter Mouton April 6, 2013

An example of the “synthetic a priori”: On how it helps us to widen our philosophical horizons

  • Wojciech Żełaniec

    Wojciech Żełaniec (b. 1959) is a professor at the University of Gdańsk 〈zelaniec@aol.com〉. His research interests include social and legal philosophy, metaphysics, and semiotics. His publications include “Sull'idea stessa di regola costitutiva” (2005); and “Perché il ‘veridico’ non è molto meglio che il ‘mentitore’” (2007).

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From the journal Semiotica

Abstract

A putative example (not Kant-style) of the “synthetic a priori” is examined with a view to, not establishing whether or not it truly belongs to that category but to drawing a philosophical lesson from the fact that it, or a similar proposition, is no longer indisputably empirically true. The example is “No surface is at the same time and for the same observer red all over and green.” An example is provided of how philosophy could deal with such recalcitrant evidence as may crop up and contradict such seemingly self-evident “synthetic a priori.”


University of Gdańsk

About the author

Wojciech Żełaniec

Wojciech Żełaniec (b. 1959) is a professor at the University of Gdańsk 〈zelaniec@aol.com〉. His research interests include social and legal philosophy, metaphysics, and semiotics. His publications include “Sull'idea stessa di regola costitutiva” (2005); and “Perché il ‘veridico’ non è molto meglio che il ‘mentitore’” (2007).

Published Online: 2013-04-06
Published in Print: 2013-04-05

©[2013] by Walter de Gruyter Berlin Boston

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