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Changes in Value Orientations in Serbia, 2003–2018. Patriarchy, Authoritarianism and Nationalism

Abstract. The authors analyze the changes in value patterns—patriarchy, authoritarianism and nationalism—in Serbia in the context of the social changes that have marked the post-socialist transformation period. They focus on the extent and intensity of two sub-patterns within each of these three basic value patterns: private and public patriarchy, general and specific authoritarianism, organic (natural) and ethnic nationalism. The conclusions about changes in these value patterns are drawn on the basis of three empirical studies conducted in 2003, 2012, and 2018. They show the prevalence of private patriarchy, general authoritarianism, and organic (natural) nationalism over their counterparts. Private patriarchy has weakened, which is largely to be explained by the significant structural changes in Serbia. On the other hand, support of general authoritarianism and organic (natural) nationalism has been on the rise, which clearly mirrors the unfavorable economic and political situation in the country.

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Introduction

Understanding the processes of postsocialist transformation in Serbia imposes the need to explore changes in value orientations. This necessity to reconsider value patterns arises from the fact that values represent one of the landmarks for collective and individual action. While actions may be motivated by different types of reasoning, this study focuses on the motivational capacity of values. They represent a significant indicator of changes in the character of dominant social relations. On the other hand, dominant value patterns bear the capacity to maintain an established system of social relations and influence the directions in which changes may develop.¹

¹ Mladen Lazić, *Čekajući kapitalizam. Nastanak novih klasnih odnosa u Srbiji*, Belgrade 2011.

During the socialist period the belated modernization and the liberal model of Yugoslav socialism brought forth the simultaneous prevalence of traditional (patriarchy and authoritarianism) and liberal values, which survived into postsocialism. Studies examining value orientations in Serbia in the first half of the 1990s showed a prevalence of patriarchy, authoritarianism, and nationalism, as well as liberal values.² However, the process of postsocialist transformation in Serbia can be divided into two periods: the 1990s were a decade of ‘blocked transformation’, during which the establishment of a market economy and political competition was slowed down by war and international isolation. The ‘blocking’ was the result of the mass conversion of positions of socialist *nomenklatura* members into private ownership. The period of ‘unblocking’ of the transformation began in the second half of the 1990s, but gained momentum only after 2000, when Slobodan Milošević’s regime ended. These years were characterized by an acceleration of the privatization process and a stabilization of the overall economic situation, as well as by organization of relatively free elections in the political sphere.³ This went hand in hand with changes in most value orientations: a decline in patriarchy and authoritarianism, a survival of an ambivalent attitude towards liberal value patterns, and an increase in nationalism.⁴

The last decade between 2010 and 2020 has been marked by a prominent socio-economic and political crisis, which was an effect of both the global financial crisis and the inconsistent and inefficient systemic transformation in Serbia. It is highly unlikely that this course of events could have provided a suitable basis for establishing a consistently dominant value system. In 2003, patriarchy and authoritarianism were on the decline, and in 2012 a reduced acceptance of patriarchy, authoritarianism, and nationalism was confirmed.⁵ However,

‘the historical obsolescence of the neoliberal model of economic regulation, without a clear alternative [...], leads to a sense of insecurity and loss of clear support in the orientation of almost all social groups, producing a tendency of weak rooting and easy change of value orientations—including the basic, systemic values—depending on the change of current historical circumstances.’⁶

Keeping in mind the above, and adding to it the significant changes in political power that took place in 2012, as well as the fact that today’s ruling coalition

² Bora Kuzmanović, *Autoritarnost*, in: Mladen Lazić, ed, *Razaranje društva. Jugoslovensko društvo u krizi 90-ih*, Belgrade 1994, 151–153; Jelena Pešić, *Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske*, Belgrade 2016.

³ Mladen Lazić, *Promene i otpori*, Belgrade 2005.

⁴ Mladen Lazić / Slobodan Cvejić, *Promene društvene strukture u Srbiji. Slučaj blokiranje postsocijalističke transformacije*, in: Anđelka Milić, ed, *Društvena transformacija i strategije društvenih grupa. Svakodnevnica Srbije na početku trećeg milenijuma*, Belgrade 2004, 59–66.

⁵ Lazić / Cvejić, *Promene društvene strukture u Srbiji*.

⁶ Mladen Lazić / Jelena Pešić, *Društvene promene i promene vrednosnih orijentacija pripadnika osnovnih klasa u Srbiji*, in: Mladen Lazić / Slobodan Cvejić, eds, *Promene osnovnih struktura društva Srbije u periodu ubrzane transformacije*, Belgrade 2013, 281–306, 302.

consists of political parties that were in power during the 1990s, it becomes understandable how the conditions for a continual support of the traditionalist value system, especially the authoritarian value orientations, have been restored. President Aleksandar Vučić's Serbian Progressive Party (*Srpska napredna stranka*, SNS) was formed in 2008 by a split off the extreme right-wing Serbian Radical Party (*Srpska radikalna stranka*, SRS). Since 2012, it has governed in a coalition with the Socialist Party of Serbia (*Socijalistička partija Srbije*, SPS), formerly Slobodan Milošević's party, but with quite volatile party programs. Assuming that the changes in value orientations of the main social groups and the flow of systemic social changes are interconnected, the need to study basic value orientations arises precisely from considering the characteristics of the transformation process, as well as the scope of their future development.

The goal of this study is to analyze the prevalence and changes in three basic value patterns in Serbia, namely patriarchy, authoritarianism, and nationalism, between 2003 and 2018. These value orientations are interpreted in opposition to each other: adherence to patriarchy, authoritarianism, and nationalism are viewed as supporting traditionalist, or 'anti-modernization', values, while their rejection are interpreted as adhering to value orientations characteristic of 'modernization'. The concept of modernization is a central part in most sociological interpretations of value changes. According to Ronald Inglehart, 'any simplistic version of modernization theory has serious shortcomings', so that 'modernization theory needs to be revised for a number of reasons'.⁷ The idea that tradition and modernization processes influence values remains valid, however, because socio-economic development, in the long run, brings about cultural changes connected to modernization, as it tends to make people more secular, more tolerant, and more trusting, and to place more emphasis on self-expression, participation, and quality of life. On the other hand, cultural change is 'path-dependent' because cultural traditions do not disappear, but maintain their influence.⁸

Besides analyzing the prevalence and changes in value patterns, this study identifies the main determinants of the examined value orientations. It consists of four parts. The first part explains the theoretical framework and presents the initial hypotheses. The second section summarizes the empirical research of 2003–2018 on which the analysis is based, including the results of the explorative factor analysis. The third part analyzes the empirical findings. The conclusion provides a comparative overview of changes in all analyzed value patterns and key explanations of the value changes in the period of postsocialist transformation in Serbia.

⁷ Ronald Inglehart / Christian Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, New York 2005, 18, 25.

⁸ Inglehart / Welzel, *Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy*, 46.

Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses

To analyze the prevalence and changes in value orientations, the three basic concepts of 'patriarchy', 'authoritarianism', and 'nationalism' need to be defined first. When it comes to patriarchy, Sylvia Walby's definition successfully combines class analysis with a radical feminist theory, stressing how the concept of 'patriarchy' is indispensable for an analysis of gender inequality. Emphasizing the importance to conceptualize patriarchy at different levels of abstraction, she proposes the following considerations: at the most abstract level, patriarchy exists as a system of social relations, while at a less abstract level patriarchy can be conceptualized as inherent to six structures: the household, paid work, state, male violence, sexuality, and cultural institutions.⁹

Apart from her analysis of patriarchy at different levels of abstraction, Walby distinguishes between two main forms, 'private' and 'public' patriarchy, which we have taken up in our study. Private patriarchy relates to relations in the private sphere (family and household), in which gender inequality, dominance, and exploitation of women's labor are pronounced. Public patriarchy relates to the public sphere, primarily to paid work, which is also male dominated. Finally, from a historical perspective, Walby points out that the nature of patriarchy changed, from private patriarchy being dominant in the 19th century to public patriarchy in the 20th century, when women gained greater access to the public sphere.¹⁰

Authoritarianism is most commonly conceptualized as a system of values that, in interpersonal relations, public life, and the sphere of work, supports an uncritical submission to authority.¹¹ This is true for sociological approaches, while in political science authoritarianism usually denotes a type of governance. In addition, in this study the term authoritarianism is used to name a traditionalist value syndrome which is antimodernist. Methodologically, we distinguish between two types of authoritarian patterns—general and specific. General authoritarianism is 'a non-critical attitude towards authority and the principle of hierarchy, that is, the co-existence of authoritarian submissiveness (above all, towards leaders) and dominance towards those on lower levels of hierarchy',¹² but also the 'unconditional acceptance of the hierarchical nature of

⁹ Sylvia Walby, *Theorizing Patriarchy*, Oxford 1991, 20.

¹⁰ Walby, *Theorizing Patriarchy*, 24.

¹¹ Bora Kuzmanović, *Autoritarnost kao socijalno psihološka karakteristika*, in: Zagorka Golubović / Bora Kuzmanović / Mirjana Vasović, eds, *Društveni karakter i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba*, Belgrade 1995, 61–95, 68.

¹² Zagorka Golubović, *Nacionalizam kao dominantan društveni odnos i kao dispozicija karaktera*, in: Golubović / Kuzmanović / Vasović, eds, *Društveni karakter i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba*, 133–171, 156.

social relations'.¹³ We analyze general authoritarianism using statements deeply linked to cultural heritage (that is personality traits built through individual socialization), as well as statements related to certain characteristics of Serbian society.¹⁴ An important authoritarian component is intolerance (authoritarian aggression) towards those who behave or think differently,¹⁵ which however we have omitted from our analysis, due to the small number of pertinent statements gathered in our research. In addition to these aspects of general authoritarianism, aspects of specific authoritarianism refer to the analytical microlevel. Here, we monitor the relation to the legal regulation of the private sphere, focusing on the ban on abortion, divorce, and homosexuality.

Finally, two aspects of a nationalist value orientation were analyzed. The first is 'ethnic nationalism', which defines the relation to other ethnic or national groups. As Todor Kuljić pointed out, 'Ethnocentrism reinforces identity and facilitates separation from other ethnic groups, while hatred towards another nation or foreigners emerges as an overstated form of collective identity'.¹⁶ Ethnocentrism is closely associated with blind patriotism, which supports destructive actions of members of one's nation, while 'a constructive patriot is critically loyal to his/her own nation and opposes any destructive inclinations'.¹⁷

The second aspect is 'organic nationalism', or 'organicism', which is about the relation to one's own national group. Although organicism is often analyzed as a dimension of traditionalism, in this study it is viewed as a dimension of nationalism, while nationalism, along with other value patterns, is defined as a part of the traditionalist value syndrome.¹⁸ We use the term 'organic nationalism' rather than related terms such as 'patriotism' or 'positive nationalism'. A distinction is often made between ethnic and political nationalism. The former is defined as devastating chauvinism and xenophobia, the foundation of which lies in the concept of a nation as a cultural and ethnic community. The latter is often seen as a positive nationalism, or patriotism, where the nation is viewed as a political community, which is a neutral category that refers to a sense of belonging to the same state. The nation is made up of individuals with the same citizenship, regardless of their origin.¹⁹ Organic nationalism, in contrast to ethnic nationalism which is more concerned with interethnic

¹³ Pešić, *Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske*, 389.

¹⁴ Lazić, *Čekajući kapitalizam*, 196–197.

¹⁵ Kuzmanović, *Autoritarnost*, 156.

¹⁶ Todor Kuljić, *Prevladavanje prošlosti*, Belgrade 2002, 131.

¹⁷ Kuljić, *Prevladavanje prošlosti*, 132.

¹⁸ Pešić offers a similar operationalization of nationalism in her analysis of changes in value orientations in Serbia and Croatia. Pešić, *Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske*, 494–495.

¹⁹ Ernest Gellner, *Nacije i nacionalizam*, Novi Sad 1997 (English original Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca/NY 2008); Aleksandar Janković, *Nacionalizam kao struk-*

relations, is a relation to one's nation, yet including the importance of tradition and the 'natural' or 'organic' origin of the nation state.²⁰ Organicism brings down the members of a nation to a single 'we', without any individual autonomy.²¹ It emphasizes the cultural and biological unity of the nation, understood as an organic community, the foundations of which lie in a distant historical past. In other words, in this dimension of nationalism,

'the organic unity of the members of the nation is emphasized, and the roots of that unity are sought in that part of the historical past in which the modern divisions of the members of the nation (class, religious, linguistic, and territorial divisions) did not exist (be that real or fictional historical references). Hence, this aspect of nationalist orientation is characterized by a reference to traditional structures and institutions, but also by an effort to homogenize the nation by eliminating all other forms of differentiation.'²²

Based on these definitions of the basic concepts, the general consideration of political and economic trends, and the empirical studies of value pattern changes during the postsocialist transformation period, we formulate the following basic hypotheses.

Patriarchy

In the case of patriarchy, its protracted decline is expected as part of a continuing trend of general weakening of patriarchal norms, as well as significant changes in the legal and institutional framework of gender equality.²³ However, although patriarchy, due to its exposure to the influence of modernization, has shown a steady decline (at least at the declarative level), the data on gender roles in the private sphere show slow changes. Previous research has shown that the involvement of men in household chores has been inconsiderably increasing,²⁴ while a survey on the use of time conducted by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia indicates that women work twice as much at home and spend half as much time in paid work than men.²⁵ On this background,

turalna prepreka u demokratizaciji bosanskohercegovačkog društva, *Sociologija* 61, no. 1 (2019), 94, DOI: 10.2298/SOC1901087J. All internet references were accessed on 29 June 2020.

²⁰ Stjepan Gredelj, Dominantne vrednosne orijentacije, in: Lazić, ed, Razaranje društva, 175–224, 181.

²¹ Nenad Dimitrijević, Words and Death. Serbian Nationalist Intellectuals 1986–1991, in: András Bozóki, ed, Intellectuals in the Post-Communist Europe, Budapest 1998.

²² Pešić, Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske, 494–495.

²³ Pešić, Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske, 494–495; Lazić / Cvejić, Promene društvene strukture u Srbiji.

²⁴ Cf. Marija Babović, Radne strategije i odnosi u domaćinstvu. Srbija 2003–2007, in: Anđelka Milić / Smiljka Tomanović, eds, Porodice u komparativnoj perspektivi, Belgrade 2009; Marina Blagojević, Rodni barometar u Srbiji. Razvoj i svakodnevni život, Belgrade 2013.

²⁵ Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Korišćenje vremena u Republici Srbiji. 2010 i 2015, Belgrade 2016, https://www.stat.gov.rs/media/1374/tus2016_srpski.pdf; cf. Selena Ra-

we expect the weakening of public patriarchy, while no significant changes are expected in the case of private patriarchy. When it comes to the relationship between public and private patriarchy, we expect private patriarchy to be more pronounced in the analyzed period from 2003 to 2018. In the public sphere, at least declaratively, the egalitarian model has come to prevail.

Authoritarianism

In the case of authoritarianism, especially the general pattern of authoritarianism, no significant change is expected, based on the dependence of value orientations on the characteristics of the dominant system of social relations. The pronounced authoritarian nature of the government, through the media and mechanisms of ideological control, contributes to the reproduction and increase of authoritarianism,²⁶ as do long-term historical factors, as authoritarianism has been a permanent trait of the majority of the population in the region.²⁷ In addition to the influence of long-term historical and systemic factors, the reproduction of authoritarianism has been conditioned by contextual or situational factors, primarily by the severe economic deprivation, with Serbia's at-risk-of-poverty population and social exclusion rate among the highest in Europe.²⁸

The relation between general and specific authoritarianism is expected to see general authoritarianism more pronounced in all three research periods. We assume that the respondents will reveal a critical stance towards the three mentioned aspects of specific authoritarianism which pertain to the legal regulation of the private sphere, primarily due to a sense of personal vulnerability caused by the regulation of relations that are considered private and intimate, such as, precisely, the ban on abortion, divorce, and homosexuality.

dović / Aleksandra Marković, Nova/stara rodna očekivanja. Konformizam ili otpor patrijarhalnoj podjeli rodni uloga u porodici, *Limes Plus. Journal of Social Science and Humanities*, no. 2 (2017), 135–152.

²⁶ A 2015 research on Serbia's political elite showed a high degree of authoritarianism among its members, cf. Irena Petrović / Marija Radoman, Vrednosne orijentacije političke elite. Patrijarhalnost, autoritarnost i nacionalizam, in: Mladen Lazić, ed, *Politička elita u Srbiji u periodu konsolidacije kapitalističkog poretka*, Belgrade 2016, 158–159.

²⁷ That authoritarianism is a dominant value orientation in Serbia has been shown by many studies, cf., for example, Dragomir Pantić, Vrednosti i ideološke orijentacije društvenih slojeva, in: Mihailo Popović, ed, *Društveni slojevi i društvena svest*, Belgrade 1977, 269–406; Kuzmanović, *Autoritarnost*; Lazić, *Promene i otpori*, 55; Lazić / Cvejić, *Promene društvene strukture u Srbiji*.

²⁸ Eurostat, *People at Risk of Poverty or Social Exclusion by Age and Sex*, 2019, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/tepsr_lm410/default/table?lang=en. Numerous newly adopted restrictive laws, such as amendments to the Labor Law, the Pension and Disability Insurance Law, or the Strike Law, affected the increase in the share of economically deprived population and precarious work.

Nationalism

Our expectations towards changes in the prevalence of nationalist attitudes is ambivalent. On the one hand, given previous research indicating a slight decline, followed by active negotiations in the EU accession process and the SNS's declarative abandonment of its right-wing ideology, we assume that there will be a further decline in nationalism.²⁹ On the other hand, given the current political circumstances, the issue of Kosovo among them, and the opportunities to mobilize the population based on nationality and thus build the legitimacy of the government, we expected an increase in nationalism. Actually, even though the results of political elite research indicate a slight decline in nationalism, the current ruling coalition continues to use nationalism as a tried and tested mechanism for mobilizing the public during times of dissatisfaction with the economic situation in the country.

When it comes to the two sub-patterns of nationalism, we expect that organic nationalism will be more pronounced in comparison to ethnic nationalism. We expect respondents to display less extreme views when it comes to interethnic relations, while at the same time strongly supporting organic nationalism, or highlighting and over-emphasizing the importance of tradition, history, and the common ancestry of the members of one's nation. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism continues to be supported by contextual factors, such as the wars during the 1990s and the impoverishment of the population. Therefore, despite the Kosovo issue remaining a political topic until today, no significant support for this value pattern is expected.

The structure of the nationalist value system also affects our assumptions about the relationship between organic and ethnic nationalism. Given that nationalism related to a sense of belonging to a larger community or collectivity has an abstract character, becoming easily receptive, a dominant support for this value pattern is expected. We expect nationalism related to interethnic relations to be expressed to a lesser extent, while nationalism concerning interpersonal relations might be present the least.

Methodological Framework of Analysis

Three empirical studies were conducted by the Institute for Sociological Research at the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, including the surveys on 'Stratification and Value Changes in the Period of Social Transformation' (2003), 'Changes in the Basic Structures of Serbian Society' (2012), and 'Everyday Life

²⁹ Petrović / Radoman, Vrednosne orijentacije političke elite, 163–170; Lazić / Cvejić, Promene društvene strukture u Srbiji, 63–64; Pešić, Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske, 505, 526.

of Households and Individuals under the Conditions of Social Change in Contemporary Serbia' (2018).³⁰ Since the data were not available for all statements in all three research years, the part of the empirical analysis devoted to the changes in value orientations will remain at the descriptive level. The average values for each of the empirical statements will be shown separately. On the other hand, the explorative factor analysis was conducted to examine the factors that potentially influenced the value orientations in 2018. The empirical statements based on which patriarchy, authoritarianism, and nationalism are analyzed are given in Tables 1, 3 and 5. The results of the explorative factor analysis show the extraction by two factors for all three value orientations, namely: private and public patriarchy; general and specific authoritarianism; and organic and ethnocentric nationalism.

Results and Discussion

Public and Private Patriarchy

The findings of the descriptive analysis indicate a decline in private and public patriarchy, since a decrease in the degree of acceptance was observed in almost all statements concerning this topic (Table 1). When the attitudes related to private and public patriarchy are observed separately for 2003 and for 2018, it is evident that in both periods private patriarchy is more widespread than public patriarchy. The average values for the statements about the division of gender roles in the household (private patriarchy) are in most cases above 3, indicating the prevailing acceptance of these views, not only in 2003, but fifteen years later as well. As an illustration, the results of the 2018 research show that the statement *If only one spouse is employed, it is more natural for it to be the husband* is supported by more than half of the respondents (59.9 %). On the other hand, the average values for almost all statements about the perception of gender roles in the sphere of paid work and education (public patriarchy) are below 3. The lowest level of support for the attitudes by which patriarchy was measured was recorded in the case of the statement *University education is more important for young men than for women* (only 10.8 %).³¹

To summarize, for both observed years the results of the descriptive analysis show that the prevalence of patriarchal value patterns about gender roles in the public sphere is not only lower compared to the value patterns about the private

³⁰ Cf. Mladen Lazić's introduction to this special issue.

³¹ A survey of value orientations in Montenegro in 2015 showed a slightly higher degree of patriarchy, cf. Irena Petrović, *Promene vrednosnih orijentacija. Patrijarhalnost, autoritarnost i nacionalizam*, in: Dragan Vukčević et al., eds, *Sociološki presjek crnogorskog društva*, Podgorica 2018, 87–88.

Table 1. Private patriarchy and public patriarchy by mean

	2003	2012	2018
<i>Private patriarchy</i>	<i>Mean</i>		
Most of the household jobs by their nature are more suitable for women.	3.59	3.52	3.31
If only one of the spouses is employed, it is more natural that it should be the husband.	3.52	3.45	3.47
A pre-school child is likely to suffer if the mother works.	2.86	/	3.39
Men are closer to public and women to private activities.	3.21	3.13	2.97
Employment is fine, but most women actually want a home and children.	3.46	/	2.92
<i>Public patriarchy</i>	<i>Mean</i>		
It is good that women and men are equal in marriage, but it is generally better for a man to have the last word.	3.05	2.90	2.50
If a woman earns more than a husband, it will always cause marriage problems.	2.62	/	2.51
At a time of job shortage, men should take precedence in employment over women.	/	/	2.59
Overall, men are better managers than women.	2.73	/	2.17
University education is more important for young men than for girls.	2.18	/	1.70
On the whole, men are better political leaders than women.	3.11	/	2.44
If the employer is to lay off workers, it is better for women who have husbands to be fired than men.	3.08	/	2.29

The minimum value is 1, the maximum is 5. A higher value indicates a higher level of agreement.

sphere, but also that patriarchal patterns do not represent the dominant value matrix in the public sphere during the postsocialist transformation period.

These results contradict Walby's assumption that in modern societies the intensity of patriarchal patterns in the family sphere has been weakening, while the reproduction and strengthening of patriarchy are rather expected to exist in the public sphere. In short, the analysis of value orientations in Serbia shows that during the postsocialist transformation the acceptance of traditional gender roles in the private sphere is much more widespread than in the public sphere. This begs an explanation.

While women's participation in the labor market during the socialist period was in line with the ideology of gender equality, and with the increasing rise in demand for labor due to the industrial development of the country,³² women's

³² On the position of women during socialism cf. Anđelka Milić, *Preobražaj srodničkog sastava porodice i položaj članova*, in: Anđelka Milić / Eva Berković / Ruža Petrović, eds, *Domaćinstvo, porodica i brak u Jugoslaviji. Društveno-kulturni, ekonomski i demografski aspekti promene porodične organizacije*, Belgrade 1981.

economic activity during the postsocialist transformation was conditioned by a pronounced economic deprivation of households. On the other hand, the weakening of the social support system led to a re-traditionalisation in the family sphere, along with a reliance on the extended family, which is subsequently reflected in the view that traditionalist, patriarchal gender patterns in the family are desirable. The grounds for such a conclusion can be seen in the acceptance of the statement that *A preschooler is likely to suffer if the mother is employed*. In 2003, 34.7 % of the respondents partially or fully agreed with this statement, while fifteen years later, this statement was accepted by as many as 56.8 %. However, the findings presented in Table 1 show that the degree of acceptance increased only for this statement. Thus, the lack of institutional support for employed mothers and for families more generally, which, in a certain way, conditioned the re-traditionalisation of family forms, did not lead to a broader re-traditionalisation of patriarchal value orientations.³³

The presence of non-patriarchal value patterns in the public sphere and a slight decline of patriarchal values in the private sphere can be explained by significant changes in the legal and institutional framework and the ratification of significant international conventions in the past decade. The National Assembly of Serbia ratified the important Convention of the European Council on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, known as the 'Istanbul Convention'.³⁴ However, the most important factor for interpreting the decline of patriarchal value patterns is the continuation of the changes induced by 'modernization' more generally, such as the decrease in the share of the agricultural and less educated population, the increase in the degree of urbanization, and the rise in female participation in the labor force.

In order to determine the individual effects of different predictors, which are assumed to have significance, we have conducted a linear regression analysis. The results of the regression analysis are presented for both forms of patriarchy, public and private. The impact of the following factors has been analyzed: gender, age, years of education, place of residence, marital status, social class, economic position, and political affiliation. The reference categories are: gender – *men*; marital status – *married*; place of birth – *village*; social class – *small farmers*; political affiliation – *a commitment to ruling political parties*. Years of

³³ Pešić, Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske, 464–465; Anđelka Milić, Osvrt na rezultate anketnih istraživanja porodica i domaćinstava u Institutu za sociološka istraživanja u poslednjih 20 godina, in: Anđelka Milić / Smiljka Tomanović, eds, *Porodice u Srbiji danas u komparativnoj perspektivi*, Belgrade 2009; Mirjana Bobić, Prekomponovanje braka, partnerstva i porodice u savremenim društvima, *Stanovništvo* 41, no. 1–4 (2003), 65–91.

³⁴ Council of Europe, Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence, Council of Europe Treaty Series. No. 210, Istanbul, 11 May 2011.

Table 2. Basic statistical indicators for the linear regression model, 2018

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Private patriarchy</i>		<i>Public patriarchy</i>	
	<i>Standardized Beta Coefficient</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Standardized Beta Coefficient</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)		0,000		0,000
Years of education	-0,187	0,000	-0,210	0,000
Age	0,100	0,000	0,052	0,039
Economic position	-0,059	0,012	-0,054	0,024
Place of residence	-0,088	0,000	-0,049	0,018
Marital status – single	-0,073	0,000	0,004	0,854
Elite strata	-0,065	0,003	-0,081	0,000
Small entrepreneurs	-0,031	0,160	-0,023	0,300
Clerks and technicians	-0,078	0,000	-0,094	0,000
Skilled workers	0,020	0,375	-0,052	0,024
Unskilled and semi-skilled workers	0,003	0,895	-0,007	0,726
Professionals	-0,160	0,000	-0,124	0,000
Political party identification – neutral	-0,122	0,000	-0,123	0,000
Political party identification – oppositional	-0,092	0,000	-0,038	0,062
Gender	-0,096	0,000	-0,165	0,000
R ²	0,233		0,196	

education, age, and economic position are given as continuous variables. The dependent variable is represented by the factor scores of public and private patriarchy (Table 2).

In short, concerning the predictors of patriarchy, we began with the following premises, based on the previous research insights: we expected a lower degree of patriarchy in women, as different attitudes of men and women towards traditional gender roles are based, above all, on differences in interests. Men tend to defend their privileges. In addition, we expected patriarchy to rank low among: the more educated, whose exposure to the modernization effects of the education system has influenced the development of critical thinking and increased the levels of tolerance; the higher social groups, who possess higher levels of education and, as a consequence, greater autonomy at work; urban dwellers, due to their more complex and diverse social contacts, the transportation infrastructure, and a greater access to information and communication technologies; people with a better economic position; younger respondents; respondents who are not married; and not lastly people inclined towards the opposition political parties, or do not have any political inclinations, as opposed

to those who are inclined towards the ruling parties. Most of these premises apply to other value orientations as well.

The regression analysis for public and private patriarchy shows that the effect of most of the observed predictors was confirmed, but the proportion of variance explained in the case of private patriarchy was slightly higher ($R^2 = 23.3\%$). A smaller percentage of the variance in the case of public patriarchy can be accounted for by a lower degree of acceptance of these views, whereby a smaller number of predictors represents significant determinants of this value pattern. What is also clearly observed is that the direction of the relationship between an independent and dependent variable is confirmed.

Analyzing the impact of individual factors, we first observed that the years of formal education in the case of both forms of patriarchy represent the most significant predictor. Furthermore, a significant finding is related to the effect of gender. The negative value of the standardized coefficient B in the case of both forms of patriarchy indicates that women are less patriarchal than men. However, when it comes to the impact of this predictor, it is observed that the impact is stronger in the case of public patriarchy, which means that women show a more critical attitude towards gender roles in the public than in the private sphere. The obtained findings can be explained by the persistently pronounced dominance of men in the private sphere, in which female emancipation is significantly slower than in the public sphere.³⁵ Furthermore, the age of the respondents also had a statistically significant effect, and the effect of this factor was significantly stronger in the case of private patriarchy. The direction of impact is as expected—older respondents are more attached to patriarchal value orientations, especially in the private sphere. The effect of the place of residence is similar: a stronger influence was observed in the case of private patriarchy, which means that the respondents from rural areas are more supportive of traditional gender roles in the private sphere, which may be explained by the greater survival of patriarchal patterns of behaviour in rural areas.

Analyzing the effect of other independent variables, we observed that the economic position of the respondents represented a statistically significant predictor in the case of both forms of patriarchy—a higher economic position led to the rejection of patriarchal values in both spheres. When it came to the independent effects of other factors (i. e. controlling the effects of other independent variables) an interesting finding was that respondents' marital status showed a significant effect only in the case of private patriarchy—unmarried respondents showed a more critical attitude towards traditional gender roles in the

³⁵ Research results show that women are twice as burdened by housework and by paid work, cf. Nada Sekulić / Isidora Jarić / Ognjen Radonjić, Predgovor. U senci javnih politika, *Limes Plus. Journal of Social Science and Humanities*, no. 2 (2017), 5–14.

private sphere. Another factor that showed significant effect was respondents' class position. Members of the elite strata, professionals, small entrepreneurs (and lower-level managers) as well as clerks and technicians rarely supported patriarchal value patterns in either sphere compared to the small farmers who are the reference category. At the same time, there was no statistically significant difference between the working class and small farmers in the case of private patriarchy, while skilled workers and highly skilled workers showed a lower degree of public patriarchy than small farmers. A lower degree of public patriarchy in the case of the working class in comparison to the small farmers can certainly be explained by the greater involvement of women from the working class in the sphere of paid work, primarily due to existential necessity, as opposed to the farmers where women are helping household members, whose tasks are mostly performed in the sphere of unpaid work.³⁶

Finally, political affiliation also was a significant predictor, to a greater extent in the case of private than public patriarchy. Respondents were divided into those who 'support the ruling parties', 'support the opposition', or 'are neutral'.³⁷ The research results show that among the respondents who state that their interests are best represented by opposition parties or the respondents who do not express political affiliation, private patriarchy is less pronounced than among those whose political affiliation is closer to the ruling political parties. In the case of public patriarchy, a statistically significant difference was observed only between the categories of respondents who are politically inclined towards the opposition parties and those who are closer to the politics of the ruling parties.

On the whole, it can be concluded that there has been a gradual decline in the intensity of patriarchy in Serbia over the fifteen-year period between 2003 and 2018. This substantially confirmed the premise of certain changes in the case of private patriarchy and significant changes in public patriarchy concerning traditional norms and patterns of behavior. What is also easily observable is that public patriarchy was accepted to a lesser extent throughout the postsocialist transformation, confirming the hypothesis of the relationship between public and private patriarchy. This confirms Jelena Pešić's findings concerning the Serbian and the Croatian society:

³⁶ SECONS. Grupa za razvojnu inicijativu / United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *Žene na selu kao pomažući članovi poljoprivrednih domaćinstva: položaj, uloge i socijalna prava*, Belgrade 2008, <https://www.secons.net/files/publications/94-publication.pdf>.

³⁷ Cf. Irena Petrović / Marija Radoman, *Patrijarhalnost, autoritarnost i nacionalizam u Srbiji*. Promene vrednosnih orijentacija, in: Mladen Lazić, Slobodan Cvejić, eds, *Stratifikacijske promene u periodu konsolidacije kapitalizma u Srbiji*, Belgrade 2019, 215–246, 231.

'The ideological-value matrix of gender role liberalization in the public sphere, as part of the process that saw the two societies [...] entering the international capitalist division of labor on peripheral grounds, went hand in hand with maintaining the traditionalist gender relations in the private sphere.'³⁸

General and Specific Authoritarianism

In this section, we present the research results related to the changes and prevalence of (non-)authoritarian value orientations in the period from 2003 to 2018. The values of the average scores for individual statements are shown in Table 3. The individual statements based on which authoritarianism was analyzed recorded an average value of below 3 when measuring specific authoritarianism, indicating a major disagreement with these views. For example, in 2018, the statement *Abortion should be prohibited by law* was supported by 34.2 %, while, as expected, a very small percentage of the respondents supported the statement that *Divorce should be prohibited by law* (14 %). The low prevalence of specific authoritarianism is explained by the critical attitude of the respondents towards a legal regulation of the private sphere. Changes of specific authoritarianism in the period from 2003 to 2018 amounted to an overall decrease in support for this value orientation, which can be explained, as in the case of patriarchy, by the persistence of structural changes, as well as of mass media mobilization.

On the other hand, the average values for statements that relate to general authoritarianism are in most cases above 3.5, indicating a prevailing acceptance of these statements throughout the entire period analyzed. The comparison of the changes that took place during the observed period indicates a slight increase in general authoritarianism. Perhaps the best illustration of the presence of an authoritarian value syndrome in Serbia is the agreement with the statement that *People must respect the authorities more in the future*, accepted by almost 70 % of the respondents in 2018.³⁹

Vis-à-vis these findings the question arises what the causes of the reproduction and slight increase in general authoritarianism might be. Certain explanations can be found in the characteristics of the political system, which are reflected in the emphatic authoritarian nature of the government, along with the hegemony of the ruling groups, which is, among other things, exercised and maintained by controlling the mass media. In this manner, uncritical attitudes towards the authorities and the hierarchical organization of social relations have become readily acceptable by wider social groups. The unfavorable

³⁸ Pešić, Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske, 465.

³⁹ For comparison, research results from Montenegro indicate a slightly lower degree of authoritarianism. In addition, here a comparison of the findings from 2003 and 2015 shows an overall decline in authoritarianism. Cf. Petrović, Promene vrednosnih orijentacija, 91–92.

Table 3. General authoritarianism and specific authoritarianism by mean

	2003	2012	2018
<i>Specific authoritarianism</i>	<i>Mean</i>		
Abortion should be prohibited by law	2.65	/	2.58
Divorce should be prohibited by law	2.02	/	1.75
Homosexuals are no better than criminals and they should be severely punished	2.78	2.76	2.42
<i>General authoritarianism</i>	<i>Mean</i>		
The most important thing for children is to teach them to be obedient to their parents	3.61	3.67	3.86
What we need in the future is that people are more respectful of authority	/	/	3.84
Without a leader, every nation is like a headless man	3.87	3.98	3.69
There are two types of people in the world – strong and weak	3.25	3.18	3.40

economic situation in the country, too, helped preserve not only patriarchal patterns (primarily in the private sphere), but also the reproduction of an authoritarian mentality.

The regression analysis was performed to determine the individual effects of independent variables that we assumed to be significant (Table 4). The results show that education once again was the most significant predictor, for both forms of authoritarianism. The negative standardized beta coefficients in both cases show that the relationship between authoritarianism and education is inversely proportional: as the level of education rises, the authoritarian value orientation decreases. In addition to the respondents' education, a strong predictor of general authoritarianism was the respondents' class position. Members of the elite strata, professionals, small entrepreneurs as well as clerks and technicians showed a lower degree of authoritarianism than small farmers. The empirical data show how the class position impacted on the acceptance of a specific form of authoritarianism. Only belonging to the professional stratum and the clerical workers stratum was a significant predictor of non-authoritarian orientation, which, along with education, can be explained by the slightly higher proportion of women in these categories.

Other statistically significant predictors for both forms of authoritarianism are economic position, where the likelihood of non-authoritarian orientation increased with the increase in the economic position, place of residence, where respondents living in cities showed a lower degree of general and specific authoritarianism as opposed to village residents, and political affiliation. Here, respondents who opted for the opposition parties or are neutral showed a lower degree of general or specific authoritarianism. Interestingly, respondents'

Table 4. Basic statistical indicators for the linear regression model, 2018

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>General authoritarianism</i>		<i>Specific authoritarianism</i>	
	<i>Standardized Beta Coefficient</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Standardized Beta Coefficient</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)		0,000		0,000
Years of education	-0,165	0,000	-0,197	0,000
Age	0,066	0,007	0,009	0,715
Economic position	-0,083	0,000	-0,124	0,000
Place of residence	-0,116	0,000	-0,091	0,000
Marital status – single	-0,072	0,000	-0,021	0,298
Elite strata	-0,080	0,000	-0,018	0,437
Small entrepreneurs	-0,046	0,034	-0,003	0,894
Clerks and technicians	-0,059	0,007	-0,068	0,003
Skilled workers	0,005	0,813	0,000	0,994
Unskilled and semi-skilled workers	0,008	0,697	0,002	0,922
Professionals	-0,171	0,000	-0,084	0,001
Political party identification – neutral	-0,171	0,000	-0,162	0,000
Political party identification – oppositional	-0,138	0,000	-0,098	0,000
Gender	0,007	0,714	-0,106	0,000
R ²	0,263		0,201	

age and marital status proved to be statistically significant predictors only of general authoritarianism. Unsurprisingly, older respondents showed a higher degree of general authoritarianism, and respondents who were unmarried adopted non-authoritarian behaviors more frequently.

The only variable that did not show statistical significance among the predictors of general authoritarianism was, in addition to belonging to hierarchically lower social groups, the gender of the respondents. On the other hand, in the case of specific authoritarianism, gender proved to be a strong predictor. Women showed a more critical attitude towards regulating and sanctioning the private sphere, which can be explained, among other things, by a sense of personal threat of a ban on abortion or divorce.

As expected, thus, the postsocialist transformation years led to a decline in adherence to specific authoritarianism, while, on the other hand, there were no significant changes in basic value orientations: general authoritarianism, i. e. uncritical compliance to the authorities, prevailed in all three periods under investigation. As was the case with the other scrutinized categories, the hypothesis of an interrelation of value sub-patterns proved to be correct. In 2003, as

well as fifteen years later, a much lower degree of specific authoritarianism was observed. The hypothesis concerning the factors of authoritarianism proved to be not entirely correct, though. Contrary to the initial premises, the analyzed predictors of the two forms of authoritarianism differed from one another. Another observation is also significant. Judging from the research findings, it is evident that the findings on authoritarianism are similar to the findings regarding patriarchy, both in terms of total prevalence and prevalence by social groups. Patriarchy and general authoritarianism are among the predominant points of view, with the lower social strata revealing to be above-average authoritarian and patriarchal.⁴⁰

Organic and Ethnic Nationalism

The third value orientation we analyze in this study is nationalism. The average values for individual statements based on which ethnic nationalism was analyzed at all three points in time were below 3, which indicates that the respondents were more likely to reject nationalist attitudes than to accept them (Table 5). Comparing the data for 2003 and 2018 brings forth slight changes in the degree of acceptance of ethnic nationalism. A more complete insight into the structure of the nationalist dimension is provided by our analysis of the acceptance of the three statements by which ethnic nationalism was measured. As was to be expected, in all three years the lowest level of agreement was recorded in the case of the statement according to which transnational (mixed) marriages are a factor of marriage instability (2003 16.6 %; 2012 13.4 %; 2018 18.2 %), while a higher percentage of agreement was recorded for the statement regarding trust in other nations (2003 51.7 %; 2012 40.8 %; 2018 45.1 %), and for the statement relating to the separation of the world into nationally 'pure' environments (2003 34.1 %; 2012 34.1 %; 2018 37.4 %).⁴¹ The findings once again led to the hypothesis that the degree of nationalism increases when moving from the private to the public sphere, i.e. institutionalized relations are not as easily accepted as those considered private and intimate. In the case of institutionalized relations, a member of another nation is primarily seen as a representative of that nation rather than as an individual,⁴² which confirms our conclusions

⁴⁰ The existence of a connection between authoritarian and patriarchal values and norms has been pointed out by research conducted in the 1970s and 1980s, too. Nikola Rot / Nenad Havelka, *Nacionalna vezanost i vrednosti kod srednjoškolske omladine*, Belgrade 1973.

⁴¹ Similar findings were also obtained in Montenegro, with a somewhat higher degree of ethnic nationalism. For more cf. Petrović, *Promene vrednosnih orijentacija*, 95–97.

⁴² Kuzmanović, *Autoritarnost*, 235.

Table 5. Organic nationalism and ethnocentric nationalism by mean

	2003	2012	2018
<i>Organic nationalism</i>	<i>Mean</i>		
Survival of one's own nation is the main task of each individual.	4.08	3.78	3.98
Common descent of members of our nation is the basis of our mutual trust.	3.65	3.47	3.77
The peasant is the best standfast for our nation.	3.84	/	3.99
A nation that does not respect its tradition deserves to perish.	3.80	/	3.86
The past of our nation should be sacred.	3.87	/	4.08
Every inch of this country should be sacred to all of us.	4.00	/	4.12
Everyone has everything he/she needs when the country is strong.	3.89	3.81	4.15
<i>Ethnocentric nationalism</i>	<i>Mean</i>		
Ethnically mixed marriages must be more volatile than other marriages.	2.28	2.16	2.04
A man may feel completely safe only when living in an environment where the majority is comprised by the members of his ethnicity.	2.76	2.80	2.70
Cooperation can be achieved between nations, but not complete trust.	3.19	3.04	3.03
When choosing a spouse, ethnicity should be one of the important criteria.	/	/	2.34
Ethnic diversity destroys the unity of our society.	/	/	2.26
It is best when all members of an ethnic group live in their nation state.	/	/	2.88

about the structure of nationalism as a phenomenon that focuses primarily on the collective rather than inter-individual relations.⁴³

On the other hand, when it comes to organic nationalism, we observed the opposite tendency. The average values for all three years are close to 4, which indicates that an organicist perception of one's nation was the dominant orientation during the period analyzed.⁴⁴ What is further observable is that changes concerning all statements have been moving in the same direction—first a slight decline (2003–2012), and then an increasing average acceptance of the statements used to measure organic nationalism (2012–2018). The average values obtained for the statements in 2018 are the highest recorded values in all value patterns we analyzed. We explain this expressed support for organic nationalism with the persisting ideological mobilization of the notion of the Serb people's suffering throughout history and in the wars of the 1990s, as well as the current politics and media campaign related to Kosovo and the Republic

⁴³ Lazić/Cvejić, *Promene društvene strukture u Srbiji*, 64.

⁴⁴ Similar findings were also obtained in Croatia. Pešić, *Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske*, 526–527.

Table 6. Basic statistical indicators for the linear regression model, 2018

<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Organic nationalism</i>		<i>Ethnocentric nationalism</i>	
	<i>Standardized Beta Coefficient</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	<i>Standardized Beta Coefficient</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
(Constant)		0,026		0,008
Years of education	-0,094	0,000	-0,122	0,000
Age	0,158	0,000	0,055	0,032
Economic position	-0,064	0,008	-0,093	0,000
Place of residence	-0,120	0,000	-0,041	0,055
Elite strata	-0,054	0,018	-0,061	0,009
Small entrepreneurs	-0,045	0,045	-0,017	0,461
Clerks and technicians	-0,005	0,828	-0,055	0,018
Skilled workers	-0,012	0,613	-0,002	0,941
Unskilled and semi-skilled workers	0,005	0,829	-0,008	0,723
Professionals	-0,095	0,000	-0,081	0,002
Political party identification – neutral	-0,126	0,000	-0,133	0,000
Political party identification – oppositional	-0,133	0,000	-0,078	0,000
Gender	-0,013	0,523	-0,090	0,000
Serbian nationality	0,049	0,014	0,196	0,000
R ²	0,180		0,158	

of Srpska. The governing Serbian Progressive Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia have maintained their dominant position precisely through nationalist mobilization and by creating a public discourse focused on the need to defend national interests.

The regression analysis was performed to determine which factors stand out as statistically significant predictors of nationalist value orientation (Table 6). One predictor was added to the previously analyzed independent variables: the respondents' nationality. Regarding the effect of respondents' nationality, research to date has shown that members of a national majority group are far more receptive to nationalist stereotypes than members of minority groups. So we expected citizens of Serb ethnicity to be more likely to advocate interethnic intolerance / ethnocentrism than the respondents from minority ethnic groups.

The results of the regression analysis show that the same predictors explain ethnocentric nationalism to a lower degree compared to organic nationalism. The most significant predictors of organic nationalism include age, as older respondents were more likely to support this form of nationalism, political

commitment, as supporters of the ruling political parties were more inclined to have organicist perceptions of the nation, and place of residence, as a traditionalist understanding of the nation was more pronounced among the rural population. Although the statistical significance of education has been recorded, the value of the beta coefficient indicates that in the case of organic nationalism (unlike the other value patterns) education has a slightly weaker effect. Also the other analyzed factors, such as economic position, citizenship, and class status, show a weaker effect. Particularly significant is the finding regarding the effect, or rather non-effect, of respondents' class position. We observed a clear difference in the degree of adherence to organic nationalism only between professionals and small farmers.

Although the research findings indicate that organic nationalism represents the dominant value orientation among the Serbian population, the examined predictors did not fully confirm the presumed deterministic effect. Albeit, this conclusion relates primarily to the effect of the level of education, class position, and economic position. It seems that the effect of structural factors in the case of an organic understanding of the nation is somewhat weaker than with the other categories under investigation. Causal mechanisms must rather be sought in systemic factors, above all the authoritarian political regime, and long-term historical factors, such as patriarchal forms of social organization, an undifferentiated social structure, and the authoritarian nature of state governance.⁴⁵

On the other hand, the results of the regression analysis show that the strongest predictor of ethnic nationalism is the ethnicity of the respondents. The value of the standardized beta coefficient indicated that the respondents of Serb ethnicity were more likely display interethnic intolerance than the respondents from minority groups.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the level of education of the respondents proved to be a statistically significant predictor, too, in that the respondents with a higher level of education tended to adopt nationalist attitudes to a lesser degree than respondents with a lower level of education. Other statistically significant determinants of ethnocentric nationalism were gender, as women rejected nationalist orientation more often, economic position, as with a declining economic position, the likelihood of adopting nationalism increased, and political commitment, as the respondents who opted for the political parties in opposition or were undecided showed a lower degree of ethnocentric nationalism. And not lastly, the respondents' class position also proved to be a statistically significant predictor. Expectedly, the members of the higher social groups, except small entrepreneurs and lower-level managers (who have

⁴⁵ Lazić, Čekajući kapitalizam; Pešić, Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske; Mari Žanin-Čalić, Socijalna istorija Srbije 1815–1914, Belgrade 2004.

⁴⁶ Alija Hodžić, Etnocentrizam društvenih grupa, in: Mladen Lazić, ed, Položaj naroda i međunarodni odnosi u Hrvatskoj, Zagreb 1991.

a lower level of education), showed a slightly lower level of adherence to ethnocentric nationalism than small farmers, while there was no statistically significant difference between members of the working class and small farmers.

Finally, the variables that represented the most significant predictors of organic nationalism—age and place of residence—proved to be less valid in explaining ethnic nationalism, which further indicates that the causal factors of these two forms of nationalism differ greatly. The basic findings of this section thus are that ethnic nationalism, unlike organic nationalism, did not represent a dominant value orientation throughout the analyzed period. Also, the degree of ethnic nationalism has been slightly decreasing, while in the case of organic nationalism, especially after 2012, there has been an increase in the intensity of acceptance.

Conclusion

The prevalence and changes in value orientations in the period from 2003 to 2018 can be observed in Chart 1. The scales of private and public patriarchy, specific and general authoritarianism, and organic and ethnocentric nationalism were constructed in a way as to summarize the changes in value orientations during the observed period of time. All of these scales were formed using three empirical statements that were given in all three research years. The minimum value on the scale is 3, the maximum is 15, while the theoretical arithmetic mean is 9. Given that the statements used for analyzing specific authoritarianism and public patriarchy were not provided in the 2012 survey, the graph shows the average values on these scales for 2003 and 2018 only.

From this graphical presentation of the data it becomes clear that the values of organic nationalism, general authoritarianism, and private patriarchy still represent dominant value orientations in Serbia. The average values on all three scales in all three periods are above the theoretical arithmetic mean. Also, while there has been a slight decline in the private patriarchy category between 2003 and 2018, the increase in general authoritarianism and organic nationalism is clearly evident. On the other hand, the remaining three value orientations, public patriarchy, specific authoritarianism, and ethnocentric nationalism, are below the middle of the scale. In addition, there is a certain decrease in the prevalence of all three value patterns. Given that changes in value orientations require a longer period of time, changes in value patterns, as expected, are more clearly observed when viewed over the period of fifteen years between 2003 and 2018.

Another significant finding that the graph illustrates is that there is a clear difference between the values of general authoritarianism, organic nationalism, and private patriarchy, on the one hand, and public patriarchy, specific

Chart 1. Average Scores on the Patriarchy, Authoritarianism and Nationalism Scales, 2003, 2012 and 2018

authoritarianism, and ethnic nationalism, on the other. This further suggests that the causal factors differ which determine the prevalence and reproduction of these value patterns. The prevalent support for the first three value orientations seems to be conditioned by long-term factors, and complemented by contextual factors, such as the wars of the 1990s, open national and state issues, and the unstable economic situation. This has stimulated the persistence of a traditionalist value syndrome. On the other hand, the values related to gender roles in the public sphere and to interethnic relations can be explained by the mutual influence of contextual factors and specific historical circumstances. The research findings concerning ethnocentric nationalism over the past 30 years solidly support this conclusion.⁴⁷

Regardless of these contradictory trends, traditionalistic value patterns continue to exist, which is proven by the high degree of intercorrelation of the six value patterns that we observed. In most cases, the correlation coefficient values are above 0.40. Further, general authoritarianism and private patriarchy represent the two dimensions that are most closely related to the other examined dimensions. Considering that the findings of the 2003 survey also indicate that authoritarian orientation and patriarchal understanding of roles in the private sphere lie at the core of the traditionalist syndrome,⁴⁸ we can conclude not only

⁴⁷ Lazić, *Promene i otpori*; Petrović / Radoman, *Vrednosne orijentacije političke elite*; Pešić, *Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske*.

⁴⁸ Pešić, *Vrednosne orijentacije u postsocijalističkim društvima Srbije i Hrvatske*, 541–542.

that traditionalism continues to be a dominant value model, but we also assess with certainty that the traditionalist value system is characterized by structural stability. Given the research findings over the past three decades, it becomes clear that the changes in value patterns are part of a long-term process. Thus, some of the considered value orientations have changed very slowly and continue to be dominant in Serbia, such as authoritarianism and patriarchy in the private sphere.

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