Foreword

Objectives of the Lane Books

The Lane series of books—of which this Leningrad volume is the eighth and most recent—is sponsored by the Institute of Governmental Studies and the Institute of International Studies, and examines similarities and differences in metropolitan policy-making in various nations and cultures. Of principal concern is how policies affect the metropolis, including its social needs, economy, land use, physical structure, and natural and man-made environment. Emphasis is on the ways in which political and administrative processes and institutions adapt to changes in the urban condition and respond to national and international influences. What organizational structures and policies govern major metropolitan regions? What new or modified organizations and policies are being urged? By whom, and to what purpose? Under what conditions can life in the metropolis become more satisfying and productive, or less dreary and economically marginal? How can educational, cultural, and intellectual objectives best be promoted?

Increasingly, the opportunities and constraints in national systems of intergovernmental relations influence the way metropolitan regions are governed. Government leaders and civic leaders are often in contest: defenders of established philosophies versus proponents of new approaches to local and regional governance. Similarly, there are debates over which public-private relationships are appropriate and workable. The content and intensity of such ideological conflicts vary over space and time and between cultural and political systems.

Policy-makers are responding to the sheer increases in the size of metropolitan regions by attempting to contain and limit growth, direct it into certain portions of the metropolis, or divert it into the hinterland. In the effort to ameliorate the deleterious effects of growth and congestion, some urban policies include urgently needed improvements in the infrastructure. Other policies are an attempt to maximize benefits and control adverse effects of large population agglomerations by emphasizing large-scale facilities, concentrations of cultural institutions, enhanced communications and transport capabilities, and so forth.

The Lane books examine these matters in order to contribute to a better understanding of (1) what people and their leaders want to do

with their metropolitan regions, (2) how they try to accomplish their aims, and (3) what results have been achieved. The focus is on the ways decision-makers—local and national—deal with major problems and try to increase each region's problem-solving capacity. The books concentrate on the readily comparable "slices" of national polities: the metropolitan regions.

A Good Time for Comparative Urban Studies

The substance and methodology of Ruble's book on Leningrad should be of great interest to students of urban affairs. His inclusion of valuable collateral information should help new researchers outside formal Sovietology become familiar with the terrain and gain a better grasp of research opportunities. For example, Ruble's appendices contain a wealth of information and useful background, including a description of the structure of the Soviet municipal system; and his documentation is extensive. All this should help Western urbanists with little or no previous experience in Soviet studies make a good start. Furthermore, by providing baseline examples of the workings of Leningrad's and the USSR's planning and economic development, Ruble helps set benchmarks for future comparative studies that should be useful in identifying and evaluating change. We sincerely hope that this book will encourage and stimulate other researchers in urban studies to explore this new territory. As Sovietologist Jerry Hough observed (in a private communication), studies of the Soviet Union are very weak in the field of urbanism and urban studies.

In any event, this seems a good time to expand urban research on the Soviet Union. The future holds promise as a time of accelerated change in the USSR, thanks to *perestroika* (restructuring), *glasnost'* (openness), and Mikhail Gorbachev's whole program of basic reform. If the promise is borne out—if, for instance, there are shifts toward more "democratic" and market-oriented political and economic arrangements—there could be wonderful opportunities for both Western and Eastern researchers in urban studies as well as in other fields. The increased openness and access to information, plus somewhat greater candor in private and public discussion in the Soviet Union, could greatly facilitate the quest of social science and policy researchers for the essential data and evidence required for in-depth studies. Changes in outlook and vision could also offer marvelous opportunities to follow events and trace phenomena—perhaps over many years—in some fascinating and potentially significant experiments in socioeconomic-political "engineering" and reform.

Comparisons and Contrasts: Market vs. Nonmarket Economies

The similarities and differences between East and West offer a multitude of options for comparative studies both of market versus nonmarket economies and strategies and of the ways that political-governmental power is organized and functions in various Eastern and Western polities. What Lindblom characterizes as the privileged position of business and businesspersons in market economies, and the "close but uneasy relation between private enterprise and democracy,"¹ will afford many comparisons and contrasts with the privileged position of party figures, the apparatchiki, and others in the USSR, with their roles in the party, in government, and in enterprises and institutions.

Parallels and contrasts can be sought in the play of personal and institutional motivations in the two systems. What makes key actors "tick"? What characterizes the things that people strive for? Why do they seek those things in preference to others, and how do their choices influence the larger systems? How do the information-discussion-propaganda mechanisms of the two systems compare and contrast in their roles of organizing the metropolis, shaping opinion, influencing behavior (including consumer behavior), and otherwise affecting the lives of the inhabitants?

In a market economy with private property, personal monetary gain and related perquisites are powerful motivators, but so is the quest for esteem, recognition, deference, sense of achievement, and other psychic rewards. How do these factors operate in the two systems, and how do they correlate with patterns of recruitment and career development? What are the parallels and contrasts in a society and economy like the USSR's, with little private property and an entirely different system of rewards and coercions? One could go on at length enumerating the multitude of factors that could be studied.

For example, Ruble notes how analysts of urban affairs in the United States have dealt with such matters as "labor supply, industry mix, capital construction, tax rates, personal income, and consumption rates," in analyses that assume the operation of a free-market economy, where communities "compete for resources much as private corporations do." He then observes,

What makes the Leningrad-based studies in this volume unusual is that they illustrate the importance of the economy to urban health in nonmarket industrial economies. The frenzied promotional activities of American city governments and chambers of commerce, and the preoccupation with property taxes that so

dominate the U.S. urban scene, do not at first seem to have a parallel in a Soviet system where land has no conventional monetary value and where local management is dominated by centralized bureaucracies. Yet our examination of Leningrad has discovered bureaucratic and political behavior analogous to that based on tax codes and real estate booms. In the USSR, the lack of market mechanisms may prevent complex policy questions from being reduced to market-oriented terms, but their absence does not prevent policy questions from arising in the first place.

Political and Governmental Variables

Future students of comparative local-metropolitan area governance not only will need to consider the strictly market/nonmarket variables, but also must try to determine the way political and governmental power is organized and distributed among various polities and to understand how this state of affairs influences developments in urban areas, in various Western contexts as well as in the USSR. For example, in Western nations there is a range or spectrum in the composition, "strength," and constitutional power of the local-state-national governments, and in the way the respective partners in nonunitary systems exercise power to influence metropolitan-area developments.

But formal governmental boundaries may count for a good deal less in the Soviet system than in most Western contexts, owing in part to the pervasive role of the Communist Party in providing linkages between successive tiers of both party and government. Another factor may be the "freewheeling" behavior of some of the Soviet enterprises, and particularly of the interenterprise associations, to which local boundaries may mean relatively little. Such institutions not only may be less encumbered by the barriers that governmental boundaries often represent in a Western context, but also may be more able, in a centrally planned society, to do things without regard for some of the constitutional and pluralistic interest-group impediments that can influence outcomes in Western systems.

On the other hand, the very complexity of the Soviet system and the ability of bureaucrats at many levels to foot-drag or otherwise "torque" the system may in their own right represent a whole realm of impediments and related influences. These forces and influences may be played out in quite interesting ways as the struggle to implement and modify the Gorbachev reforms proceeds. We must also remember that in political, economic, and social systems operating as differently as those of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and other Western countries, there are similar slippages of information (including orders) both up and down the hierarchies and throughout the inter-

organizational complex that allow foot-dragging, misreading, and even noncompliance.

Perspective on the Leningrad Experience

In evaluating Ruble's book it is important to consider some of the restrictions under which he worked, such as the limited amount of social and economic data or of reliable social indicators available to him. He simply did not have access to the wealth and variety of information that one expects when studying Western systems. Perhaps, under glasnost, future researchers will have easier access to more data.

Also, Ruble's study is a study of *Leningrad*, an atypical Soviet city that differs in important ways from other large Soviet cities. Readers need to be aware of this special character, and cautious when generalizing from the Leningrad experience. Nevertheless, despite being atypical (and in some ways even because of it), Leningrad and its experiments can have a much broader significance. Thus, when noting Leningrad's unique role, Ruble also attempts to place it in context:

Leningrad's region-oriented centralized managerial structures (i.e., managerial authority is concentrated in middle-level institutions rather than either in the ministries in Moscow or in individual enterprises) stand in opposition to more market-oriented reform packages that have emerged as dominant under Mikhail Gorbachev. Leningrad nurtured organizational forms that were intended to be activist in that they required leadership by a new set of institutions on the periphery but, at the same time, were profoundly conservative in that they preserved a centralized bureaucratic ethos. When Romanov's bid for national power was crushed in 1985 by the Gorbachev juggernaut, such centralizing reform packages fell by the wayside. Nonetheless, the Leningrad experience of the 1960s and 1970s continues to offer an important alternative economic vision to that of either Brezhnev's ministry-oriented approach or Gorbachev's focus on quasi-market enterprise reform.

Ever since World War II, Leningrad has engaged in a strong effort at reconstruction and socioeconomic development. It has educated a new workforce, used social science research for policy innovation and implementation, and emphasized technologically intensive industry to counter the region's intrinsic natural and locational disadvantages. Crucial to Leningrad's effort has been its experiments with the integration of science and technology, aimed at improving the use of science in the interest of technological and economic development.

Since these are also crucial issues for the entire Soviet Union, the

Leningrad experience should be viewed in the light of nationwide efforts in science and technology. These are also big issues for other countries, including the United States, Japan, the European nations, and the developing countries, all of which seek to benefit from the better functioning of science and scientific research and more effective use of science to feed technological advances and improve productivity and economic standing.

In still other ways the Leningrad experience parallels those elsewhere. The growth of Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay Area is a classic example of the use of local intellectual and professional communities as a resource to spark science and high-technology-based economic growth and development. Leningrad has been working in a similar direction, using its intellectuals as both a positive economic force and a political resource. The professional and research communities have done staff work for the politicians, writing position papers and helping them set their agendas. For future students of comparative urban studies and of technology and public policy, some fascinating analogies and contrasts should come to light in examining the roles of professionals and intellectuals in various Western and non-Western systems.

As important as Ruble's book is in its own right, its greatest value may be in serving as a benchmark to measure the effects—in one huge metropolitan region—of the rise and stabilization or decline of glasnost and perestroika. And we should not foreclose the possibility that the Leningrad industrial-scientific-technological linkages now constitute such powerful political ties that they may be able to act as brakes on perestroika, if not roadblocks. Undoubtedly there will be many accommodations to local as well as national elites, and perhaps to previously unheard-of popular demands.

The significance of Ruble's work as a baseline analysis is demonstrated by rapidly moving changes in Soviet politics. In March 1989, voters in the USSR's first real elections in 70 years rejected party establishment figures in many parts of the nation. Particularly striking were the Leningrad results. The region's party boss, Iurii Solov'ev, had his name crossed off by some 55 percent of the voters, and several other key figures also lost. Solov'ev then lost his party post in July 1989, when Mikhail Gorbachev traveled to Leningrad to witness the appointment of Boris Gidaspov to replace Solov'ev.

While we are obviously still too close to these events to have any clear understanding of their implications for the longer-term future, the defeat of the Leningrad political machine in the election for delegates to the Congress of People's Deputies marks the likely end of a conservative chapter in Leningrad history that began with the emergence of Frol Kozlov after the Leningrad Affair of the 1940s. This postwar era was dominated by the economic and institutional interests that Ruble has

documented in his study. He demonstrated the sources of stability and power of the conservative coalition, but he also pointed to initial signs of decline and the rise of incipient protest, especially in his discussion of preservation and environmental issues surrounding the 1986 general plan. Few, however, seemed to anticipate the strength of the response registered in the March elections. Whatever happens next, Ruble's book will serve as a valuable guide, helping Westerners compare the future with the past 40 years in Leningrad's political life.

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