Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

Ulrich Glassmann; Jan Sauermann

doi:10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008

Published by De Gruyter September 10, 2012

Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

Ulrich Glassmann and Jan Sauermann

From the journal World Political Science

https://doi.org/10.1515/wpsr-2012-0008

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Abstract

What impact do majority rule and unanimity rule have on welfare and decision costs? According to Buchanan and Tullock ([1962] 1999) the unanimity principle must be regarded as a democratic norm, because it guarantees Pareto-efficient welfare effects. We present experimental results from a public goods game, which demonstrate in contrast to this assumption that majority rule can produce greater welfare effects than unanimity rule. This result suggests a critical revision of theoretical approaches which narrow the legitimacy of majority rule in this respect.

Keywords: common good; decision costs; laboratory experiment; majority rule; unanimity rule

Corresponding author: Ulrich Glassmann, Department of Political Science, University of Cologne, P.O. Box 411020, 50870 Cologne, Germany, Phone: +49 221 470 2853, Fax: +49 221 470 7447

Published Online: 2012-9-10

Decision Costs and Welfare Effects of Democratic Voting Rules: an Experimental Analysis

Abstract

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