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Was There a Decline in Ethnic Polarization in Macedonia Between 2003 and 2005? Results from a National Panel Analysis

Abstract. This article reports findings based on analyses of a large national panel study of attitudes towards ethnic relations and conflict in Macedonia from 2003 to 2005. Ethnic Macedonian and Albanian attitudes towards ethnic exclusionism and intolerance are shown in the context of such attitudes among other nationalities in the countries of the Western Balkans. The authors present a structural equation model of the determinants of a simple attitude scale measuring such attitudes in Macedonia, and the changes between 2003 and 2005. The data show marked improvement with regard to attitudes related to insecurity about ethnic violence, especially among Albanians. There was also evidence of improved attitudes about interethnic cooperation. The greatest change was among Albanians, who had very strongly exclusionist attitudes in 2003. At the same time, however, attitudes about ethnic intermarriage became even more negative.

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Introduction

In the spring of 2001, the Republic of Macedonia experienced a series of attacks on its armed forces by Albanian fighters, as well as village occupations, prolonged periods of sniping, closed off roads and border crossings, the killing of innocent individuals, crowd violence against Albanian- and US-owned shops, and attacks on vehicles owned by international agencies. Mortar fire came close to Skopje, some villages became isolated from the control of the central government and some experienced violent police assaults. Considering the most accurate estimates of loss of life – from one to two hundred killed – and examining this situation from the standpoint of the present, this conflict pales in comparison to the violence and loss of life associated with the wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo. Yet it would be a tremendous mistake to

underestimate the level of fear and anger involved and the potential the conflict held to escalate far beyond the tragedies that did occur. Macedonian citizens of both ethnicities worked out a set of agreements with the aid of European intermediaries – the Ohrid Framework Agreement – bringing Macedonian society back from the precipice of danger. The struggles for power and for peace in Macedonia, however, remain strongly related to ethnic rights and relations, and the threat or use of violence has not been completely eradicated.¹

This article presents evidence regarding the degree and nature of changes in the attitudes of Macedonian citizens about Macedonian-Albanian ethnic relations, from the period 2003 to 2005. Why are we interested in Macedonia? For students of attitude changes regarding ethnic relations during the evolving circumstances of ethnic conflict, the Macedonian case offers an unusual opportunity. In late fall 2003, it was possible to carry out a large, representative international social survey, meeting good standards of sampling methodology and employing professional interviewers. These interviews included questions about an internal conflict that had been at its peak only a couple of years earlier. In addition, in 2005 we were able to re-interview respondents included in the 2003 survey, providing a large, representative national data set, in the context of a difficult political transition based on a brokered agreement to avoid civil war. Hence, the Macedonian case provided a rare research opportunity in its combination of a very serious political situation involving recent and potential conflict together with conditions and resources allowing a large national panel analysis of change. Analyses of what has happened in Macedonia can inform research on the resolution of civil wars in general, while contrasting with the experience in other Yugoslav successor states.

Earlier Related Research

The analytic thrust of this article is to be located within a broader research context related to peace studies and to our other analyses of Macedonia. Most systematic micro-level research on civil war concerns questions of the origin or dynamics of hostilities; comparatively little attention has been paid to post-conflict developments and the normalization of inter-group relations. Among the exceptions is the work of Humphreys and Weinstein, who explore determinants of successful demobilization and reintegration of former combatants

¹ For accounts of the main political developments leading up to the conflict and its aftermath, see Zhidas DASKALOVSKI, *Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multi-Ethnic Macedonia 1989-2004*. Skopje 2005; Joseph MARKO, *The Referendum on Decentralization in Macedonia in 2004: A Litmus Test for Macedonia's Interethnic Relations*, *European Yearbook of Minority Issues* 4 (2005), 695-721; and Armend REKA, *The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-Ethnic Relations in Macedonia*, *Human Rights Review* 9 (March 2008), n. 1, 55-69.

in Sierra Leone,² as well as Arjona and Kalyvas' similar analysis in the case of Uganda.³ However, despite the importance of evaluating DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration) programs, these studies offer little insight on the process of reconciliation among the national populations.

In the Yugoslav successor states, large-scale national attitude surveys concerning post-conflict attitudes toward ethnic exclusion versus reconciliation have been carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.⁴ The best cross-sectional analysis of changes in attitudes toward ethnic relations in the Western Balkans is a series of articles by Croatian sociologists, in cooperation with American and Norwegian colleagues.⁵ The Southeast European Social Survey Project (SEESSP) data and two earlier large surveys in the Socialist Federated Republic of Yugoslavia from 1987 to 1989 provide additional cross-sectional and cross-temporal comparisons for nearly all former Yugoslav republics.⁶ Macedonia, however, is the only Western Balkan country for which we have national panel data, with the same respondents interviewed over a two-year period, in close temporal proximity to the period of greatest violence.

Our project surveys in Macedonia have produced two main conclusions thus far. First, the depth of the division between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians has been, and remains, vast. One rarely encounters wider divisions in attitudes manifested in national public opinion polls in other countries. The respective beliefs and attitudes of each group concerning the causes of the violent ethnic conflict in 2001 exhibit the widest division, but such differences of opinion extend to many other realms as well.⁷ Among ethnic Macedonians, and even more so among ethnic Albanians, attitudes are so homogeneous that there is relatively little variation based on age, education, or religiosity.

² Macartan HUMPHREYS / Jeremy M. WEINSTEIN, Demobilization and Reintegration, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51 (August 2007), n. 4, 531-567.

³ Ana A. ARJONA / Stathis KALYVAS, The State of Youth and Youth Protection in Northern Uganda: Findings from the Survey for War-Affected Youth, Report for UNICEF Uganda 2006.

⁴ Randy HODSON / Duško SEKULIĆ / Garth MASSEY, National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia, *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (May 1994), n. 6, 1534-1558; idem, Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict in the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29 (2006), n. 5, 797-827; Zan STRABAC, Ethnic Attitudes in Contemporary European Societies, Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim 2007; Albert SIMKUS, Guest Editor's Introduction: The SEESSP Project, *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (Fall 2007), n. 3, 3-14; and idem, Cross-National Differences in the Western Balkans in Three Dimensions of Attitudes, *ibid.*, 15-31.

⁵ SEKULIĆ / MASSEY / HODSON, Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict (above fn. 4).

⁶ SIMKUS, Guest Editor's Introduction (above fn. 4), 3-14; idem, Religiosity and Ethnic Exclusionist Attitudes in the Western Balkans: Changes in Specific Groups, 1990-2004, Presentation at the Conference of the RC28 Research Committee on Social Stratification and Mobility of the International Sociological Association, Beijing, 14-16 May 2009.

⁷ SIMKUS, Cross-National Differences in the Western Balkans (above fn. 4).

Multi-level analyses of the effects of geographical (i. e. residential) proximity to violent incidents during the conflict have shown that living in, or close to, the municipalities experiencing violence had almost no effect on the beliefs and attitudes articulated. Hence, ethnic identity had uniform and overwhelmingly strong effects on attitudes related to ethnic issues.⁸

Data

This article is based on the 2003 Macedonian survey data from the SEESSP survey, and the Macedonian panel re-interview data from the 2005 interviews supported by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) in Trondheim and the Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) program within the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO). The 2003 SEESSP survey was very broad, focusing on many aspects of the attitudes and socio-economic characteristics of adults in the societies of the Western Balkans, with a few questions bearing on the specific circumstances of Macedonia. The SEESSP-CSCW panel survey of 2005 was almost entirely focused on issues related to the Macedonian-Albanian conflict in Macedonia and thus represents our most valuable resource for studying this conflict. This article concentrates on those items included both in the 2003 and the 2005 surveys. These analyses are limited to the panel evidence of change during that period.

In examining the evidence of change, we first report analyses based on scales of “ethnic exclusionism” (sometimes referred to as “ethnic intolerance” or “discrimination”). Nearly identical scales have proven to have high reliability in previous survey research on the Western Balkans, and their items have also been used in a substantial proportion of related analyses in former Yugoslavia and Croatia.⁹ We thus display the scale scores of such attitudes among ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia, and compare them with earlier analogous results in the surrounding countries.

Despite the value of scales based on several attitude items in many kinds of comparisons, we found that structural equation models for the determinants of such attitudes and changes in these attitudes in Macedonia, based on factors sub-

⁸ Halvard BUHAUG et al., *Ethnic Polarization and Post-Conflict Animosity: The Case of Macedonia*, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston August 2008, available at <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/7/9/1/4/pages279141/p279141-1.php>, 18 May 2010; and Kristen RINGDAL / Albert SIMKUS / Ola LISTHAUG, *Disaggregating Public Opinion on the Ethnic Conflict in Macedonia*, *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (Fall 2007), n. 3, 75-95.

⁹ HODSON / SEKULIĆ / MASSEY, *National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia* (above fn. 4), 1534-58; SEKULIĆ / MASSEY / HODSON, *Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict* (above fn. 4), 797-827; STRABAC, *Ethnic Attitudes in Contemporary European Societies* (above fn. 4), 41-116; and SIMKUS, *Cross-National Differences in the Western Balkans* (above fn. 4), 15-31.

suming 3 to 5 indicators of ethnic tolerance, proved to obscure several important details of attitude change, even though they did provide a “true” description of the average changes for sets of items. There are two main reasons for this: first, the changes in attitudes among ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, respectively, were of a different quality; second, the fact that the items in the scales of “ethnic tolerance”/“ethnic exclusionism” correlated highly within cross-sectional surveys, especially among surveys including mixed nationalities, did not mean that the changes in such attitudes were actually of the same quality for all individual scale items. Indeed, the patterns of attitude change were impressively and understandably related to the content of the individual items. So, following the scale-based analyses, we report item-specific differences and changes for ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, with measures of how large these differences were and tests of significance to assess the likelihood that these differences were simply due to sampling error.

Details of Sampling and Design

In November through December 2003, a representative sample of adult citizens of Macedonia was selected by the Macedonian branch (BRIMA) of Gallup International, consisting of a stratified geographical sample in which nearly all municipalities were sampled, proportional to size. The general sampling design, procedures, and the sub-contracted survey agency were the same as those used in the majority of surveys carried out by international agencies in Macedonia. This survey differed from similar surveys through its unusually large sample size and its double oversample of ethnic Albanian respondents. This sample was part of the larger SEESSP project, which included similar samples from the rest of the Western Balkans, i. e. from the Yugoslav successor states excluding Slovenia, but adding Albania. More details of the survey design are provided in an overview published in a special issue of the *International Journal of Sociology*.¹⁰

The total sample size for the 2003 Macedonian survey included 2,593 respondents, of whom 1,478 were ethnic Macedonians, 993 were ethnic Albanians, and 122 were members of other ethnicities. Albanians comprise approximately 24 percent of the citizens of Macedonia, and the sample intentionally oversampled from Albanian communities and neighborhoods by a factor of two in order to conduct Macedonian-Albanian comparisons with relatively low sampling errors.

The original SEESSP national samples were divided into two random groups (samples A and B), with some questions only being included in one sample or the other. As a result, the sample size for some questionnaire items is half of that

¹⁰ SIMKUS, Guest Editor’s Introduction (above fn. 4), 3-14. This project was funded by the Research Council of Norway and the Norwegian Council for International Education, in a special research program for the Western Balkans, funded by the Foreign Ministry of Norway.

for other items. However, since the total SEESSP sample was larger than that of most similar surveys, and ethnic Albanians were over-sampled, even this half of the sample (sample B) represents a larger sized sample than the total samples of most similar opinion surveys in Macedonia. The 2005 panel re-interviews were specifically designed for the purpose of Macedonian-Albanian comparisons; respondents from the smaller ethnic groups were not re-interviewed.

Out of 2,471 original respondents who were sought for re-interviews, 1,881 (76 percent) were successfully re-interviewed: a re-interview rate of 82 % for Macedonians and 67 % for Albanians. Both the 2003 and the 2005 interviews were face-to-face interviews, conducted at respondents' homes, lasting approximately 75 minutes for the first interview and 50 minutes for the second. Respondents were administered questionnaires in either the Macedonian or Albanian language, and the interviewers were of the same ethnicity as the respondents. This was feasible due to both a very high level of residential segregation, and the familiarity of the survey organization with the details of neighborhood compositions.

Measures of Attitudes and Their Most Important Determinants

The mode of analysis presented here involves many hypothesis tests, combining a series of exploratory analyses with interpretations based on local interviews and an evolving logic of explanation. We depart from convention by having more "dependent variables" than explanatory variables. We employ three different ways of examining attitudes in Macedonia: The first involves using a five-question scale to compare attitudes towards ethnic exclusionism among ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in Macedonia to such attitudes among the other large nationalities and countries in the Western Balkans; the second uses a simple three-question version of that scale (highly correlated with the five-question scale) in a multi-variate structural equation model of change in Macedonia; the third examines changes in the individual questionnaire items and adds more measures of interethnic attitudes in order to reach a more complicated, yet more accurate conclusion about changes in such attitudes in Macedonia during this period.

Table 1 lists thirteen questionnaire items included in the Macedonian panel data. The first eleven items are Likert-format items, with respondents being given five possible responses ranging from "strongly agree" to "strongly disagree". Item 12 had five response categories ranging from "Many people would help me" to "There is no one that would help me"; and item 13 had four response categories, ranging from "not at all" to "very much". The first three items are classic questions from earlier Yugoslav and Croatian surveys, while the others

Table 1. Individual attitude scale items repeated in 2003-2005 panel interviews.

1. Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belongs to their ethnicity.
2. Among ethnicities, it is possible to create cooperation, but not real trust.
3. Ethnically mixed marriages by definition are more unstable than others.
4. It is best that villages, towns, and cities are composed of only one ethnicity.
5. In choosing a spouse, ethnicity should be one of the most important considerations.
6. For now, it is best that people work with their own ethnicity, and not try to build relationships with people of the other groups.
7. I still have friends among the other ethnicities in this country, and I want to improve my personal relations with them.
8. Now is the time for members of our ethnicity to improve relations with the other ethnicities in this country.
9. It would be best for Macedonia if those belonging to one ethnic group lived in ethnically pure territories.
10. Holding to the Framework Agreement is the key to solving the problems of Macedonia.
11. No political future exists in Macedonia without compromise and cooperation between Albanians and Macedonians.
12. If you were threatened by an armed group of another ethnicity, would a neighbor of that ethnicity help you?
13. When you are walking in this neighborhood or community, do you worry that someone would attack you just because of your ethnicity?

were asked only in the SEESSP surveys. Items 10–11 were included only in the SEESSP survey in Macedonia, while the remaining items were asked in all seven SEESSP countries. Items 4 and 5 were included only in the “format B” samples and thus involve sample sizes only half as large as those for the first three items (though with approximately 1,830 cases in sample B, the data set is still as large as most national surveys of attitudes). Analyses have shown a very high correlation between additive scales based on either the first three or the first five items, especially when calculated across countries and ethnic groups. In short, the three-item version of the scale can be used where sample size is most important in reducing standard errors, while the five-item version yields a higher scale reliability (Cronbach’s alpha of .72 as opposed to .65), at the price of lower sample size and higher sampling error.

Since we concentrate here on measuring attitude change and examining a variety of different attitude items, we include only limited analyses of the individual level determinants of these attitudes, apart from nationality and year. In our structural model of change in a simple scale based on the first three items in Table 1, we include as predictors the respondent’s age, number of years of formal education, ethnic identity, gender, and level of religiosity, as measured by frequency of attendance at religious ceremonies. Our earlier analyses have shown these factors – particularly ethnicity, years of education, and religiosity – to be the strongest determinants of the surveyed attitudes.




Figure 1. Mean values of scale for ethnic exclusionism by country and major ethnic group. *Source:* The source to all figures is the data analyzed here, gathered in the SEESP of 2003.

The Five-Item Scale for Ethnic Exclusionism: Differences among Countries and Major Ethnic Groups in the Western Balkans

We have computed an additive scale of “ethnic intolerance” or “ethnic exclusionism” based on the first five items in Table 1. Several earlier analyses have excluded one or two of the scale items, and sometimes included an additional item or two, but all versions tend to be highly correlated in the cross-sectional surveys in the western Balkan countries. Figure 1 displays the average (mean) values of this scale for twelve groups based on country and ethnic identity in the Western Balkans. This figure is based on the SEESP survey data, involving large national samples in all the countries displayed, with a total sample size of approximately 22,000. In this figure, a higher value indicates higher ethnic exclusiveness or intolerance. We see that the scale scores for ethnic Macedonians in Macedonia are high, though not as high as those for ethnic Albanians in either Macedonia or Kosovo. The scores for ethnic Macedonians are lower

than those for Albanians, and lower than those for Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but they are higher than for Serbs in Serbia, Croats in Croatia, and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, ethnic exclusionist attitudes for ethnic Macedonians were in the middle of the range of averages, while such attitudes for ethnic Albanian Macedonians were among the highest in the region. Earlier analyses show that these differences among groups based on both ethnicity and country remain substantial even after controlling for individual variations in factors such as level of education, age, sex, religiosity, and urban versus rural residence.¹¹

The Determinants of Exclusionist Ethnic Attitudes Within Macedonia

In light of these differences in attitude within the wider regional context, how are the differences in attitudes within Macedonia to be explained? How did they change between 2003 and 2005, i. e. roughly between the beginning of the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and of the resistance to its full implementation? The main explanation of individual responses to this scale in 2005 was still, undoubtedly and overwhelmingly, ethnicity. In 2005, as well as in 2003, the data illustrate a society – perhaps better said, two societies – in which people judge their situation in diametrically opposed ways. Each group interprets the reasons for the conflict completely differently. For ethnic Macedonians, the conflict was caused by criminal gangs, by Albanian guerilla leaders (who, according to rumors among ethnic Macedonians, came mostly from Kosovo and, far fewer, from Albania), and perhaps by Macedonian-Albanian political leaders striving for profit and power by playing “the ethnicity card”, all pursuing the ultimate goal of a “greater Albania”. In contrast, for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, the conflict was about whether or not they could be full and equal citizens in their own country. They felt that their chances of gaining a position in the Macedonian administrative structures or in business were low, i. e. that they were at a disadvantage relative to ethnic Macedonians. Based on both our data and personal interviews in Macedonia, for the most part, ethnic Macedonians see Albanians as undeserving “winners” in a Framework Agreement that they believe was extorted through violence. Ethnic Macedonians tended to minimize past ethnic inequalities, discrimination, and injustices, while seeing the ethnic struggle as manipulated to the benefit of Albanian politicians and criminals. Ethnic Albanians saw the Framework Agreement as the consequence of a just struggle – a struggle the goals of which were, at least as of 2005, being thwarted by a lack of the agreement’s full implementation.

¹¹ SIMKUS, *Cross-National Differences in the Western Balkans* (above fn. 4), 15-31.




Figure 2. The final structural equation model with insignificant effects deleted. The effect coefficients are standardized coefficients. The explained variance in the attitude factors was .175 for late 2003 and .303 for late 2005. Deviance/df = 5.369, NFI = .956, CFI = .964, RMSEA = .041.

A Structural Equation Model of the 2003-2005 Changes in Ethnic Tolerance Based on the Three-Item Scale

A structural equation model was estimated by studying the determinants of ethnic exclusionism in 2003 and the determinants of changes in this attitude between 2003 and 2005. Three of the five ethnic exclusionism items mentioned above (the first three items in Table 1) were included as indicators of an underlying, unobserved attitudinal construct. In this model, higher values of these factors indicate lower ethnic exclusionism and higher ethnic tolerance (the opposite of the scaling in Figure 1). A higher value for the "Ethnicity" variable indicates the effect of being an ethnic Albanian as opposed to an ethnic Macedonian; a higher value for the "Gender" variable indicates the effect of being female; and higher values for the "Age", "Education", and "Religiosity" variables indicate respondents who are older, more highly educated, and more religious.

Gender proved to be statistically insignificant in its effects in both the 2003 and 2005 scales. Neither age nor religiosity had significant effects on attitudes in 2003, but they did in 2005. Removing these statistically insignificant effects resulted in a more intelligible model with a much better statistical fit (NFI = .956,

CFI = .964, D/df = 5.369, RMSEA = .041). This improved model is shown in Figure 2. The coefficients shown are standardized effects and, as such, may be compared to each other. All causal effects included are significant at the ($p < .01$) level. The squared multiple correlation coefficient for the attitude factor was .175 for 2003 and .303 for 2005.¹²

The strongest effect in the model is the negative effect of being Albanian on ethnic tolerance in 2003 (-.36). The consistency in respondents' scale scores between 2003 and 2005 is substantial (+.30), but perhaps less consistent than we might have expected. Even after controlling for the effect of the attitude in 2003 on the attitude in 2005, being Albanian still had a significant negative effect on tolerance in 2005 (-.20). Having a higher education had a positive effect on tolerance in 2003 (+.15), and an even stronger effect in 2005 (+.22). Indeed, education had the strongest effect on attitude change. Age and religiosity had negative effects on tolerance in 2005, but their effects were very small (-.08 and -.07, respectively).

Despite the goodness of fit statistics and the plausibility of the parameters for the model in Figure 2, the factors for ethnic exclusiveness included only three of the five items often used in similar previous studies. Part of the reason for this is that these three items were included for the entire sample of respondents, permitting a larger sample size. However, the effects of the exogenous variables on the scale factors are not to be underestimated, and the relationship between the factors at the two interview periods revealed that some of the individual items reacted individually rather than uniformly. Hence, the model proved to fit better with only these three attitude indicators, as opposed to five. Regardless of the fact that the first five items have been shown to be correlated highly enough to form a reliable scale in individual surveys, the individual items may in various circumstances be rather different in their determinants and in their patterns of change. For this reason, we devote the remainder of this article to looking at the pattern of change for each item individually in the entire set of thirteen items shown in Table 1.

¹² The variable "ethnicity" is scored as a 1 for ethnic Albanians and a 0 for ethnic Macedonians, and is thus the effect of being Albanian versus being Macedonian. "Age" is measured in years of age and "education" is measured in years of formal education. "Religiosity" is a scale based on the frequency of attendance at religious services. The variable "gender" was omitted from the model, having no significant effects. ETHTOL03 and ETHTOL05 are abstract factors measured by three indicators each, namely items 1-3 in Table 1. For this model, a positive score on these factors means that respondents were more ethnically tolerant or inclusive and less exclusionist or intolerant in their attitudes. A model including items 4 and 5 necessarily greatly reduced the number of cases and resulted in a poorer model fit, and is thus not included here. Correlations of errors across time for the first and second items were found to be insignificant. The causal relationships included were all significant at $p < .001$.

Table 2. Items grouped and ranked by direction and degree of change in the item mean value for both ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians. All items have been scaled such that a "positive" values for the item scores, and changes in item scores, indicate lower or decreased ethnic exclusionism, and consequently, more ethnic tolerance, increased support for the Framework Agreement, and a greater feeling of personal security.

Items showing general positive change among both Macedonians and Albanians, 2003-2005. (Numbers in parentheses are average change on scale of 1-5 between 2003 and 2005.)

(+.52)	6.	For now, it is best that people work with their own ethnicities, and not try to build relationships with people of the other groups.
(+.47)	13.	When you are walking in this neighborhood or community, do you worry that someone would attack you just because of your ethnicity?
(+.41)	12.	If you were threatened by an armed group of another ethnicity, would a neighbor of that ethnicity help you?
(+.32)	7.	I still have friends among the other ethnicities in this country, and I want to improve my personal relations with them.
(+.16)	4.	It is best that villages, towns, and cities should be composed of only one ethnicity.
(+.11)	1.	Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belongs to their ethnicity.
(+.11)	10.	Holding to the Framework Agreement is the key to solving the problems of Macedonia.

Items showing no change among both Macedonians and Albanians (ns = not statistically significant).

(-.01ns)	2.	Among ethnicities it is possible to create cooperation, but not real trust.
(+.06ns)	9.	It would be best for Macedonia if those belonging to one ethnic group lived in ethnically pure territories.
(-.06ns)	11.	No political future exists in Macedonia without compromise and cooperation between Albanians and Macedonians.

Items showing general negative change among both Macedonians and Albanians.

(-.22)	3.	Ethnically mixed marriages by definition are more unstable than others.
(-.14)	5.	In choosing a spouse, ethnicity should be one of the most important considerations.

Question-Specific Changes in Attitudes in the Macedonian Panel

Tables 2, 3, and 4 display average changes in the responses of ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian citizens of Macedonia to the thirteen items listed in Table 1. In these tables, the items are grouped by the kinds of comparisons involved and by the nature of the differences. Within the groups, items are ordered by the magnitude and direction of the changes over time. All of the reported differences and changes are based on repeated-item analyses of variance for each item, with the responses in 2003 and 2005 as the time-varying variable, and ethnicity as the predictor variable. Adjusted mean differences are presented, along with tests of significance for the differences.

Table 3. Significant changes which were different for ethnic Macedonians compared to ethnic Albanians.

<i>Items for which responses become more positive for both Macedonians and Albanians, but for which the positive changes are larger for Albanians. (The first number is the change for Macedonians; the second number is the change for Albanians.)</i>	
(+.28, +.75)	6. For now, it is best that people work with their own ethnicity, and not try to build relationships with people of the other groups.
(+.33, +.62)	13. When you are walking in this neighborhood or community, do you worry that someone would attack you just because of your ethnicity?
(+.21, +.60)	12. If you were threatened by an armed group of another ethnicity, would a neighbor of that ethnicity help you?
(+.23, +.40)	7. I still have friends among the other nationalities in this country, and I want to improve my personal relations with them.
<i>Items for which responses stayed the same or became more negative for Macedonians, but more positive for Albanians.</i>	
(-.07, +.40)	4. It is best that villages, towns, and cities should be composed of only one ethnicity.
(-.04, +.16)	9. It would be best for Macedonia if those belonging to one ethnic group lived in ethnically pure territories.
<i>Items for which responses remained the same or became only slightly more positive for Macedonians, but became more negative for Albanians.</i>	
(+.03, -.30)	5. In choosing a spouse, ethnicity should be one of the most important considerations.
(+.03, -.15)	11. No political future exists in Macedonia without compromise and cooperation between Albanians and Macedonians.
(+.08, -.10)	2. Among ethnicities it is possible to create cooperation, but not real trust.
<i>Item for which responses became more negative for both Macedonians and Albanians, and especially so for Macedonians.</i>	
(-.33, -.11)	3. Ethnically mixed marriages must be more unstable than others.

Table 2 shows items grouped by 1) those which showed improvements over time for both ethnic Macedonians and Albanians; 2) those which showed no significant changes for either ethnic group; and 3) those which showed a negative change for both ethnic groups. These item-specific analyses show that the nature of change was quite different for specific items. The two items related to interethnic marriage, items 3 and 5, changed significantly in the negative direction, while items 1 and 4, related to ethnic integration and security, changed positively. However, the changes in these items were far smaller than the changes in other items. Items 6, 13, 12, and 7 underwent the most significant changes by far, all in a positive direction. These items are most closely related to ethnic cooperation (not including marriage!) and feelings of security regarding ethnic violence.

Table 4. Items grouped and ranked by the magnitude of the average difference between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians in both 2003 and 2005.

<i>Items for which responses are more negative for Albanians than for Macedonians in both 2003 and 2005. (The numbers in parentheses are the differences in the average values for Albanians compared to Macedonians.)</i>	
(-.68)	5. In choosing a spouse, ethnicity should be one of the most important considerations.
(-.63)	1. Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belongs to their ethnicity.
(-.62)	13. When you are walking in this neighborhood or community, do you worry that someone would attack you just because of your ethnicity?
(-.54)	7. I still have friends among the other ethnicity in this country, and I want to improve my personal relations with them.
(-.48)	6. For now, it is best that people work with their own ethnicity, and not try to build relationships with people of the other groups.
(-.36)	9. It would be best for Macedonia if those belonging to one ethnic group lived in ethnically pure territories.
(-.33)	2. Among ethnicities it is possible to create cooperation, but not real trust.
(-.28)	4. It is best that villages, towns, and cities should be composed of only one ethnicity.
(-.11)	8. Now is the time for members of our ethnicity to improve relations with the other ethnicities in this country.
(-.06ns)	12. If you were threatened by an armed group of another ethnicity, would a neighbor of that ethnicity help you?
<i>Items for which responses are more positive for Albanians than for Macedonians in both 2003 and 2005.</i>	
(+1.60)	10. Holding to the Framework Agreement is the key to solving the problems of Macedonia.
(+.30)	11. No political future exists in Macedonia without compromise and cooperation between Albanians and Macedonians.

Table 3 shows most of the thirteen items grouped in terms of whether the direction and degree of change was greater for ethnic Macedonians or for ethnic Albanians. Items 6, 13, 12, and 7 showed much more positive change for ethnic Albanians than for ethnic Macedonians, although the changes for ethnic Macedonians were significantly positive as well. These are all items concern increased interethnic cooperation and increased security regarding ethnic violence. Items 4 and 9, related to attitudes towards ethnically “pure” territories or towns, changed in a positive direction for Albanians only. This is at least partly due to the fact that Albanians in 2003 had expressed much more desire for residential separation than did Macedonians.

In interpreting the degree of change in the attitudes of both ethnic Macedonians and Albanians, it is important to recognize the magnitude of the differences between the two ethnic groups, both in 2003 and 2005. Table 4 shows the significance of these differences. Here, the items are grouped and ranked on the basis of average Macedonian-Albanian differences in both years, with the

biggest differences of opinion on matters of security from ethnic violence and cooperation and integration between the groups. On average, ethnic Albanian attitudes have been more negative with regard to ethnic integration, cooperation, and insecurity, and thus had more room for improvement.

In summarizing these differences, we can draw the following conclusions. First, while attitudes towards interethnic marriage are often interpreted as indices of social distance and inter-group integration, in Macedonia this issue seems to be a poor indicator of changes in group relations. Neither ethnic Macedonians nor Albanians prove to be open to mixed marriage in theory or in practice. While more careful cross-national analyses should be carried out, this issue may involve far less flexibility among ethnic Macedonians and Albanians than among Croats, Bosniaks, and perhaps, Serbs.

Second, changes in ethnic security issues have been very important for ethnic Albanians. In all of our research visits to Macedonia from 2001 to 2006, ethnic Macedonians repeatedly spoke of their fears regarding Albanians, and we do not discount these fears. But, in the 2003 survey, ethnic Albanians feared violence from ethnic Macedonians even more – on both the local and the national level. This clearly improved between 2003 and 2005. Third, our panel data show very significant improvements in the openness of Albanians toward interaction with Macedonians in most spheres of life outside marriage. These positive changes took place against the baseline of markedly exclusionist Albanian attitudes in 2003. In short, we believe that single questions alone, or individual scales based on summing scores over multiple items, have proven to be an oversimplified approach to measuring changes in Macedonian attitudes towards ethnic integration and stabilization, obscuring specific changes and continuities. The changes, and the explanations of such changes, are complex and require examining a number of issues and a variety of survey questions.

Conclusions

Altogether, these results present a plausible picture of Macedonian ethnic relations in the light of qualitative interviews with expert local informants, while remaining open to some disagreement in interpretation. The cultural divisions and social distances between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have historically been, and remain, very great, perhaps in some ways greater than those among Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia (but not greater than those between ethnic Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo). These differences were exacerbated and politicized in relation to the changes that occurred following the Macedonian separation from Yugoslavia from 1991 to 2001. Obviously, the evolution of events in Kosovo

and the opening of interactions with Albanians in Albania played a role in the development of the conflict in 2001.

The fact that Macedonian citizens were very deeply divided in 2003 is perhaps less of a surprise than the fact that national opinion surveys demonstrated divisions of quite such magnitude. The Ohrid Framework Agreement did bring European pressure upon both ethnic groups to accept changes that many on both sides, but particularly among ethnic Macedonians, did not want. The Agreement and its implementation were aided by fears of repeating the experiences of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, as well as by the limited military resources on both sides.

The body of evidence we have presented shows that the changes between 2003 and 2005 accomplished the main short-term goal of the Framework Agreement; namely, feelings of ethnic security, especially among ethnic Albanians, improved substantially. In addition, the attitudes of ethnic Albanians towards ethnic cooperation and limited integration clearly became much more positive, from an extremely negative starting point in 2003. The victories that Albanians secured on a number of issues resulted in considerable resentment among ethnic Macedonians, but not in a dramatic increase in polarization on the Macedonian side. On the one hand, a degree of working trust and hopefulness developed. On the other hand, bitterness about the conflict, mistrust, and misunderstanding remain great. The contraction of various dimensions of "social distances" became more acceptable in public discourse – short of the issue of intermarriage. However, substantial changes in social segregation, especially in the realm of the most intimate social relationships, can only be expected to occur over a long period of time – much longer than the period of two years analyzed here, as important as that period was. Furthermore, such changes should be expected to depend on concrete changes in social conditions, objectively as well as subjectively.