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Glosses and Commentaries on the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* before Abelard

1. Introduction

The early Middle Ages are often stereotyped as a time of platonism, to be contrasted with the aristotelianism of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Yet two of Aristotle's logical works, the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione*, were available, in good translations by Boethius, from the ninth century onwards.¹ This fact, however, usually remains a footnote in accounts of early medieval philosophy; and even specialists in the history of logic have rarely turned their attention to the presence of the two Aristotelian texts in the early Middle Ages. For the most part, they have either concerned themselves with the use of Porphyry's *Isagoge*, the central text in the controversy over universals.² Or they have searched – in independent treatises and in commentaries to Boethius's *De topicis differentiis* and to Aristotle's *De sophisticis elenchis* – for the origins of the logica modernorum, those

¹ The manuscripts are listed in *Georges Lacombe*, *Aristoteles Latinus – codices: pars prior* (Cambridge 1955), *pars posterior* (Bruges–Paris 1957); *Laurenzio Minio-Paluello*, *Aristoteles Latinus – codices: supplementa altera* (Bruges/Paris 1961). See also *J. Isaac*, *Le Peri Hermeneias en occident* (Paris 1953) 36–52.

² This approach goes back at least to *Barthélemy Hauréau*, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique*, Vol. 1 (Paris 1872): see especially 42–50; hereafter cited: *Hauréau*, *Histoire*. Two modern scholars have worked systematically and in detail on early twelfth-century logical commentaries to the *Isagoge*. In his unpublished King's College, Cambridge Fellowship dissertation, Peter Abelard and his School (1962), *David E. Luscombe* edits and discusses a number of twelfth-century Porphyry commentaries; more recently, *Yukio Iwakuma* has set about tackling this material even more comprehensively (see his forthcoming article: *Pseudo-Rabanus super Porphyrium* Introduction and critical text, in: *Grammatica speculativa*; hereafter cited: *Iwakuma*, *Pseudo-Rabanus*; and his *Vocales*, or early nominalists, in: *Traditio* 47 (1992) 37–111; hereafter cited: *Iwakuma*, *Vocales*). I am very grateful to Professor Luscombe for allowing me access to his unpublished dissertation, and to both him and to Mr Iwakuma for their generosity in providing me with materials and advice to help with my work on early medieval logic. Mr Iwakuma was also kind enough to comment on a near-final draft of this paper and so help me to avoid a number of errors.

branches of the subject which medieval logicians themselves devised and elaborated.³

Both these approaches have helped to build up a rich and varied picture of early medieval logic, but also one in which the *Categories* and the *De interpretatione* remain in the background. They should not be left there. The *Categories* and *De interpretatione* discuss far more than logic or even the usual adjuncts of logic, such as semantics and the theory of meaning. They raise issues in the philosophy of mind and action and, above all, in what would later be called metaphysics. To show that thinkers from before the thirteenth century engaged with such questions would prompt a new appreciation of the range and importance of early medieval philosophy, which is so often seen as a mere prelude to the achievements of the Golden Age of scholasticism.

This is a grandiose project; here only a limited part of it will be tackled, and in a preliminary way. The discussion will be restricted to the glosses and commentaries written explicitly on the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* (as opposed to the many varied works which discuss questions raised by these texts), and to the period before c. 1120 – that is to say, roughly speaking, before Abelard completed his long commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry.⁴ Since most of these glosses and commentaries are unfamiliar (and unpublished), one of the tasks in the following pages will be to survey them and give an indication of their chronology, provenances and forms.⁵ But the main aim of this paper is to give an idea of the philosophical interest of this material, by looking closely at how just two themes are treated: in the case of the *Categories*, the question of what the treatise is about – words or things; in the case of *De interpretatione*, the famous discussion of future contingents in Chapter 9. What were the views about each of these topics which early medieval scholars inherited from the ancient tradition through Boethius?

The subject-matter of the *Categories* had been a matter for contention between two of the most celebrated ancient Platonists: Plotinus and his pupil, Porphyry.⁶ Plotinus criticized Aristotle's categories as a defective account of reality. But Por-

³ See especially the pioneering work of *Lambertus Maria de Rijk*, *Logica modernorum*, Vols 1 & 2 (Assen 1962, 1967). Commentaries to the *De topicis differentiis* are examined thoroughly in *Niels J. Green-Pedersen*, *The tradition of the topics in the middle ages* (Munich-Vienna 1984).

⁴ *Constant Mews*, On dating the works of Peter Abelard, in: *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 52 (1985) 73–134, esp. 74–104.

⁵ This survey is based on the 'Working-Catalogue' included in *John A. M. Marenbon*, *Medieval latin commentaries and glosses on aristotelian logical texts, before ca. 1150 A.D.*, in: *Commentaries and glosses on aristotelian logical texts: the syriac, arabic and medieval latin traditions*, ed. *Charles S. F. Burnett* (Warburg Institute Surveys and Texts, London 1993) 77–127; hereafter cited: *Marenbon*, *Commentaries*. As the phrase 'Working-Catalogue' suggests, this list makes no claim to be complete or definitive, but aims rather to provide a basis for further work in the area.

⁶ See *Christos Evangelou*, *Aristotle's Categories and Porphyry* (*Philosophia antiqua* 48, Leiden – New York – Copenhagen – Cologne 1988).

phyry – so several modern reconstructions suggest – argued that the categories were not supposed to be a description of reality.⁷ Rather, Aristotle based them on language, and language in its turn is based on how things are perceived through the senses. The categories, then, refer to the sensible world by way of language and can be accepted by Platonists as accurate within their own sphere. Boethius reflects this view in his commentary on the Categories.⁸ Aristotle's intention, he says, is to discuss 'words which signify things *as* signifying' (de vocibus res significantibus, in eo quod significantes sunt pertractare – 160A, cf. 160B, 163B). He explains the qualification '*as* signifying' by making a contrast between the Categories and the De interpretatione. In the De interpretatione, words are classified from the point view of their form into two main classes – those which are declined (nouns) and those which are tensed (verbs) (159B–D; 163A). By contrast, the division into ten categories is based on what the words signify – a substance, a quantity, a quality and so on (160D–161A). A little further on, Boethius poses himself the question why Aristotle calls individual sensible things, such as this man or that horse, primary substances: "since intelligible substances, such as God and the soul, are naturally prior, why does he not call these primary substances?". He answers by explaining that the Categories is about names (*nomina*) and names 'were given in the first place mainly to those things subject to the senses' and only afterwards to what is intelligible and incorporeal (183D–184A). In talking about words *as* signifying, then, the Categories does not, on Boethius's view, talk about the world as Platonic metaphysics reveals it really to be, but rather presents the limited, sensibly-based view of the world which is reflected in language.

To turn to Chapter 9 of the De interpretatione. Here Aristotle raises the following central problem. It seems to be true to say that either there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow. But then, if it is true that a sea-battle will take place tomorrow, does this not mean that the sea-battle must take place then? Or if it is true that there will not be a sea-battle tomorrow, does it not follow that there cannot be a sea-battle on that day? That is to say, if statements about future contingent events are true or false, the consequence seems to be that all things happen of necessity, and no room is left for free will. Aristotle certainly does not think that everything happens of necessity, but commentators are still not agreed on exactly how he resolves the difficulty he poses in this chapter.⁹ For Boethius, however, in both of the commentaries he wrote on De interpretatione, Aristotle's solution was clear. Statements about future contingents are true or false but, unlike statements about the present or the past, they are not true or false defi-

⁷ See *Sten Ebbesen*, Commentators and commentaries on Aristotle's *Sophistici elenchi*, Vol. 1 (Corpus latinum commentariorum in Aristotelem graecorum 7,1, Leiden 1981) 133–70, reprinted in: *Aristotle transformed: the ancient commentators and their influence*, ed. *Richard Sorabji* (London 1990) 141–171.

⁸ *Patrologia Latina*, Vol. 64, 159–294.

⁹ See *Richard Sorabji*, *Necessity, cause and blame* (London 1980), Bibliography § 8 for details of those who hold the various positions.

nately but indefinitely.¹⁰ In his longer, second commentary, Boethius analyses the argument by which Aristotle arrives at this conclusion into four steps (Vol. 2, 201–50):

- (1) If future contingent statements are true or false definitely, then everything happens of necessity;
- (2) If everything happens of necessity, then there can be no human free will;
but
- (3) Human beings do have free will;
therefore
- (4) Future contingent statements are not true or false definitely.

Whereas, in the *De interpretatione*, Aristotle is content to treat stage (3) of this argument as an implicit assumption, in his commentary Boethius argues for it at length, describing and rejecting the views of the stoics (who allow people be free only in the sense that they can conform to necessity) and showing how human deliberation and free will introduces an element of genuine contingency into the universe.¹¹

2. The earlier period: a survey of the material

From the ninth until mid-eleventh century (if not later),¹² exegesis of the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* usually took the form, not of continuous commentary, but glosses written in the margins and between the lines of copies of the texts.¹³ Whereas such glosses are rare (although by no means without interest) in manuscripts of the literal translations of the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, there is a version of the *Categories* which was annotated extensively in a number of manuscripts from the ninth century and later. Known in the Middle Ages as the *Categoriae decem* or *De decem categoriis*, and invariably attributed to St Augustine, it is often described by modern scholars as a ‘paraphrase’ of Aristotle’s *Categories*. But this is rather misleading. The aim of the Greek original, of which the text is probably a Latin translation, was to give both the gist of Aristotle’s text and, in brief form, some of the additional explanations and discussions by which com-

¹⁰ Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii commentarii in librum Aristotelis ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ, ed. Karl Meiser. Vol. 1 (Leipzig 1877) 106: 30 – 107: 2: “necesse enim est [in his quae contingentes uocantur] ut aut affirmatio uera sit aut negatio, sed non ut definite quaelibet earum uera sit, altera falsa definite”, cf. Vol. 2 (Leipzig 1880) 203: 13 ff. All references hereafter are to this edition.

¹¹ See Normann Kretzmann, *Nos ipsi principia sumus: Boethius and the basis of contingency*, in: T. Rudavsky, *Divine omniscience and omnipotence in medieval philosophy* (Dordrecht 1985) 23–50.

¹² See below, p. 31, for the question of the dating of the early continuous commentaries.

¹³ In this paper, the term ‘glosses’ will be reserved for such marginal and interlinear annotations, whilst ‘commentary’ will mean a continuous commentary. This distinction does not, however, correspond to one in medieval terminology: cf. Marenbon, *Commentaries*, n. 40.

mentators hoped to make the text more easily comprehensible. The *Categoriae Decem*, therefore, offers a pre-digested version of the Categories along with a commentary. Little wonder that for the earliest medieval logicians it was more appealing than either of the two genuine Aristotelian logical works, or even than the *Isagoge*, all of which needed to be read along with Boethius's voluminous commentaries.¹⁴

The annotations in the various manuscripts of the *Categoriae Decem* are not the notes of isolated, individual readers, but a set of glosses. Although a set of glosses is not a single, fixed work, which is copied from one manuscript to another except for scribal errors, different copies of the set have much shared material. In the case of the *Categoriae Decem*, most of the 19 surviving glossed manuscripts have many glosses in common, although none has exactly the same set as any other.¹⁵ Some of the manuscripts contain hardly any glosses except those which are 'standard' – that is to say, found in most other manuscripts; some mix standard glosses with 'eccentric' material – that is to say, glosses unique to a particular manuscript or shared by only two or three; and a few manuscripts contain a preponderance of eccentric glosses. The glosses themselves vary from the briefest interlinear notes – explaining a word or translating a Greek term – to long annotations crammed into the margins, and usually keyed to passages in the text by means of reference signs.¹⁶

Among the 'eccentric' material are some comments which, in their ideas as well as language, show the influence of John Scottus Eriugena. For instance, they discuss negative theology, the relationship between species and individuals, the nature of punishment in Hell and the Return of all things to God in characteristically Eriugenian terms.¹⁷ Probably the earliest annotated manuscript of the *Categoriae Decem*, Milan Ambrosiana B 71 sup., written and glossed in the third quarter of the ninth century, probably at Auxerre, contains a rich collection of such Eriugenian comments but little standard material. The glosses in this manuscript may well be the work of Heiric of Auxerre, a follower of Eriugena's, or at least closely derived from it.¹⁸ There are two other manuscripts with large numbers of Eriugenian glosses, as well as other standard and 'eccentric' material: a St Gall codex

¹⁴ See *Laurenzio Minio-Paluello*, Note sull'Aristotele latino medievale: XV – Dalle *Categoriae Decem* pseudo-Agostiniane (Temistianae) al testo vulgato aristotelico Boeziano, in: *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 54 (1962) 137–147 (= *Laurenzio Minio-Paluello*, *Opuscula: the Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam 1972) 448–458); hereafter cited as *Minio-Paluello*, *Categoriae Decem*; *John A. M. Marenbon*, From the circle of Alcuin to the school of Auxerre (Cambridge Studies in medieval life and thought, 3rd series, Vol. 15, Cambridge 1981) 51–52, 75, 111, 121–123; hereafter cited: *Marenbon*, From the circle.

¹⁵ These 18 include two manuscripts with very abbreviated, mostly interlinear glosses, two twelfth-century manuscripts, and two manuscripts in which the glosses are written out in continuous form. See *Marenbon*, From the circle, 173–184 and add: Florence Laurenziana S. Marco 1, 13 ff. 26r–28v – s. xii (glosses written out in continuous form).

¹⁶ See *Marenbon*, From the circle, 121–123, 173–179 and *Marenbon*, *Commentaries*, 80–1 for fuller discussion.

¹⁷ See the glosses edited in *Marenbon*, From the circle, nos. XIII, XXIV, XXX, XXI.

¹⁸ See *Marenbon*, From the circle, 121–123.

(Stiftsbibliothek 274), probably glossed in the mid-to-late ninth century; and Paris BN 12949 (s.x^{ex}/xiⁱⁿ), a logical collection associated with the mid-tenth-century scholar Israel Scottus.¹⁹ Predominantly standard sets of glosses are found in late ninth, tenth and eleventh-century manuscripts from a wide variety of the important monastic centres, such as Corbie (Leningrad F.V. class. lat. 7 – s. ix), Freising (Munich clm 6373 – s. x; Munich clm 6367 – s. xi), Mont Saint-Michel (Avranches 229 – s.x); and they are found also in a probably insular manuscript (Corpus Christ College Cambridge 206 – s.x). A Welsh manuscript (Bern C 219 – s.x) contains a very abbreviated set, whilst a manuscript from Fleury (Orleans 263 – s.x) mixes a few standard glosses with its own ‘eccentric’ (but not Eriugenian) material.

By comparison with this proliferation of glosses to the *Categoriae Decem*, Aristotle’s own text of the *Categories* received little attention from exegetes before the late eleventh century, although it was available in both Boethius’s genuine translation and – more widely in the ninth and tenth centuries – in a translation made up from Boethius’s and another, which may in fact have been an earlier draft by Boethius.²⁰ Just three of the manuscripts from before the twelfth century contain any more than fleeting glosses: a late tenth-century copy of the genuine translation, which was at Fleury by the thirteenth century and is now in Paris (BN 2788); a ninth-century Corbie manuscript (Leningrad F.V. class. lat. 7) and an eleventh-century manuscript from Cologne of the composite translation (Cologne Cathedral Library 191). The glossators appear to have worked independently. All three use Boethius’s commentary, but in the Leningrad manuscript his remarks are considerably simplified and comments from other sources, such as the glosses to the *Categoriae Decem* (also contained in this volume), are included.

Also closely based on Boethius’s commentary is a work remarkable because of its form. Although the glosses to the *Categoriae Decem* are written out in one manuscript (Paris BN 13953 – s.x¹) (C1)²¹ with lemmata as a continuous commentary, the only properly free-standing logical commentary from the early period is a dialogue on the *Isagoge* and the *Categories* (C4), from the tenth or, at the latest, the early eleventh century. Although the manuscript which preserves it in its fullest form has connections with Fleury (Vatican reg. lat. 1281 – s. xiⁱⁿ), an earlier manuscript of a version of the part of the commentary on the *Isagoge* (Vienna Pal. lat. 2508 – s. x) suggests that the compilation may have originated in St Gall.²² This commentary serves the same sort of purpose as the *Categoriae*

¹⁹ See Marenbon, *From the circle*, 175–177 and, for the Paris manuscript, *Edouard Jeuneau*, *Pour le dossier d’Israel Scot* in: *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 53 (1985) 641–706 (= *Edouard Jeuneau*, *Études érigéniennes* (Paris 1987) 641–706). For the St Gall manuscript, see also below, pp. 28–9.

²⁰ See *Categoriae vel Praedicamenta*, ed. *Laurenzio Minio-Paluello* (Aristoteles Latinus, Vol. 1, 1–5, Bruges, Paris 1961) xii–lii and *Minio-Paluello*, *Categoriae Decem*. All references to the *Categoriae Decem* and the *Categories* are to the pages and lines of this edition.

²¹ This number refers to the ‘Working-Catalogue’ in Marenbon, *Commentaries*. Catalogue-numbers will be given hereafter in the same way for other commentaries.

²² On Vatican reg. lat. 1281, see *André Van de Vyver*, *Vroeg-middeleeuwsche wijsgeerige*

Decem, allowing the reader to dispense with reading both the original text and Boethius's commentary and rely instead on the digest it provides.

Only two manuscripts of the *De interpretatione* from before the twelfth century contain substantial glosses, and in the case of one, Paris BN 12949, they occur only at the very beginning of the work. Leiden Voss Lat F 70 (s. x), however, contains glosses to roughly the first half of *De interpretatione*, many of which are based on Boethius's second and more complex commentary. Even taking into account Notker of St Gall's German versions of the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, which include Latin glosses mainly based on Boethius,²³ it is clear that before the late eleventh century exegesis of the two logical treatises by Aristotle was not widespread, like that of the *Categoriae Decem*, but confined to a few outstanding centres, such as Fleury and St Gall.

3. The early period: the subject-matter of the *Categories*

According to some scholars, the glosses to the *Categoriae Decem* show signs of nominalism.²⁴ If their view were correct, it might be expected that the glossators would insist that the subject-matter of Aristotle's *Categories* is not things, but words. In fact, their view was in general very different. Their point of departure was, of course, not Aristotle's text itself, but the pseudo-Augustinian version. In the *Categoriae Decem*, the commentators would find, cited with approval, Themistius's view that, primarily, Aristotle's treatise is about what is perceived. The text then goes on to argue that Aristotle also discusses what is and what is said, because

Verhandeligen, in: *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 4 (1942) 156–199, at 195–196; and *Marenbon*, *Commentaries*, 83–4. *Lambertus Maria de Rijk*, On the curriculum of the arts of the trivium at St Gall from c. 850–c.1000, in: *Vivarium* 1(1963) 35–86, at 57–64, discusses the version in the Vienna manuscript (without reference to any other versions). An origin in St Gall is also supported by the fact that, in Vatican reg. lat. 1281, the *Isagoge* and *Categories* commentary is followed by the *Distributio omnium specierum nominum inter Categorias Aristotelis*, considered by de Rijk in his article (83) to have been written at St Gall in the ninth century. The whole text has now been edited by *Giulio d'Onofrio*, *Excerpta Isagogarum et Categoriarum* (*Corpus Christianorum, continuatio mediaevalis* 120, Turnhout 1995).

²³ Edited (with an account of the sources) in: *James C. King*, *Die Werke Notkers des Deutschen*, Bd. 5 & 6 (Tübingen 1972, 1975).

²⁴ *Hauréau*, *Histoire*, Vol. 1, 184–196; *Karl Prantl*, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendland*, Vol. 2 (Leipzig, 1861) 40–41; *Karl S. Barach*, *Zur Geschichte des Nominalismus vor Roscellin*, in his *Kleine philosophische Schriften* (Vienna 1878). Although these arguments were carefully scrutinized and rejected in *Josef Reinert*, *Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik* (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 8,5, Münster 1910); hereafter cited: *Reinert*, *Nominalismus*, the view has been repeated by respected modern scholars: see *Jean Jolivet*, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, in: *Encyclopédie de la Pléiade. Histoire de la philosophie*, Vol. 1 (Paris 1969) 1261; *Mariateresa Fumagalli Beonio Brocchieri* and *Massimo Parodi*, *Storia della filosofia medievale* (*Manuali Laterza* 8, Rome 1989) 103. 'Nominalism' is used in this discussion to refer (as it traditionally has done) to a position about the nature of genera and species.

what we perceive 'arises from what is, which we perceive when we see it' and, without language, we would never be able to make manifest anything we perceive. (137:20–28). The glossators treat this passage straightforwardly. But, at other points, many of them are at pains to insist that the subject-matter of the *Categories* is, quite simply, things. If the *Categoriae Decem* sometimes discusses language, the glossators suggest that this is Augustine's addition to the subject-matter of Aristotle's original text. For instance, one standard gloss explains that Aristotle himself did not discuss 'polionima' and 'heteronima', which are merely verbal matters, but he did talk about the distinction between equivocal and univocal terms because this is linked with the definition of substances and Aristotle's intention was not to treat 'those things which are said ... but those which are'.²⁵ Another gloss goes even further. Before Aristotle, it says, all the philosophers 'discussed discourse – that is, the ordering and parts of speech'. It was Aristotle who first talked about, not just speech, but the foundation for all speaking: 'essence and its accidents'.²⁶

In one manuscript alone, however, there is a long initial gloss which offers a quite different interpretation. The manuscript is St Gall 274, which besides its Eriugenian material also contains many glosses unique to it, some of which show a range of interests and reading unmatched by any of the other glossators. Among the St Gall glossator's reading-matter was a copy of Boethius's commentary on the *Categories*. His view of Aristotle's purpose is entirely shaped by it. He states it, in Boethius's words, to be to consider 'the first names and words for things', not with regard to their form, but 'as signifying'.²⁷ The St Gall exegete did not just copy this statement mindlessly from Boethius, but took the point to heart, be-

²⁵ Gloss to PRAETERMISIT (136:12): "Hoc beatus Augustinus interponit ex suo, quia disputaturis utile uidebatur. Nam Aristotiles id omisit, quia non de his quae dicuntur, id est uerbis, sed de his quae sunt proposuerat disputare, et polionima et etheronima in uerborum ratione uersantur – in pluralitate nominum non substantiarum. Ergo ideo omissa sunt a philosopho. Superiora uero, id est omonima et sinonima, substantiae diffinitionem requirunt, ut quod est homo pictus et quod est homo uerus, quid etiam animalia, demonstrent. Itaque nequaquam omissa sunt a philosopho sed diligenter tractata ..." (Corpus Christi College Cambridge 206, f. 26r; a similar gloss is found in eg. Munich clm 6373, Munich clm 6367, Paris BN lat 12949, Vienna 843).

²⁶ Gloss to CVM OMNIS (133:3): "Cum enim omnes philosophi de oratione tantummodo tractauerunt, id est de contextu scilicet et ordinatione partium, primus Aristoteles de examine, id est initio et fundamine ipsius sermonis, disseruit; id est de usia eiusque accidentibus ex quibus oratio omnisque nostra locutio construitur. Neque possumus loqui nisi sit substantia aliqua de qua loquamur ..." (Vienna 843, f.1v; a very similar gloss is found in eg. Munich clm 6367, Munich clm 6373, Paris BN lat 12949, Cambridge Corpus Christi College 206).

²⁷ Gloss at head of work: "... In hoc igitur opere haec intentio est de primis rerum nominibus et de uocibus res significantibus disputare, non in eo quod secundum aliquam proprietatem figuramque formantur, sed in eo quod significantes sunt ..." (p. 5). The gloss goes on to excerpt other parts of Boethius's introduction to his commentary: from 159 CD, 160C, 161A, 161B.

cause he returns to it at least twice,²⁸ insisting that Aristotle's subject is not things, but words (though words signifying things).²⁹

In the few surviving glosses on Aristotle's *Categories* itself, the view about the work's subject-matter is similarly taken directly from Boethius (except in the Leningrad manuscript, which contains no comment on the question at all). Indeed, Paris BN 2788 includes, not as a gloss but as a preface to the text, a précis of Boethius's introduction. And, in Cologne Dombibliothek 191, there is a brief but clear statement of Boethius's answer (183D–184A) to the question why God and the soul are not called 'first substances': "because names were first imposed on those things which were chiefly subject to the senses".³⁰ The dialogue-commentary (C 4: ff. 18v–19r) also resumes Boethius's views.

Taken as a whole, the glosses and commentary on the *Categories* and *Categoriae Decem* in the earlier group do not then, provide any evidence the existence of an early medieval nominalism. Left to their own devices, without the influence of Boethius's commentary, and despite the view offered by their own text, the glossators of the *Categoriae Decem* stressed that Aristotle's subject-matter was things, not words. Only when Boethius is used, do these early logicians conclude that Aristotle is talking about words; and here they copy Boethius faithfully – indeed literally – and explain that the subject-matter is 'words *as* signifying'. Perhaps, however, these early glosses do provide some clues as to how nominalism came later on to develop. Boethius's view is not nominalist. Yet there are aspects of his *Categories* commentary which could lead to nominalism.

²⁸ To CAPACI AD INFINITVM NOMINE (134:17–18): "Hic demonstratur quod intentio Aristotelis est in hoc libro disputare non de rebus sed de primis nominibus res significantibus, quia nomina categorias uocat, ut est 'homo'. Aliud enim est illud nomen, hoc est illa praedicatio, aliud res de qua praedicatur" (p. 7); To DIVISIO SVBSTANTIAE section (145:23 ff.): "Adeo non de rebus de uocibus tractatur est, ut diceret 'dicuntur' (cf. 146:5). Res enim proprie non dicuntur, sed uocesed". (p.23).

²⁹ There is also another gloss, found not only in St. Gall. 274 (p. 20) but also in Paris BN 12949 and Leningrad F. V. Class. lat 7, which draws on Boethius's *Categories* commentary: to IDEM ANIMAL GENVS EST (144:3), printed in *Hauréau*, *Histoire*, Vol. 1, 192 n.2 and *Marenbon*, *From the circle*, p. 190 and discussed in *Reiners*, *Nominalismus* 6–8. The passage of Boethius used (176 CD) is one where he explains how, in a statement such as 'Animal is a genus' or 'Man is a species', 'genus' and 'species' are not definitions of animal or man, but 'designative names'. The *Categoriae Decem* gloss reproduces this point accurately, but does not repeat Boethius's further remark (176 D), which can be read in a nominalistic sense; that species and genera are 'quodammodo nominum nomina'.

³⁰ To QVAE PRINCIPALITER SVBSTANTIAE (49:2): "Cum naturaliter intelligi[bi]les substantiae prime sint, ut deus et animus, quaeritur cur non has primas nuncuparit. Idcirco quoniam nomina prime illis indita sunt que principaliter sensibus fuere subiecta" (25v).

4. The early period: chapter 9 of *De interpretatione*

Only one gloss appears by the text of Chapter 9 of *De interpretatione* in Leiden Voss. lat. F 70; but it is of unexpected interest. Unlike most of the other glosses in the manuscript, it is not a literal quote from Boethius, or a garbled version of his words. It defines four classes: (1) that which cannot possibly not be, and so exists always; (2) that which cannot possibly be, and so never exists; (3) that which can possibly not be, and so does not exist always; and (granted the correction of an apparent scribal error) (4) that which can possibly be, and so does not always not exist. The first two of these classes are eternal, the other two temporal. An example of (1) is provided by the fact that heat is always in fire, and of (2) by the fact that coldness is always absent from it. The glossator then makes a division between those things which exist temporally but substantially – whatever is generated or corruptible (presumably the members of (3)); and those which exist temporally and per accidens, changing from being to non-being and non-being to being by the variability of some accident (presumably the members of (4)). The glossator ends by remarking that (3) and (4) are contingent, because they might or might not take place; but (1) and (2) happen from simple necessity.³¹

Although most of the ideas here can be found in Boethius, especially in one passage from the second commentary (236:5 – 237:9), the glossator's formulation and schematization of them is his own. His neat fourfold division brings out clearly what modern commentators have described as Boethius's 'statistical' interpretation of modality;³² and in this gloss, which is the last he enters, he makes clear the links between the discussion of future contingents in this chapter and the treatment of possibility and necessity in Chapter 12 and 13. This glossator's schematic approach and emphasis on the logical aspect of the problem is an early example of an approach which, two centuries later, would flourish and produce impressive results."

³¹ "Quicquid est quod impossibile est non esse, semper est. Quicquid impossibile est esse, semper non est. Et quicquid est quod possibile est non esse, non semper est. Quicquid est [*the ms. reads quicquid non est*] quod possibile est esse, non semper non est. Duo uero aeternaliter et duo temporaliter. Nam ignis, cum numquam frigidus sit, semper calet. Idcirco alterum aeternaliter et semper inest, alterum uero semper abest. Eorum autem quae sunt temporaliter, alia sunt substantialiter, alia per accidens. Et substantialiter non semper est quicquid corrumpitur, et non semper etiam est quicquid generatur. Per accidens quoque non semper est et non semper non est quicquid alicuius accidentis mutabilitate ita uariatur ut de esse in non esse et de non esse in esse mutetur. Sunt itaque haec duo contingentia, quoniam eueniunt utrumlibet. Duo uero superiora ex simplici necessitate et numquam possunt contingere" (f. 7r).

³² See *Simo Knuuttila*, *Time and modality in scholasticism*, in: *Ders. Reforging the great chain of being* (Synthese historical library 20, Dordrecht, Boston 1981) 163–257 at 170–178; and *Lilli Alanen* and *Simo Knuuttila*, *The foundations of modality and conceivability in Descartes and his predecessors*, in: *Simo Knuuttila*, *Modern modalities* (Synthese historical library 33, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1988) 1–69, at 18–21.

5. The later period and the forms of the commentaries

Surviving twelfth-century manuscripts contain at least 32 commentaries to the Categories and De interpretatione, most of which can be dated to the mid-twelfth-century or earlier. But how much earlier?

It would be convenient to attribute the material in twelfth-century manuscripts to the twelfth century, especially since it is shortly after 1100 that the study of logic is first seen to be flourishing in Paris, under the aegis of William of Champeaux. Yet this would leave the eleventh century strangely barren of exegetical material on the two aristotelian texts (except in the pseudo-Augustinian version): only one glossed manuscript of the Categories and none of the De interpretatione. This is particularly surprising in view of the strong interest in these works evident in other material from the period. Consider – to take only the most obvious example – Anselm's use of the Categories in his De grammatico and of the De interpretatione in Cur Deus homo.³³ Moreover, a commentary on Porphyry (P3), found in a number of twelfth-century manuscripts, has recently been shown, by its discussion of universals, to belong in its earliest version to the 1060s.³⁴ It seems likely, therefore, that some commentaries were written to the Categories and De interpretatione, if not at the same time, then shortly afterwards. None the less, there is at present no firm evidence to date any particular surviving Aristotle commentaries to the late eleventh, as opposed to the early twelfth-century. What forms were taken by these commentaries from the first part of the twelfth or perhaps the late eleventh century?

Like the glossators of previous centuries, the commentators remained greatly under the influence of Boethius.³⁵ But they also went beyond him in two different ways. The first consisted in developing a type of exegesis unknown to Boethius. In his commentaries, Boethius usually gives a few sentences or a paragraph of Aristotle's text, which he then proceeds to discuss. Although he tries to make Aristotle's meaning clear, he does not provide a thorough word-by-word analysis of the text. Probably he did not think it necessary. But medieval logicians wished to instruct their pupils by ensuring that they grasped every detail of their author's argument. In order to do this, they divided the text into brief segments, which they paraphrased, sometimes in the third person, sometimes taking on the voice of Aristotle himself. Although they occasionally paused to explain a name or a word, their main concern was to make every step in the argument completely explicit. Often they used the logic of topical inference learnt from Boethius's De differentiis topicis to provide them with what a modern philosopher would call a 'logic of

³³ See Desmond P. Henry, *The logic of Saint Anselm* (Oxford 1967).

³⁴ See Iwakuma, Pseudo-Rabanus. The earliest version is contained in Oxford Bodleian Laud lat. 67; later versions in Paris BN lat 13368 and Assisi Bibl. Conv. Franc., 573. I am grateful to Mr Iwakuma for this information, and for allowing me to see part of his article before its publication.

³⁵ The following three paragraphs summarize the conclusions of Marenbon, *Commentaries*, pp. 85–91, where detailed references will be found.

real arguments'. This type of close exegesis provided what might be called the 'literal' element, found in most twelfth (late eleventh-)century commentaries.

The second way in which these commentators went beyond Boethius was to use his method of commentary to discuss questions he had not anticipated. There are many discursive passages in Boethius's commentaries, in which he examines a problem raised (or even merely implied) by the text, sometimes setting out a number of different views and giving his arguments for choosing one of them. Not only did the medieval scholars copy such passages; they also added their own views and debates on the questions Boethius had raised, and raised other questions which had not occurred to him. The best known examples of such discussions concern the passage on universals in the *Isagoge*. But there were many other topics chosen for extensive discussion, including future contingents and the related problems of freewill and determinism.

Most logical commentaries from the later period are composite: they contain both literal exegesis and wider discussion of problems, in some cases copied closely from Boethius, in others ranging far beyond him. There are, however, some commentaries in which the literal element predominates, despite the occasional discursive passage. And there are a few 'problem commentaries' from which the literal element is almost entirely absent.³⁶ Most of the commentaries survive in no more than one manuscript, although there are cases where two commentaries share common material; and where there is more than one manuscript, it often turns out that there is more than one version. Almost all the commentaries, except Abelard's, are anonymous; but a number of them mention the names of famous logicians, such as Abelard himself or Alberic. Perhaps many of the commentaries should not, then, be regarded as finished literary works, prepared by a master of logic, so much as the records made by pupils of the teaching they had received: 'reportationes' rather than 'ordinationes', to use a later terminology.

6. The later period: commentaries written before c. 1120 – a survey of the material

Which of these commentaries on the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* date from the period before Abelard composed his long commentaries to these texts – before, that is, about 1120? Many of the commentaries contain references to names or doctrines which show that they must have been written after 1120; among some of those which remain, there are strong indications of a variety of sorts that they were written before then.

³⁶ The Working-Catalogue in *Marenbon, Commentaries* (which makes no claims to be comprehensive) lists 24 composite commentaries on the *Isagoge*, *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, 9 literal commentaries and 8 problem commentaries.

In the case of the Categories, there are two literal and two composite commentaries which there are grounds to place in the first two decades of the twelfth century or even a little earlier. One of them (C 6) is found in Cambridge Fitzwilliam Museum Maclean 165, and it follows an Isagoge commentary written in the same manner and presumably by the same teacher. Both commentaries are not merely literal, but of the most deadening literality. The author pedantically reduces every argument to a series of the simplest steps, and insists on identifying the topical inference used wherever possible. For instance, early in the *Categories* (6: 14–18) Aristotle makes the point that, if it is true to call a given individual a man, then – given that man is an animal – it is also true to say of the individual that he is an animal. The Fitzwilliam commentator breaks this down into three separate topical inferences, each worked out in full: that what is predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject (proved by the topic ‘from parts’); that what is predicated of man may be predicated of a given man (proved by the same topic); and that ‘man’ and ‘animal’ may be predicated of a given man (proved by the topic ‘from a cause’).³⁷ The passages of literal exegesis in commentaries from the 1120s and 1130s suggest that, by then, such thoroughness would have been considered otiose.³⁸ Moreover, the form of C 6 also suggests an early date, before the norms for continuous commentaries on logical texts had been fully established. Instead of giving lemmata, like almost all the other pieces from the later period, the Fitzwilliam commentator proceeds for the most part by posing a series of questions, each introduced by *utrum*. But these are not questions concerned with the problems raised by the text, but rather ones designed to facilitate a step-by-step exposition – very reminiscent in type to those given to the questioner in the tenth-century dialogue commentary (C 4). Fitzwilliam Maclean 165 is not a logical collection, or a school textbook, but a rather luxuriously produced volume. This makes it hard to find any clues about where C 6 originated.

The other early literal commentary on the Categories is found in Paris BN 13368, an important collection of logical texts. The commentary (C 5) is usually attributed to Abelard – probably correctly, although since it is missing its beginning and end, it does not explicitly name Abelard as author. If Abelard wrote the commentary, a date sometime about 1102 is probable (although a dating as late as 1113 or 1114 cannot be entirely excluded).

One of the composite commentaries on the Categories (C 8), found in no fewer

³⁷ “Vtrum quod praedicatur de praedicato praedicetur de subiecto. sic probat a partibus. Homo inquit est praedicatum de subiecto aliquo homine. Sed quod praedicatur de homine praedicatur de subiecto aliquo homine. Ergo quod praedicatur de praedicato – substantialiter subaudi – praedicatur et de subiecto. Vtrum quod praedicatur de homine praedicetur de aliquo homine. A parte. Animal inquit praedicatur de homine. Ergo pro sed <sic> inquit de quodam homine animal praedicatur. § Vtrum homo et animal praedicentur de quodam homine. A causa. Si quidam homo est, et homo et animal tunc praedicantur de ipso. Sed homo est ut ait; ergo homo et animal praedicantur de quodam homine” (102v).

³⁸ Although he would agree with a dating to before c.1120 for C 6, Mr Iwakuma has commented to me that he sees the pervasive references to the Topics in this commentary as an extraordinary feature, which cannot be considered a sign of intellectual unsophistication.

than four manuscripts,³⁹ is very probably to be dated to before c. 1120 for a number of reasons. Although it contains interesting original material, large parts of the work consist of (unattributed) verbatim extracts from Boethius's commentary. Such a use of Boethius suggests a date early in the twelfth century, if not before, for three reasons. First, it is the way in which Boethius was used by the early glossators and in the dialogue-commentary (C4). Second, there are good grounds for believing that an Isagoge commentary (P4) which uses Boethius in a similar type of way was written, in its different versions, from c.1060 to c. 1100.⁴⁰ Third, long, unattributed quotations of this kind are not usually found in commentaries known to have been written after c. 1120.

By adding two other pieces of evidence, a more precise probable dating for C8 can be reached. One of the manuscripts (Vatican reg lat 230) contains a version of the commentary with long, original additions, which discuss questions frequently raised in Abelard's long commentary (completed no later than 1120) and commentaries written after these. This suggests a date in the 1120s for this longer version. It also suggests that, since these questions are not raised in it, the original form of C8 was composed some time before c. 1120; whilst the commentator's adoption of the 'collection theory' makes a date after 1108/9 almost certain.⁴¹ Both the relatively large number of copies, and its author's awareness of the controversy about universals, make it tempting to see this commentary as a product of one of the Parisian schools. C7, preserved in a single Paris manuscript (BN lat 17813) presents Aristotle's intention in terms similar to those used in C8, but more simply; it also uses passages from Boethius's commentary without attribution. A similar dating for it seems probable.⁴²

³⁹ See n. 50 below.

⁴⁰ See *Iwakuma*, Pseudo-Rabanus, Introduction § 2 & § 3.

⁴¹ See *Iwakuma*, Vocale, n. 6 & n. 24. In 1108/9 Abelard and William of Champeaux engaged in the controversy which led to the development, first of an 'indifference' theory of universals, then of the 'collection' theory and then the 'status' theory. The 'collection' theory was already current when Abelard wrote the first of his long commentaries on Porphyry (certainly before 1120; probably c. 1117): see *Bernhard Geyer*, Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 21, Münster 191–33) 14: 7–31; hereafter cited: *Geyer*, Abaelards Schriften.

⁴² In *Iwakuma*, Vocale, n. 24, it is suggested that the commentary on Porphyry in Paris BN lat 17813 (P14) is by William of Champeaux or a pupil of his, and written in the second decade of the twelfth century. Although it would be tempting to suggest the same authorship for C8 (written by the same scribe, according to *Iwakuma*), further study of the two commentaries would first be necessary in order to confirm whether they do in fact propose similar theories. There are also three more commentaries on the Categories which might possibly have been written before c. 1120: C14 (in Assisi, Bibl. conv. Franc. 573) which I have not examined but is probably related to C8, although different from it; the fragment of a literal commentary in Oxford Corpus Christi College 233 (C13) and a commentary on the last quarter of the text in Paris BN lat 13368 (C11). For discussion and dating of some of the Categories commentaries probably written after c. 1120, see *John A. M. Marenbon*, 'Vocalism, nominalism and the commentaries on the Categories from the earlier twelfth century' in: *Vivarium* 30 (1992) 51–61; hereafter cited: *Marenbon*, Vocalism.

There are two groups of commentaries on the De interpretatione which probably date from early in the twelfth century. The first group is centred round Abelard's literal commentary (H4), which can be dated to much the same period as his literal commentary on the Categories. It is also found in the Paris BN lat 13368 where, unlike the Categories commentary, it is explicitly attributed. A literal commentary with very close parallels to this version of Abelard's is found in Munich clm 14779 (H5): there are strong arguments to suggest that it is in fact a more faithful version of Abelard's teaching than the text in the Paris manuscript.⁴³ There is also a literal commentary in Oxford Corpus Christi College 233 (H7) which shares more with Abelard than coincidence, or Boethius, can easily explain.

The second group consists of two related composite commentaries. One of them (H11) is found in Paris BN lat 13368 and in Vatican reg. lat. 230. In the Paris manuscript, it has been given the strange title 'Hrabanus super Terencium'. This would suggest that it should be paired with the Isagoge commentary P3 which, in that manuscript, is inscribed 'Hrabanus super Porphyrium' and, in its revised version there has been dated to the end of the eleventh century.⁴⁴ Frequent unattributed quotations from Boethius in the manner of both P3 and C8 also suggest a date in the first two decades of the twelfth century (if not before). Another commentary on De interpretatione (H9), preserved in Orleans 266 and Assisi Bibl. Conv. Franc. 573, has many passages close to H11 and shares its high degree of dependence on Boethius. A similar dating for it is probable. Whether H9 and H11, like Abelard's literal commentary and those associated with it, can be linked to the Parisian schools is uncertain; although both Paris BN 13368 and Orleans 266 (which includes logical 'sententie' by Abelard, and Positio uocum sententie, a work quite probably by him)⁴⁵ have Parisian links.⁴⁶

Although almost all these datings must be regarded as tentative, they gain support from a circumstance that may already have become clear. Most of these probably early commentaries on the Categories and De interpretatione are found, at least in one of their copies, in just three logical collections: Paris BN lat 13368, Assisi, Bibl. Conv. Franc. 573 and Munich clm 14779. By contrast, none of these commentaries is in two of the most important logical-collections which contain works from the time of Abelard's maturity and later: Berlin lat fol. 624 (Abelard's long De interpretatione commentary and commentaries associated with Alberic)

⁴³ See below, Appendix.

⁴⁴ This dating is Iwakuma's suggestion (private communication); cf. also Iwakuma, Pseudo-Rabanus § 2.

⁴⁵ The sententie are edited in *Laurenzio Minio-Paluello*, Twelfth century logic. Texts and studies, Vol. 2 Abaelardiana inedita (Rome 1958) 109–121; for a description of this manuscript, see xli–xlvi; the Positio uocum sententie is discussed (§ 4) and edited (Text 1) in Iwakuma, Vocales.

⁴⁶ A fragment of a literal commentary on De interpretatione in Paris BN lat 13368 (H12), attributed to Abelard for no very good reason by *Victor Cousin*, *Ouvrages Inédits d'Abélard* (Paris 1836) xvi, xviii, may also have been written before 1120.

and Paris Arsenal 910.⁴⁷ Moreover, Paris BN lat 13368, Assisi, Bibl. Conv. Franc. 573 and Munich clm 14779 all contain Isagoge commentaries which can be dated to before 1120.⁴⁸

Even this handful of commentaries on the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* which can dated to before c. 1120 presents a great quantity of material, which has still to be sifted and studied. Only a selection of it will be discussed in the two following sections.

7. The later period: the subject of the *Categories*

For the author of C6, the abstract questions about the subject-matter of the *Categories* which Boethius had raised seemed an irrelevance. He includes the briefest of prefaces, which is designed simply to tell his readers why Aristotle begins by discussing equivocal, univocal and denominative words. He finds his answer by turing to two widely separated passages in Boethius's commentary (166C, 239–40) and bringing out points that are merely implicit there. Aristotle begins by defining equivocal and univocal words because 'category' is a word used equivocally of the ten categories, since they have no substance in common, whereas each of the categories is predicated univocally of the things which belong to it. And he needs to include a definition of denominative words because qualities (the fourth of the categories) are related to the things which have them – whiteness, for instance, to white – by denominative derivation.⁴⁹ Does this introduction indicate that the commentator wished deliberately to take a metaphysically-sparing, linguistic view of Aristotle's purposes? Or is it rather evidence rather of his wish to avoid any complex issues which might interfere with the main business of elucidating Aristotle's argument by using the theory of topical inferences?

No such restraint is shown in C8.⁵⁰ Like Boethius's commentary, it contains a

⁴⁷ On Paris Arsenal 910, see *Lambertus Maria de Rijk*, *Somme new evidence on twelfth-century logic*, in: *Vivarium* 4 (1956) 1–57.

⁴⁸ The Paris and Assisi manuscripts contain P3 (see above, n. 39) and the Paris manuscript also contains Abelard's literal commentary on Porphyry (P5); the Munich manuscript contains P7, on which see the Appendix, below.

⁴⁹ "SVBTILIS INDAGATOR RERVM Aristotiles de decem generibus, quae pro excellentis continentiae causa praedicamenta uocauit, acturus prolegomena quaedam, id est praedicenda, in suo praemisit tractatu. Cum enim ipsa genera alternatim considerata entis uel praedicamenti uel cuiuslibet uocabuli communione coniuncta omni uero ratione substantiae carencia equiuoca essent, equiuocorum noticiam magna deposcit necessitas. Cum uero ipsa eadem singulatim ad species considerata nomen ipsius et rationem praebeant substantiae, de uniuocis quoque non inaniter praemonstrauit. Cum uero de qualitate in loco quarto ceterorum disposita esset locuturus, cum et ipsa per qualium deriuacionem dinoscatur, et de subiectis nisi per ea minime praedicetur, de denominatiuis quoque necessaria utilitate praescipsit. Vnde sic ab aequiuocis exorditur principium." (Cambridge Fitzwilliam Museum MacClearn 165, f.102r).

⁵⁰ All quotations from C8 are taken from Vatican reg. lat. 230 (V), but they include only ma-

long introduction discussing (according to the conventions of such prefaces), the author's intention, the utility of the work, the part of philosophy to which it belongs, its authorship and its title.⁵¹ It is here that the nature of Aristotle's subject – words or things – is discussed. At first sight, the longer discursive parts of this commentary, such as the introduction, might appear to be entirely a tissue of direct quotations from Boethius, rearranged and with a word changed here, a phrase or sentence omitted there. Certainly, on matters such as the title and authorship of the Categories and its status as a work of logic, the commentator is willing to copy Boethius almost verbatim. Yet, along with the material adapted from Boethius, are to be found passages of original discussion.

The commentator is acutely aware of the contention among his contemporaries over the nature of species and genera. Not only does he understand its relevance to the question about the subject-matter of the Categories; he also sees that some of Boethius's remarks in his Categories commentary can be used to throw a new light on the matter. "Some", he remarks, "say that genera and species are only things, some that they are only words. But both groups are equally in error. For genera and species are both words and things".⁵² To support this view, the commentator turns to Boethius. There are many places, he observes, where Boethius says that genera and species are things, both in his second commentary on Porphyry and in the commentary on the Categories, where he says that Aristotle's subject consists of the ten words which signify the ten first things. Yet, the commentator adds, in his Categories commentary Boethius also says that genera and species are in a certain way the names of names. Here he has in mind the passage (176 CD) where Boethius poses the question why, given that inferences of the form "Socrates is a man, men are mortal, therefore Socrates is mortal" are valid, it

terial also in the other manuscripts; the added passages in V, probably dating from c. 1120 or later, are not discussed here. Readings from British Library Royal 7. D. XXV (B), Munich clm 14458 (M) are given where the text in V is obviously wrong.

⁵¹ See *Richard W. Hunt*, "The introduction to the *Artes* in the twelfth century", in: *Studia mediaevalia in honorem admodum Reverendi Patris Raymundi Josephi Martin* (Bruges [1948]) 85–112, reprinted in *Richard W. Hunt*, *The history of grammar in the middle ages*. Collected papers (Amsterdam 1980) 117–144; and *Marenbon*, *Commentaries*, 92–3 for more detailed discussion of the conventions of these prefaces.

⁵² "Item sciendum est quod dicunt quidam res tantum genera et species esse, quidam uero tantum uoces. Sed utrique equaliter peccant. Vtrumque enim et uox et res genus et species est. Et quod res genus et species sit, habemus ex auctoritate Boethii qui dicit in pluribus locis in secundo commento super Porfirium res genera et species esse; et etiam in commento super *Categorias* ubi dicit intentionem Aristotilis in *categorias* esse tractare de decem uocibus prima rerum genera significantibus. Confirmat etiam Boetius in eodem commento in expositione illius precepti quoniam alterum de altero predicatur et contra, uoces esse genera et species, dicens et genera et species quodammodo nomina nominum sunt. Sed cum uox genus et species sit, hoc habet ex suo significato quod proprie genus et species est, ut hec uox 'animal' non ex se dicitur genus quia individualis est sed gratia illius communis rei quam significat que per omnia animalia dispersa est et proprie dicitur genus quarundam aliarum rerum. Dicitur etiam a quibusdam uoces tantum esse fundamenta et accidentia. Quod est falsum. Dicit enim Boethius in commento res et fundamenta et accidentia esse ubi dicit: 'Quicquid est uel est substantia uel accedens'" (Vatican reg. lat. 230, f. 41 va).

is not true to say, „Socrates is a man, Man is a species, therefore Socrates is a species“; and Boethius answers in the words echoed by the twelfth-century commentator, explaining that species and genera are ‘in a certain way names of names’.

The commentator is, however, quick to make it clear that he is not suggesting that species and genera depend merely on language. „The fact that a word is a species or genus“, he adds, „depends on what it signifies, which is properly a genus or a species. For example, the word ‘animal’ is not called a genus from itself, since it is an individual thing, but thanks to that common thing which it signifies which is dispersed through all animals and is properly called the genus of certain other things.“

This way of thinking determines the commentator’s view about the ten categories which are the ten most general genera. „It should be seen“, he says, ‘that there are ten common things which are the foundations of all other things and are called the most general things – as, for example, this common thing, substance which is dispersed through all substances and this thing, quantity, which is dispersed in all quantities, and so on. And, just as there are ten common things which are the foundations of all other things, so also there are ten words which, thanks to the things they signify, are said to be the foundations of all other words. So, for example, the word ‘substance’, thanks to the common thing which it signifies is said to be the foundation of substantival words.“⁵³ The commentator goes on to qualify and explain the idea of ‘common’ things and words by using the notion of a collection. There are ten collections of things, in the likeness of which were invented ten collections of words.⁵⁴

There is nothing unusual about such a ‘collection’ theory.⁵⁵ However, the more general theory of words and things into which this common idea is incorporated is very interesting. In his second commentary on the *Isagoge* Boethius certainly tried to develop a view of genera and species as in some way both things and not-things. But he did not suggest they are things and words, but things and thoughts.⁵⁶ It is the *Categories* commentary which contains a passage which can

⁵³ “Videndum est quod sunt decem res communes que omnium aliarum rerum sunt principia et genera uocantur generalissima, ut hec communis res substantia que per omnes substantias dispersa est et *hec res* [so L; V *om. hec*; M *om. res*] quantitas que in omnibus quantitibus dispersa est, et sic de ceteris. Et quemadmodum sunt decem res communes que omnium aliarum rerum principia sunt, sic etiam decem uoces sunt quae omnium aliarum uocum gratia rerum quas significant dicuntur principia esse. Vt hec uox ‘substantia’ gratia illius communis rei quam [so BM; V *qua*] significat dicitur esse principium uocum substantialium, et sic in aliis” (Vatican reg. lat. 230, f. 41 ra).

⁵⁴ “Vidende sunt etiam decem collectiones rerum ad quarum similitudinem inuente sunt decem uocum collectiones quae dicuntur predicamenta. Vnam collectionem rerum dicimus esse communem substantiam cum omnibus aliis rebus substantialibus per quas omnes dispersa est. Aliam uero rerum collectionem esse dicimus communem quantitatem cum aliis omnibus rebus quantitatis et cetera. Eodem modo hec uox substantia cum aliis uocibus positae dicitur quedam uocum collectio quae uocatur substantie predicamentum, et sic in quantitate et cetera” (ibid.).

⁵⁵ See n. 41 above.

⁵⁶ Samuel Brandt, Anicii Manilii Severini Boethii in *Isagogen Porphyrii commenta* (Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum 38, Vienna/Leipzig 1906) 159:10–167:20.

be interpreted as treating genera and species as words – in the very passage quoted in support of this view by this commentator (176 CD).⁵⁷ Although the commentator draws on the theories developed in his time in Isagoge commentaries, he changes them by using ideas Boethius developed only in connection with the Categories. He himself remains a realist, who emphatically rejects the position (which he is aware that some of his contemporaries hold) that genera and species are words and words alone. But by transforming Boethius's view of the categories as 'words signifying things as signifying' into a picture of the ten most general genera as complementary collections of things and words, he provided a framework highly susceptible to adaptation by those, such as Abelard, who wished to preserve the foundation of genera and species in the nature of things, whilst denying that they were in any way things themselves.⁵⁸

8. The later period: Chapter 9 of De interpretatione

In their examinations of the subject-matter of the Categories, the early twelfth-century logicians borrowed from Boethius and developed his views in the direction he had set, but to an extent which he had probably not anticipated. In their treatment of future contingents, it would be truer to say that they began to develop their ideas in a different direction altogether from Boethius's. But in the earliest commentaries, this becomes apparent only on close inspection.

Boethius's discussion of chapter nine of De interpretatione in his second commentary is an extended disquisition which, in the course of putting forward a particular reading of Aristotle's enigmatic statements, enters into a study of the place of human free-will in the physical universe. This aspect of Aristotle-as-seen-by-Boethius seems not to have been what most interested the early medieval commentators (even those in the 1130s and 1140s), although Abelard did show his grasp of it outside his strictly logical works. Certainly, Boethius's second commentary on the De interpretatione was widely used (though not, it seems, his first). In composite commentaries, Boethius's comments on, for instance, the stoics were diligently copied or summarized; but they were used as pieces of extra information and did not form, as in Boethius, the heart of the discussion. Rather, there came to be a new centre of interest. First, scholars began to concentrate on the exact logical form of the different types of statements examined by Aristotle and to investigate the concept of necessity in a more systematic way than Boethius had done here. Then, from about 1120 onwards (Abelard's long commentary may provide the first example) they started to concentrate this approach on a problem which Aristotle did not even mention in the chapter and Boethius's second com-

⁵⁷ Cf. *Reiners*, *Nominalismus*, 6–8; *Sten Ebbesen*, Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the origins of medieval logic, in: *Richard Sorabji*, *Aristotle transformed* (London 1990) 445–461; and *Marenbon*, *Vocalism*.

⁵⁸ See *Marenbon*, *Vocalism*, for more detailed discussion of this point.

mentary raises only in passing: how is human free-will compatible with divine prescience? As can be seen in commentaries from the 1130s and 1140s (such as H10 and H17), the focus of this debate came to be the nature, not of human freedom but of divine knowledge, as revealed by the logical analysis of statements such as „God can/cannot know other things than he knows“. ⁵⁹ And it is easy to see how, through the intermediary of Book I, Distinction 39 of Peter the Lombard's *Sentences* (where the heading for Chapter 3 asks *utrum Deus possit plura scire quam scit*), the twelfth-century logicians' new agenda for thinking about Chapter 9 of *De interpretatione* came to influence metaphysical and theological debate to the very end of the medieval period and beyond it. In the two commentaries from very early in the twelfth-century which will now be examined, only the beginnings of this process can be seen.

For instance, the treatment of Chapter 9 in the composite commentary H9 depends, sometimes verbatim, on Boethius's second commentary, although it does not attempt to match its amplitude. But there are important differences. At the very beginning of his discussion, the commentator distinguishes between three different sorts of futures and therefore of future-tense statements. There are those which have necessary truth or falsehood simpliciter, those which have determinate truth or falsehood and those which are contingently true or false. An example of the first kind is 'God is immortal'; of the second, 'a man will die'; of the third 'Socrates will fight'. ⁶⁰ These categories come from Boethius (II 186:24 ff.) but the commentator has not only set them out more clearly: he has also renamed them. Boethius had distinguished between the necessity of statements about sempiternal things ('God is immortal') and another sort of necessary statement (which he does not label), which is necessary so long as there exists a subject for the statement: 'man is mortal' is such a statement because 'so long as there is a man, then he will be mortal'. The commentator calls statements such as 'a man will die' determinately true probably because (as Boethius explains) they are true always only by virtue of a determination – that is, an added element which modifies the simple statement: 'a man will die' may not be true, because there may be no men, but if there is a man, then he will die. However, as his discussion of the chapter continues, it becomes apparent that the commentator is also using the words 'determinate' and 'indeterminate' where Boethius uses 'definite' and 'indefinite'. What Aristotle is trying to show, he says, is that statements about future contingents are not true or false determinately, but only indeterminately. ⁶¹

⁵⁹ See, for instance, the commentary in Paris Arsenal 910, ff. 163r–186v (H10) at f. 174r and ff.; and the commentary in Berlin lat. fol. 624, ff. 87v–96v (H17), ff. 94v–95r.

⁶⁰ "Nunc Aristoteles de ueritate et falsitate propositionum de futuro confidemus. Dicendum igitur quod futura alia sunt simpliciter necessaria, alia determinata, alia contingencia. Eodemque modo propositiones de futuro alie habent simpliciter necessariam ueritatem uel falsitatem, alie determinatam, alie contingentem: necessariam, ut 'Deus est immortalis'; determinatam, ut 'homo morietur'; contingentem ueritatem uel falsitatem, ut 'Socrates pugnabit' (Orleans 266, p. 18a).

⁶¹ This terminology becomes standard: see, for example, Abelard's long commentary on *De interpretatione*, *Geyer*, *Abaelards Schriften*, 420:22–423:12, where (422:26–9) 'determina-

One passage from this commentary shows most clearly the close attention to the form of statements which would characterize twelfth-century treatments of future contingents. Boethius had been content to assert that, by contrast with those about the future, statements about the past and present were all definitely true or false. The commentator realizes that there is a problem. Whereas 'Socrates will sit' is a future-tense statement, and will be true only indefinitely or, as the commentator puts it, indeterminately, if I say 'The statement "Socrates will sit" is true', this whole statement is in the present tense: does this not mean that – following Boethius – 'Socrates will sit' must itself be true definitely (or determinately)? The commentator seems (does this not mean that – following Boethius – 'Socrates will sit' must itself be true definitely (or determinately)!) for the moment willing to accept this conclusion and he offers the explanation that the indeterminacy of 'Socrates will sit' is in accord with the indeterminacy of the event, which has not yet happened; whereas taken in the sense of 'The statement "Socrates will sit" is true' it makes a remark about the present, and so determinate, inherence of truth in the statement.⁶² But, wisely, in his following remarks the commentator decides to abandon the position that all past and present-tense statements are determinate. When Aristotle said this, he argues, he intended the qualification to be understood – 'those which are concerned with what has happened or is happening'.⁶³ Commentaries on the *De interpretatione* from a little later in the century show how the problem which this early commentator raises, but treats briefly, developed as an important topic. In his long commentary Abelard gives the problem a sophisticated treatment, whilst H10 (probably from the 1130s or 1140s) bears witness to lively debate between logicians who held, like Boethius, that all past and present-tense statements are determinate, and those who denied this.⁶⁴

The literal commentary H5 takes much less material verbatim from Boethius than H9, perhaps because Boethius's discussions of necessity and freewill are in the main judged irrelevant to its task of close commentary on the text. However, it

tum' is explained as meaning what is by its nature knowable to us (even if we do not know it): and H10, ff. 173v–174r.

⁶² "Notandum autem quod cum dicimus propositionem determinate uel indeterminate ueram nichil aliud est dicere quod uera est ita quod agit de determinato uel indeterminato rei euentu. Sed sciendum quod quamuis 'Socrates sessurus est' 'Socrates sedebit' est uera sed indeterminate, cum a tem dicitur "Socrates sedebit" est uera' hec propositio est de presenti, unde potest dici 'Socrates sedebit' uera est determinate cum prius diceretur 'Socrates sedebit' est uera indeterminate. Attendit ergo quamuis 'Socrates sedebit' est uera indeterminate – hoc est dicere uera est ita quod agit de indeterminato euentu rei, quando uero dicitur 'Socrates sedebit' est uera determinate – hoc est, dicere ueritas presentialiter (et ideo determinate) inest ei – ut in una indeterminatio ad euentum rei, in alia determinatio ad ueritatem referetur." (Ibid.).

⁶³ "Quod uero dicit de propositionibus de preterito non est de isto sed est adiectio sententie postea sic. Necesse affirmationem esse ueram uel falsam et item negationem ueram esse uel falsam, et affirmationem uel negationem dico factam in his quae sunt et quae facta sunt id est et de rebus presentibus et de preteritis" (Orleans 266, p. 18b).

⁶⁴ For Abelard, see Geyer, *Abaelards Schriften*, 423:41–424:27; for H10, see Paris Arsenal 910, f. 173v.

does contain a short, discursive introduction to Chapter 9 and there is a classification of different types of sentence in some ways close to that found in a similar position in H9. Here too Boethius's comments are ultimately the source, but this commentator has added more of his own. The categories he offers are not of future-tense statements, but more generally of types of necessity (two of which turn out to apply to statements). There are, he says, three types.⁶⁵ First, there is what is inevitable and can in no way be changed, such as that a man will die or that the sun will rise. Second, there is the determinately necessary, the cause of which cannot be impeded by chance or free-will. This type of necessity is exemplified by past and present-tense statements, since it is only with regard to future-tense statements that something can be impeded from happening. Third, there is the type of necessity – consequent necessity – which, he says, is found in statements 'when their mode of action is said to be the coherence of their terms'. For example, 'necessary' is used in this sense when we say, "If Socrates is a man, then necessarily he is an animal". Consequent necessity, the commentator adds, can be either changeable or unchangeable. In "If Socrates is a man, then necessarily he is an animal", it is changeable, because Socrates, the subject of the statement, could cease to be an animal (when, for instance, he dies). By contrast, "If Socrates is a man, then necessarily he is a substance" is an example of necessity both consequent and unchangeable, since Socrates cannot possibly fail to be a substance.

It may seem surprising that in this classification the fact that a man will die (sometime) is placed along with the fact that the sun will rise as an example of inevitable necessity, whereas Boethius uses a proposition asserting human mortality as an example of a proposition which is necessary but does not refer to things which are sempiternal: one can only say 'so long as man exists, then it is necessary that man is mortal' (II 187:28-9). But there is good sense behind this reclassification. In H5's scheme, inevitable necessity is the property of events which cannot but take place: it is a feature of the way things are in the world. Determinate necessity turns out to be a feature, not of events, but of statements: a feature they have simply by virtue of being past or present-tense, since it is only what is future which can be impeded. Consequent necessity is also a feature of statements, but of hypothetical rather than categorical ones. The distinction within it between changeable and unchangeable serves much the same purpose as Boethius's contrast between ordinary and sempiternal necessity, since it would follow from this distinction that 'If God exists, he is immortal' has consequent and unchangeable necessity (God cannot not be immortal), whereas 'If Socrates is a man, he is mortal' is consequently but changeably necessary.

This commentator's independence of mind does not stop him from following the main lines of Boethius's reading of Chapter 9, although – like the writer of H9 – he uses the words 'determinately' and 'indeterminately' where Boethius uses 'definitely' and 'indefinitely'. However, the writer often interrupts his somewhat

⁶⁵ This passage is edited in the Appendix below in Text A, § 4–6. References are to the section – numbers there.

laborious exposition of each sentence to raise and solve technical objections to the coherence of Aristotle's argument.⁶⁶ Such passages, which show an attention to the detail of formal argument alien to Boethius, sometimes verge on the discussion of sophisms; and, indeed, at the very end of the chapter, the commentator raises, and then resolves, a sophistical argument (not in Aristotle or Boethius) designed to show that no future is contingent.

9. Conclusion

The commentaries on the Categories and De interpretatione from the first two decades of the twelfth century (or perhaps a little earlier) demonstrate, by comparison with earlier medieval exegesis, both a more comprehensive grasp of Boethius and, at times, a much greater independence from him. However – at least with regard to the two themes discussed in this paper – the lines of development are those already adumbrated in the earlier material.

In deciding on what was the subject-matter of Aristotle's Categories, the medieval logicians followed Boethius's suggestions, but began to draw from them more implications than Boethius himself seems to have had in mind. In the introduction to his commentary on the Categories, Boethius had put forward some ideas which could be used as the basis of a theory where classification into genera and species is explained, primarily though not exclusively, in linguistic terms. By the mere act of divorcing these suggestions from Boethius's understanding of the place of logic in the scheme of knowledge, the early medieval glossators took the first step towards the formulation of such a theory. In C 8 that theory, though still only an implicit possibility, is brought a stage nearer to explicit realization.

In their discussion of Chapter 9 of De interpretatione, medieval logicians moved away from Boethius's main interest: the place of human free-will in the universe. Already in the tenth century, the glossator of the Leiden manuscript showed the concern with the logical form of statements which became more obvious in commentaries like H9, and predominant in H5, which (as will be argued in the Appendix) is probably the work of the young Abelard. But it would take the genius of the mature Abelard – aided, no doubt, by the example of Boethius's De consolatione Philosophiae – to attach those formal preoccupations to the question of divine prescience, so opening to future exegetes of this chapter a discussion of divine knowledge which would develop into one of the central themes of thirteenth and fourteenth-century metaphysics and theology.

⁶⁶ See Appendix, Text A, § 7 and 11; Text B, *passim*.

Appendix

This appendix has two sections. In the first, two extracts from the De interpretatione commentary in Munich clm 14779 are edited; in the second, arguments are given (particularly on the basis of the edited extracts) for considering that this the commentary is a version of Abelard's literal commentary on De interpretatione, fuller and more authentic than that preserved in Paris BN 13368, which has been edited by Dal Pra.⁶⁷

1. Texts from Munich clm 14479 (H5)

A. (f. 51r) IN SINGVLARIBVS VERO (13:17–18)

[§ 1] Superius egit de propositionibus que fiunt de presenti et de preterito, et dixit in illis esse determinatam ueritatem et falsitatem; que propositiones, cum sint singulares et contradictorie et diuidant uerum uel falsum, habent determinatam ueritatem uel falsitatem. Similiter uellet aliquis in propositionibus de futuro esse determinatam ueritatem uel falsitatem, cum ille propositiones de futuro sint contradictorie et singulares et diuidunt uerum uel falsum. Ad hoc remouendum quod propositiones que agunt de contingenti futuro habent determinatam ueritatem ponit A<ristoteles> hanc sententiam; [§ 2] et, cum ad hoc ostendendum – quod propositiones quae agunt de contingenti futuro non habent determinatam ueritatem [si – *expunctuated*] – ponat 'necesse', uidendum est quot modis accipiatur 'necesse' et quot modis accipiatur 'futurum'.

[§ 3] Necessarium aliud ineuitabile, aliud determinatum, aliud consequens (id est conueniens). [§ 4] Ineuitabile est quod nullo modo potest permutari ut necesse est hominem mori, solem oriri. Determinatum necessarium est cuius causa non potest impediri per casum uel per utrumlibet – ut [in ueris – *expunctuated*] propositionibus de presenti et de preterito est determinata ueritas, id est determinatum necessarium, quarum causa non potest impediri per casum uel per utrumlibet, [§ 5] ut in hac propositione, 'Socrates est albus' est determinata [uerita – *expunctuated*] ueritas cuius causa, id est albedo inherens subiecto non potest impediri, licet pos<it> permutari. Inpediri enim tantum dicimus de rebus futuris. [§ 6] Consequens necessarium est quod consideratur in propositionibus secundum modum actionum ipsarum propositionum. Modum actionis ipsarum propositionum dicimus coherentiam terminorum, siue cohereant p<er>mutabiliter siue impermutabiliter; ut in hac propositione que dicit, 'Si Socrates est homo, necessario est animal', ponitur necessarium consequens (id est conueniens) et non necessarium ineuitabile. Quia, cum animal sequatur ad hominem est necessario, non sequitur inper-

⁶⁷ Mario dal Pra, Pietro Abelardo. Scritti di logica (Milan, 1968²) 69–153.

mutabile consequens, quia animal potest permutari circa idem subiectum. Sed cum dicimus, 'Si Socrates est homo, necessario est substantia', hic ponitur necessarium consequens et impermutabile, quia substantia ita coheret subiecto ut non possit separari. [§7] Et nota quod consequens necessarium (id est conueniens) continet [continet] ineuitabile necessarium et determinatum. Continetur etiam necessarium ineuitabile a determinato necessario, sed non continetur ab illo necessarium determinatum, quia quicquid est ineuitabile necessarium est [in]determinatum et consequens, sed non convertitur. Habemus esse necessarium consequens (id est conueniens) in propositionibus de futuris contingentibus, ut cum dicimus, 'Socrates albus erit', hec propositio necessario est uera uel falsa. [§8] Cum tot modis dicatur 'necessarium', non agit de necessario ineuitabili sed de necessario consequente et determinato. [§9] De ineuitabili ideo non agit, quia necessarium ineuitabile non est in omnibus propositionibus de presenti et de preterito sed necessarium determinatum et consequens inuenitur in omnibus propositionibus de presenti et preterito.

[§10] 'Futurum' quoque dicitur duobus modis: futurum enim aliud naturale, aliud contingens. Naturale, quod non potest impediri aliqua causa quin eueniat, ut homo morietur, sol orietur. Contingens futurum est quod habet se ad esse et non esse, ut Socrates erit albus. Nota quod naturale contingens futurum potest fieri contingens per aliquam determinationem sic [i. – *expunctuated*]: sit determinatio que auferat naturam ipsius futuri, ut 'Socrates cras morietur': [§11] 'moriatur' quod erat naturale fit contingens per hanc determinationem additam que est 'cras', quia habet se ad esse et ad non esse. Si uero dicamus, 'Cras orietur sol', non fit contingens, quia hec determinatio non aufert naturam ipsius naturalis futuri cui adiungitur.

[§12] Casus ita diffinitur: casus est inopinatus euentus rei. Vtrumlibet est precognitus euentus rei.

[§13] Notandum quod ideo magis im<m>oratur in singularibus quam in contradictoriis, quia uniuersales et particulares contradicunt ueritatem uel falsitatem a singularibus.

[§14] Continuatio: In propositionibus de presenti et de preterito est determinata ueritas uel falsitas, sed in propositionibus factis de singularibus subiectis et de futuris contingentibus non est similiter, id est non habent determinatam ueritatem uel falsitatem sed habent alterum tantum sub disiunctione[m].

B. (f. 51v) VTRAQVE ENIM (14:4-5)

[§1] Probat primam consequentiam: uero si omnis affirmatio uel negatio uera uel falsa est determinate, necesse est esse uel non esse determinate. Nam in talibus[is] propositionibus, id est precedentibus ueris determinate uel falsis determinate, non erunt utraque, id est esse et non esse simul, id est indeterminate. Ab immediato.

[§2] Hec consequentia non uidetur ualere. Nam inueniuntur multa disiungentia immediatim, alterum quorum si non sequatur ad aliquod antecedens, non relinquitur tamen ut alterum immediatum sequatur ad idem antecedens. Vt cum dicimus, 'Quidquid est, aut est homo, aut non homo', si 'non homo' non sequatur ad

animal, propterea homo – aliud immediatum – non sequitur ad idem antecedens, id est ad animal. Et ideo sic dicendum. Si nullo modo patiuntur sese utraque cum illo antecedente simul, id est indeterminate, tunc necesse est alterum sequi tantum ex illo antecedente determinate. Regula talis est: si aliquod immediatum nullo modo patitur se esse cum aliquo antecedente, suum immediatum sequitur ad idem antecedens.

[§ 3] Et nota quod, cum tria membra ponuntur in disiunctione hoc (scilicet, si omnis affirmatio uel negatio uera uel falsa est determinate, necesse est omne esse uel non esse determinate, uel utraque adesse indeterminate, uel utraque abesse determinate), hoc ultimum membrum (scilicet, utraque abesse determinate) notatur in libro ubi dicitur *AT VERO NEC QUONIAM NEVTRVM* (15:1).

[§ 4] Tertium membrum uidetur esse superfluum, quia continetur in secundo. Et hoc probatur sic. Si utraque assunt indeterminate et utraque absunt determinate. [§ 5] Et hoc probatur per medium sic: si utraque adsunt indeterminate, tunc ponitur esse et non esse indeterminate. A pari. Et si ponitur esse et non esse indeterminate, tunc cum ponitur esse indeterminate, remouetur esse determinate. A pari. Et cum ponitur non esse indeterminate, remouetur non esse determinate. A pari. Et si uera est ista [...] cuius omnes partes uere sunt, [§ 6] sequitur quod, cum ponitur esse indeterminate, remouetur esse determinate, et quod cum ponitur non esse indeterminate remouetur non esse determinate. Vere sunt singule partes – id est, et ponitur esse indeterminate et ponitur non esse indeterminate et remouetur esse determinate et remouetur non esse determinate. Et si uere sunt iste quattuor partes, uere sunt due, scilicet quod remouetur esse determinate et non esse determinate, et ita si utraque assunt indeterminate, utraque absunt determinate. [§ 7] Et quamuis hoc membrum superfluum sit, tamen Aristoteles ideo aponit ut satisficiat omnem obiectionem.

[§ 8] Notandum quod si duo opposita ponuntur in aliquo, ab eodem remouentur. Vt, si Socrates est albus uel niger, Socrates nec albus nec est niger. Quia si est albus, non est niger, et si est niger, non est albus. Sed non conuertitur quod si duo opposita remouentur ab aliquo, ideo ponuntur in eodem, nisi sint immediata per omne esse, sicuti in istis immediatis: Si lapis nec est irrationale nec rationale, tunc lapis est rationale et irrationale, quia si non est rationale est irrationale, et si non est irrationale est rationale.

2. The authorship of H5

Most twelfth-century commentaries are, and will probably, remain anonymous. But in the case of H5, it may be possible to cast some light on the identity of its author. H5 is preserved only in Munich clm 14779 (M). Whereas it has attracted little attention from scholars, an Isagoge commentary also in M (P7) is much better known. Its similarity to Abelard's literal commentary (P5), as found in

Paris BN 13368 (Par) was noted by Schepss nearly a century ago.⁶⁸ More recently, in his unpublished King's College, Cambridge Fellowship dissertation, David Luscombe examined this relationship more thoroughly.⁶⁹ In his view, the Munich Porphyry commentary reads like an abbreviation of Abelard's; although there are a few insignificant additions, it is in general briefer and simpler. It is, he suggests, perhaps the work of a pupil of Abelard's, based on his master's teaching. Yukio Iwakuma, who has edited this commentary, takes a different view. He believes that the Porphyry commentary in P is a revision based on that in M and, since the Paris commentary is explicitly attributed to Abelard, he concludes – perhaps rather precipitately – that the Munich commentary is probably by Abelard's teacher, Roscelin. Iwakuma also suggests very tentatively the same authorship for the *De interpretatione* commentary in M (H5).⁷⁰

A partial examination of H5 suggests that, whatever may be the case for the two Porphyry commentaries, the relationship between the *De interpretatione* commentaries cannot be explained in this way. H5 is longer and usually more complex than the literal commentary on *De interpretatione* attributed explicitly to Abelard in Par (H4), and it is very hard to envisage any process of revision (by Abelard or someone else) which would have led from H5 to H4. The beginning of the discussion of Chapter 9 (Passage A above) gives a good idea of the type of relationship which obtains between these two texts. In the following table, the passage in H5 is correlated with that in H4. Reference to the sections of Text A above and to the pages and lines of dal Pra's edition of H4.

H 5	H 4
§ 1	100:4–11
§ 2	99:30–2
§ 3	x
§ 4	99:34–40
§ 5	x
§ 6	x though cf. briefer treatment of consequent necessity at 99:32–4
§ 7	x
§ 8	99:32–4 (but difference)
§ 9	x
§ 10	99:44 – 100:4
§ 11	x
§ 12	99:41–2
§ 13–14	100:11–19

As this table makes clear, the material is arranged in a different order in the two

⁶⁸ Georg Schepss, *Zum lateinischen Aristoteles und Boethius*, in: *Blätter für das bayerische Gymnasialschulwesen* 29 (1893) 116–117; see also Geyer, *Abaelards Schriften*, 596 n.1.

⁶⁹ David E. Luscombe, *Peter Abelard and his school* (1962) 217, 225–234.

⁷⁰ Iwakuma, *Vocales* § 5.

commentaries, and H4 omits a good deal of what is found in H5. The passages omitted are mostly those which explain, illustrate or develop points: § 5 – nature of determinate necessity; § 6 – detailed discussion of consequent necessity; § 7 – relationship between three sorts of necessity; § 9 – explanation of why inevitable necessity is not discussed by Aristotle here; § 11 – explanation of why a determinator can make a natural necessity contingent. There is, by contrast, just one point which H4 includes here, but is omitted by H5: ‘Accipitur etiam necesse pro utili et pro amico’ (99:42–3).

Is H5, then, a version of H4, to which additional material has been added, by Abelard or another? Or perhaps H4 an abbreviated version of H5? Such explanations are made improbable by the fact that, where passages in the two commentaries do correspond, there are still verbal differences and differences in the way that the same point is made. For example:

et, cum ad hoc ostendendum – quod propositiones quae agunt de contingenti futuro non habent determinatam ueritatem – ponat ‘necesse’, uidendum est quot modis accipiat ‘necesse’ et quot modis accipiat ‘futurum’.

[H5 §2]

Casus ita diffinitur: casus est inopinatus euentus rei. Vtrumlibet est pre-cognitus euentus rei. [H5 §12]

Continuatio: In propositionibus de presenti et de preterito est determinata ueritas uel falsitas, sed in propositionibus factis de singularibus subiectis et de futuris contingentibus non est similiter, id est non habent determinatam ueritatem uel falsitatem sed habent alterum tantum sub disiunctione[m].

[H5 §14]

Quia in presenti negotio uult agere de necesse et de futuro, uidendum est quot modis accipiat utrumque [H4 f. 134 va – 99:30–2]

Casus est inopinabilis euentus rerum; utrumlibet opinatus euentus rei habendus per humanam dispositionem. [H4 f. 134 va – 99:41–2]

Continuatio: in contradictoriis et singularibus agentibus de presenti vel de preterito est ueritas et falsitas sub disiunctione[m] et determinate; sed in singularibus, id est in propositionibus factis de singularibus subiectis et futuris predicatis contingentibus non est similiter, quia, licet habeant ueritatem uel falsitatem sub disiunctione, tamen non habent determinate [H4 f. 134 va – 100:13–19]

The most plausible way of explaining such similarities and differences between the two texts is to suppose that they are each different records of the same teaching – the young Abelard’s lectures on *De interpretatione*. But which of the two is the more accurate? Although the greater fullness of H5 is not, in itself, proof of superior accuracy (the additional comments might be from a source other than Abelard), the character of the extra material does suggest that H5, and not the well-known H4, presents the best account of Abelard’s teaching. Moreover, the ac-

count of consequent necessity (§ 6), not found in H4, seems to be related to Abelard's discussion of consequence in his *Dialectica*.⁷¹

One of the following comments⁷² brings out more clearly the superiority of H5. Each (though in slightly different words and a different order) says that, for any pair of contradictories, Aristotle begins by considering the following possibilities. Either only one or only the other is true determinately, or both are true indeterminately or both are false determinately. Both commentaries then raise the objection that the third of these possibilities need not have been stated since it is implied by the second; and both then set out to explain why this is the case. H5 provides exactly what is needed, an argument to show that if it is indeterminately the case that *a* and not-*a*, then it is determinately not the case that *a* and not-*a*. H5 then adds, as an afterthought, a more general argument to show that, with certain exceptions, if it is true to assert that two opposites apply to something, it is also true to deny it. In H4, the only argument given is this second, more general one. But it is plainly inadequate, since it ignores the contrast between the indeterminacy of its being the case that *a* and not-*a* and the determinacy of its not being the case that *a* and not-*a*. Here, then, H5 provides a clear, if laboured, analysis, whereas P's omission spoils the argument. It is hard to resist the conclusion, in this case at least, that H5 represents Abelard's train of thought, whereas H4 offers a garbled version of it.

⁷¹ *Lambertus Maria de Rijk*, Petrus Abaelardus: *Dialectica* (Assen ²1970) 272:26 – 273:26.

⁷² Text B above gives the version in H5. The text of H4 is printed by Dal Pra at 101:1–26 (Paris BN 13368, f. 134vb – 135ra); the words 'in libro' should be added before 'ubi' in l. 10.