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Epistemic logic: All knowledge is based on our experience, and epistemic logic is the cognitive representation of our experiential confrontation in reality

Dan Nesher
From the journal Semiotica

Abstract

Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. However, epistemic logic is our basic science which enable us to prove the truth of our cognitions, including the epistemic logic itself.


Corresponding author: Dan Nesher, Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel, E-mail:

Acknowledgments

A shorter version of this article was presented in the 8th Quadrennial International Fellows Conference of Pittsburgh University Center for Philosophy of Science, Lund University, Sweden July 2016. In memoriam of Jaakko Hintikka, an astute philosopher and dear friend, the pioneer of Epistemic Logic.

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Published Online: 2020-12-07
Published in Print: 2021-01-27

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