Accessible Requires Authentication Published by De Gruyter Oldenbourg May 14, 2016

Marktwirtschaft und Subsidiarität: Die föderative Arbeitsteilung auf dem Prüfstand

Claus-Friedrich Laaser and Jürgen Stehn

Abstract

The article analyses whether the efficiency of economic policy decisions in national and supranational communities can be improved by deepening the division of labor between different levels of government. Using a model based on the theory of fiscal federalism, normative criteria for the optimal vertical distribution of authority are developed. A comparison between the derived optimality conditions and the factual distribution of authority in the Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union indicates that in Germany as well as within the EU a decentralisation of economic policy authority would be welfare-improving.

Online erschienen: 2016-5-14
Erschienen im Druck: 1996-4-1

© 1996 by Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart