Abstract
Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) have proliferated in the last decade as part of electoral campaigns in Europe. Several studies have linked the usage of the applications to an increase in voting intention, yet the literature on the factors that make people more likely to be influenced by VAAs is not really developed. This paper tries to contribute to this literature by addressing two key questions: first, how non-institutional forms of political participation influence abstentionism among VAA users and second, how VAA encourages voting intention among these politically engaged abstentionists (activation effect). We first examine (a) whether being engaged in non-institutional forms of participation increases the likelihood of a VAA user declaring him/herself to be a voter and (b) whether being engaged in non-institutional forms of political participation has an effect on the probability of becoming a “voter” after filling in the VAA questionnaire. Our results suggest that the VAA “activation effect” nexus exists and it affects a significant percentage of abstentionist. Those users that have participated in non-institutional forms of participation – such as demonstrations or online petitions – are more likely to declare being voters before filling in the VAA. Among the abstentionists, once they answered the set of 30 key questions, a considerable percent (between 14 and 22 percent depending on the threshold used) declared to have the intention to vote (activation effect). The prevailing profile of the activated user is a young man with tertiary education. The motivational reason for voting a party also matter in increasing the probability that an “activation effect” happens. The competency of the party, its ideology, the candidate presented by the party and the users’ self-interest are also good predictors of the “activation effect.”
Appendix
This appendix intends to supplement the above research by offering the regressions and marginal effects applied to the national samples in order to provide information about the specific marginal effects each of the variables take on each of the countries. Also, we provide the statistical definition of the variables used in the modelling of this paper and the first three tables intend to provide the distribution of the participation of the over-30-year-old users in non-institutional forms of participation.
Table A1:
Percentage of Over 30 VAA users who went to a Demonstration in the Last 12 Months.
Country | Have you attended a demonstration in the last year? |
|||
---|---|---|---|---|
Measure | No | Yes | Total | |
Portugal | Absolute | 2029 | 1148 | 3177 |
Relative | 63.87% | 36.13% | ||
Spain | Absolute | 3585 | 6013 | 9598 |
Relative | 37.35% | 62.65% | ||
UK | Absolute | 2715 | 434 | 3149 |
Relative | 86.22% | 13.78% | ||
Total | Absolute | 8329 | 7595 | 15,924 |
Relative | 52.3% | 74.7% |
Table A2:
Percentage of Over 30 VAA users who Signed an Online Petition in the Last 12 Months.
Country | Have you signed a petition in the last 12 months? |
|||
---|---|---|---|---|
Measure | No | Yes | Total | |
Portugal | Absolute | 648 | 2529 | 3177 |
Relative | 20.4% | 79.6% | ||
Spain | Absolute | 2212 | 7386 | 9598 |
Relative | 23.05% | 76.95% | ||
UK | Absolute | 537 | 2612 | 3149 |
Relative | 17.05% | 82.95% | ||
Total | Absolute | 3397 | 12,527 | 15,924 |
Relative | 23.33% | 78.67% |
Table A3:
Correlations between Demonstrating and Signing an Online Petition for the Whole Sample.
Demonstration | Petition | |
---|---|---|
Demonstration | 1 | – |
Petition | 0.2557 | 1 |
Table A4:
National Logistic Regression.
Logisitc regression of being activated by the EU-Vox |
|||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Portugal total | Portugal (18–30) | Portugal (30–94) | Spain total | Spain (18–30) | Spain (30–94) | UK Total | UK (18–30) | UK (30–94) | |
DV: Being activated by the EU-Vox | |||||||||
Young | −0.110 | 0.0816 | 0.0735 | ||||||
(0.267) | (0.168) | (0.214) | |||||||
Demonstration | 0.118 | 0.166 | −0.0307 | 0.345 | 0.553* | 0.142 | 0.343 | 0.317 | 0.323 |
(0.338) | (0.483) | (0.497) | (0.190) | (0.270) | (0.292) | (0.336) | (0.439) | (0.572) | |
Petition | −0.291 | −0.354 | −0.0509 | 0.266 | 0.134 | 0.484 | −0.00096 | −0.594 | 0.444 |
(0.297) | (0.449) | (0.428) | (0.197) | (0.251) | (0.338) | (0.248) | (0.403) | (0.344) | |
Liberal-Conservative | −0.0474 | −0.0545 | −0.0307 | −0.0703 | −0.0821 | −0.0613 | 0.0225 | −0.0334 | 0.108 |
(0.0600) | (0.0895) | (0.0873) | (0.0395) | (0.0505) | (0.0705) | (0.0445) | (0.0612) | (0.0685) | |
Economic Right-Left | 0.0271 | −0.0894 | 0.0782 | −0.0641 | 0.0482 | −0.233** | 0.00666 | −0.0517 | 0.0441 |
(0.0570) | (0.0860) | (0.0839) | (0.0477) | (0.0619) | (0.0835) | (0.0488) | (0.0714) | (0.0722) | |
More EU-Less EU | 0.113* | 0.114 | 0.0969 | 0.0475 | 0.0332 | 0.0563 | 0.0513 | 0.0481 | 0.0769 |
(0.0517) | (0.0820) | (0.0727) | (0.0261) | (0.0362) | (0.0398) | (0.0396) | (0.0599) | (0.0567) | |
−0.110 | 0.0816 | 0.0735 | |||||||
No reason to vote | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
(.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | |
Competency | 1.892*** | 1.846** | 1.657 | 2.196*** | 2.100*** | 2.340*** | 0.993* | 1.074 | 1.089 |
(0.532) | (0.648) | (1.003) | (0.331) | (0.414) | (0.577) | (0.440) | (0.560) | (0.766) | |
Ideology | 1.594*** | 1.390*** | 1.822*** | 1.729*** | 1.594*** | 1.961*** | 0.808*** | 0.969** | 0.666* |
(0.282) | (0.420) | (0.400) | (0.193) | (0.258) | (0.299) | (0.224) | (0.324) | (0.320) | |
Self-interest | 1.353 | 1.079 | 0 | 2.104*** | 1.726** | 2.883** | 0.960 | 1.465 | 0.416 |
(1.445) | (1.464) | (.) | (0.450) | (0.540) | (0.897) | (0.760) | (0.945) | (1.463) | |
Family | 0.461 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1.820 | 1.167 | 0 |
Interest | (1.284) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (1.149) | (1.313) | (.) |
Candidate | 1.015 | −0.298 | 1.523* | 1.578** | 1.510* | 1.708* | 0.139 | −0.791 | 0 |
(0.594) | (1.208) | (0.753) | (0.501) | (0.637) | (0.797) | (0.795) | (1.168) | (.) | |
Gender | −0.0265 | 0.412 | −0.354 | −0.173 | −0.240 | 0.00599 | −0.227 | −0.334 | −0.0771 |
(0.286) | (0.395) | (0.463) | (0.205) | (0.264) | (0.345) | (0.243) | (0.324) | (0.411) | |
University | −0.359 | −0.181 | −0.310 | 0.0552 | 0.0454 | 0.0974 | −0.0668 | 0.0769 | −0.138 |
(0.298) | (0.523) | (0.461) | (0.170) | (0.266) | (0.291) | (0.245) | (0.347) | (0.399) | |
Age | −0.0848 | 0.0184 | −0.00105 | 0.0116 | 0.0105 | −0.00366 | |||
(0.0655) | (0.0210) | (0.0352) | (0.0152) | (0.0423) | (0.0137) | ||||
Constant | −1.221* | 1.007 | −2.285* | −2.171*** | −2.029* | −2.863*** | −0.766 | −0.229 | −1.526 |
(0.599) | (1.572) | (1.145) | (0.354) | (0.906) | (0.809) | (0.522) | (1.264) | (1.010) | |
Pseudo R2 | 0.136 | 0.210 | 0.192 | 0.150 | 0.182 | 0.236 | 0.045 | 0.138 | 0.099 |
Observations | 325 | 149 | 173 | 839 | 458 | 378 | 402 | 210 | 188 |
DV: Being activated by the EU-Vox 2014 (1-being activated; 0-not-being activated). The sample are those users that initially declared as not-having the intention of voting at the European Election. There are 3 models for each country, 1 with all the population and the dummy variable young (1 being young and 0 not being young), and the other with young and old users. We use these regressions for the second set of three hypotheses.
Table A5:
National Samples of Logistic Regressions.
Logisitc regression of being activated by the EU-Vox |
|||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Portugal total | Portugal (18–30) | Portugal (30–94) | Spain total | Spain (18–30) | Spain (30–94) | UK total | UK (18–30) | UK (30–94) | |
DV: Initially declared voting | |||||||||
Young | −0.153 | −0.336*** | −0.435*** | ||||||
(0.117) | (0.0701) | (0.113) | |||||||
Demonstration | 0.625*** | 0.228 | 0.859*** | 0.357*** | 0.372*** | 0.450*** | 0.192 | 0.295 | 0.0263 |
(0.147) | (0.225) | (0.196) | (0.0801) | (0.113) | (0.116) | (0.173) | (0.227) | (0.271) | |
Petition | 0.168 | 0.163 | 0.133 | 0.381*** | 0.381*** | 0.270* | 0.492*** | 0.142 | 0.752*** |
(0.132) | (0.193) | (0.185) | (0.0804) | (0.108) | (0.122) | (0.133) | (0.207) | (0.179) | |
Liberal-Conservative | −0.101*** | −0.123** | −0.0708 | −0.0550** | −0.0421 | −0.0414 | −0.00990 | 0.00384 | −0.0117 |
(0.0277) | (0.0444) | (0.0364) | (0.0171) | (0.0226) | (0.0272) | (0.0246) | (0.0347) | (0.0356) | |
Economic Right-Left | 0.0545* | 0.0613 | 0.0334 | 0.0558** | 0.0459 | 0.0599 | 0.0272 | 0.00685 | −0.00772 |
(0.0258) | (0.0401) | (0.0348) | (0.0192) | (0.0247) | (0.0309) | (0.0253) | (0.0365) | (0.0372) | |
More EU-Less EU | 0.0860*** | 0.0704* | 0.101*** | 0.103*** | 0.0829*** | 0.121*** | −0.0149 | −0.000634 | −0.00598 |
(0.0216) | (0.0334) | (0.0287) | (0.0111) | (0.0155) | (0.0164) | (0.0225) | (0.0327) | (0.0321) | |
No reason to vote | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
(.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | |
Competency | 1.320*** | 0.853** | 1.963*** | 1.219*** | 1.397*** | 1.015*** | 0.891*** | 0.916** | 1.051** |
(0.232) | (0.300) | (0.402) | (0.148) | (0.188) | (0.242) | (0.226) | (0.291) | (0.380) | |
Ideology | 1.174*** | 1.266*** | 1.154*** | 1.239*** | 1.206*** | 1.303*** | 1.069*** | 1.078*** | 1.099*** |
(0.127) | (0.199) | (0.167) | (0.0743) | (0.103) | (0.108) | (0.119) | (0.176) | (0.166) | |
Self-interest | 1.324* | 0.644 | 0 | 1.131*** | 0.895*** | 1.648*** | 0.625 | 0.497 | 1.101 |
(0.623) | (0.682) | (.) | (0.203) | (0.241) | (0.399) | (0.380) | (0.457) | (0.757) | |
Family | 0.509 | 0.455 | 0.708 | 1.311* | 1.008 | 1.632 | 0.646 | 0.814 | 0.848 |
Interest | (0.651) | (0.840) | (1.077) | (0.614) | (0.780) | (1.034) | (0.501) | (0.659) | (0.795) |
Candidate | 1.376*** | 1.519** | 1.265*** | 1.224*** | 1.083*** | 1.345*** | 0.614 | 0.406 | 1.246 |
(0.289) | (0.480) | (0.364) | (0.218) | (0.289) | (0.337) | (0.426) | (0.543) | (0.764) | |
Gender | −0.112 | 0.0814 | −0.414* | −0.154 | −0.0760 | −0.352** | −0.116 | 0.0611 | −0.450* |
(0.127) | (0.178) | (0.191) | (0.0840) | (0.110) | (0.134) | (0.125) | (0.165) | (0.203) | |
University | 0.637*** | 0.556* | 0.429* | 0.344*** | 0.185 | 0.121 | 0.158 | 0.486** | −0.204 |
(0.137) | (0.224) | (0.197) | (0.0703) | (0.112) | (0.111) | (0.125) | (0.181) | (0.191) | |
Age | 0.0882** | 0.0225* | 0.0786*** | 0.00889 | 0.0310 | 0.0255*** | |||
(0.0278) | (0.00897) | (0.0160) | (0.00573) | (0.0225) | (0.00743) | ||||
Constant | 0.258 | −1.842* | −0.462 | 0.229 | −1.913*** | 0.0913 | 0.818** | −0.564 | 0.0955 |
(0.267) | (0.715) | (0.525) | (0.144) | (0.400) | (0.320) | (0.282) | (0.664) | (0.531) | |
Pseudo R2 | 0.096 | 0.100 | 0.116 | 0.088 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.048 | 0.047 | 0.071 |
Observations | 3027 | 1201 | 1808 | 9046 | 3971 | 5075 | 2899 | 1231 | 1668 |
Dependent variable: Declaring at the beginning of the questionnaire the intention to vote (1 declare being a voter; 0 declare being a non-voter). There are 3 models for each country, 1 with all the population and the dummy variable young (1 being young and 0 not being young), and two with the sample of young and non-young users. We use these regressions for the first set of three hypotheses.
Table A6:
Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression of being Activated by the EU-Vox (Tables A3 and A4).
Marginal Effects of logistic regression of being activated by the EU-Vox |
|||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Portugal total | Portugal (18–30) | Portugal (30–94) | Spain total | Spain (18–30) | Spain (30–94) | UK total | UK (18–30) | UK (30–94) | |
Young | −0.0214 | 0.0145 | 0.0173 | ||||||
(0.0519) | (0.0298) | (0.0503) | |||||||
Demonstration | 0.0230 | 0.0323 | −0.00562 | 0.0614 | 0.104* | 0.0227 | 0.0807 | 0.0713 | 0.0750 |
(0.0657) | (0.0940) | (0.0910) | (0.0335) | (0.0498) | (0.0465) | (0.0784) | (0.0981) | (0.133) | |
Petition | −0.0566 | −0.0689 | −0.00930 | 0.0472 | 0.0251 | 0.0771 | −0.000226 | −0.133 | 0.103 |
(0.0575) | (0.0868) | (0.0782) | (0.0349) | (0.0470) | (0.0533) | (0.0583) | (0.0888) | (0.0785) | |
Liberal-Conservative | −0.00922 | −0.0106 | −0.00562 | −0.0125 | −0.0154 | −0.00977 | 0.00528 | −0.00749 | 0.0251 |
(0.0116) | (0.0174) | (0.0160) | (0.00697) | (0.00939) | (0.0112) | (0.0104) | (0.0137) | (0.0155) | |
Economic Right-Left | 0.00528 | −0.0174 | 0.0143 | −0.0114 | 0.00904 | −0.0371** | 0.00156 | −0.0116 | 0.0103 |
(0.0111) | (0.0165) | (0.0152) | (0.00845) | (0.0116) | (0.0129) | (0.0115) | (0.0160) | (0.0167) | |
More EU-Anti EU | 0.0221* | 0.0223 | 0.0177 | 0.00844 | 0.00623 | 0.00898 | 0.0120 | 0.0108 | 0.0179 |
(0.00984) | (0.0157) | (0.0131) | (0.00460) | (0.00676) | (0.00629) | (0.00924) | (0.0134) | (0.0129) | |
No reason to vote | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
(.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | |
Competency | 0.368*** | 0.360** | 0.303 | 0.390*** | 0.394*** | 0.373*** | 0.233* | 0.241* | 0.253 |
(0.0958) | (0.113) | (0.178) | (0.0533) | (0.0698) | (0.0849) | (0.101) | (0.121) | (0.174) | |
Ideology | 0.310*** | 0.271*** | 0.333*** | 0.307*** | 0.299*** | 0.313*** | 0.190*** | 0.218** | 0.155* |
(0.0437) | (0.0700) | (0.0549) | (0.0284) | (0.0413) | (0.0374) | (0.0491) | (0.0665) | (0.0710) | |
Self-interest | 0.263 | 0.210 | 0 | 0.374*** | 0.324*** | 0.460*** | 0.226 | 0.329 | 0.0969 |
(0.280) | (0.283) | (.) | (0.0762) | (0.0975) | (0.136) | (0.177) | (0.208) | (0.340) | |
Family | 0.0897 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.427 | 0.262 | 0 |
Interest | (0.250) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (0.267) | (0.293) | (.) |
Candidate | 0.198 | −0.0580 | 0.279* | 0.280** | 0.284* | 0.272* | 0.0326 | −0.178 | 0 |
(0.114) | (0.235) | (0.132) | (0.0873) | (0.117) | (0.125) | (0.187) | (0.261) | (.) | |
Gender | −0.00516 | 0.0802 | −0.0647 | −0.0307 | −0.0451 | 0.000955 | −0.0533 | −0.0750 | −0.0179 |
(0.0557) | (0.0760) | (0.0844) | (0.0365) | (0.0494) | (0.0551) | (0.0569) | (0.0722) | (0.0956) | |
University | −0.0698 | −0.0352 | −0.0568 | 0.00981 | 0.00852 | 0.0155 | −0.0157 | 0.0173 | −0.0322 |
(0.0575) | (0.102) | (0.0840) | (0.0303) | (0.0500) | (0.0463) | (0.0575) | (0.0779) | (0.0927) | |
Age | −0.0165 | 0.00337 | −0.000196 | 0.00185 | 0.00236 | −0.000851 | −0.0165 | ||
(0.0125) | (0.0038) | (0.00660) | (0.00241) | (0.00950) | (0.00319) | (0.0125) | |||
Observations | 325 | 149 | 173 | 839 | 458 | 378 | 402 | 210 | 188 |
Table A7:
Marginal Effects of Logistic Regression of Being Initially Active.
Marginal Effects of logistic regression of being initially active |
|||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Portugal total | Portugal (18–30) | Portugal (30–94) | Spain total | Spain (18–30) | Spain (30–94) | UK total | UK (18–30) | UK (30–94) | |
Young | −0.0161 | −0.0318*** | −0.0513*** | ||||||
(0.0123) | (0.00663) | (0.0133) | |||||||
Demonstration | 0.0658*** | 0.0267 | 0.0820*** | 0.0338*** | 0.0429*** | 0.0346*** | 0.0227 | 0.0411 | 0.00259 |
(0.0155) | (0.0264) | (0.0187) | (0.00758) | (0.0130) | (0.00899) | (0.0204) | (0.0316) | (0.0268) | |
Petition | 0.0177 | 0.0191 | 0.0127 | 0.0360*** | 0.0439*** | 0.0208* | 0.0580*** | 0.0198 | 0.0743*** |
(0.0139) | (0.0226) | (0.0177) | (0.00760) | (0.0124) | (0.00942) | (0.0156) | (0.0288) | (0.0176) | |
Liberal-Conservative | −0.0106*** | −0.0144** | −0.00676 | −0.00521** | −0.00484 | −0.00318 | −0.00117 | 0.000534 | −0.00115 |
(0.00290) | (0.00518) | (0.00347) | (0.00162) | (0.00260) | (0.00210) | (0.00290) | (0.00483) | (0.00351) | |
Economic Right-Left | 0.00574* | 0.00720 | 0.00319 | 0.00528** | 0.00528 | 0.00461 | 0.00320 | 0.000954 | −0.000762 |
(0.00271) | (0.00469) | (0.00332) | (0.00181) | (0.00284) | (0.00238) | (0.00298) | (0.00508) | (0.00367) | |
More EU-Anti EU | 0.00904*** | 0.00826* | 0.00967*** | 0.00975*** | 0.00955*** | 0.00935*** | −0.00176 | −0.0000883 | −0.000591 |
(0.00226) | (0.00390) | (0.00273) | (0.00105) | (0.00178) | (0.00127) | (0.00265) | (0.00455) | (0.00317) | |
No reason to vote | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
(.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | (.) | |
Competency | 0.139*** | 0.100** | 0.187*** | 0.115*** | 0.161*** | 0.0781*** | 0.105*** | 0.128** | 0.104** |
(0.0244) | (0.0350) | (0.0385) | (0.0140) | (0.0215) | (0.0187) | (0.0266) | (0.0401) | (0.0374) | |
Ideology | 0.123*** | 0.149*** | 0.110*** | 0.117*** | 0.139*** | 0.100*** | 0.126*** | 0.150*** | 0.109*** |
(0.0132) | (0.0229) | (0.0158) | (0.00699) | (0.0115) | (0.00852) | (0.0139) | (0.0238) | (0.0163) | |
Self-interest | 0.139* | 0.0756 | 0 | 0.107*** | 0.103*** | 0.127*** | 0.0737 | 0.0692 | 0.109 |
(0.0654) | (0.0801) | (.) | (0.0191) | (0.0277) | (0.0308) | (0.0447) | (0.0635) | (0.0748) | |
Family | 0.0535 | 0.0534 | 0.0676 | 0.124* | 0.116 | 0.126 | 0.0761 | 0.113 | 0.0838 |
Interest | (0.0685) | (0.0986) | (0.103) | (0.0581) | (0.0898) | (0.0796) | (0.0590) | (0.0916) | (0.0785) |
Candidate | 0.145*** | 0.178** | 0.121*** | 0.116*** | 0.125*** | 0.104*** | 0.0724 | 0.0565 | 0.123 |
(0.0303) | (0.0561) | (0.0347) | (0.0206) | (0.0331) | (0.0260) | (0.0502) | (0.0756) | (0.0755) | |
Gender | −0.0118 | 0.00956 | −0.0395* | −0.0146 | −0.00875 | −0.0271** | −0.0136 | 0.00851 | −0.0445* |
(0.0134) | (0.0209) | (0.0183) | (0.00795) | (0.0127) | (0.0103) | (0.0148) | (0.0230) | (0.0201) | |
University | 0.0670*** | 0.0653* | 0.0409* | 0.0326*** | 0.0213 | 0.00928 | 0.0186 | 0.0677** | −0.0201 |
(0.0143) | (0.0261) | (0.0187) | (0.00665) | (0.0129) | (0.00852) | (0.0147) | (0.0250) | (0.0189) | |
Age | 0.0104** | 0.00215* | 0.00905*** | 0.000684 | 0.00432 | 0.00252*** | |||
(0.00324) | (0.000856) | (0.00184) | (0.000441) | (0.00313) | (0.000735) | ||||
Observations | 3027 | 1201 | 1808 | 9046 | 3971 | 5075 | 2899 | 1231 | 1668 |
Table A8:
Variable Description.
Variable | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
---|---|---|---|---|
Activated | 0.56177 | 0.496188 | 0 | 1 |
Initially Active | 0.874655 | 0.331121 | 0 | 1 |
Young | 0.377167 | 0.484692 | 0 | 1 |
Demonstration | 0.476953 | 0.499484 | 0 | 1 |
Petition | 0.786674 | 0.409669 | 0 | 1 |
Liberal-Conservative | 3.307084 | 2.557268 | 0 | 10 |
Economic Left-Right | 2.377795 | 2.454986 | 0 | 10 |
Pro-Anti EU | 6.130934 | 3.05416 | 0 | 10 |
Competency | 0.080865 | 0.272637 | 0 | 1 |
Ideology | 0.599312 | 0.490054 | 0 | 1 |
Self-interest | 0.027215 | 0.162714 | 0 | 1 |
Family interest | 0.005586 | 0.074532 | 0 | 1 |
Candidate | 0.036568 | 0.187705 | 0 | 1 |
Gender | 0.744168 | 0.436341 | 0 | 1 |
University | 0.700764 | 0.457938 | 0 | 1 |
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