Foreword

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Modern Japanese foreign policy is a subject of bewildering complexity and also vagueness. It involves most facets of the intricate and fast-changing society of Japan and also the interaction of the Japanese with an even more diverse and unstable world which surrounds them. It is hard to come to grips with and almost impossible to pin down in fixed words within the limits of a single volume.

Attempts by one author to present a neat unitary view of the whole of Japanese foreign policy always appear to others to be limited, superficial, or somewhat biased. Multiple views from a variety of stances, though possibly confusing and even contradictory in places, are more likely to produce a better concept of the whole. It is like the exploration of the surface of the moon or some distant planet: a selection of pictures from diverse angles and different degrees of closeness is more likely to give a better concept of the lay of the land than any one shot, no matter how finely focused.

Unlike a moon-scape, however, Japanese foreign policy is undergoing constant change. One approach would be to concentrate only on the present moment, but to do so would be to lose the sense of motion. Again, as with angles of vision, a variety of approaches in time, some basically historical, others focused on specific contemporary aspects of the problem, gives a chance for a deeper understanding and some sense as to where Japan may be heading.

The present volume is an attempt to deepen our understanding of Japan's foreign policy by viewing the subject in a variety of different ways. It is the outgrowth of a conference of American and Japanese scholars held geographically midway between the two groups on the Hawaiian island of Kauai in January 1974. The essays of which it consists were in their earliest form papers presented at this conference. They were each discussed at length by the assembled group of experts, which included a few like myself who had not written

papers but were there merely for the discussions. Subsequently each author revised his essay on the basis of the criticisms and suggestions of others with differing areas of specialization and angles of vision and in line with suggestions for their coordination made by the conference chairman and editor, Robert Scalapino. The result is this volume.

I found the original presentation of the papers at Kauai a most stimulating experience and have once more been rewarded by reading over the revised papers. In this Foreword I would like to prepare the reader a bit for what to look for in these essays and to say a word or two of caution about some features of the terrain which may still be missing or obscure in this particular assortment of views.

The table of contents is itself a sort of analysis of how these essays fit together. First come three essays grouped under the heading "Decision-Making and the Foreign Policy Process." In the first two, Haruhiro Fukui and Hans Baerwald explore the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the Diet as key elements in the decision-making process on foreign policy. In the third, Michael K. Blaker analyzes the style of Japanese diplomatic negotiations as revealed in a number of specific prewar examples and a few taken from the postwar period.

The second rather loose grouping of three essays has the title "Interests: Public and Private." In the first, Akio Watanabe analyzes recent Japanese public opinion on certain foreign policy issues as revealed through public opinion surveys. The other two are detailed studies of specific foreign policy issues, both having to do with the economic side of the spectrum. These are Gerald Curtis's careful study of the proposed Japanese exploitation of the Tyumen oil fields in Siberia and Sadako Ogata's analysis of the attitudes and actions taken by the Japanese business community in the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China in 1972, presented as a case study of the role of business in the formulation of foreign policy.

These two essays lead naturally into the next section on "Economics and Foreign Policy," which is made up of three essays of broader scope. Masataka Kosaka looks outward from Japan in analyzing Japan's changing international economic policies, whereas Gary Saxonhouse looks from the changing international economic environment inward to the opportunities and problems this has created for Japan. Chalmers Johnson's essay, in contrast to these other two, is a detailed study of the organizational history of MITI, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, and its influence on Japan's economic foreign policies.

The next section, entitled "Security Issues," shifts attention to this other main aspect of Japan's foreign policy. It consists of two essays both general in nature but approaching the problem in different ways. Makoto Momoi gives a detailed history of the Self-Defense Forces and the changing concepts of their strategic mission. Donald Hellmann discusses the reasons why Japan since the

war has kept a very low profile in security matters and why he believes this may be changing.

The final section, labeled "A Summary," is appropriately reserved for two papers, one by an American, the other by a Japanese, which attempt an overview of the whole. Again the approaches are different enough to avoid undesirable duplication. Seizaburo Sato takes a broad historical view of the attitudes and perceptions the Japanese have brought to their foreign policy problems and also gives some consideration to their mechanisms for policy formulation. Scalapino, while glancing back at history, concentrates on an analysis of the position in which Japan now finds itself. He discusses the possibilities of Japan moving away from its present close association with the United States to some other bilateral relationship or, more plausibly, a position of neutralism or equidistance from all the acknowledged power centers of the world. On balance, Scalapino doubts the probability of any such move and expects only small, incremental changes rather than some dramatic reshaping of Japan's foreign policies.

Sato in his paper suggests a three-way division of the foreign policy problem. There are first the realities of the international environment and national power, then the internal attitudes toward international matters, which may limit or skew the perceptions of the problems posed, and finally the mechanisms by which the nation goes about formulating foreign policies, which again may limit or distort the decisions made. This last phase of the subject is related to the broader subject of the Japanese decision-making process in general, which of late has been a lively topic of interest among those concerned with Japanese matters.

Exactly a year before the Kauai conference, another conference in the same series was held on the Hawaiian island of Maui and led to the publication of a volume entitled *Modern Japanese Organization and Decision Making*, which was edited by Ezra Vogel, the conference chairman.* While many of the essays in this book bear on the organization and decision-making of business firms, labor unions, and work groups and on other subjects little related to foreign policy, others concern the organization of the bureaucracy and its procedures as well as the influence of big business, intellectuals, and the newspapers on policy decisions, which are all subjects of direct relevance to the formulation of foreign policy.

In the present volume a number of essays are concerned with this problem. It is a central interest in Johnson's lengthy essay on MITI as well as Fukui's and Baerwald's papers on the Foreign Ministry and the Diet. Watanabe's study of public opinion bears on it, as do also Blaker's work on tactical style in diplomatic negotiations and Ogata's study of the business community's role in

*Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975.

one specific problem, while Sato too considers the subject briefly but in more general terms.

The essays in this and the earlier Vogel volume greatly expand our understanding of the decision-making process in Japan as it bears on foreign policy, though by their very nature they do more to clarify the operations of parts of the machine than the integration of these various parts into a working whole. We learn of the functioning of some of the key ministerial bureaucracies which, as everyone knows, are the original drafters of most policies and legislation and represent the institutional memory and continuity of the Japanese government. We also learn of the organs for handling foreign policy matters in the Diet and something of the attitude of the public, the influence of business, the role of intellectuals, and the power of the mass media. But there is still much to be clarified about how these popular, political, and bureaucratic elements fit together in policy formulation.

Divergent policies of the various ministries must be harmonized under the overall supervision of the cabinet, and bureaucratic planning must also be brought into line with what the Diet majority is willing to enact into legislation. In this second problem, the cabinet, of course, as the "executive committee" of the Diet and the controller of the bureaucracy, has a key role in meshing bureaucratic policies with political opinions. But the various organs of the Liberal Democratic Party, which forms the Diet majority, seem to play an even more important role. In particular, the party's Policy Affairs Research Council and its various committees serve as a diverse and flexible forum where divergent opinions within the party, clashing views of the ministries, and the opinions of various outside pressure groups can all be heard and a viable consensus achieved. This process of blending varied political and administrative views and achieving a balance in foreign policy between political and bureaucratic pressures is still an area that needs clarification.

The influence of outside pressure groups and public opinion on foreign policy also needs more exploration. Ogata's case study bears out Gerald Curtis's conclusion in his essay in the Vogel volume that the direct influence of big business on policy is now much less than had once been assumed, but the pressures of business and other outside forces nonetheless do have a role that needs more study. Certainly public opinion in general and the mass media more specifically exercise an influence on the attitudes of politicians and thus on the formulation of policy. A politician, after all, must be responsive to the views of his supporters to be elected. Although most experts agree that domestic matters loom far larger than foreign policy for most voters, still popular attitudes undoubtedly serve as a constraint on politicians in foreign policy matters, which they no doubt apply in turn to the bureaucrats.

Even when politicians do not fear for the votes that sustain them, they may be influenced in their actions by public clamor and direct political action.

Foreign policy has normally been the area in which the ruling Liberal Democratic Party felt itself most vulnerable to attack through determined obstructionism by the opposition parties in the Diet, popular demonstrations in the streets of Tokyo (which like all the major cities leans in its sympathies toward the opposition), and criticism by the mass media, which as metropolitan phenomena tend to share in the leftward lean of the city populations. There can be little doubt that both direct and indirect popular pressures on Diet politicians have been constraining influences on Japanese foreign policy, helping to account for its seeming timidity and admitted "low posture." In fact, the role of the politician both in terms of his responsiveness to public attitudes and pressures and in turn his restraining influence on bureaucratic policies appears to be the key central link in the process of policy formulation that still needs careful study and elucidation.

Whatever the mechanisms for formulating foreign policy, the chief determinants are inevitably the actual international realities and the national perception of these. As Scalapino points out, Japan has witnessed a complete transformation of its relationship to the outside world in the roughly dozen decades since the coming of Perry in 1853. In fact there has been a series of sweeping changes which cumulatively have produced an almost 100 percent reversal of the basic conditions in which Japan finds itself.

Before 1853 Japan was as close to complete political and strategic isolation and economic autarchy as any developed country in modern times could possibly be. But suddenly it found its economy menaced by the cheap machine production of the West and even its political independence threatened. By heroic efforts it achieved military and economic security against the West and won back legal equality by getting rid of the so-called unequal treaties. In the process, however, the Japanese came to see their strategic interests in broader terms than the old isolationism and, like the countries of the West, embarked on a policy of achieving security through imperial expansion. Again Japan proved successful, and by the time of the First World War it possessed a burgeoning empire and was clearly the paramount power of its quarter of the globe.

Japan, however, had meanwhile started to industrialize, as a necessary part of its policy of achieving security through "enriching the country and strengthening the military" (*fukoku kyōhei*). Industrialization increasingly forced Japan out of the shelter of its old autarchy and made it dependent on foreign raw materials as well as export markets abroad to pay for them. When imperial expansion began to run into what was in time to prove the quagmire of nascent nationalism, the Japanese paused briefly in the 1920s to consider the possibility of security through peace and international trade. The world depression, however, helped throw the decision against this course and back to the seizure of a

large enough empire to support the industrial economy that was emerging in Japan. This proved the wrong choice, and Japan went down to utter defeat and destruction.

After the war, under favorable international conditions, largely produced by the United States, as Saxonhouse explains in his essay, Japan staged a seemingly miraculous economic recovery. But it emerged from the war shrunken to the size it was in the days of economic independence and isolation, though with more than three times the population of that time. It found itself even more completely outclassed in military strength by the nuclear superpowers than it had been in its days of peril in the mid-nineteenth century. It had become entirely dependent for life on an advanced industrial economy, which in turn depended on the natural resources and markets of the whole world. No other major country relied as heavily as Japan on resources and markets located so far away in distant areas of the globe. In this sense, Japan had moved in twelve decades from being the world's most isolated country to being the most global.

It would be hard to imagine a greater change in the international position and national power of a country, and the Japanese were completely aware of this frightening transformation. The sense of smug security of Tokugawa times and the proud confidence in their own military powers of a half-century earlier had given way to a clear realization that Japan was pitifully vulnerable to any disruption of trade and itself possessed no defense against nuclear attack in a world that continued to be riven by deep ideological and emotional fissures.

It is not surprising that popular perceptions in Japan of the meaning of these changes has remained confused and in sharp conflict. Some persons have perhaps underreacted, clinging to outworn concepts, but even more appear to have overreacted and jumped to false conclusions. This confusion in popular Japanese attitudes is one of the reasons why Japanese foreign policy is so hard to come to grips with. Emotions run high on many aspects of foreign policy. The weight of public opinion and popular pressure is hard to gauge. Public rhetoric often seems little related to the detailed actions of government and business.

There is also a confusion in perceptions of another sort. The Japanese started their modern period convinced that they were in essence an "Eastern" country merely employing "Western" techniques, and from this some of them developed the concept of being the leaders and champions of Asia against an oppressive West. But at the same time, other Japanese saw their nation as spiritually departing from Asia to become "civilized" and modern. Neither concept proved correct, but the old ambiguity remains. There can be no doubt that the Japanese now find their most numerous contacts and the closest parallels to their contemporary society in North America and Western Europe. At the same time, they feel uncomfortably distinct as the one great industrialized land of non-Western cultural background, and geographically, of course, they remain in East Asia. Attitudes toward the outside world and perceptions of inter-

national problems remain the most confused and confusing aspects of Japanese foreign relations. This is an area that calls for much more thorough exploration. Three of the Japanese contributors, Watanabe, Kosaka, and Sato, comment cogently on this side of the problem, but more study is needed.

Given the startling shifts in the surrounding environment and in Japan's relative power and given the ambiguities of Japanese attitudes and the confusion of perceptions, it is surprising that Japan's foreign policy has remained as stable as it has since the war. One reason for this undoubtedly was the favorable environment the United States created during the first two postwar decades. Japan was able politically to stay quite safely out of sight behind the American international stance, while concentrating on its own economic recovery in an economically open world the United States had helped shape. Of equal importance was a tacit consensus among leadership elements in Japan, and probably among most of the people as well, on a policy of putting economic growth above all other goals. Japan developed a diplomatic style of reacting flexibly to others, while avoiding initiatives itself and concentrating on its own economic objectives. Judged by the results, it would be difficult to find a country that has been more successful in its postwar foreign policies.

But as the essays of Kosaka, Saxonhouse, Hellman, Sato, and Scalapino all show, conditions have changed greatly in the past few years. Japan has grown economically too large and the American economic and strategic stance has become too uncertain to permit Japan safe refuge in the lee of American policy. The vital relationship between Japan and the other industrialized nations, which also include Japan's chief sources of food and raw materials, has become extremely complex and threatened by new tensions. Japan probably needs to develop a more positive attitude in its relations with these countries, in place of its passive, reactive policies of the past, if the external economic environment is to remain healthy and favorable for Japan. More care must also be devoted to relations with the largely preindustrial countries, which are essential sources of raw materials for Japan and now form a large part of the international political environment. And there is need for a cautious though friendly and carefully balanced policy toward the two great rival Communist powers, which may become more important sources of Japanese raw materials in the future and in any case are both uncomfortably close to Japan.

Some scholars have suggested that in this period of new and more difficult foreign policy problems, the Japanese decision-making process may prove too complex and uncertain to produce decisions of adequate clarity and wisdom. In other words, Japan may become dangerously immobilized in its foreign policies. This possibility makes the decision-making process all the more important a subject of study. The process is perhaps more complex than in other countries and certainly more of it proceeds out of sight—that is, not in open parliamentary hearings and debates but in the more hidden consultations of party

committees and in quiet negotiations between party factions, between ministries, between politicians and bureaucrats, and between outside pressure groups and opposition parties and those in power. My own judgment is that these procedures are as capable of coming up with the necessary decisions as are our own, possibly being somewhat more cumbersome and slower but at the same time producing decisions that are more likely to be supported by a consensus and are therefore less likely to be soon overturned. But these are matters on which no one can be certain, and much more study is needed.

A more serious problem than the decision-making process is the confusion in popular Japanese attitudes and perceptions about the world environment and Japan's place in it. This confusion is aggravated by the depth of hostility and distrust within Japanese politics, which is a direct outgrowth of the years of intellectual repression and heavy indoctrination during the 1930s and the war years. Differences of view are greatly magnified by unhappy memories as well as by new ideologies. In addition, all Japanese are deeply aware of Japan's frightening vulnerability. These psychological factors combine to give a certain volatility to what since the war has otherwise proved to be an extraordinarily stable and generally predictable democratic political process. These psychological pressures also suggest that, regardless of the complexities of the decision-making process, a new foreign policy consensus may not be easy to reach.

Despite these doubts, however, I tend to agree with Scalapino in expecting no sudden shifts in Japanese foreign policy but rather small incremental changes. In fact, I feel this process is already well under way. I do not look for the shift on defense policies that Hellman seems to expect. On the other hand, a friendly equidistance toward China and the Soviet Union already seems to have been established and is proving basically sound. There seems to be general agreement that more efforts must be made to smooth relations both with the oil-rich and the resources-poor nonindustrialized countries, though such general principles are, of course, easier to formulate than to embody in concrete policies. The first shock of the oil crisis produced dreams in Japan of an independent economic policy, but these ebbed during the next two years, leaving a renewed realization of the crucial importance of close cooperation with the other industrialized nations, which come closest to having the same interests and goals as Japan and account for more than half of Japan's trade. This has been especially true with regard to the United States, which alone provides a quarter of Japan's imports, mostly essential food and raw materials, and more than a quarter of its export market. Perhaps this is the reason why the successful imperial visit to the United States in October 1975 produced a general feeling that the visit symbolized a new stage in Japanese-American relations of true equality and deepened mutual understanding.

The judgments I have expressed here, of course, may not be accepted by everyone. Admittedly they are based on only an incomplete understanding of present realities, which by their own uncertainty make the future all the more obscure. The thirteen contributors to this volume would probably come up with as many variant interpretations of the present situation and future prospects. But one thing is sure. If the reader will look with these thirteen authors from their various angles of vision at the different aspects of the foreign policy terrain they describe, he will certainly be in a much better position to make his own judgments on these matters.